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Abstract 
 
This thesis presents a detailed analysis of China’s banking reforms and their interactive 
relationship with economic development, starting in 1978.  
 
Developing a synthesized analytical framework, this thesis examines and verifies the 
applicability and feasibility of several competing theoretical perspectives within the 
Chinese context. These include the aspects of monetization, financial liberalization, 
allocative efficiency view of finance (according to the neoclassical doctrine), and 
productive efficiency view of finance (from the Keynesian–Schumpeterian view of 
endogenous credits creation).  
 
This thesis argues that these perspectives consider only one dimension of China’s 
financial development, and that such a generalized view is unsuitable. Additionally, as 
China’s transitional economy still has strong market-supplanting attributes, studying 
China’s financial development and its interactive role with real sector development 
post-1978 from a purely neoliberal, market-criteria lead to bias and distortion.  
 
This thesis investigates China’s evolving financial reform primarily from the aspects of 
monetization, financial liberalization, and functional view of finance. It emphasizes the 
interactions between the function of resources allocation, which draws on the existence 
of market frictions found in the mainstream doctrine, and the function of credit creation, 
found in the post-Keynesian endogenous finance theory of development. This thesis 
undertakes both a qualitative and quantitative analysis of China’s financial sector. 
 
This thesis finds that it is the complementarity of the productive efficiency and the 
allocative efficiency that explains the seemingly confusing phenomenon that an 
inefficient financial system, according to purely commercial criteria, has successfully 
supported China’s economic development over the last 30 years. 
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 Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
The relationship between financial development and economic growth has been a 
long-term controversial issue, and has received significant attention from economists. In 
early economic growth studies, following Keynes’s general theory — in which the 
importance of financial consideration, called a “state of confidence,” was assumed 
insufficient to affect economic activities and investment decisions — financial systems 
had neither a clear nor detailed role in output determination. Gertler (1988) points out 
that most of the early macroeconomics literature ignored the potential relationship 
between the performance of credit markets and output levels.  
 
In Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973), and Shaw (1973), there is considerable 
evidence to indicate a relationship between financial development and economic growth. 
However, even being inspired by, among others, the model of financial repression and 
theoretical and empirical research, it was not until the 1990s that new growth theories 
were developed and several new econometrical methods were introduced. In this wave 
of work, financial intermediations were treated as endogenous determinants in the 
growth models, as most studies looked at the internal linkages between finance 
development and economic growth. However, while a positive relationship was 
confirmed in most of the literature of the last 20 years, the causality between finance 
and growth remains unclear. In addition, the channels—the ways in which financial 
development affects economic growth—remain controversial. 
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 Following the model of financial repression, introduced by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw 
(1973), new growth theories (comprising endogenous growth models) focus on the 
importance of financial systems in economic growth by illustrating how financial 
intermediations efficiently allocate resources. A basic assumption is the existence of 
market frictions, such as informational asymmetry and transaction costs. In this 
framework, several related functions of financial systems, such as pooling savings, 
acquiring information, allocating resources, managing risks, and monitoring corporate 
governance, can be distinguished and classified under aggregated functions of allocative 
efficiency (see Levine, 1997, 2005; Merton, 1992; Merton & Bodie, 1995, 2005).  
 
For the most part, the productive efficiency view of financial development is advocated 
by post-Keynesian economists (e.g., Davidson, 2002; Lavoie, 1984, 2006). It was 
Schumpeter (1934) who first proposed that creating money is a role that only banks 
perform. Keynes (1937) highlighted the role of money in finance when he introduced 
“finance motive” as one of the four reasons for needing money. With the development 
of the Keynesian–Schumpeterian view of endogenous money and endogenous finance, 
the productive efficiency view illustrates that the main function financial systems play 
in accelerating economic growth is to create money and credits to the market, not to 
overcome market frictions. 
 
In the framework of allocative efficiency, the role finance plays in economic 
development is from a qualitative perspective, while in the Keynesian–Schumpeterian 
framework of productive efficiency, it is from a quantitative perspective. Although there 
are several distinct differences between how these two frameworks use the functions of 
financial systems, the relationship between allocative efficiency and productive 
efficiency is complementary, not substitutive. On the one hand, through the function of 
19 
 
 creating money, productive investment in the economy is facilitated through credits 
expansion. On the other hand, the function of resource allocation facilitates resources 
more efficiently into firms’ investment. To be clear, it is difficult to explicitly 
distinguish which part of financial growth is contributed by which efficiency, and 
existing studies have made little effort to explore whether economic growth is more 
sensitive to one efficiency than the other. Understanding how the efficiencies effect 
economic development would provide a better understanding of the role of financial 
systems, as well as of financial development, on economic determination.  
 
Along with the continuously changing theoretical debate on the finance–growth nexus 
over the past 20 years, empirical research objectives have also been changing. The 
original financial repression theories by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) concerned 
the phenomenon of financial repression in developing countries, usually referred to as 
less developed countries (LDCs). However, though the emergence of the functional 
view of financial development builds upon endogenous financial intermediations, 
research objectives switched to a more global outlook. Influential empirical applications 
during this wave (e.g., Beck, Levine, & Loayza, 2000; King & Levine, 1993a, 1993b, 
1993c; Levine, Loayza, & Beck, 2000) used a global-level cross-country dataset. No 
particular concentration was given to any economic group, and all economies were 
treated as universal in the application of finance–growth theories.  
 
Even if a worldwide positive finance–growth nexus is confirmed, related policy 
implications for developing economies would most likely be different from that of 
developed economies. “Well-functioning” financial systems, from a Western 
perspective, are usually absent in the developing world. To a certain extent, financial 
development in developing economies can be understood by the term “financial reform”; 
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 reforms first comprise the construction of a fully functioning financial system, followed 
by financial development through diversification, sophistication, and further prudential 
regulations. There are no exceptions to this process; and as a typical developing 
economy, financial development in China followed this path.  
 
China started its economic reform in 1978 by adopting a more liberal economic system. 
Price liberalization, enterprise reforms, and financial sector reforms were introduced, 
and along with other reforms, significant development and changes were achieved. The 
most remarkable, and fundamental, change was that China switched its economy from 
an administrative model to its own specialized market–socialist model. As a result, 
China has had an average annual growth rate of more than 9 percent over the last 30 
years, and became the world’s second-largest economy following the global financial 
crisis in the late 2000s. Using Purchasing Power Parity, an oft-used method to conduct 
relative price estimation, it is expected that in the next ten years China will overtake the 
United States to become the world’s largest economy, if China maintains this growth 
rate. 
 
Financial sector reforms have been vital in China’s economic growth. The 
transformation of investment institutions from administrative-based to market-based has 
been challenging, and overall the process can be understood as a gradual increase in 
liberalization, commercialization, and internationalization. The former Soviet-style 
mono-banking system was gradually replaced by a market-oriented, two-tiered financial 
system, though the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) remains the central bank, even after 
promulgation of the Central Bank Law and the Commercial Bank Law in 1995. The big 
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 four state-owned banks1 (SOBs) continue to dominate the banking sector and the 
financial system, so clearly state influence remains strong. However, China’s stock 
market, launched in the early 1990s with the establishment of the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange, has grown rapidly, providing a substantial 
channel for firms to raise funds. It should be noted, though, that the exchanges comprise 
a small percentage of financial activities. In other words, the stock market in China, 
from the perspective of financial activities, is not as important as the banking sector. 
 
In studies at the nexus of finance and growth, China receives comparatively little 
attention. Though it is one of the most important developing countries in the world, it is 
usually excluded in cross-country empirical studies. The reason for this, though, is that 
there is a lack of available data. For example, there is no official source for M3 data (i.e., 
liquid liabilities, or broad money), which is widely used as a major financial 
development indicator in empirical studies. Additionally, the results of empirical studies 
that do include China are mixed and confusing. China’s financial system is labeled as 
“inefficient” because of government interventions, such with its credit allocation 
program and its historically high volume of nonperforming loans (NPLs) (Naughton, 
2007, p. 460; Lardy, 1998). Even so, the financial system has supported China’s strong 
economic performance, which, according to mainstream finance and growth theories, 
should not have occurred. Despite its “inefficient” financial system, dominated by the 
SOBs, China has also achieved significant financial deepening through its continuing 
economic reforms. This is the opposite of the highly regarded views that there is a 
relationship between the size of a financial sector and its efficiency, and that a financial 
system’s efficiency is key to sustaining long-term development. Several researchers are 
1 The big four SOBs in China are the Bank of China, the Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China, the China Construction Bank, and the Agriculture Bank of China. 
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 now trying to explain this unexpected phenomenon. For example, Allen, Qian, and Qian 
(2005) found that the linkages among law, finance, and growth in China are significant 
but complex. Any confusing results in case studies that include China could be largely 
due to the “simply applying” approach: the applicability of market-based, mainstream 
finance–growth theory to China may not be robust enough, and some important features 
of the Chinese economy and its financial system may not be considered seriously 
enough.  
 
To understand the confusion caused by China’s strong economic performance yet its 
underdeveloped financial system, it is necessary to study the relationship between 
China’s economic development and economic reforms. In addition, it is necessary to 
consider alternative theories when analyzing China’s economy. This is not only to 
widen perspectives, but also to overcome the limitations of the mainstream theories, 
especially as related to transitional economies. For example, in the 1980s, Latin 
American countries undertook financial sector reforms, which included liberalizing 
interest rates, removing government credit programs, and opening capital accounts. 
These reforms did not benefit economic development, and caused several financial and 
banking crises (Arestis, 2004). This proves that the benefits of financial liberalization 
policies are not always as robust as what mainstream theorists advocate. The Chinese 
financial system has undergone successful fundamental market reforms, particularly 
since the mid-1990s; however, it must be noted that the system is still partly 
commercialized. It still contains developmental characteristics, for example, social 
welfare development, infrastructure development, and supporting the rate of labor 
employment. Thus, mainstream theories cannot appropriately explain or assess the role 
of finance in China, as they are based on the preconditions of pure market economies. 
While China now claims it has as a socialist market economy, some features of a 
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 centrally planned economy still exist. Public ownership in various economic entities and 
government interventions in economic activities continue, though the major reforms 
have increased market competition throughout the economy. 
 
Considering the limited number of Chinese case studies, it is thus vital to clarify the 
exact mechanisms through which finance affects the state’s economy, and to 
appropriately characterize the nature of the evolving Chinese financial system. Given 
the complex nature of the Chinese economy, it is necessary to answer several questions 
with reference to China’s specific economic characteristics and features. These answers 
are vital for understanding China’s financial and economic development.  
 
These questions include: What is the driving force behind China’s strong economic 
performance? And how does this driving force relate to the financial sector? Are reform 
and development of financial systems the key determinants of economic growth? Are 
the positive effects on China’s development due to its commercial-oriented (and thus 
profit-seeking) reforms or due to development-oriented reforms? The two primary 
functions of a financial system are financial resources allocation and credit creation. 
These can be seen as reflections of, respectively, the commercial and developmental 
attributes of China’s financial sector. Which function, however, is more important for 
Chinese economic development? Which is better for supporting overall development? 
Are there any trade-offs between resource allocation and credit creation in China’s 
financial reform? Is it possible that for China these two functions are complementary, 
not substitutive? 
 
This thesis attempts to answer these questions by drawing on a range of alternative 
theories to assess the nature of China’s financial system and its economic development. 
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 The preliminary proposal is that the financial system contains not only commercial, but 
also developmental, elements. Fully assessing and studying the development of China’s 
financial system and institutional effects will not only widen the breadth of research for 
the future, but also contribute to understanding policy implications for future financial 
reform in China. Moreover, studying China’s financial and economic reforms can 
provide useful references and policy implications for financial reforms in the rest of the 
developing world. 
 
1.1 Propositions and methodologies: hypotheses and analytical 
approaches 
 
This thesis is a study of the financial development and its effect on economic 
development in post-1978 China. Given the continuous dominance of the banking 
sector in the Chinese financial system, the two objectives assessed in this thesis are: (1) 
the development of the Chinese banking sector, and (2) its role in economic 
development. The time span under investigation is 1978 to 2010.  
 
There is conflicting evidence that, on the one hand, China has had significant economic 
achievement since 1978, and, on the other hand, its financial system is still in an initial 
stage of development and is “inefficient” when compared with Western economies. The 
major investigation of this thesis is: How has China’s inefficient financial sector 
successfully supported its economic development? A fundamental step is to define the 
term “financial development.” In a review of the theoretical literature on the finance–
growth nexus, the definition has changed over time. In the early literature, 
“development” of a financial system suggested a degree of monetization in an economy. 
Against the background of the Washington Consensus and the dominance of 
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 neoliberalism, the definition of financial development became equated with 
liberalization of financial systems. In the wave of the new growth models in the 1990s, 
which emphasized endogenous financial intermediations, market failures and market 
frictions were evident in financial activities. In the 2000s, development thus became 
related to improved efficiency. In this thesis, financial development in the competing 
theoretical perspectives will be assessed. Given that development in the financial sector 
in post-1978 China occurred mainly through financial reforms, this thesis argues that 
connections exist between the state’s on-going financial reforms and economic 
development. This connection was, and remains, vital for China’s economic 
transformation. 
 
Several theoretical models of finance and development will be tested using the 
experience of Chinese financial reforms. Whether or not these models hold true, the 
applicability of such theories can be reflective. This is certainly important, given that 
China’s particular financial system embodies features from centrally planned economic 
systems, developing economies, and transitional economies. However, in the 
mainstream literature, the “simply apply” approach adopted in most case studies that 
include China did not verify the applicability of propositions from the mainstream 
finance-growth theories. Without such verification, it is not possible to have a 
comprehensive understanding of the reforms within China’s financial sector.  
 
The four propositions of this thesis are: 
 
Market-oriented financial sector reform occurred only over last three decades, and the 
Chinese financial system currently contains both commercial and developmental 
characteristics. The first proposition is that a system with mixed characteristics (i.e., 
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 both market-conforming and market-supplanting attributes) cannot be fully explained 
by mainstream finance and development theories, as these were developed based on 
pure market economies, where profit-seeking is set as the only target.  
 
Mainstream doctrines place internal efficiency of financial systems (e.g. allocative 
efficiency) as central to assessing financial and economic development. A second 
proposition is that such doctrines cannot substantially explain why China’s inefficient 
financial sector, by neoclassical standards, successfully supports the state’s economic 
development. Alternative theories can offer perspectives that create a better 
understanding of this growth. 
 
Better economic development can be achieved by improving credit creation (productive 
efficiency) of the financial sector, according to the theory of endogenous finance from 
the Keynesian-Schumpeterian tradition. A third proposition is that China’s strong 
economic performance is related to improved productive efficiency of the financial 
sector.  
 
 
There is a trade-off between productive efficiency and allocative efficiency. In China’s 
case, the gains in productive efficiency (from financial reforms) outweigh the losses in 
allocative efficiency; and the gains from an improved productive efficiency aid 
development. The fourth proposition is that because money creation and credit 
expansion are specific features of banks, a bank-banked financial system can support 
development better than other financial institutions. 
 
Both qualitative and quantitative analytical approaches are used in this thesis to research 
these hypotheses and propositions. The main methodology is a comparative approach, 
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 via qualitative and descriptive analyses at two levels. The first level is to study the 
developmental process of China’s financial sector, both structurally and institutionally, 
and to compare the effects of financial development during different stages of the state’s 
reform.  
 
The second level is to analyze the effects of financial sector reforms on development in 
China. This will include verifying the applicability of different finance and development 
theories and defining the term “financial development” in China. The synthesis of these 
two levels of analysis will offer a better understanding of China’s financial reform. 
 
Developing accurate financial development indictors is crucial in the study of finance 
and growth. A positive finance–growth nexus, which measures long-term growth rates 
and aggregate financial indicators, has been accepted in recent China case studies. 
However, the aggregate indicators may not be sufficient to reflect the dynamics of how 
finance affects economic growth (that is, the dynamic interactions between aggregated 
savings, investment, deposits, and loans). In this respect, theoretical models and 
empirical studies are disconnected from each other because of a conceptual problem: 
models and studies answer different questions. The majority of empirical studies take 
the stance that finance leads to economic growth and treat financial indicators as 
independent variables in their regressions. However, in most of the literature on 
theoretical models, there is a two-way causal relationship between finance and 
economic growth. Using larger databases and advanced econometric methods is the 
usual approach, but what is more important is finding a better measurement of financial 
development that links both theory and evidence. This is one of the challenges in this 
empirical study.  
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 This thesis applies traditional measurements on the degree of financial development in 
China by assessing the effects between savings and investment, deposits, and loans. An 
analysis of the integration of cross-provincial capital as a broader measurement of 
China’s financial development is undertaken. Furthermore, beyond analyzing the nexus 
between savings, investment, deposits, and loans, and their dynamic interactions with 
economic development, this thesis clarifies the possible efficiency attributes (both 
allocative and productive) in different phases of China’s financial reform. 
 
Econometric tests in this thesis are mainly based on the panel technique. This technique 
is widely used to determine the finance–growth relationship in several studies, and the 
panel data analysis allows a researcher to study the dynamics of change with a relatively 
short time series. The combination of time series with cross-sections can enhance the 
quality and quantity of data in ways that would be impossible using only one of these 
two dimensions. For example, in this study, the dataset was developed using the year 
range 1980 to 2010, and included 29 provinces of China. A pure cross-section or pure 
time series data set can only provide 31 or 29 observers, respectively, while panel data 
can provide 899 observances (31x29). The main limitation of a cross-sectional approach 
is that it might not be sufficient to explain the complex relationship between financial 
development and economic growth via a Barro-style (Barro, 1991) single equation. 
Therefore, before applying direct econometric tests between financial development 
indicators and economic growth, panel-based techniques were used on the empirical 
analysis on the interaction between savings, investment, deposits, and loans. 
 
Data from a variety of statistical yearbooks published by the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China and government authorities were used as the raw data in this study. 
In addition, annual reports and published statistical documents from government 
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 departments, publicly published reports, data series, and documents from the central 
bank and regulation bodies were used. These sources include the Ministry of Finance, 
the PBOC, the China Banking Regulatory Commission, and the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission. Datasets, including the World Development Indicators from 
the World Bank and the International Financial Statistics from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), were used to fill in the gaps in data from China’s official sources. 
Financial development and economic development indicators were developed and 
calculated according to the raw data to ensure consistency. 
 
Although many researchers have criticized the credibility of Chinese official economic 
data, current research and studies are now using this official data, and so this thesis also 
employs official state data for following reasons. First, statistical standards used by the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China are largely formulated with the guidance of 
global institutions, including the IMF and World Bank. Therefore, the quality of the 
Chinese data meets international standards. Second, publishing accurate data is a legal 
requirement, according to the Statistics Law of 1983. Third, and most important, the 
Chinese government uses its own official data for internal planning purposes, so that 
there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of the data (Chow, 2006). It should be noted 
that while the majority of the official economic data in China is credible, errors may, of 
course, still exist. 
 
1.2 Structure of the thesis 
 
This study includes nine chapters. This chapter describes the purpose and research 
background of the study. Along with highlighting the importance and significance of 
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 this topic, this chapter describes the thesis’s main methodology and the analytical 
framework. The major objective of this analysis is to redefine the term “financial 
development” in regards to China by comparing different finance–growth theories. 
Through redefining this term, a comparative analytical framework is constructed that 
focuses on China’s financial reforms and its interactive relationship with its economic 
development.  
 
Chapter 2 offers a detailed review, from both theoretical and empirical perspectives, of 
the existing literature on the finance–growth nexus. The first section in Chapter 2 looks 
at the progressive development of research from the financial repression thesis. The 
second section focuses on the role of finance in contemporary endogenous growth 
models. In part three, two theoretical frameworks that focus on different aspects, with 
reference to both mainstream neoclassical and the alternative Keynesian-Schumpeterian 
theories, are reviewed from a functional view of financial development. Through a 
comparative review of theoretical models, different feasibility conditions are illustrated. 
In the final section, empirical applications of the finance–growth nexus, as classified by 
different econometric approaches, are reviewed. Additionally, alternative approaches 
that attempt to understand the interaction between financial development and economic 
development in China are assessed. In this literature survey, along with discussing the 
advantages and limitations of existing theoretical and empirical models and applications, 
the connection between theoretical and empirical finance–growth models is reviewed, 
particularly because these two trends of studies have quite different emphasis. 
 
Chapter 3 offers an explanation of the principle events in China’s overall economic 
transformation and insights into China’s financial reform starting in the late 1970s. The 
banking sector reform is placed in the center of this transformation, given the dominant 
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 role of China’s banking industry in all financial activities. By assessing the institutional 
and structural changes and different focuses throughout the four phases of China’s 
financial sector reforms, this chapter illustrates a clear picture of the particular 
interactive role financial reform plays in China’s economic transformation.  
 
In Chapter 4, by redefining “financial development,” an assessment of China’s financial 
development is undertaken. Starting with monetization, the degree of financial 
deepening and financial broadening of the Chinese economy is explained. China’s 
financial development then is assessed from the perspective of financial liberalization. 
Along with analyzing the core elements (interest rates ceilings, financial intermediation 
control, and amount of state intervention in financial activities) according to the 
financial repression theory, a financial repression index is constructed so as to provide 
an overall assessment of the degree of financial liberalization in China over the four 
reforming periods.  
 
Chapter 5 extends the analysis started in Chapter 4, but with a focus on the allocative 
efficiency of financial development, which defines financial development by the 
efficiency of the financial sector in allocating resources. First, a comparative analysis is 
conducted of the two commonly held presumptions in the literature: that China’s 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are less efficient than non-SOEs, and that its SOBs are 
less efficient than non-SOBs. According to these presumptions, SOBs that lend to SOEs 
are a distortion of allocative efficiency, or, in other words, allocative inefficiency. In a 
comparative analysis of SOEs and non-SOEs, SOBs and non-SOBs, and several aspects 
of state and non-state sectors, no evidence was found to support this presumption. 
Second, two alternative approaches are provided in this chapter to study the efficiency 
characteristics in resources allocation, from the perspective of investment efficiency and 
32 
 
 deviation from market-level investment. Overall, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 measure 
China’s financial development via different theoretical perspectives. The extent and 
under what conditions the finance–growth theoretical model is consistent with the 
evidence is analyzed, which is vital for carrying the analysis to the next level.   
 
Chapters 6 and 7 assess financial development in China by linking allocative and 
productive efficiency view of financial development with the Keynesian–
Schumpeterian model of endogenous credit creation. The focus in both these chapters is 
the interactive relationship between savings, investment, deposits, and loans. Chapter 6 
presents a detailed analysis of aggregate investment, savings, loans, and deposits, so to 
provide a solid background for the analysis discussed in Chapter 7. In Chapter 7, both 
theoretical traditions are reviewed in order to understand the evolving interaction 
between both efficiency models at different stages of China’s financial reform. The 
causal relationship between savings and investment is reviewed through panel error 
correction models to discover the potential causation between aggregate savings and 
investment in China and to verify the applicability and validity of both theoretical 
perspectives in analyzing financial development and real sector development in China 
 
In Chapter 8, further empirical tests on the finance–growth nexus in China are carried 
out. First, the connection between investment efficiency, the scale of investment, and 
financial development is captured. Second, the direct interaction between financial 
development and economic growth in China, using a system GMM panel estimator, is 
undertaken. In addition, the effect of financial liberalization on China’s economic 
growth is assessed. 
 
Chapter 9 summarizes the main findings of this study, and discusses the limitations and 
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 prospects for future research. 
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 Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Following Smith (1776/1904), who first highlighted the importance of finance in 
economic development in his magnum opus Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations, the relationship between the development of financial systems and 
economic development has received significant attention.  
 
This chapter surveys existing theoretical models, perspectives, and empirical studies on 
finance and development. By conducting this review, this chapter presents the 
oft-changing focus and scope of the finance–growth nexus. This, in turn, provides 
considerable information for developing the analytical framework in this thesis. Section 
2.2 explains the original theory of financial repression. Section 2.3 focuses on the 
endogenous role of finance in new growth theories by emphasizing the existence of 
market frictions in financial transactions. Functional views of finance, as well as a brief 
discussion of the complementary relationship between allocative efficiency and 
productive efficiency of financial systems, are presented in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 
discusses empirical studies according to different econometric methods. In addition to 
reviewing the studies that follow the mainstream approach, studies that draw on 
alternative theories to assess financial development in China are also discussed. The 
conclusions of this chapter appear in Section 2.6. 
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 2.2 From the perspective of financial liberalization 
 
2.2.1 McKinnon’s and Shaw’s financial repression models 
 
The original financial liberalization thesis originated with McKinnon’s (1973) and 
Shaw’s (1973) financial repression models, in which they each advocated for examining 
the institutional effects of financial development. In contrast to earlier monetary growth 
models, McKinnon and Shaw each highlighted the role of investment and financial 
intermediation in economic growth, and each developed their models with the 
assumption that a liberalized financial sector can accelerate economic development. 
Based on the observation that in developing countries poor performance of investment 
and economic development is associated, McKinnon (1973) pointed out that this 
phenomenon occurs because of an inefficiency in a financial system caused by 
“financial repression.” According to McKinnon, typical financial repression policies 
include interest rate ceilings, high reserve requirements, directed credit allocation 
mechanisms, and other market distortion policies. These policies then lead to 
insufficient investment in the economy and undermine long-term economic 
development. The theoretical framework (and related policy implications) of a financial 
system free from any intervention, which is based on McKinnon’s and Shaw’s financial 
repression models, is known as the financial liberalization theory. 
 
Building on the work of Gurley and Shaw (1955) and Patrick (1966), financial 
liberalization theory follows the hypothesis of “supply-leading” relationships between 
financial systems and economic growth. Within the basic assumptions of this 
framework, investment is a negative function of the real interest rate, but savings are 
positively correlated with both interest rates and levels of investment. Therefore, in a 
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 typical financial repression policy, such as a nominal interest rate ceiling, real interest 
rates are kept lower than market-clearing rates. According to Fry (1995, p. 25), growth 
could suffer from three kinds of detriments. First, a fixed low interest rate could lead 
low-return investment projects to become profitable, which would decrease the average 
efficiency of an investment. Second, the rationing of high-return projects could result in 
a situation of adverse selection. Third, because financial intermediaries cannot set 
higher loan rates for those accepting risky (that is, more productive) investment projects, 
credit would be allocated only after considering the risk levels and transaction costs, not 
the expected return. In an extreme case, if a ceiling is also applied to deposit rates, the 
savings rate would expect to be reduced as well, as people tend to consume more “today” 
rather than save for the future. Under the financial repression framework, not only is the 
efficiency of how savings transfer into investment affected, but so is the equilibrium 
level of savings and investment. This implies that both quantitative and qualitative 
channels of investment will be restricted. The policy implications of the financial 
liberalization theory, based on this example, can be summarized as abolishing interest 
rate ceilings, reducing reserve requirements, and restricting lending interventions from 
the state and directed credits. It is expected that financial liberalization would lead to a 
high degree of financial deepening and thus greater economic growth. 
 
Although McKinnon’s and Shaw’s models share some common features and lead to 
similar conclusions and policy implications, there are also some differences. For 
example, McKinnon used outside money (i.e., money held represents no corresponding 
liabilities), while Shaw emphasized inside money. In McKinnon’s model, money and 
physical capital are complementary rather than substitutive (1973, p. 59), which 
highlights the requirement of preexisting savings. In his model, investment cannot 
materialize without sufficient savings in the form of bank deposits. In McKinnon’s 
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 complementarity hypothesis, it is assumed that economic entities are restricted to 
self-finance, implying that firms cannot borrow to invest and that individuals are 
involved in investment activities. Thus, the difference between individual consumers 
and business investors is relatively small. Shaw’s model followed establishing debt 
intermediation, in which firms are not restricted to self-finance and financial 
intermediation facilitates investment projects by providing loans (Gurley and Shaw, 
1955). According to Fry (1995, p. 28), it also implies that the efficiency of financial 
intermediaries, in allocating financial resources to both savers and investors, is 
positively related to the growth of per capita income (see also Goldsmith, 1969). 
Although the original models by McKinnon and Shaw emphasized different roles of 
internal and external finance in economic activities, from the perspective of the function 
of investment, these two models are complementary to one other. 
 
2.2.2 Criticisms and complements of the financial liberalization theory 
 
In contrast to the financial liberalization theory, in which higher real interest rates may 
enhance greater economic development, neostructuralist scholars (for example, Buffie, 
1984; Taylor, 1983; Van Wijnbergen, 1983) argue that because of hedge effects and 
unorganized money markets in developing countries, higher interest rates can 
negatively affect economic performance. If cost-push inflation increases the rates of 
deposit, then a substitution of hedge assets (such as gold and land) for bank deposits 
would result in falling general prices and constricting investment; hence, reducing 
economic growth. In the neostructuralist models, developing countries’ unorganized 
money markets, or curb markets, are assumed to be more efficient than formal financial 
intermediaries because there is no need for reserve requirements. Thus, increasing 
deposits’ rates of interest can lead to an increase in the demand for money that comes 
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 from using curb market loans (Taylor, 1983). A reduction in the volume of loanable 
funds, however, is contrary to the intention of increasing investment levels in financial 
liberalization. In addition, real interest rates may not be the only intermediation that 
adjusts levels of savings and investment. As suggested by Demetriades and Luintel 
(1996), the financial liberalization theory, to certain extent, largely ignores the direct 
impact on financial deepening by other channels of financial repression, other than 
interest rates.  
 
Along with the argument of market failure, which is caused by adverse selection and 
moral hazard (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981), Demetriades and Luintel (1996) argued that the 
assumption of perfect competition among financial intermediaries in the financial 
liberalization theory could also lead to level of bias. Perfectly competitive financial 
intermediaries imply a zero cost in financial activities, but as a result, not only interest 
rates but also transaction costs influence aggregate savings and investment. 
Laurenceson and Chai (2003) argued that little effort has been made to study the 
behavior of financial institutions in the financial liberalization theory.  
 
Interpreting the relationship between savings and investment, Arestis (2005) and Arestis, 
Nissanke and Stein (2005) argued that the role of savings is overstressed in the financial 
liberalization theory. In McKinnon’s model, preexisting savings fund investment, 
leading to capital accumulation. However, capital accumulation is not directly 
facilitated by savings but by investment loans provided by the financial system. The 
process of financing investment is the result of credit creation by the financial system, 
which means that savings is not a prerequisite for investment. In other words, it is the 
financing mechanisms, not savings, which affect economic growth. Despite 
over-stressing the role of savings in growth determination, for causality issues, as 
suggested by the post-Keynesian school, it is loans, not savings, which create deposits.  
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Hellman, Murdock, and Stiglitz (1997) argued that, from the perspective of financial 
restraint, some government interventions may generate positive effects on economic 
development, but not on the adoption of financial liberalization policies. Because the 
financial liberalization theory focuses on less developed countries (LDCs), Yang (1996) 
extended the theory to include reforming centrally planned economies (CPEs). He 
argued that while reforming CPEs and LDCs share some similar features, in reforming 
CPEs financial controls are more important than finding a conventional market solution, 
in which interest rates are not an effective tool to adjust aggregate savings and 
investment.  
 
In a follow-up to his original theory, McKinnon (1993) stressed two prerequisites for 
the practice of financial liberalization theory: the role of sequencing and institutional 
preconditions. Based on the empirical evidence of financial crises in developing 
countries over the last 30 years, countries that choose different sequencings experienced 
similar financial crises as those that followed the optimal sequencing advocated by 
McKinnon (Arestis, 2004; Arestis & Stein, 2005). However, Arestis and Stein (2005) 
pointed out that the instability of such macroeconomic environments, resulting from the 
failure of financial liberalization policies, is not due to wrong sequencing but to 
theoretical weakness in the theory. They further suggested that it is necessary to analyze 
“institutional endowments” in order to achieve a better understanding of the 
development of a financial system. 
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 2.3 The role of finance in endogenous growth models 
 
2.3.1 From exogenous growth theory to endogenous growth models 
 
In McKinnon’s and Shaw’s theories, financial liberalization has only short-term effects. 
Whether financial development can affect long-term economic growth and what is the 
long-term relationship between finance and sustainable economic growth are core 
questions to answer. The emergence and development of the endogenous growth theory 
(new growth theory) in the early 1990s made it possible for financial development to be 
treated as an endogenous process and a determinant of economic growth. That is to say, 
in endogenous growth models, the marginal product of capital is assumed not to 
decrease because of diminishing returns to scale. Therefore, the determinant of 
economic growth becomes a “positive function of the investment ratio” (Fry, 1995, p. 
69). In McKinnon’s and Shaw’s financial liberalization framework, the basic link 
between finance and real sector output growth is the complementarity between money 
and physical capital, while in the endogenous growth models, the theoretical basis is 
how financial systems correct market failures caused by informational asymmetry and 
transaction costs. Under the endogenous growth theory, a causal relationship between 
finance and growth is two-way: financial sector development can promote the 
efficiency of resource allocation (economic development), and economic development 
can promote participation in the financial sector (Arestis, 2005). As increased efficiency 
of firms that result from constant return to scales (CRS) or increasing returns to scale 
(IRS) is made a function as aggregate capital stock, and capital accumulation increases 
efficiency throughout the entire economy. Pagano (1993) argued that a financial sector 
development can experience overall growth effects, not just level effects. 
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 In a typical exogenous growth model, for example, the Solow (1956) model, it is 
assumed that a steady long-term growth rate is determined by exogenous variables (e.g., 
technological changes, human capital formulations). The key feature of exogenous 
growth models is the decreasing returns to capital (DRK), which means that economic 
behavior and economic policies have only level effects. Financial development also has 
only level effects, not growth effects, because finance is assumed to affect the quantity 
and quality of investment and output levels, but not the rate of growth directly.  
The development of endogenous growth models relaxed the assumption of DRK and 
introduced the concept of CRS and IRS. This means that the long-term equilibrium 
growth rate could be affected by other factors, such as human capital. There are two 
waves of endogenous growth models, and according to Fry (1995), the first wave 
models by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) modeled financial intermediation: “The 
precise cause of endogenous growth does not affect the role of finance” (Fry, 1995, p. 
61). 
 
2.3.2 Endogenous financial intermediation in endogenous growth 
models 
 
In De La Fuente and Marin (1996), second-wave endogenous growth models can be 
seen as a synthesis of first-wave endogenous growth models and endogenous financial 
intermediation (the endogeneity of both economic growth and financial development) 
(see Diamond, 1984; Diamond & Dybvig, 1983). In second-wave endogenous growth 
models, the role finance plays in economic growth is explained under the framework of 
financial functions because of market frictions and imperfect markets. It is assumed that 
in developing a financial system, problems such as informational asymmetry and 
uncertainty would be lessened, and the efficiency of resources allocation would be 
42 
 
 improved, directly effecting long-term growth. Fry (1995), however, proposed that 
second-wave endogenous growth models ignored the dynamic process of financial 
liberalization and stabilization, so that short-term stabilization and long-term economic 
growth were not considered simultaneously. 
 
There are two groups of literature on second-wave endogenous growth models. The first 
group, based on the overlapping-generations model developed by Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983), emphasizes the importance of liquidity provisions in financial systems 
(Bencivenga & Smith, 1991, 1992; Greenwood & Smith, 1997; Levine, 1993; 
Saint-Paul, 1992). The second group is based mainly on Diamond’s (1984) model, 
which stressed that the strength of a financial system is in collecting, processing, and 
producing specialized information. By acquiring information, financial systems allow 
facilitation of real sector growth through better resources allocation (Greenwood & 
Jovanovic, 1990; King & Levine, 1993b). Most of the literature in both groups 
advocates a two-way relationship between financial development and economic growth: 
real sector development increases incentives to form a more sophisticated financial 
system, and a sophisticated financial system promotes more efficient real sector growth. 
Also, a fixed entry fee in running financial intermediation is always assumed to be exist, 
which implies the need for a more sophisticated financial system (Bencivenga & Smith, 
1993; Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1990; Greenwood & Smith, 1997; Levine, 1993). 
 
In first group, Bencivenga and Smith (1991) introduced a three-period-lived 
overlapping-generations model to investigate the liquidity risks of banks. It first 
assumed that liquid investment is not directly productive. With risk diversification 
provided by financial systems, financial resources can be invested into riskier but more 
productive projects. In other words, the emergence of financial intermediation is to meet 
43 
 
 the liquidity requirements of individual investors, so as to adjust pooled resources into 
such projects. In general equilibrium, higher growth rates can be achieved because 
financial systems facilitate investment favorable to capital accumulation. To extend this 
model, Bencivenga and Smith (1992) included government and economic policies. 
Because the formal financial sector (e.g., banks) is more advanced at pooling and 
sharing risks — via financial liberalization-oriented economic policies — the informal 
financial sector (e.g., curb markets) tend to transfer financial resources into the formal 
sectors. This is in contrast to critical arguments within the neostructuralist school (see 
Buffie, 1984; Taylor, 1980; Van Wijnbergen, 1983, 1985). 
 
Financial intermediaries, performing not only as banks but also as stock markets, 
promote economic growth (Greenwood & Smith, 1997; Levine, 1993; Saint-Paul, 1992). 
Along with banking systems, stock markets also provide risk aversion mechanisms by 
allowing individual investors to sell their stocks during an investment project. Therefore, 
both investing in financially productive but risky projects and individuals’ ability to 
liquidate are possible. As for the structure of financial systems, Greenwood and Smith 
(1997) argued that competition among market service providers allows for a more 
efficient market. They also pointed out that only financial intermediation, not equity 
markets, can stimulate economic growth. 
 
As summarized by Fry (1995, p. 67–68), the endogenous models based on Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983) assume a financial system is risk averse, as the aim is greater investment 
and higher growth rates. For example, banks and mutual funds use portfolio 
diversification to reduce risks, while stock markets satisfy both fund demands from 
firms and liquidity needs for individual investors.   
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 Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) developed a different model in the second literature 
group. Their model introduced the dynamic interaction between finance and growth 
through a financial system’s function of acquiring high-quality information. In their 
model, financial intermediaries produce better information, which leads to better 
resource allocation. For example, if there is a fixed cost for forming or joining a group 
of financial intermediaries, through economic development, more individuals could 
afford that price, increasing the number of financial intermediaries that produce higher 
quality information, leading to even higher allocative efficiency. Through this dynamic 
cycle, financial development stimulates economic growth, and vice versa. 
 
Also from the second literature, King and Levine (1993b) and Saint-Paul (1992) 
indicated the role of financial intermediations in evaluating firms’ ability for 
technological innovation. In their models, both financial intermediaries and financial 
markets can improve processing-information efficiency, which can help determine 
which projects have the best possibility of success. With more reliable information, 
financial intermediation can allocate resources for these projects, and new innovations 
can accelerate productivity and economic growth. Based on the assumption that 
specialized technologies are riskier than more flexible ones, it is argued that with better 
information, financial markets can encourage greater specialization of labor and 
increased capital into production by introducing a diversified portfolio (Saint-Paul, 
1992).  
 
The model by De La Fuente and Martin (1996) assumed that successful technological 
innovation depends on the monitoring of firms’ actions by outsiders, for example, by 
financial intermediaries. If innovation can only be monitored at a cost, the optimal level 
of monitoring can then be determined by relative factor prices. By adjusting monitoring 
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 activities to the optimal degree, financial systems can balance the cost and benefit of 
innovative activities. This suggests a positive relationship between the development of 
financial systems and innovation activities, and hence economic growth. Diamond 
(1984) and Sussman (1993) pointed out that the formation of financial intermediaries 
could be the result of incentives offered by monitoring firms. The cost of financial 
intermediation decreases as the number of financial intermediaries and market 
competition increases. Conversely, Saint-Paul’s (1992) model assumed that the cost of 
financial intermediation is exogenous and adjusted by government taxation, which 
implies the role of government in promoting the efficiency of a financial system.  
 
This point of view was extended by Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992, 1995), who 
introduced government interventions as a kind of financial repression in their 
endogenous growth models; they argued that both monetary and fiscal policies can 
produce taxations of financial intermediaries. They indicated that a government that 
does not consider long-term effects will choose to repress its financial sector because it 
is assumed that a financial system will provide cheap and easy resources for the public 
budget. Such governments opt for economic policies to increase per capital real money 
demand, which increases inflation revenue. The repression will produce a negative 
effect on the number of quantitative and qualitative financial services, and reduce the 
efficiency of resources allocation. The influence of financial repression is obvious, and 
in Roubini and Sala-i-Martin’s model, high inflation, tax evasion, and lower economic 
growth are linked. 
 
Pagano’s (1993) review of the finance–growth nexus provided a broader scope to look 
inside the role of finance in economic growth. Based on an AK style production 
function:  
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 Yt = AKt  (1) (Eq. 2.1) 
where Yt is total output at time t; Kt is capital stock at time t (which include both 
physical capital and human capital); and A reflects the social marginal productivity of 
capital (i.e., the level of technology). The function (1) shows that the aggregate output is 
a linear function of the aggregate capital stock. 
 
Pagano (1993) assumed that if a population is fixed and there is only one good in the 
market that can be either consumed or invested, then the total investment in time t can 
be shown as the total capital at t + 1 minus that at time t:  It = Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt  (Eq. 2.2) 
Here, δ is the depreciation rate. Assuming that the economy considered is a closed one, 
and there is no role for government, the total savings, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  will be equal to total 
investment, 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 so as to achieve capital market equilibrium. Because of market frictions, 
such as transaction costs and informational asymmetry, a proportion of savings, at a rate 
of 1 − ∅, will be lost, which can be seen as the inefficiency of financial system: 
∅St = It  (Eq. 2.3) 
The growth rate of total output, 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡+1 at time t + 1, will be equal to 
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡
− 1 = 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡+1
𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡
− 1  (Eq. 2.4) 
By combining this equation with Equation 2, and by moving the time factors, a stable 
growth rate will show as  g = A 𝐼𝐼
𝑌𝑌
− 𝛿𝛿  (Eq. 2.5) 
and by defining s = 𝑆𝑆
𝑌𝑌
 and the small 𝑠𝑠 means the savings rate, Equation 5 can be 
rewritten as  g = A∅s − δ  (Eq. 2.6) 
Equation 6 clearly shows how financial development can affect economic growth. 
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In this AK model, the steady long-term growth rate can be affected by influencing A, ∅, 
or 𝑠𝑠  by: (a) increasing A  (the improvement in technology); (b) increasing ∅ 
(enhancing a financial system’s efficiency for transferring savings to investment); or (c) 
increasing 𝑠𝑠 (increasing saving rates directly).  
 
Table 2.1 contains a detailed summary of the key studies on both waves of endogenous 
finance–growth theories. 
 
Table 2.1 Endogenous finance and growth models 
First-generation 
models 
Model Main findings 
Bencivenga & Smith 
(1991) 
Developed three-period-lived 
overlapping-generations model; 
assumed only "illiquid” 
investment yields productive 
capital. 
Financial intermediaries positively affect real 
growth rate determination by affecting 
composition of savings in economy favorable to 
capital accumulation. 
Bencivenga & Smith 
(1992) 
Developed three-period-lived 
overlapping-generations model; 
assumed role of liquidity 
provision in determining output 
and inflation. Created model to 
formalize optimal degree of 
financial repression / 
liberalization. 
(1) If curb markets appear due to financial 
repression, financial liberalization helps transfer 
funds from informal financial sector to formal 
one; (2) financial market liberalization delivers 
efficient risk sharing by increasing inflation tax 
base. 
Bencivenga & Smith 
(1993) 
Developed two-period-lived 
overlapping-generations model; 
assumed role of informational 
frictions in investment projects 
and role of credit rationing; 
assumed two-way causal 
direction between real growth 
rates and the level of credit 
rationing. 
(1) Level of credit rationing negatively associated 
with real growth rates; (2) government policies 
designed to affect extent of credit rationing 
affects growth on output determination. 
Greenwood & 
Jovanovic (1990)  
Developed general equilibrium 
model with endogenous financial 
intermediation sector; assumed 
bi-directional relationship 
between financial intermediaries 
and economic growth if 
functions of collecting and 
analyzing information are 
highlighted.  
(1) Financial intermediaries allocate funds to 
investment projects with highest returns, and 
economic growth leads to financial development; 
(2) economy obtains higher growth rates in its 
infancy and achieves stable income distribution 
with developed financial structure. 
Greenwood & Smith 
(1997)  
Developed two models; assumed 
endogeneity of market formation. 
(1) Financial markets follow certain levels of real 
development (given cost of market formation); 
(2) formation of financial markets promotes 
economic growth through liquidity provisions 
and by overcoming transaction costs; (3) 
competition among potential players in the 
market causes efficient formation of the market. 
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De Gregorio (1993) Developed three-period-lived 
overlapping-generations model; 
highlighted role of borrowing 
constraints in savings 
determination; individual 
behavior based on life-cycle 
hypotheses. 
(1) Borrowing constraints lead to higher rates of 
savings and increases physical capital 
accumulation; (2) borrowing constraints 
negatively affect human capital accumulation 
(individuals usually maximize income when 
facing borrowing constraints); (3) overall effect 
of borrowing constraints on growth uncertain. 
King & Levine (1993b) Developed endogenous growth 
model; emphasized role of 
financial systems in 
entrepreneurial selection. Based 
on the Schumpeterian tradition. 
(1) Financial systems assess prospective 
entrepreneurs and select projects with highest 
degree of successful innovation; (2) resources 
mobilized to finance promising projects though 
financial intermediaries; (3) financial systems 
allow investors to diversify risks, given 
uncertainty of innovative activities; (4) revealing 
potential profits, financial systems stimulate 
innovations. 
Levine (1993)  Developed endogenous growth 
model; emphasized easing 
liquidity and productivity risks, 
and costs of transactions, 
information gathering, and 
resource coordination. 
(1) At the level of development, policies and 
legal codes determine financial structures and 
financial services; (2) risk diversification, 
information processing, and cost easing allows 
financial systems to determine levels of 
investment (and hence rate of economic growth). 
Roubini & Sala-i-Martin 
(1992) 
Developed endogenous growth 
model with the role of financial 
development and inflationary 
finance. 
(1) Governments favor financial repression 
policies (leads to larger stocks of nominal money 
in private sector; hence increases in inflationary 
revenue (tax) for governments); (2) side effect is 
reduction in total amount of financial services 
provided by financial systems (reduced inputs 
and outputs lowers rate of economic growth). 
Roubini & Sala-i-Martin 
(1995) 
Developed endogenous growth 
model with financial repression, 
tax evasion, and inflation. 
(1) Governments advocate financial repression, if 
tax evasion is serious, to increase revenue from 
money creation; (2) financial repression 
decreases efficiency of financial sector, increases 
costs of intermediation (which decreases 
investment levels and rates of economic growth); 
(4) financial repression leads to tax evasion, low 
growth, high inflation. 
Saint-Paul (1992) Developed endogenous model; 
assumed role of technological 
choice of financial markets. 
 
(1) Diversified investment portfolios allow agents 
in financial markets to hedge investment projects 
(leads to specialized divisions of c and 
productivity; (2) financial markets allow for 
riskier technologies (technological choices affect 
viability of financial markets); (3) lowering 
financial market operating costs allow 
governments to promote financial development 
through policies.  
Sussman (1993) Developed one-period 
endogenous growth model with a 
banking institution component. 
(1) Incentives to monitor firms causes formation 
of banks; (2) markets for financial systems grow 
through capital stocks accumulation (leads to 
increase in number of banks; (3) individual banks 
become specialized and efficient with expansion 
of banks; (4) competition among banks leads to 
decreases in costs of financial intermediation and 
markups of financial services. 
De La Fuente & Martin 
(1996) 
Developed endogenous growth 
model; assumed the role of 
innovation in growth 
determination. 
(1) Financial development and output growth 
endogenously determined; (2)  efficient 
monitoring on innovative activities delivered 
when financial intermediaries occur 
endogenously; (3) optimal degree of monitoring 
determined by price of financial intermediations 
(affected by accumulation of capital); (4) better 
monitoring by financial intermediaries promotes 
level of innovative activities (through better 
insurance terms). 
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2.4 Functional views of financial system 
 
To understand the mechanism how finance affects economic development, the functions 
of a financial system — the role it plays in the economy and what channels it facilitates 
in real sector economic development — is assessed in this section. 
 
In order to provide a broad theoretical basis, both neoclassical and Keynesian–
Schumpeterian frameworks (which concentrate on different functions of financial 
systems) are reviewed. The neoclassical framework of the finance–growth nexus mostly 
focuses on how financial systems enhance the efficiency of resource allocation through 
so-called market frictions, which include information costs and transaction costs. 
Starting with Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959), under the neoclassical framework, 
financial systems are said to ameliorate informational asymmetry (Diamond 1984) and 
transaction costs because of market frictions in economic and financial activities. 
Therefore, through accommodations of the financial system, such as mobilizing savings, 
producing useful market information, and monitoring corporate governance, enterprises 
can achieve effective production and efficient investment through better resources 
allocation. The development of a financial system that focuses on functions that aim for 
efficient resource allocation is induced as the allocative efficiency of a financial system. 
In contrast, credit creation, which is another important function of a financial system 
according to the Keynesian–Schumpeterian framework, is understood as a productive 
efficiency of financial development.  
 
On the concept of money, the Keynesian–Schumpeterian framework assumes that 
money and credit—or in a broader concept, finance—is endogenous to economic 
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 development, and that the main function of a financial system is to create money and 
credit in the market (Davidson, 2002; Lavoie, 1984, 2006; Palley, 1996). Financial 
systems create credit to meet firms’ investment needs, and loans are created out of 
nothing, not from preexisting savings, which is what is expected in the mainstream 
framework. In turn, investment facilitated by a financial system will deliver savings 
accumulation for both firms and households. Under the Keynesian–Schumpeterian 
framework, the linkage goes from investment to savings, but that is reversed in standard 
theories. Under the Keynesian–Schumpeterian framework, the development of a 
financial system is treated the same as how credit is developed efficiently, which is the 
productive efficiency of a financial system.  
 
Two core functions of a financial system can be distinguished: the allocative efficiency, 
and the productive efficiency. It is fair to argue that these two frameworks are not in 
conflict because they focus on different roles in financial systems. Allocative efficiency 
focuses on the quality of finance (a qualitative view), while productive efficiency 
focuses on the quantity of finance (a quantitative view). The next three sections discuss 
how these efficiencies are achieved. The first section focuses on allocative efficiency; 
the second section, productive efficiency; and the third section, the interactive 
relationship between these two efficiencies. 
 
2.4.1 Allocative efficiency, a qualitative view 
 
Starting with the pioneering works of Schumpeter (1934) and Gurley and Shaw (1955), 
it has been argued that economies grow faster under developed financial systems. 
Following the standard neoclassical growth theories, which is based on Solow’s (1956) 
model, it is assumed that there are two basic channels that link financial system 
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 development with real sector growth, both quantitatively and qualitatively: capital 
accumulation and total factor productivity (explained as Solow residuals). The 
quantitative channel of capital accumulation mainly focuses on the pooling and 
mobilization of savings by individuals. Through savings mobilization, financial systems 
provide funds and facilitate productive investment projects for enterprises, and hence 
promote output growth and capital accumulation. An efficient financial system also 
channels funds into projects that use new technologies, increasing the possibility of 
innovation and higher productive output growth. The qualitative channel shows that 
financial system development raises the efficiency of financial resources allocation, but 
reduces levels of informational asymmetries because of market imperfections 
(Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1990). To improve the quality of financial services, financial 
systems must develop new financial technologies.  
 
Many scholars started their analyses from an institutional perspective of financial 
systems. Merton and Bodie (1995) offered that the functions and services of a financial 
system are more stable than the financial structures, as systems do not change much 
over time. They also said that the structure of institutions follows the development of 
functions, not vice versa. A functional approach may provide a better understanding of 
the role a financial system plays in economic development. According to Levine (1997, 
2005), Merton (1992), and Merton and Bodie (1995, 2005), the functions and services 
provided by a financial system that are designed to deliver better economic performance 
can classified into several categories. Furthermore, the channel through which basic 
functions affect growth is efficient resources allocation; these basic functions serve as 
part of the aggregated level, single primary function, i.e. the function of allocative 
efficiency. This follows the functional approach first introduced by Levine (1997). In 
this approach, basic functions and services are summarized into four categories: 
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 mobilizing and pooling savings, acquiring information and allocating resources, 
managing risks, and monitoring and exerting corporate governance (see Figure 2.1). 
 
Figure 2.1 Mainstream functional view of financial development 
 
Source: Levine (1997, p. 691). 
 
2.4.1.1 Mobilizing and pooling savings 
 
In assuming that a financial system is to achieve efficient resources allocation, then 
financial resources are understood as savings, both household and corporate. Arestis and 
Demetriades (1993) found that, according to the financial repression models developed 
by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), savings are assumed to be financial savings, 
which is a mix of unproductive assets and interest-seeking deposits. This is in contrast 
to the assumption of total savings in Solow’s (1956) growth theory. Solow’s theory is 
Market frictions on resources allocation:
- Information costs
- Transaction costs
Emergence of financial system: 
- Financial intermediaries
- Financial markets
- Financial instruments
Functions: 
- Mobilizing savings
- Acquiring information and allocating 
resources
- Risk amelioration
- Monitoring firms and exerting corporate 
governance
Improved allocative efficiency and channels 
for growth
- Capital accumulation
- Technological innovation
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 based on the logic that financial savings affect the supply of loanable funds in the 
marketplace, and hence the level of economic development created by investment.  
 
It is assumed that a well-functioning financial system can enhance the efficiency of 
savings mobilization. In Levine (2005), the mobilization procedure is costly because 
savers hand over control of their money to institutions, yet it also creates a higher 
efficiency because it eases the frictions of both transaction costs within the process of 
collecting savings from individuals and the informational asymmetry costs between 
savers and potential users of the savings. Through savings mobilization, individual 
financial resources are integrated into group investment. With sufficient external 
financial resources, the limitations of project investment through self-finance are 
overcome; and this directly affects capital accumulation and economic growth. The 
mobilization of savings is through financial instruments, for example, diversified 
portfolios or financial markets (i.e., security markets). With the introduction of these 
instruments, improvements in risk diversification and liquidity are achieved. Pooling 
savings also has an effect on how quickly firms can grow and expand. By introducing 
multiple investors into a project, economically inefficient scaling during production 
processes can largely be reduced (Acemoglu & Zilibotti, 1997; Sirri & Tufano, 1995).  
 
Along with increased financial resources through increased savings mobilization, 
sufficient funding from the financial system also impacts economies of scale by 
overcoming liquidity constraints and by offering potential technological innovation 
(Bagehot, 1873/1962; McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). Increased funding, of course, 
indirectly promotes economic growth, as well. 
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 2.4.1.2 Acquiring information and allocating resources 
 
In Merton and Bodie (1995), producing useful information for decision-making 
processes is treated as a latent function of financial systems. The helps determine, for 
example, the costs of evaluating firms and market conditions before investment. For the 
individual investor, two constraints must be faced: lack of capabilities and means to 
acquire, process, and produce information effectively; and investment decisions are 
determined by the quantity and quality of their information. If there are fixed costs in 
acquiring information about investment projects, without a financial system — which 
here mainly implies financial intermediaries — individual investors will have to pay for 
those fixed costs. This situation explains why in an emerging financial systems, 
individuals are incentivized to form financial intermediaries, so as to economize on the 
costs of acquiring information (Diamond, 1984).  
 
Starting with Schumpeter (1934)，information processing through financial systems not 
only includes identifying firms with better production, but also firms with a higher 
possibility of developing new technologies and innovation (Acemoglu, Aghion, & 
Zilibotti, 2006; Blackburn & Hung, 1998; Galetovic, 1996; King & Levine, 1993b; 
Morales, 2003). In other words, financial systems can affect economic growth by 
stimulating technical innovation through collecting, processing, and producing 
information. 
 
2.4.1.3 Managing risks 
 
Reducing risks through trading and pooling resources is generally believed to be 
another important role of financial systems. Levine (2005) concluded that to overcome 
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 both informational and transaction costs, emerging financial intermediaries and 
financial markets need to include the vehicle of diversification and pooling of risks.  
 
Two distinct types of risks are considered here: liquidity risks and investment failure. 
Liquidity risks reflect the uncertainties of trading assets into a medium of exchange. 
Within financial systems, uncertainties can be diversified and transferred through 
financial instruments, such as bonds, equities, and demand deposits. As to the process, 
consider the following situation, with the assumptions that investors are not willing to 
lose long-term control of their savings and that high-return projects are positively 
related to long-term capital flow and investment. In Diamond and Dybvig (1983), there 
are two additional assumptions: it is difficult for individual investors to identify whether 
another individual has received a shock, and that those who receive a shock want to 
access their money before the project produces returns. Under such situations, if there is 
no role of state-contingent insurance, there is the incentive to form financial markets to 
alleviate frictions. Furthermore, financial intermediaries, especially banks, can offer 
liquid insured deposits to individual investors so as balance both liquidity and returns 
on projects. 
 
Other risks are the possibility of investment failure and lack of diversification. Based on 
the logic that high-return projects are high-risk and that investors are normally risk 
averse, Gurley and Shaw (1955) stated that by introducing portfolios, financial systems 
shift funds toward higher return projects. In the portfolio theory, the introduction of a 
diversified investment portfolio means there is investment in both high-return and 
innovation-related projects, which usually involve higher risks of failure, and economic 
growth is enhanced through not only capital accumulation but also technological 
innovations (Acemoglu & Ziliboti, 1997; King & Levine, 1993b). 
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2.4.1.4 Monitoring managers and exerting corporate governance 
 
Starting with Coase (1937), corporate governance means that as individual investors 
become involved in investment projects through financial systems, share or equity 
holders have an influence on the behavior of firm managers. The goal of these investors 
is, of course, profit maximization. According to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), without 
corporate governance, financial institutions may not collect enough information on 
borrowers, which could lead to adverse selection and constrain both the efficiency of 
savings mobilizations and the flow of capital. Monitoring processes offer a higher 
certainty that firms will be profitable, productive, and more efficient. 
 
Diamond (1984) argued that, with proper financial arrangements, financial 
intermediaries might not only reduce monitoring costs but also ease the problem of 
“free riders.” Monitoring by financial intermediaries is the same as monitoring by the 
investors. Stock prices can also act as a tool to evaluate company assets and the 
performance of firm managers (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1982). This in turn can lead 
stronger corporate governance. 
 
2.4.1.5 Summary 
 
Following McKinnon’s (1973) and Shaw’s (1973) financial repression thesis (the 
importance of a liberalized financial system in supporting long-term economic 
development in developing economies), the mainstream theory of finance and growth 
also largely emphasizes the importance of market principles in improving efficiency in 
allocating financial resources. The basic assumption behind these market principles is 
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 the existence of market frictions; that is, informational asymmetry and transaction costs. 
A market-oriented financial development path is key to facilitating a financial system 
and thus economic development. The same is true for new growth theories; that is, 
endogenous growth models were introduced in the analytical framework because 
endogeneity of financial intermediation was assumed. 
 
As mentioned above, in financial development, according to Levine (2005), several 
related basic functions of a financial system can be classified under the aggregated 
primary function of “allocative efficiency” (Levine, 1997, 2005; Merton, 1992; Merton 
and Bodie, 1995, 2005). In other words, the major function of a financial system is to 
match savings and investment in the most efficient way.  
 
2.4.2 Productive efficiency, a quantitative view 
 
In the mainstream finance–growth theory, financial systems try to ease market frictions 
(informational asymmetry and transaction costs) to create real sector development. 
Through policy making and developing financial functions, a more sophisticated and 
larger financial system becomes efficient in easing market frictions. These are but two 
functions that influence finance, and hence economic development.  
 
In contrast, post-Keynesian economists (e.g., Davidson, 2002) argue that the above 
analysis ignores vitally important functions of a financial system, especially a system 
with both a central bank and commercial banks. These are the functions of credit, and 
more basic, the function of money creation, which is where the supply of credit is 
treated as endogenous (Palley, 2002). 
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 This theoretical tradition, with the view of endogenous money, can be traced to 
Schumpeter and Keynes. It was Schumpeter (1934) who first presented the idea that 
creating money is a function only of banks. Through credit creation, banks facilitate 
productive firms to adopt new factor combinations (i.e., new technologies). Keynes 
(1937) highlighted the role of money in finance when he introduced the so-called 
finance motive as one of the four reasons to demand money.  
 
Post-Keynesian scholars extended the endogeneity view of money into a broader 
framework, known as endogenous finance, and put this type of finance as central in 
post-Keynesian monetary theories (Palley, 1996, 2002; Banchs, 2006). From Lavoie 
(2006), the logic behind endogenous finance is based on two assumptions: that there 
will always be a “fringe of unsatisfied customers” (implying credit rationing) (see 
Keynes, 1930, p. 364) and that financial intermediaries always meet firms’ demands 
(implying that the causal direction of a savings–investment nexus is from investment to 
savings). Under this logic, the original source of funding in a business cycle is the will 
of investment from firms.  
 
In Davidson (2002), the endogenous supply of credits is understood as an 
“income-generating-finance” process. It is assumed that firms have a profit incentive: 
controlling working capital loans through increased borrowing in order to overcome the 
higher costs of increased flow of output. On the assumption that a financial system can 
accommodate a demand of loans from firms, the system would respond positively to 
firms’ request, and the attendant expansion of credits would be seen as an endogenous 
process. In the short-term, increasing real income and prices follow the endogenous 
expansion of credit supply. The expansion of credits will stop when a new and higher 
equilibrium output level is achieved. Conversely, when firms expect that credit demand 
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 will decline, the process reverses, so that the supply of credits declines endogenously, 
though debt pay-off.  
 
Through credit creation, Nell (1992) stated that the level of effective aggregate demand 
could be stimulated to enhance economic growth. Palley’s (1994) credit-driven model 
of a business cycle showed a similar approach: the total amount of credit throughout an 
economy expands. The function of a financial system, under the mainstream framework, 
is to ease market frictions of both transactional and informational asymmetry costs so as 
to improve the efficiency of financial resources allocation. It is fair to say, then, that the 
function of credit creation is to increase the number of financial resources in the 
economy. Efficient credit production through endogenous mechanisms begins with 
investment by firms.  
 
In other words, contrary to the view in the mainstream framework that savings occur 
when sectors individually decide to save, in the endogenous finance theory from the 
Keynesian-Schumpeterian tradition, savings occur when there is income creation from 
investment (Dullien, 2009). Investment is created by entrepreneurs’ willingness to 
invest and through facilitation by bank credits. In this alternative framework, the 
objective is the interaction of finance and the real economy, not the financial system 
itself. The main function of a financial system in economic development is to create 
money and credit in the market, not overcome market frictions. 
 
When applied into practice, this quantitative view explains the strong economic growth 
performance in certain developing countries that not only had inefficient financial 
systems, but also had no ex-ante increased saving rates or international capital inflows 
during their economic take-off (Dullien, 2009). When assessed under a productive 
efficiency view of finance, a key function of financial development is creating credit 
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 “out of nothing” (Herr, 2010). 
 
The instability of finance, first raised in Minsky’s famous finance instability hypothesis, 
is largely overlooked in the neoclassical world. While Minsky’s hypothesis focuses on 
short-term instability (Palley, 2011) and the Keynesian–Schumpeterian theory of 
endogenous finance concentrates on long-term economic development, what both 
theories have in common is that they treat finance as a dynamic integration between 
money credit and productive investment. This too is overlooked in the mainstream 
doctrine. The allocative efficiency view of financial development focuses more on 
improvement in a financial system itself; that is, the achievement of several financial 
functions rather than the dynamic interaction between financial development and the 
real economy. The Keynesian–Schumpeterian theory treats finance and financial 
processes as dynamic, while the mainstream doctrine sees financial development as 
static and isolated. 
 
2.4.3 Discussion 
 
2.4.3.1 Differences between the two frameworks 
 
To discuss the differences between these two frameworks, or the two distinct functions 
of a financial system, it is important to review the sources of investment funds. The 
neoclassical framework assumes that, before any investment activities, there are 
preexisting financial resources, namely, financial savings, in the economy. Thus, a 
financial system acts as a financial intermediary to facilitate a firm’s investment through 
these resources. In Palley (1994), this precondition implies that savings are transferred 
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 into loanable funds that are automatically invested. With the introduction of market 
frictions, which occur between savings and investment integration, the finance 
mechanism maintains the same. In an Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959) world, perfect 
markets and information means there is no need for a financial system to improve its 
efficiency in resources allocation, and money is assumed to be exogenous because the 
money supply is adjusted by central banks through tools like open market operations. 
According to Hahn (1981), there is no room for the existence of money in these models. 
Based on the assumptions that financial resources are determined by exogenous nature 
endowments and that the money supply is exogenous, the functions of a financial 
system are restricted to helping ease inefficiencies in financial resource allocation, not 
to creating more resources.  
 
The Keynesian–Schumpeterian framework emphasizes the endogeneity of the credit 
supply. Financial systems can create credit out of nothing to meet the willing investment 
from firms because of the existence of a money-multiplier. Economic development 
under this framework can be seen as a development path via credit expansion, leading 
to capital accumulation and technological innovations. How a financial system creates 
credits sufficiently to meet the demands of firms and stimulate both the output level and 
economic growth are functions for productive efficiency. Figure 2.2 shows the dynamic 
business cycle based on the logic of these two frameworks. As mentioned above, the 
neoclassical framework concentrates on the quality of funds, while the Keynesian–
Schumpeterian framework focuses on the quantity of credit. 
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 Figure 2.2 Contrasting views on the savings–investment nexus 
 
Source: Dullien (2009, p. 8). 
 
2.4.3.2 Complementation or substitution 
 
Two efficiencies are discussed in this section: allocative and productive. Since they 
focus on different things, it is fair to say that the relationship between them is 
complementary, not substitutive. Investigating the development of a financial system 
can be interpreted as an assessment of the savings–investment nexus. The distinguishing 
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 difference between these two efficiencies is whether savings cause investment or 
investment causes savings. By carefully evaluating the impact of financial development 
on savings and on investment, and on their nexus, can provide important information in 
assessing the mechanisms behind finance and development, and through which 
financial systems effect real sector development. 
 
Lo, Li, and Jiang (2011) argued that these two theoretical models represent different 
development strategies, and their development paths focus on different aspects of 
financial intermediation to facilitate economic development. On the one hand, the 
mainstream finance–growth view is that, at each given period, financial systems 
optimize efforts on resources allocation, subject to the constraints of the availability of 
resources. On the other hand, the Keynesian-Schumpeterian view emphasizes the 
improvement of the “productivity” of a financial system, which largely means credit 
creation as the mechanism that supports real sector growth. An “inefficient” financial 
system, from the mainstream criteria, can be “efficient” from the alternative perspective. 
Yang (2006) and Lo et al. (2011) argued that the potential trade-off between these two 
efficiencies is the key to interpreting how an “inefficient” financial system can support 
real sector growth, for example, as in China. One explanation is that the gains from a 
productive efficiency in China’s financial system have been greater than the costs of 
allocative inefficiency. 
 
2.5 Empirical evidence 
 
Since the pioneering work of Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973) and 
Gupta (1984), a growing number of empirical studies have focused on the nexus 
between financial development and economic growth. Although some work applied 
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 time series analyses to find out the potential causality between the finance–growth 
nexus, most of the existing literature used cross-sectional (cross-country) (see Barro, 
1991) and panel analyses. Despite some exceptional studies (see Andersen & Tarp, 2003; 
De Gregorio & Guidotti, 1995; Khan & Semlali, 2003; Ram 1999; Zhang, K., 2003), a 
positive relationship between the measures of finance development (e.g., M2/GDP) and 
economic growth (e.g., the growth rate of real GDP per capita) has been documented in 
most empirical studies (Demetriades & Andrianova, 2004). This implies that there 
exists an association between finance and growth, both across and within countries over 
time. Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (2005, p. 214) argued that above a certain 
critical level of financial development, a positive, though “eventually vanishing,” effect 
of finance on long-term economic growth rates can be found. Empirical studies on the 
finance–growth nexus in China remained rare until the early 2000s. Some of the most 
influential cross-country studies (see Beck et al., 2000; King & Levine, 1993a, 1993b, 
1993c; Levine et al., 2000) did not include China in their datasets because of 
unobservable or missing data. It was not until Liu and Li (2001) and Aziz and 
Duenwald (2002) that research focused on China. 
 
2.5.1 Early cross country studies and financial indicators 
 
Goldsmith’s (1969) study is one of the earliest and most influential on the nexus of 
finance and growth. Goldsmith examined the correlation between financial development 
and economic growth from 1860 to 19642 with a dataset comprising 35 countries.3 
With the assumption that the larger the financial sector, the higher the quality of 
2 Most of the series for developed countries trace back to 1880; and for five particular 
countries, the data traces back to 1860. Some less developed countries in the sample 
could only be traced to 1880 or 1900. 
3 The dataset included 35 countries (19 developed countries and 16 LDC), with two 
socialist economies (the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia) included in this number. 
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 services it provides, Goldsmith roughly examined the correlation between the size of a 
financial intermediary sector and economic growth, concluding that there is a positive 
relationship between these two. However, the limitations of his study are obvious. The 
first limitation is it included only 35 countries, which is insufficient for a cross-country 
study. The second limitation is that some factors that can significantly affect economic 
growth were not systematically controlled (Levine, 1997). Furthermore, in measuring 
financial development, there can be a problem of two levels of inaccuracy. At one level, 
the size of a financial sector may not appropriately reflect the functions of a financial 
system, and the expansion of scale may not be equal to the development of the sector, 
given the importance of efficiency in the finance industry. At a second level, the 
measurement of a financial sector by one particular variable may not be sufficient to 
reflect all the dimensions of the scales of a financial system.  
 
Goldsmith’s pioneering study was the first attempt to explore the role of a financial 
system in economic growth. Despite its limitations, it inspired later research in the 
context of cross-country analyses. Some questions continue to remain unclear, including 
the causality between finance and growth (does finance promote growth or vice versa) 
and not knowing which part of the financial system affects growth (financial 
intermediaries, financial market, or a mix).  
 
It was not until the early 1990s that many economists touched on this topic again, 
following the development of the endogenous growth theory and theoretical models. 
King and Levine (1993a) extended Goldsmith’s dataset into 77 countries and from 1960 
to 1989, and examined whether financial development affects economic growth through 
capital accumulation and productivity growth. According to their results, it can be 
argued that financial development, measured by the four financial development 
66 
 
 indicators, significantly boosts economic growth through capital accumulation and 
productivity growth. To examine the causality between finance and growth, King and 
Levine (1993a) applied the value of the financial indicator in 1960 into their regression, 
and found that financial development can be a predictor for future economic growth. 
This “finance lead growth” perspective was further confirmed and supported by Levine 
and Zervos (1998). 
 
Another contribution from King and Levine (1993a) is the construction of several 
financial intermediary indicators, which measures the relative efficiency of banking 
systems (financial intermediaries). The financial indicators that they developed are now 
widely used as the standard measurements for financial systems in studies (Beck et al., 
2000; King & Levine, 1993b; Levine et al., 2000). The concept of the first indicator, 
financial depth, was adopted from Goldsmith (1969) and McKinnon (1973). Financial 
depth is defined as the ratio of liquid liabilities (M3) to GDP (M3/GDP), which has 
been improved from a comparatively narrow monetary measurement (e.g., M1) to a 
broader one. However, this measurement can only reflect the level of finance 
development, not its efficiency. A higher M3/GDP ratio does not imply a higher level of 
financial development, if development is defined in accordance to the theoretical 
finance–growth models in the mainstream doctrine (i.e., better efficiency in financial 
resources allocation). The ratio of M3/GDP refers to the monetization level in one 
economy, or the level of financial deepening (defined as the ratio of financial assets to 
GDP), which reflects only one part of a country’s financial development. Levine and 
Zervos (1998) argued that the increase in the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP does not 
mean an increase in credit provision in an economy, because it is not clear whether the 
increase in liabilities is from commercial banks, other financial intermediaries, or the 
central bank.  
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The second indictor is a country’s “bank,” which is the ratio of total assets of 
commercial banks to the sum of domestic assets in commercial banks and a central bank. 
The assumption behind this indicator is that commercial banks are better than central 
banks at efficiently allocating financial resources through the four financial functions. 
The limitation of this indicator is obvious. First, commercial banks are not the only type 
of financial intermediation, and second, in some developing countries, such as China, 
the banking industry is dominated by state-owned banks (SOBs). Therefore, a banking 
industry may face strong interventions from the government, both directly and 
indirectly.  
 
The third, and final, financial indicator is “private,”4 and it is the ratio of credit issued 
from the private sector to the GDP, which implies that the more credit issued to the 
private sector, the more efficient the financial system is in resources allocation. What is 
worth noting is that the underlining presumption is that the private sector uses funds 
more efficiently than the public sector. King and Levine (1993a) argued that although 
the second and third indicators may not reflect the size and efficiency of a financial 
system directly, when combined with the first indictor, measurements complement the 
finance–growth nexus. 
 
2.5.2 Contemporary panel studies 
 
With the development of econometric technology, accounting for both cross-sectional 
4 There are four indicators adopted in King and Levine’s (1993a) study, but two are 
concerned with credit issued to the private sector; one is the ratio of credit issued to the 
private sector to total credit issued, and the other is the ratio of credit issued to the 
private sector to the GDP. These two indicators are considered the same for this thesis.  
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 analyses and time dimensions, using panel datasets and related econometric techniques 
have dominated finance–growth empirical studies in recent years. The advantages of 
using a panel technique are obvious. For one, according to Hsiao (1986), it can enlarge 
the number of observances in a dataset by introducing a time dimension. Second, 
Levine et al. (2000) pointed out that a panel technique can effectively control for 
unobserved section-specific effects, which are classified as the error term in regressions 
with pure cross-sectional data. For country-level studies, empirical results show that the 
development of a financial system can positively accelerate economic growth (Beck & 
Levine, 2002, 2004; Beck et al., 2000; Benhabib & Spiegel, 2000; Levine et al., 2000; 
Rousseau & Wachtel, 2000, 2002). Studies at the firm and industry levels found that 
financial development can largely affect the growth of firms and industries by easing 
constraints of external finance and stimulating investment (Demirguc-Kunt & 
Maksimovic, 1998; Rajan & Zingales, 1998; Wurgler, 2000).  
 
Another trend in the literature is to add stock markets to empirical models. In Arestis, 
Demetriades, and Luintel (2001), banks and stock markets can be seen as substitutive 
sources for corporate finance, so estimating banking sector development would only 
lead to a bias in assessing the finance-growth nexus. Focusing on providing liquidity, 
empirical results show that stock markets can significantly stimulate growth (Atje & 
Jovanovic, 1993; Beck & Levine (2004); Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1998; Levine 
& Zervos, 1998; Rousseau & Wachtel, 2000; Shen & Lee, 2006).  
 
By employing instrumental variables in the debate of whether the banking sector or 
stock markets promote economic development more effectively, a view of law and 
finance emerges. The theoretical assumption is straightforward because modern finance 
is based on contracts; legal origins can influence law systems by protecting investors’ 
69 
 
 rights and enforcing contracts. These, in turn, can to a certain extent affect the 
efficiency and structure of financial systems. La Porta et al. (1998) first introduced legal 
origins as instrumental variables. In a regression model, Levine et al. (2000) used the 
same set of legal origins, and found that by controlling for the effect of legal origins, the 
linkage between financial intermediary development and long-term growth remained 
positive. Furthermore, their results also showed that legal origins could be vital in 
determining financial development. Levine (2002) and Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Levine (2003) later confirmed these results. In particular country studies, Allen et al. 
(2005) associated the legal sector with the finance–growth nexus in their comparison 
study of China and other economies, and found the connections are complex. 
 
2.5.3 Limitations of cross country studies 
 
Most of the cross-country, regression-based empirical tests are designed according to 
the regression model by Barro (1991), and modified with additional financial indicators 
or instrumental variables. Ang (2008) argued that the single equation approach is too 
simple to explain the complex relationship between finance and growth. In contrast to 
the theoretical literature on the finance–growth nexus, which assumes a two-way causal 
relationship between finance and growth, most empirical studies take the view that 
finance leads to growth and treat financial indicators as independent variables in their 
regressions. In this latter view, theoretical models and empirical studies are 
disconnected because this is a conceptual problem. 
 
Putting finance and growth indicators on two sides of the same equation led to the idea 
that financial development affects economic development. A positive finance–growth 
relationship that has been investigated statistically to determine whether, like in the 
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 mainstream literature, finance spurs growth by easing market frictions or through other 
ways that are hard to prove. As proposed by Aziz (2008), simply testing the correlation 
between financial development proxies and economic growth cannot capture the 
connection between finance and growth, especially in fast-changing economies, such as 
in China and India. Aziz wrote that the mechanism between finance and development is 
“more deep rooted and complicated” (Aziz, 2008, p. 5). 
 
Data limitation is another restriction. The wide use of aggregated data across countries 
causes the inability to distinguish country-specific effects. As Solow (2001) argued, 
although different economies may share some common features, distinctive 
characteristics still exist. This raises a second issue: grouping countries in different 
ways can lead to different conclusions. Fernandez and Galetovic (1994) argued that if 
King and Levine’s (1993a) dataset were divided into OECD (Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development) and non-OECD countries, the supposed 
positive correlation in OECD countries would become insignificant. For example, if 
Japan were excluded from the OECD country sample, the correlation would be 
essentially zero. Driffill (2003) indicated that in Levine and Zervos’s (1998) dataset, the 
significance of financial indicators in the regression is largely due to the strong growth 
performance of the Asian Tigers before the 1997 Asian crisis. By controlling for legal 
and social factors in Levine and Zervos’s (1998) dataset, Garretsen, Lensink, and 
Sterken (2004) found that there are no positive links between stock market development 
and economic growth. Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) reassessed the results from King 
and Levine’s (1993a) influential study. By extending the original timeframe of 1960–
1989 to 1960–2004, Rousseau and Wachtel argued that the significant and positive 
linkage between financial and growth indicators tended to diminish after 1989, and the 
reason, suggested by the authors, is the increasing frequency of financial crises starting 
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 in the late 1970s. Their conclusion is that financial development, as measured by 
financial deepening, may not always have a positive effect on economic development. 
Excessive and rapid financial deepening can also bring inflation and financial crises. 
 
A third potential bias was raised by Ang (2008): Without considering the complexity of 
the evolution of financial environments and historical aspects of economic development, 
general cross-country analyses cannot capture specific features of a country. A 
global-level positive relationship between financial development and economic growth 
can be negatively or positively affected by the performance of an individual country or 
by exogenous shocks. Demestriades and Hussein (1996) reported that the experiences of 
economic development and financial development from different countries are all 
treated as homogeneous entities, which can hardly reflect the differences of institutional 
and structural characteristics across countries. 
 
The lack of high-quality data to measure country-specific effects, or not considering 
individual countries’ financial backgrounds, development paths, or other historical 
contexts, could affect the robustness of empirical results obtained from cross-country 
finance–growth studies and leave related policy implications unanswered. 
 
2.5.4 Time series studies and limitations  
 
Along with using cross-country regressions, another trend in the empirical literature on 
finance and growth is to employ time series analyses in particular county case studies. 
The main advantage of this approach is that it makes it possible to formally test the 
causality between finance and growth. In other words, the question of whether finance 
leads or follows growth can be examined systematically. During the 1990s, in the 
evolution of econometric techniques, normal vector autoregressive models (VARs) and 
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 Granger-type causality tests dominated time series-based empirical studies (see 
Demetriades & Hussein, 1996; Gupta, 1984; Jung, 1986). More recently, empirical 
studies have employed the error-correction model (ECM), the vector error-correction 
model (VECM), principal component analysis (PCA), and other advantaged time-series 
approaches (see Arestis & Demitriades, 1997; Arestis et al., 2001; Arestis, Luintel, & 
Luintel, 2004; Demetriades & Hussein, 1996). Developed by Johansen (1988, 1991), 
the ECM and VECM methods make it possible to test the long-term causality between 
finance and growth. 
 
For constructing financial development indicators, similar indicators are adopted when 
comparing cross-country studies. Two common indicators, the ratios of M2/GDP and 
M3/GDP, are used to measure the size of a financial system. The ratio of bank credits 
issued to the private sector to GDP (private credits/GDP) is applied to measure the 
development of the banking sector, while the measurement of stock market 
development largely follows the work by Levine and Zervos (1998), using the total 
value of domestic shares and the trading value of domestic exchanged to measure stock 
markets activities.  
 
While many empirical studies detected a positive correlation in the finance–growth 
nexus, results for causality were mixed across countries. Some studies suggested a 
one-way causal relationship, from finance to growth (Bell & Rousseau, 2001; Gupta, 
1984; Jung, 1986; Neusser & Kugler, 1998; Rousseau & Vuthipadadorn, 2005). Other 
studies showed the reverse (Arestis & Demetriades, 1997; Demetriades & Hussein, 
1996). Some studies, meanwhile, indicated a bi-directional causality (Luintel & Khan, 
1999).  
 
In examining whether the banking sector or stock markets promoted higher growth, 
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 Arestis et al. (2001) found a negative correlation between stock markets and economic 
growth in Japan, France, and the United Kingdom. They argued that stock markets and 
banking sectors are substitutive sources for corporate finance, and that an 
overemphasized stock market implies that the structure of a financial system does 
matter. 
 
There are two key issues in a time series approach. The first is the restriction of the time 
span of the dataset. Theoretically, in some time series methods, for example, the VAR 
approach, the frequency of a dataset has little impact on the final results, which means 
that the choice of annual, quarterly, or monthly data would not bias the empirical results. 
This is true, however, only if there are enough observations, that is, a sufficient time 
span of the dataset. To explore a long-term relationship between finance and growth, 
time series-based empirical results are sensitive to the time span. The majority of 
studies developed datasets in a range of 20 to 50 years, but even 50 years may not be 
long enough to produce reliable and accurate results.  
 
A more serious problem is the reliability of the Granger causality test. In a single 
regression equation, if variable X helps predict the future value of variable Y, then X 
Granger-causes Y. Demetriades and Andrianova (2004, p. 43) found that X 
Granger-causes Y does not have the same meaning as X causes Y. It is very likely that 
there exists another unobserved factor, Z, which is the true cause of both X and Y. 
Therefore, X Granger-causes Y only suggests that X contains some information to 
predict the future time path of Y. As suggested by Demetriades and Andrianova (2004), 
an appropriate version of expression from the results of the finance–growth nexus 
Granger causality test is that finance is a leading indicator of economic growth, or vice 
versa. 
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2.5.5 China case studies 
 
Before reviewing the empirical studies of the finance-growth nexus in the Chinese 
economy, three points need to be raised. First, China is a large country with 31 
provinces, 5  making it possible to apply a cross-sectional analysis by using a 
provincial-level dataset. Second, since the late 1970s, China has undergone remarkable 
economic reform, transitioning from a Soviet Union-type model to a more 
market-oriented one. This implies that it would be appropriate to apply Western 
economic theory, which draws on market economy, in the context of China’s post-1978 
economy. Third, as a transitional economy, some economic data is not available, 
especially from early in the transition. Although the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China has made great efforts to trace historical economic statistics under the System of 
National Accounts, missing data, especially at the province and city levels, is still very 
common. Therefore, it is not surprising that financial development in China is usually 
assessed with alternative financial development indicators that slightly differ from those 
employed in global-level or regional-level cross-country studies.  
 
It is not surprising therefore that China has been excluded in some of the most 
influential cross-country studies. It was not until the early 2000s that more studies 
focused on China, in both cross-country and single-country case studies. By 
constructing a provincial-level dataset, the majority of China’s case studies applied 
panel analyses, while more recently some studies have applied time series analyses. A 
summary of major finance-growth studies on China is presented at the end of this 
chapter in Table 2.2.  
5 Actually, there are 31 administrative regions in China, including 27 provinces and 4 
Direct Administrative Municipalities. 
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Because of the unavailability of provincial-level M2 and liquid liabilities data, most 
panel studies developed their indictors by using the ratio of domestic bank deposits to 
GDP to measure the size of a banking sector at the provincial level (Boyreau-Debray, 
2003; Cheng & Degryse, 2010; Hao, 2006; Ren, 2007). In national time series studies, 
both the ratio of M2 to GDP and the ratio of domestic bank deposits to GDP are 
employed to measure the size of a banking sector (Fan, Jacobs, & Lensink, 2005; Jalil 
& Ma, 2008; Liang & Teng, 2006; Liu & Shu, 2002). Another proxy is the ratio of loans 
extended by SOBs to GDP (Boyreau-Debray, 2003; Hasan & Zhou, 2006; Hao, 2006). 
The assumption is that SOBs may prefer to issue credit to even unprofitable, inefficient 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), given their close relationship with the government. 
Therefore, this indicator attempts to measure the efficiency of allocating financial 
resources of the financial system as a whole by measuring the (in)efficiency of credit 
provision from the SOBs. An alternative indictor for the ratio of loans from SOBs to 
GDP is the ratio of total credit issued to the private sector to GDP (private credits/GDP) 
(Guillumont-Jeannency, Hua, & Liang, 2006; Jalil, Feridun, & Ma, 2010; Liang, 2005, 
2008; Shan, Feridun, & Ma, 2001). However, the use of private credit to GDP ratio 
could underestimate the degree of financial deepening in China, given that many types 
of enterprises, even those with foreign funds, are both SOEs and private enterprises, that 
is, mixed ownership (Zhang, Wan, & Jin, 2007, p. 40). Purely private-owned enterprises 
were still limited. Drawing on this point, Zhang et al. (2007, p. 41) developed an 
alternative financial deepening indictor, namely credit issued to non-SOEs over GDP 
ratio. To construct this variable, given that the proportion of credit extended to SOEs 
over total credit at the province level is not publicly available, Zhang et al. generated 
SOEs’ shares of total credit granted with the proxy of SOEs’ shares of total output, with 
the assumption there is a strong correlation between SOEs’ share of total credit and their 
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 output share. 
 
Litter effort has been made to measure the development of the stock market in China, 
and the reason is quite simple. Being launched in the early 1990s, the Chinese stock 
market has grown quickly with the establishment of the Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange. However, overall, they share a comparatively small stake in 
all financial activities. In other words, the importance of the stock market in China is 
not nearly as vital as the banking sector. According to the empirical results from Ren 
(2007), who applied three traditional stock market indicators with the reference of 
Levine and Zervos (1998), plus an indicator for the daily percent change of the 
Shanghai composite price index, into a growth equation, there is no causal relationship 
between the development of stock markets and economic growth in China. 
 
Generally, the empirical results from study to study are mixed. In some pioneering 
studies, a positive relationship between financial development and economic growth 
was not identified (Aziz & Duenwald, 2002; Boyreau-Debray, 2003; Chang, 2002). The 
connection between banking sector development and growth in China is certainly weak. 
As argued by Boyreau-Debray (2003), this could be due to the dominance of SOBs in 
China’s banking industry and because of the high volume of nonperforming loans 
(NPLs) in SOBs. These could have a strong negative effect on China’s overall economic 
performance. In more recent studies, a positive finance–growth linkage has been 
captured (see Cheng & Degryse, 2010; Hao, 2006; Li, 2009). The results from 
Granger-type causality studies are, however, mixed. Liang and Teng (2006), Shan et al. 
(2001), and Shan (2005) all suggested a one-way causal connection from economic 
growth to financial development. Liu and Shu (2002) argued that the linkage is two-way, 
while Chang (2002) and Ren (2007) indicated that the association between these two 
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 variables in China are negligible and independent.  
 
In Demetriades and Andrianova (2004), the positive relationship of the finance–growth 
nexus is accepted as measured by a long-term growth rate or by the level of per capita 
GDP, though what is less sure is the causality. Looking at empirical data on China, the 
situation is quite similar. A positive relationship has been largely captured in existing 
studies, but the causality remains complex. Studies are now using larger databases and 
more advanced econometric methods, but determining how to gain better measurement 
of financial development to link both theory and evidence remains vital. 
 
2.5.6 Limitations of China’s case studies 
 
Although most of the case studies on China suggest a positive relationship between 
financial development and economic growth, it may only imply a positive correlation 
between the size of its financial sector and economic growth, given that the links 
between theories and evidence are becoming out of touch with each other. Theoretical 
models emphasize the efficiency of a financial system, but empirical studies measure 
size. A larger financial sector does not mean a better match of savings and investment or 
the ability to create credit more efficiently. 
 
When talking about the limitations of case studies on China, the main critique is the 
“simple applying” approach using international experience. Existing empirical methods 
on the finance–growth nexus are based on the theoretical models developed from the 
observations and experiences of more advanced Western economies. Therefore, a 
“simple applying” solution largely neglects some specific features of the Chinese 
economy. In order to achieve a better understanding of the finance–growth nexus in 
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 China, its financial structure, institutional organization, economic reforms, and some 
historical contexts need to be taken under consideration. Although applying 
provincial-level data in China, rather than cross-country analyses, allows for some 
control of specific features of the Chinese economy, it is worth noting that the 
“decentralization” strategy of the state government body since 1994 may lead to certain 
levels of bias. The continuous process of industrialization mainly drives China’s 
economic, so how well SOBs support local, industrial SOEs is vitally important. That is 
to say, different developmental policies, advocated by different levels of governments 
from region to region, can lead to different local financial-sector performance, and thus 
industrial performance.  
 
Continuous liberalization, commercialization, and internationalization are three main 
aspects of China’s economic reform, but at the same time China’s financial system 
remains a mixed system with strong market-supplanting elements (Lo et al., 2011). 
According to the basic assumption of mainstream literature, in which the private sector 
is seen as more efficient than the state sector, the Chinese financial system is labeled as 
inefficient because of the dominance of SOBs and the continual lending to SOEs. 
However, when linking China’s so-called inefficient financial system with its overall 
economic performance over the past 30 years, it is hard to explain how this financial 
system supported remarkable economic achievement. The conclusions of such empirical 
studies on finance–growth in China are quite similar, no matter what empirical results 
have been produced: positive, negative or insignificant. The similarities are that if 
finance accelerates growth in China, the gains are mainly due to market-oriented 
reforms; and if a positive nexus is not found, the most likely reason is insufficient 
market-oriented reforms.  
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 The rationality for using China-specific financial development indicators — such as the 
percentage of loans extended from SOBs to GDP — to measure efficiency of the 
financial system is based on presumptions that may not be substantially valid in an 
impure market-oriented economy with an impure market-determined system. Whether 
SOBs are comparatively less efficient than non-SOBs or whether the private sector uses 
funds more efficiently than SOEs remains debatable.  
 
The East Asian miracle6 and the China “miracle” show the importance of the role of 
government in guiding economic development. Under certain circumstances, 
governments can process information and allocate resources more efficiently when 
there is market failure and information asymmetry. Even in the neoclassical tradition, 
Andrianova, Demetriades & Shortland (2012) developed their models to determine the 
influence of government ownership of banks on economic development by extending 
and reexamining the dataset in La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes & Shleifer (2002). 
According to Andrianova et al.’s results, from a sample of 128 countries studied 
between 1995 and 2007, government ownership of banks was not harmful to economic 
development. This is not surprising, because the economies of countries with SOBs 
generally grow faster than those without SOBs. 
 
Empirical studies on the Chinese finance-growth nexus following the neoclassical 
approach explain only part of the story. For example, how financial development 
mechanisms affect economic growth (the interaction between savings and investment) 
has not been studied, so that the interactive linkages between finance and real sector 
development remain unclear. Additionally, financial development indictors cannot be 
6 The East Asian miracle referred the strong economic performance of Hong Kong, 
Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan (i.e., the four Asian Tigers) between the early 
1960s and 1990s. 
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 used to directly assess efficiency, and the application of some indictors are questionable 
because their usage is based on presumptions that hold only in pure market economies.  
 
2.5.7 Investigation of the interaction between financial systems and 
economic development in China 
 
A small number of studies have tried to assess the finance–growth nexus through 
alternative approaches. One approach is to emphasize the infeasibility of applying 
commercial criteria to analyze China’s financial system. For Laurenceson and Chai 
(2003), a feature of China’s banking sector, especially in the SOBs, is the continuous 
embodiment of both commercial and developmental attributes started in the late 1970s. 
The objective of SOBs is not only profit-oriented, but also development-oriented. SOBs 
facilitate real sector development by enhancing the productivity of industrial enterprises, 
stimulating capital accumulation, and correcting market failures. However, SOBs are 
also responsible for social development objectives, such as social safety improvements 
and easing of regional inequalities. Therefore, a purely profit-oriented assessment of a 
mixed financial system is not appropriate. From the angle of promoting social 
development, lending behaviors of SOBs, especially in the first half of the reform 
period, share some of the features of fiscal expenditures. 
 
Lo et al. (2011) also emphasize a mixed financial system with strong 
market-supplanting elements. The empirical results of Laurenceson and Chai’s and Lo 
et al.’s studies largely show that China’s SOB-dominated banking sector has supported 
China’s economic development quite well. As stated above, in the mainstream doctrine, 
one reason SOBs are considered inefficient is their continual lending to SOEs. 
Laurenceson and Chai (2003) and Lo et al. (2011) started with different focuses, yet 
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 both rejected this argument. Laurenceson and Chai reexamined the relative productivity 
of SOEs in China, and argued that the efficiency or productivity of SOEs is not as low 
as expected in mainstream studies, when under the context of state and non-state sector 
comparison. They found that a particular contribution of the Chinese financial system is 
selecting and lending to productive SOEs. Lo et al. insisted on the importance of 
introducing alternative theories to broaden the field of vision. By introducing the 
concept of “productive efficiency” in the Chinese financial system, from the 
Keynesian-Schumpeterian theory of credit creation, Lo et al. found that it is the strong 
market-supplanting elements in the Chinese financial system that made significant 
contributions to China’s economic development, in which productive efficiency gains in 
the financial system outweighed the losses in allocative efficiency. Sun (2006) tested the 
hypothesis of endogenous money from different schools of endogenous credit supply in 
the post-Keynesian tradition by investigating endogenous finance mechanisms that 
actively deliver economic development through the savings–lending behavior of 
Chinese banks. 
 
A second approach is to indirectly analyze the efficiency of financial systems by 
assessing investment and financial interactions in economic growth. This approach 
evaluates the interactions of capital accumulation and the productivity of capital and 
economic development from the perspective of finance. The hypothesis behind this 
approach is straightforward: if financial development happens during certain periods, a 
financial system should channel savings into more productive investment and provide 
increased financial resources to more projects. These actions can be observed through 
either an increased pace of capital accumulation or increased productivity of capital. 
Xiong (2010) estimated the relationship between investment efficiency, real interest 
rates, and financial deepening by applying a provincial dataset that covered 1987 to 
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 2004; the results showed that financial development has made positive and significant 
contributions to investment efficiency overall, especially in the industrial and service 
sectors. In this study, investment and financial development efficiencies were estimated 
using the Incremental Capital Output Ratio (ICOR). He (2003) designed his model to 
assess financial development, and examined the cointegration linkage among the 
following three variables: the ICOR, the share of funds channeled by financial 
intermediation in total fixed asset investment, and total fixed asset investment as a 
proportion of GDP. The main results from He are in line with Xiong, who captured a 
positive correlation between financial development and investment efficiency. He 
further indicated that between 1981 and 2002, financial intermediation did a better job 
of supporting investment expansion than improving investment efficiency. This same 
result was found by Lo et al. (2011).  
 
Zhang (2005) also emphasized the efficiency of investment. Following the logic that 
financial development increases investment efficiency and the enhancement in 
investment efficiency spurs economic development. Zhang (2005) focused on the 
second part of this story. By comparing the ICOR of the state-owned sector to the 
non-state sector, Zhang found that the overall investment efficiency of the Chinese 
economy has improved since the early 1980s, and that it is largely due to the rapid and 
efficient improvements made in the non-state sector. However, at the same time, the 
financial system still channels the majority of its financial resources into the state sector. 
Therefore, without further financial sector reforms, especially in lending behaviors, 
China’s future growth could be affected.  
 
Feldstein-Horioka (1980) examined cross-regional capital mobility as reflections of the 
level of financial integration and the allocative efficiency of a financial system. The 
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 hypothesis used is simple and straightforward: If there is a perfect capital mobility in 
one economy across regions, which implies an overall efficient financial system that 
can overcome market frictions, there should not be a correlation between aggregate 
savings and investment at the regional level. Both Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2004, 
2005) and Li (2010) examined the relationship between provincial-level savings and 
investment in post-1980 China, and they observed significant Feldstein-Horioka 
coefficients, which indicates a relatively slow movement of capital across the provinces. 
Incremental savings inefficiently retained inside the provinces cannot fuel more 
productive investment across the provinces. This certainly shows a relatively low 
degree of nationwide financial integration across China.  
 
One possible explanation for this, as proposed by Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2004, 
2005), is that there is inefficient resource allocation in state-controlled sectors. By 
breaking down China’s aggregated investment data, by the source of funds over the 
period from 1984 to 2001, Boyreau-Debray and Wei found that only investments 
channeled by foreign direct investment and self-raising funds were positively correlated 
with marginal productivity of capital. For investment channeled by government budgets 
and loans from SOBs, the relationship became negative. A different explanation was 
offered by Watanabe (2006), who took the position that the relative inactive nationwide 
movement of capital was a result of the joint effect of the pace of fiscal reform and 
financial system reform. According to Watanabe, from 1985 to 1998, when the pace of 
fiscal reform was faster than that of capital market development, a weaker cross-broader 
capital movement was observed, but after 1998, when capital markets showed a faster 
development, the converse occurred. 
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 2.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, theoretical and empirical studies on the relationship between financial 
development and economic development were reviewed. In the review of the theoretical 
literature, theoretical models were broken into three groups: the financial liberalization 
model, the endogenous financial intermediation model, and the functional financial 
development model. 
 
In Section 2.2, the original financial repression models of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw 
(1973) were discussed, including that these models argued that financial liberalization 
would lead to an increase in both savings and investment levels, and hence lead to 
capital accumulation and growth. However, the financial liberalization theory suffers 
from criticisms from neostructural scholars, who instead emphasize the role of informal, 
even black financial markets, in developing economies. Furthermore, the disappointing 
results from the application of financial liberalization in Latin American economies in 
the 1980s further question the validity of the theory. In Arestis and Stein (2005), the 
failure is not due to a sequencing problem, but to a natural weakness of the financial 
liberalization theory: neglecting to consider the institutional endowment of a financial 
system. 
 
Section 2.3 reviewed more contemporary finance–growth theoretical models, under the 
framework of endogenous growth models from the neoclassical doctrine. New growth 
models assume a constant return to scale, or even an increase in return to scale in 
growth determination. Scholars developed models by assuming an endogenous financial 
intermediation in growth determination. Drawing on the concept of market frictions 
(informational asymmetry and transaction costs), an endogenous financial 
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 intermediation is assumed to overcome or smooth over such frictions. A two-way causal 
relationship between financial sector and real sector development has been emphasized 
in these models.  
 
A functional view of financial development, which contains theoretical aspects of the 
mainstream doctrine and the Keynesian–Schumpeterian theory of endogenous finance, 
was reviewed in Section 2.4. Two efficient attributes of financial development were 
distinguished: the allocative efficiency view and productive efficiency view of financial 
development. The key differences between these two efficiencies can be traced to the 
starting point of these two theoretical perspectives. The mainstream view of allocative 
efficiency treats finance as a process of channeling savings into investment funds and, 
hence, creating investment; but in the Keynesian–Schumpeterian view of endogenous 
finance, the process of finance starts with the demands of investment of entrepreneurs, 
and hence banks’ ability to fulfill such willingness. In other words, according to the 
productive efficiency view, the finance process moves from investment to savings. 
Furthermore, it has been argued that these two efficiencies are more likely to be 
complementary than substitutive to each other, as their starting points focused on 
different aspects of the same issue.  
 
Section 2.5 surveyed empirical studies of the finance–growth nexus. Cross-country and 
times series approaches were reviewed, and the limitations of both approaches were 
discussed. The literature on finance and growth in China was reviewed, and it was 
argued that without assessing the mechanisms of how financial development interacts 
with real sector development in a transitional economy, a “simple applying” approach 
can be biased. Finally, alternative approaches that assess the interactive relationships 
between finance and development in China were reviewed. Theses alternative 
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 approaches include emphasizing market-supplanting elements of the Chinese financial 
system, assessing the efficiency of aggregated investment, and studying the interaction 
between aggregated savings and investment.  
  
87 
 
 Table 2.2 Studies of finance and growth 
Author(s) Methodology Data 
coverage 
Time span Financial development 
indicator(s) 
Growth 
indicator(s) 
Main findings for China 
Cross-Sectional and Panel Regression Studies 
Aziz & Duenwald 
(2002) 
Fixed-effects, 
panel regressions 
Provincial 
panel, 27 
provinces 
1988-1997, 
annual 
1. Bank loans/GDP 
2. Bank loans to non-state 
sector/GDP 
1. Real GDP per capita 
growth 
2. Total factor 
productivity 
3. Investment/GDP 
Financial development: no 
significant growth in provinces. 
Boyreau-Debray (2003) 1. First 
differenced 
GMM, dynamic 
panel regressions 
2. System GMM, 
dynamic panel 
regressions 
Provincial 
panel, 29 
provinces 
1990-1999, 
annual 
1. SOB credits/GDP 
2. Bank deposits/GDP 
3. SOB loans/ deposits 
4. Banks concentration index 
Initial real GDP per 
capita 
Financial deepening: no 
contribution to local economic 
performance. Bank credit: 
negatively correlated with 
provincial economic growth. 
Cheng & Degryse 
(2010) 
1. Fixed-effects, 
panel regressions 
2. System GMM, 
dynamic panel 
regressions 
Provincial 
panel, 27 
provinces 
1995-2003, 
annual 
1. Bank deposits/GDP 
2. Bank credits/GDP 
3. Non-bank deposits/GDP 
4. Non-bank credits/GDP 
1. Real GDP per capita 
growth 
2. Initial real GDP per 
capita  
3. Real per capita 
capital stock growth 
4. Initial real GDP 
5. Real capital stock 
growth 
Financial development: 
significant increase in economic 
growth. Non-bank financial 
institutional development: 
negatively correlated with 
economic growth. 
Guillaumont-Jeannency 
et al. (2006) 
System GMM, 
dynamic panel 
regressions 
Provincial 
panel, 29 
provinces 
1993-2001, 
annual 
1. Credits issued to private 
sector/GDP 
2. Credits issued by other than 
the four SOBs/total credits 
1. Total factor 
productivity 
2. Technical efficiency 
growth 
Financial development: 
significant increase of China's 
total factor productivity growth. 
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 3. Credits issued to public 
sector/GDP 
3. Technical progress 
growth 
Hao (2006) System GMM, 
dynamic panel 
regressions 
Provincial 
panel, 28 
provinces 
1985-1999, 
annual 
1. SOB loans/GDP 
2. Household savings 
deposits/GDP 
3. Fixed asset investment 
finances by loans/financed by 
state budgetary 
Initial real GDP per 
capita 
Financial development: 
significant increase in economic 
growth, but loan expansion does 
not promote growth. 
Hasan & Zhou (2006) Fixed-effects, 
panel regressions 
Provincial 
panel, 31 
provinces 
1986-2002, 
annual 
1. SOB loans/GDP 
2. Loans by non-state 
banks/total loans 
3. Corporate bonds 
issuance/GDP 
4. Number of listed firms/total 
firms 
Initial real GDP Financial markets and 
institutional development: 
significant increase in economic 
growth. 
Li (2009) 1. Pooled OLS, 
panel regressions 
2. Fixed-effects, 
panel regressions 
3. 
Random-effects, 
panel regressions 
Provincial 
panel, 26 
provinces 
1980-2004, 
annual 
1. Loans/GDP 
2. Household savings 
deposits/GDP 
3. Loans/state budget for capital 
construction and enterprise 
innovation 
4. Banks concentration index 
1. Initial output per 
worker 
2. Productivity 
improvements in terms 
of level 
3. Physical capital 
accumulation in term 
of level 
4. Output per worker 
growth 
5. Productivity 
improvement in 
growth term 
6.Physical capital 
accumulation in 
Effects of financial development 
to economic growth are sensitive 
to selection of growth indicators; 
relationship between finance and 
growth appears long-term. 
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 growth term 
Liang (2005) System GMM, 
dynamic panel 
regressions 
Provincial 
panel, 29 
provinces 
1990-2001, 
annual 
1. Loans/GDP 
2. Credits issued by other of the 
four major SOBs/Total credits 
3. Credits issued to private 
sector/GDP 
Real GDP per capita 
growth 
Financial development: 
significant increase in economic 
growth. Government 
deregulation in financial sector: 
promotes economic growth. 
Liang (2008) 1. System GMM, 
dynamic panel 
regressions 
Provincial 
panel, 29 
provinces 
1990-2001, 
annual 
1. Loans/GDP 
2. Credits issued by other then 
the major SOBs/total credit 
3. Credit issued to private 
sector/GDP 
Initial real GDP per 
capita 
Financial development: 
significant increase in economic 
growth in coastal provinces, not 
in inland provinces. 
Ren (2007) 1. Fixed-effects, 
panel regressions 
2. 
Random-effects, 
panel regressions 
Provincial 
panel, 30 
provinces 
1985-2002, 
annual 
1. Bank deposits/GDP 
2. SOB loans/deposits 
3. Bank loans/GDP 
4. Banks concentration index 
5. Credit issued by four 
SOBs/total credits 
Real GDP growth Financial development: no 
significant economic growth. All 
five financial indicators 
negatively related to GDP 
growth. 
Zhang, K. (2003) Fixed-effects, 
panel regressions 
7 East and 
Southeast Asian 
countries and 
China, national 
level 
1960-1999, 
annual 
Liquid liabilities (M3)/GDP Real GDP growth Linkage: nothing significant 
between financial development 
and economic growth in 8 East 
Asia countries. 
Zhang et al. (2007) GLS, panel 
regressions 
Provincial 
panel, 29 
provinces 
1987-2001, 
annual 
Bank loans to non-state 
enterprises/GDP 
Total factor 
productivity 
Financial deepening: 
significantly boosts productivity 
growth.  
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 Time Series Studies 
Chang (2002) 1. Multivariate 
VAR model  
2. ECM 
3. Granger 
causality test 
Time series, 
national level 
1987-1999, 
quarterly 
Monetary survey/GDP Initial real GDP Financial development and 
economic growth: relationship is 
independent.  
Demand-following and 
supply-leading hypotheses: 
neither is significance. 
Fan et al. (2005) 1. VECM 
2. Granger 
causality test 
Time series, 
national level 
1992-2004, 
quarterly 
1. M2/GDP 
2. Bank credits/GDP 
3. Market value of all listed 
shares/GDP 
Initial GDP Financial deepening and banking 
sector development: promote 
long-term economic growth but 
effect of stock market is 
negative. 
Jalil & Ma (2008) 1. ARDL 
2. ECM 
Time series, 
China and 
Pakistan, 
national level 
1960-2005, 
annual 
1. M2/GDP 
2. Deposits/GDP 
3. Bank credits/GDP 
Real GDP per capita 
growth 
Financial development and 
economic growth: positive but 
insignificant relationship. 
Jalil et al. (2010) 1. ARDL 
2. ECM 
3. PCA 
Time series, 
national level 
1977-2006, 
annual 
1. Liquid liabilities (M3)/GDP 
2. Credits to private sector/GDP 
3. Commercial bank 
assets/Commercial bank and 
Central bank assets 
Real GDP per capita 
growth 
Financial development: fosters 
economic growth  
Liang & Teng (2006) 1. VARs 
2. Granger 
causality test 
Time series, 
national level 
1952-2001, 
annual 
1. Bank credit/GDP 
2. Deposits/GDP 
Initial real GDP per 
capita 
Financial development: 
positively correlated with 
economic growth; causal 
relationship is one-way 
(economic growth to financial 
development). 
Liu & Shu (2002) 1. VARs 
2. ECM 
3. Granger 
causality test 
Time series, 
national level 
1983-1997, 
quarterly 
1. M2/GDP 
2. Domestic Credits/GDP 
Real GDP per capita 
growth 
Financial development and 
economic growth: relationship 
between is positive and 
significant; causal relationship is 
two-way. 
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 Ren (2007) 1. VARs 
2. Granger 
causality test 
Time series, 
national level 
1995-2004. 
monthly 
1. Bank loans/Industry 
value-added (IVA) 
2. M2/IVA 
3. Market value of all listed 
shares/IVA 
4. Tradable domestic 
shares/IVA 
5. Trades of domestic 
share/tradable market 
capitalization 
6. Daily percent change of 
Shanghai composite price index 
Real IVA growth No evidence that banking sector 
plays leading role in economic 
growth. Combined with financial 
markets, results shows that 
financial development is effect, 
not cause, of economic growth.  
Shan et al. (2001) 1. VARs 
2. Granger 
causality test 
Time series, 9 
OECD 
countries and 
China, national 
level 
1986-1998, 
quarterly 
Bank Loans to private 
sector/GDP 
Real GDP per capita 
growth 
Economic growth to financial 
development: one way causal 
relationship 
Shan (2005) VARs Time series, 10 
OECD 
countries and 
China, national 
level 
1985-1998, 
quarterly 
Total credits Real GDP growth Economic growth to financial 
development: one way causal 
relationship. 
Zhang, K. (2003) OLS Time series, 7 
East and 
Southeast Asian 
countries and 
China, national 
level 
1960-1999, 
annual 
Liquid liabilities (M3)/GDP Real GDP growth Association between finance and 
growth s negligible. 
Note: ARDL = autoregressive distributed lag model; ECM = error-correction model; GLS = generalized least squares; GMM = generalized method of 
moments; OLS = ordinary least squares; PCA = principal component analysis; VAR = vector autoregression models; VECM = vector error-correction 
models. 
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 Chapter 3 
Economic reform and financial sector reform 
in China 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Before starting an analysis of China’s financial development, the major features of the 
Chinese economy will be discussed so as to provide a comprehensive background. 
Following this discussion, China’s financial reforms will be assessed in the order of 
phase of the reform and key events. 
 
Financial-sector reforms in China started simultaneously with the state’s overall 
economic reforms in the late 1970s. Over more than three decades, the main direction of 
these reforms can be concluded as “increasing marketization, commercialization and 
internationalization” (Lo et al. 2011, p. 267). Indeed, by the end of 2011, more than 
3,800 banking institutions had been established, as well as nonbanking financial 
institutions. Financial markets — the money market, bond market, and stock market — 
were created. These institutions and markets grew rapidly; however, strong 
market-supplanting elements, which were a legacy of the previous centrally planned 
period, remained in the system, making China’s financial system mixed. These 
market-supplanting elements, which are largely reflected by state-ownership in the 
financial sector, means that the Chinese financial system is considered inefficient when 
judged by pure market principles. Generally, being bank-based, remaining under state 
influence, and being large but with low efficiency’7 are the three widely regarded 
7 The efficiency here is in terms of the standard of a pure market-determined financial 
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 features of the Chinese financial system. In Cousin (2007), the French phrase un géant 
aux pieds d’argile (clay-footed giant) has been used to describe the Chinese economy 
and its financial system: a gigantic and well-performing economy supported by a 
low-efficiency, frail banking system. 
 
3.2 Background and key aspects of economic reforms since 
1978 
 
3.2.1 Background of overall economic reforms since 1978 
 
Prior to 1978, the Chinese economy was marked as a typical administratively heavy, 
socialist economy that was largely influenced by the Soviet Union model. Starting in the 
1950s, the “centrally administrated big push industrialization: strategy had been adopted, 
as country leaders thought it would be the fastest way to enrich the country (Naughton 
2007, p. 5). The result of this strategy, which was used from the 1950s into the late 
1970s, not only caused both leaps and retrenchments, but also caused the Chinese 
economy to be considered abnormal. On the one hand, according to GDP per capita and 
the levels of urbanization, China was a typical low-income economy; on the other hand, 
when compared with other low-income economies, the levels of industrialization and 
energy consumption in China were exceptionally high (Naughton, 2007, p.10). The 
phenomenon of overindustrialization dominated the pre-reform era, and only since the 
overall economic reforms starting in 1978 has China gained a normal pattern of 
development. 
 
system.  
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 3.2.2 A gradual approach of reform 
 
The year 1976 opened a new period of developmental for the Chinese economy, after 
the Cultural Revolution, which lasted nearly two decades, came to a close. The 
announcement of the “reform and opening up” policy at the Third Plenary Session of 
the 11th Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee in December 1978 
started the economic reforms by abolishing the previous centrally planned model. 
Unlike the economic reforms in former Soviet Union countries, which adopted “shock 
therapy” (i.e., a radical, one-step pro-market reform), via neoliberalism, China 
undertook gradual reforms via the trial-and-error strategy. China’s most fundamental 
change was to introduce market principles. Various ownerships were introduced into the 
economy, and the price system was eased. This gradual transition is reflected throughout 
the entire reform period. For the financial system, the transition from a mono-banking 
system into a modern financial one was not achieved by adopting a package of policies 
at one particular time, but rather through the adoption of different reform policies across 
many years. This evolution of China’s financial reform will be discussed in detail in 
Section 3.3. 
 
Price liberalization and state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform were part of the 
gradualism approach. In the pre-reform period, the price of goods and other factors were 
not determined by the power of the market, but were directly set by the government. 
Therefore, the first challenges the Chinese government faced were to loosen its control 
and to introduce a dual-track price system. Before the reforms, all industrial enterprises 
were state-owned, and the objective was not profits, but completing the production 
quota set within the state plans. In the dual-track price system, the price of input factors, 
such as materials used in meeting production quotas, were still fixed by the state, 
though at far lower than true market prices. Simultaneously, the prices of factors that 
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 used for profit-making purposes became more market-based. Pricing liberalization 
occurred slowly so as to accommodate the process of overall reform. The removal of 
SOE production quotas and China joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) were 
two particularly significant steps in releasing state control of pricing. However, the 
dual-track price system and price controls still exist. For example, it was not until 
March 2013 that the dual-track price system for both coal and electricity were finally 
removed, allowing prices for these commodities to be determined by the market. 
Originally, Jia Ge Chuang Guan (shock therapy of price reform) had been planned by 
the central government in 1988, but it was postponed because of an unexpected run on 
banks, caused by the expectation of future high inflation. Radical price reform policies 
have never been adopted, and the gradualism approach still continues.  
 
To reform China’s SOEs, several steps have taken place, which is in line with the 
gradualism principle. Marketization was the initial reform, in which SOEs were given 
greater autonomy in their operation and management, and their objectives were 
gradually switched to be more profit-oriented. The eventual abolishment of production 
quotas and government subsidies, and the introduction of market-based pricing, led to 
even fewer interventions from the government on SOEs’ operation.  
 
SOEs were finally given financial independence, which meant that their working capital 
and investment funds were not financed by budgetary fiscal expenditure anymore, but 
by loans from the banking sector. At the same time, however, this caused a new problem 
of soft budget constraint, which was followed by the problem of nonperforming loans 
(NPLs) in the banking sector. Although the financial backing of SOEs had switched 
from the state to bank credit, the remaining state ownership of both banks and industrial 
enterprises led to the situation that loans were not generated by pure market principles. 
When SOEs face insolvency, for example, state-owned banks (SOBs) are always 
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 required by a local government to extend lending or to provide further funds in order to 
avoid the problems such as unemployment and socioeconomic instability. Such 
situations nowadays rarely occur because of the deepening of reforms in both the SOEs 
and the financial sector. On the one hand, banks are becoming more liberal and 
profit-oriented, so that they do not have to lend to insolvent SOEs. On the other hand, 
SOEs with financial problems are now allowed to collapse. 
 
Another step occurred with the share-holding reforms of SOEs: the partial privatization 
of the state ownership. State ownerships in SOEs are reflected by the percent of shares 
held by state-owned investment companies or different government bodies. When SOEs 
become publicly listed, institutional investors, as well as ordinary citizens, become 
eligible to buy and trade the remaining shares in circulation.  
 
SOEs’ ownership reform is regarded as the hardest but most important step in China’s 
corporate-sector transition. Unlike the rapid and complete privatization approach 
adopted in former Soviet Union economies, some state ownership in China has been 
maintained. In addition to the gradualism principle, the government started another 
principle during its ownership reform: Zhua Da Fang Xiao (grasping the large and 
letting the small go). According to this principle, SOEs are classified into two groups: 
important large-sized, or less important small- or medium-sized. SOEs in the first group 
are usually energy, telecommunication, heavy industrial, and national defense 
enterprises. For the reason of national security, their state ownership is still retained by 
the government in the form of state share-holding. For the second type of SOEs, they 
were allowed, and even encouraged, to transform to private or mixed ownership in order 
to improve efficiency through market competition and enhanced self-adaptive 
capacities.  
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 Along with reforming SOEs, ownership reform also took place through the 
diversification of different ownerships. Foreign investors were first welcomed in 1979 
by creating joint-venture enterprises with local companies in special economic zones in 
the Guangdong and Fujian provinces; after China joined the WTO in 2001, wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises were allowed to be established. Another initiative was to 
allow local governments in rural areas to create and pursue Township and Village 
Enterprises (TVEs) development strategies. The establishment TVEs not only absorbed 
laborers who had been let go from the agriculture sector in rural areas, but it also 
deepened the diversification of enterprises’ ownership structure.  
 
3.2.3 Economic overview 
 
After more than 30 years of reforms, China’s has a “mixed” economic system that is 
considered a “market socialist economy,” because it contains both market resource 
allocation and state ownership. This system has undergone significant economic 
development. China’s GDP surpassed Japan’s, and China became the world’s second 
largest economy, after the United States, starting in 2010. In 2011, the nominal GDP of 
China’s economy reached 47,310 billion CNY (USD 7,318 billion). Table 3.1, which 
includes select economic indicators for China, provides a brief review of China’s 
macroeconomic condition.  
 
 
China’s GDP growth rate in a world comparison (see Table 3.2), on the one hand, shows 
an average of double-digit growth over the last three decades. On the other hand, 
economic growth between China and the rest of the developing world (the categories of 
low income and middle income”), has shown great divergence. Under the influence of 
neoliberalism starting in late 1970s, China is an example of a country that did not suffer 
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 from “lost decades,” as frequently happens across the developing world. In Lo and Li 
(2011), China’s quick economic development is attributable to continuous 
industrialization and capital deepening. In most developing economies, there have been 
periods of deindustrialization, or at least industrial stagnation. 
Table 3.1 Macroeconomic Indicators for China (2011) 
GDP (current bln CNY) 47310.41 
   Real GDP % change 9.3 
Government Revenue (% of GDP) 21.97 
Total Value of Imports & Exports (% of GDP)  49.99 
Trade balance (bln USD) 154.9 
Gross domestic savings (% of GDP) 52.52 
Gross domestic capital formation (% of GDP) 48.45 
Foreign direct investment (current bln USD) 116.01 
Loans extended by financial institutions (% of 
GDP) 123.05 
Population (mln) 1347.35 
Per Capita GDP (CNY) 35198 
Exchange rate (average, CNY:USD) 6.4588 
Source: China Statistic Yearbook (2013) 
Table 3.2 China’s economic growth and international comparison, 1961–2011 
Country Name 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-2000 2001-11 
China 4.65  6.28  9.35  10.45  10.38  
Brazil 6.19  8.51  1.65  2.56  3.56  
Russia   -3.00  -3.61  4.86  
India 4.03  3.08  5.57  5.57  7.41  
South Africa 6.00  3.39  1.54  1.84  3.49  
Japan 9.30  4.50  4.64  1.14  0.64  
United States 4.21  3.27  3.25  3.44  1.58  
Germany  2.91  2.34  1.95  1.19  
Korea 8.26  7.30  8.74  6.19  4.12  
Low income 3.82  2.10  2.77  2.80  5.44  
Middle income 5.16  5.34  3.10  3.84  6.05  
High income 5.38  3.64  3.29  2.66  1.59  
East Asia & Pacific 8.35  4.85  5.17  3.02  3.64  
Europe & Central Asia 4.99  3.17  2.44  1.89  1.72  
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
5.44  5.64  1.31  3.26  3.43  
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.96  3.69  1.86  2.34  4.73  
Middle East & North 
Africa 
9.20  8.64  1.81  4.10  4.38  
South Asia 4.31  3.05  5.45  5.29  6.91  
Source: World Bank (2013) 
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However, China is still a low-middle income country because of its large population 
base. Although GDP per capita in China has risen gradually, from less than USD 200 at 
the beginning of the reforms in 1978, to more than USD 5,000 in 2011 (World Bank, 
2013), it only was ranked as number 100 in a world comparison. 
 
There have been structural changes in the Chinese economy; for example, by 2011, the 
agriculture sector had declined from a share of 28% of the economy to around 10%, 
while the service sector increased from 24% to 43%. The industrial sector remained the 
largest sector throughout all the reforming periods, with a share that ranges between 42% 
and 48%. Measured in absolute terms, the industrial sector expanded more than 12 
times since 1980, when the change in price8 was controlled. When various ownerships 
in the industrial sector were introduced, non-state industrial enterprises quickly 
expanded. Before reforms, SOEs dominated the industrial sector with as share of more 
than 80% of total industrial output, but this has reversed through reforms. By 2011, 
SOEs accounted for only a quarter of total output (see Table 3.3). 
 
Table 3.3 Share of industrial output by ownership, % 
Selected Year SOEs non-SOEs 
1970 87.61 12.39 
1975 81.09 18.91 
1980 75.97 24.03 
1985 64.86 35.14 
1990 54.61 45.39 
1995 33.97 66.03 
2000 47.34 52.66 
2005 33.28 66.72 
2010 26.61 73.39 
2011 26.18 73.82 
Source: Author’s calculation. China Statistic Yearbook (various issues).  
 
8 The change of price here is measured by the Producer's Price Index for Manufactured 
Products. 
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 The diversification of ownership structure in the corporate sector, especially in the 
industrial sector, has brought market elements into the economy. More 
market-determined factor prices, especially more market-determined capital prices, 
were vital for China’s economic achievement. China’s financial system — which kept 
pace with economic reforms — facilitated real sector development. With continuous 
support from the financial sector, other sectors’ economic reforms were also successful. 
 
3.3 Financial sector reform 
 
In China, banks are the financial system (Walter & Howie, 2011, p. 27). By the end of 
2010, total assets in the banking sector reached 95,305.3 billion CNY. When compared 
with total market capitalization (26,540 billion CNY in China’s stock market, and 5,050 
billion CNY in total assets of all insurance companies), it is fair to say that banking 
sector dominates financial activities in China. From the perspective of total social 
financing, banks loans are still the most important channel for enterprises to raise 
investment funds, accounting for nearly 60% of all sources of funds (see Table 3.4). 
Given this dominance, this thesis will be mainly focus on bank reform.  
 
 
While financial sector reform occurred simultaneously as China’s economic reform, 
many observers have pointed out that the lag between financial reform and reforms in 
other sectors have widened. However, Cousin (2011, p. 10) argued that state leadership 
has been reluctant to push for deeper reforms in the financial sector because of its 
unwillingness to lose control of capital flows and resource allocation. This account, 
however, may be too general. Top leadership changed over time, so the momentum for 
pushing reform changed over time as well. 
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 Table 3.4 Total Social Financing in China, 2002-2011, RMB billion 
  Bank 
Loans in 
RMB 
Bank Loans 
in Foreign 
Currency 
Entrusted 
Loans 
Trusted 
Loans 
Others* Total 
Social 
Financing 
2002 1847.5 73.1 17.5   30 2011.2 
2003 2765.2 228.5 60.1   306.8 3411.3 
2004 2267.3 138.1 311.8   85 2862.9 
2005 2354.4 141.5 196.1   237.3 3000.8 
2006 3152.3 145.9 269.5 82.5 534.6 4269.6 
2007 3632.3 386.4 337.1 170.2 1331.8 5966.3 
2008 4904.1 194.7 426.2 314.4 991.1 6980.2 
2009 9594.2 926.5 678 436.4 2032.3 13910.4 
2010 7945.1 485.5 874.8 386.5 4019.5 14019.1 
2011 7471.5 571.2 1296.2 203.4 2830.6 12828.6 
Source: China Statistics Yearbook (2012). Others include: undiscounted bankers' 
acceptances, net financing of corporate bonds, and equity financing on the domestic 
stock market by non-financial enterprises. 
 
As described above, financial reform in China followed a gradual approach. However, 
years after the establishment of the two-tiered banking system in 1993, China 
experienced rapid financial liberalization through the establishment of stock markets in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen, SOB shareholding reforms, and more liberalized interest rates. 
The Asian financial crisis in 1997 was a turning point, and it warned China of the risks 
and costs of the potential collapse of its financial system. From that event,, 
strengthening regulations and supervision of the financial sector became more important. 
By the end of 20th century, the big four SOBs were recapitalized by the state and their 
NPLS were redistributed to four newly established Asset management companies. The 
peak of financial liberalization was the public listing of the four SOBs in both domestic 
and Hong Kong stock markets, starting in late 2005. After that time, the speed of 
financial reform suddenly decelerated, which, according to Walter and Howie (2011, p. 
15), can explained by the change in CPC leadership at the end of 2006. Supporting, 
rather than leading, economic development was now favored by the state, in order to 
maintain economic stability.  
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 Over the course of the reforms, the main concentration, or the policy targets, changed. 
Given the different themes of the reforms, and to deliver an in-depth assessment, the 
reforms have been broken into four periods based on several key events and the 
progress of the reforms. The first phase of reform took place between 1978 and 1983, 
and the second phase took place between 1983 and 1989. China started with a 
mono-banking system, but the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) was separated from the 
Ministry of Finance in 1984, and banks in general were established. However, excessive 
lending due to initial financial reforms caused nationwide financial disorder and high 
inflation in the late 1980s. After a short cool-down period, financial reform restarted in 
1993, one year after Deng Xiaoping’s famous southern China tour, which signaled the 
need to keep reforming. Although the 1984 reform made the PBOC a pure central bank 
because a two-tiered banking system had been created, it was not until 1994 that 
improvements were made in institutional and legal environments. In 1994, three 
development-oriented policy banks were created, and the Central Banking Law and 
Commercial Banking Law were promulgated by the National People’s Congress.  
 
After a readjustment period between 1989 and 1993, this thesis marks 1993 through 
2003 as the third phase of reform. During this period, along with additional banking 
sector reforms and better institutional and legal environments, other efforts included the 
development of stock markets and loosening capital control. The Asian financial crises 
in 1997 caused China to decelerate its liberalization of international finance, that is, the 
opening of capital accounts, and it also caused the state to focus on the stability of its 
financial system. During the second half of this phase, particularly after 1998, state 
banks were recapitalized by the state, and a target of public listing (mainly targeting the 
Hong Kong stock market) were been put on the state’s agenda. The stock market was 
aimed at improving corporate governance and risk management.  
 103 
  
The fourth phase started in 2003 and is ongoing. This phase is focused on issues of 
regulation and supervision, especially after the world financial crises that started in 
2007. This thesis takes the position that for foreseeable future, improving financial 
regulations and supervision will remain the focus of the reforms. 
3.3.1 Financial system before the reform 
 
Before 1978, there was no financial system in China. Although some individual banking 
institutions did exist, such as the PBOC, the Bank of China (BOC), and the China 
Construction Bank (CCB; named the People's Construction Bank of China at that time), 
these banking institutions were not the kind of banks expected today. They did not 
mobilize savings, process information, or facilitate investment. Their mission, instead, 
was to fulfill national economic development plans, such as the five-year plans devised 
by the CPC. As capital flows, for the most part, were regulated by these plans, banks 
were simply the cashiers for the government (Xu, 1998, p. 14), at both central and local 
levels. As a result, the PBOC, under the Ministry of Finance, was both the central bank 
and a commercial bank, which is expected in a typical mono-banking system. 
Furthermore, the BOC, which was involved with international financial services, was 
under the PBOC, though very few services were provided. The CCB was actually the 
Capital Construction Investment Division, under the Ministry of Finance. In other 
words, it was the same unit with two different names, which is a distinctive Chinese 
institutional arrangement.  
 
The banking system operated the following way. The National Development and 
Reform Commission (formerly the State Planning Commission) wrote the draft for the 
following year’s financial plan, which listed every financial transaction for the purpose 
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 of facilitating long-term investment projects. This draft was then sent to the Ministry of 
Finance for approval. Once the annual plan was approved, as the cashiers of the 
Ministry of Finance, the banks accepted savings from households and SOEs, and 
provided funds and working capital to particular sectors and for particular projects 
according to the financial plan. The only bank operations not predetermined in the 
yearly plan was short-term loans.  
 
The functions of financial intermediation were limited, as were the functions of issuing 
currency and adjusting macroeconomic environments; there were not considered as 
business areas of the PBOC or other banking institutions. There were no other kinds of 
financial institutions and no financial markets, which left plenty of space for future 
reform. 
 
The weaknesses of the system before 1978 are obvious. First, savings were not 
mobilized to generate more loanable, investment funds, but for absorbing excess money 
in the economic circulation (Xu, 1988, p. 14). This means there were no incentives for 
banks to improve their efficiency in pooling savings and transforming savings to 
investment. Second, as long-term loans and working capital was not determined by 
market entities, the efficacy of the funds utilization was usually low and not guaranteed. 
Effective regulations and supervision was also nonexistent. Third, long-term loans for 
project investment were predetermined by the plans. The dearth of effective instruments 
on the market, for example, interest rates, made it hard to determine the accurate 
amount needed for future investment, which weakened the effectiveness of future plans. 
 
The domination of state and collective ownership in the corporate sector during the 
central planning years largely effaced the entrepreneurship of firms in Keynesian–
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 Schumpeterian terms. There was no room for banks to have an effect on economic 
development. Financial reforms, aimed at providing more effective resource allocation, 
only occurred after economic reform had taken place.  
 
3.3.2 The first phase of reform: 1978 to 1983 
 
Moving form a centrally planned economy to an economy with market attributes, the 
primary objective of financial reform was to change the financial mechanisms of 
resource allocation, that is, switch the plan determined/budget determined model to a 
market determined one. This raised the demand for real financial intermediations — 
conventional banks and a real financial system. As a result, the share of the state budget 
in financing capital investment in SOEs declined dramatically, from more 80% in 1978 
to less than 40% in 1985 (see Table 3.5). 
 
Table 3.5 Investment in Fixed assets in State-owned Enterprises, 1960-1985 
Year Total 
investment  
(Bln Yuan) 
Capital Construction  
Investment  
(Bln Yuan) 
Financed by  
state budget  
(%) 
1960 41.66  38.87  77.63  
1965 21.69  17.96  90.80  
1970 36.81  31.26  87.26  
1975 54.49  40.93  81.98  
1978 66.87  50.10  83.31  
1979 69.94  52.35  79.96  
1980 74.59  55.89  62.49  
1981 66.75  44.29  56.80  
1982 84.53  56.55  48.92  
1983 95.20  59.41  58.20  
1984 118.52  74.32  54.36  
1985 168.05  107.44  39.23  
Source: China Statistic Yearbook (1986) 
 
Several decisions were made by the central government in 1979. In January, the 
People’s Bank of China was separated from the Ministry of Finance. However, despite 
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 this independent status, the PBOC continued to be both the central bank and a 
commercial bank until 1984. In this first phase, the PBOC was both a regulatory body 
and market player in the Chinese financial system until the formal introduction of a 
two-tiered banking system in 1984. At that point, the PBOC acted as only the central 
bank.  
 
In February, the Agriculture Bank of China (ABC) was established as an independent 
bank; prior to this point, it had been under the Rural and Agriculture Financing 
Department within the PBOC. The purpose of this change was to better promote rural 
development, especially in providing better financial services for Township and Village 
Enterprises (TVEs) and supervising Rural Credit Co-operatives (RCCs). In March, 
independent status was also given to the BOC, and its specialization in international 
trade and foreign-related businesses was retained. Meanwhile, one of the BOC’s 
activities, foreign currency administration, was shifted to a newly formed regulatory 
body, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange. The BOC remained the only bank 
that served as an import–export bank, responsible for all exchange-related transactions, 
until 1985, when other banks were permitted to take part in foreign-related businesses. 
The CCB was made nominally independent in August 1979, though it was still managed 
by the Ministry of Finance. However, its function of allocating funds to facilitate SOEs’ 
capital construction changed gradually from distributing interest-free state money to 
extending commercial bank loans. It was until September 1983 that the CCB became a 
fully independent bank. 
 
To conclude, the first phase of financial reform witnessed the establishment of real 
banks in China (see Table 3.6). To accommodate reforms in the corporate sector, the 
role of financial intermediation was highlighted because of the change in the financial 
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 mechanism: from state budget to loans. The experience gained in banking autonomy in 
this phase of reform laid the foundation for future reforms, including the establishment 
of the two-tiered banking system, and new kinds of banking and nonbanking financial 
institutions with various ownership structures. It is worth noting that in this phase of 
reform, nonbanking financial institutions, such as RCCs and Trust and Investment 
Corporations (TICs), were established and entered market competition, providing 
alternative financing channels to real banks. 
 
Table 3.6 Timetable of forming new banking institutions 
Institution  Date Events 
People's Bank 
of China  
Jan. 79 Separated from MOF 
Jan. 84 Detached all commercial businesses; became only 
central bank, responsible for financial regulations 
Aug. 97 Securities regulation duties moved to China Securities 
Regulatory commission  
Sep. 98 Abolished all provincial branches; restructured into 9 
regional branches; not administratively related to 
provincial governments  
Nov. 98 Insurance regulation duties moved to China Insurance 
Regulatory Commission 
Apr. 03 Banking sector regulation duties moved to China 
Banking Regulatory Commission; becomes purely 
monetary agency 
Bank of China  Apr. 79 Separated from PBOC; still responsible for foreign 
exchange-related businesses 
Apr. 94 Specialized bank for foreign-related businesses; no 
longer responsible for foreign exchange administration 
Agriculture 
Bank of China  
Feb. 79 Separated from PBOC 
China 
Construction 
Bank 
Aug. 79 Nominally separated from MOF; specialized to finance 
SOEs’ capital construction projects 
Sep. 83 No longer administrated by MOF; becomes 
independent bank  
Mar. 96 Switching to its current name 
Industrial and 
Commercial 
Bank of China  
Jan. 84 Separated from PBOC; becomes final state-owned bank 
Source: PBOC, BOC, ABC, CCB and ICBC. MOF: Ministry of Finance; PBOC: 
People’s Bank of China.  
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 3.3.3 The second phase of reform: 1983 to 1989 
 
Regaining its position back into the World Bank in the mid-1980s was not only a 
political victory for China; it also implied China’s determination in liberalizing and 
reforming its financial sector to follow in the steps of other advanced economies. On 
January 1, 1984, the PBOC was no longer responsible for commercial banking, as those 
duties were moved to the newly formed Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
(ICBC), and the PBOC officially became only a central bank. With a two-tiered banking 
system framework, at the top tier was the PBOC, which functioned as the monetary 
agency and which was responsible for both monetary policies and currency stability. At 
the second tier were the SOBs, the ABC, the BOC, the CCB, and the ICBC. In addition 
to preserving their own characteristics, these banks also performed as financial 
intermediaries to provide financial services such as mobilizing savings and facilitating 
investment. In addition, before the creation of an independent banking regulatory body, 
the PBOC acted as both the regulatory authority and the Lender of Last resort for the 
SOBs: it acted as both the banker to the government and the bank of banks.  
 
By changing its role to a monetary and regulatory body, the share of PBOC’s total assets 
in the financial system dropped from more than 90% before reforms to nearly 25 
percent in 1986 (Xu, 1998, p. 21). In its new role, the PBOC used direct and indirect 
tools to regulate banks. A credit plan, which determined the amount of money a bank 
could borrow, was published by PBOC on an annual basis. Before the employment of 
more prudential, asset-liability-based management instruments in 1998, these credit 
plans allowed the PBOC to control the scale of total social financing. Reserve 
requirements and short-term liquidity to specialized banks were put in place by the 
PBOC; and interest rates, though kept artificially low to support industrial SOEs, were 
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 also used as a banking management tool by the PBOC. 
 
Between 1985 and 1987, Joint-Stock Commercial Banks (JSCBs) — such as the Bank 
of Communication (BOCOM), the China International Trust and Investment 
Corporation Bank (CITIC), and China Merchants Bank (CMB) — were approved to 
enter the banking industry to promote competition in the financial sector. In addition, 
several regional banks, including the Guangdong Development Bank (now known as 
China Guangfa Bank) and the Shenzhen Development Bank, and the Yantai Housing 
Savings Bank and Bengbu Housing Savings Bank were permitted to be establish by the 
PBOC in the second half of the 1980s. Apart from generating a third tier of banking, 
competition among the SOBs was strengthened by allowing overlapping business areas. 
The other SOBs were gradually allowed to operate foreign exchange-related businesses, 
traditionally assumed to be the exclusive area of the BOC. Meanwhile, the ABC was 
allowed to open branches in urban areas, and was no longer restricted to the agriculture 
and rural sectors.  
 
For nonbanking financial institutions, collective-owned Urban Credit Co-operatives 
(UCCs) grew rapidly in the second half of the 1980s, and filled the market not covered 
by large commercial banks. They extended short-term loans, especially to individuals 
and small private enterprises. In the late 1990s, the UCCs were transformed into City 
Commercial Banks (CCBs). 
 
The second phase of financial reform continued the direction set in the first phase. By 
the end of 1988, there were 20 banking institutions and 745 TICs across China. Given 
the adoption the two-tiered banking framework, real competition among banks emerged, 
though it was limited. With the explosive growth in household savings between 1983 
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 and 1989, a rapid expansion in financial institutions was recorded. Not only did the 
number of institutions expand, but so did the asset levels and scale of credit provided by 
banks. However, the combination of expansionary growth of cheap banking credit and 
artificially repressed interest rates resulted in serious problems over the next several 
years. These problems included nationwide high inflation and social instability. A 
cool-down and adjustment period became necessary, and it was not until 1993 that 
financial reform was restarted. 
 
3.3.4 Adjustment period: 1989 to 1993 
 
The excessive provision of bank loans, with an average annual growth rate higher than 
30% between 1984 and 1986 certainly exacerbated the overheating of the entire 
economy in the second half of the 1980s (see Figure 3.1). The credit boom was largely 
due to the state’s relaxation of credit ceilings. Starting in the mid-1980s, banks were 
allowed to extend more credit if they also collected more savings. The major side effect 
of this boom was an unexpected high inflation rate. The inflation rate, if measured by 
Consumer Pricing Index (CPI), suddenly rose to nearly 20% in 1988 and 1989 in the 
wave of this boom (see Figure 3.1). Furthermore, as mentioned above, the central 
government was planning to adopt a shock therapy for future price reforms, though this 
plan was never set into motion. The combination of these factors caused serious 
problems, including social instability and financial disorder. 
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 Figure 3.1 CPI and bank loan growth rate, 1978–1992, % 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. National Bureau of Statistics of China (2009); Almanac of 
China's Finance and Banking (various issues); China Statistic Yearbook (various issues). 
There is no composite CPI before 1985; pre-1985 data is the CPI in urban areas. 
 
During the cool-down period, no policies on future financial reform were made; and the 
PBOC made several efforts to return financial activities to their normal developmental 
paths. The tool the PBOC employed was a tighter credit ceiling, mainly through 
tightening credit plans. The new ceilings not only put restrictions on bank loans to SOEs, 
but also on loans to TVEs. The ceilings had a two-level structure. On the first level, the 
PBOC regulated credit ceilings on a bank-by-bank basis; on the second level, banks 
themselves deployed ceilings to their local branches. In order to monitor the 
enforcement of ceilings, starting in 1989, which was the second year with an inflation 
rate above 18%, the PBOC requested formal quarterly reports on the implementation of 
ceilings. 
 
Other efforts were made to put the economy back on its developmental path, such as 
raising interest rates and official reserve requirements, and strictly controlling the 
number of central bank credits to commercial banks. In order to protect deposits and to 
keep the interest rate positive, a long-term RMB Value Protected Savings Deposit Plan 
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 (World Bank, 1990, p. 54) was introduced by the PBOC in the third quarter of 1988.  
 
The results of the direct and indirect controls on the financial sector were obvious in 
that the inflation rate been dropped to no more than 5% in 1990, and remained 
moderately low over the next few years. As Walter and Howie (2011, p. 37) observed, it 
was not until Deng Xiaoping’s talks in south China in 1992 that financial reform started 
again.  
 
3.3.5 The third phase of reform: 1994 to 2003 
 
The credit plans and credits ceilings designed by the PBOC highlight the strong state 
interventions in bank lending. It also shows the dominant role of direct credit in bank 
lending, and that loans were not extended on a pure commercial basis. The SOBs were 
still responsible for providing working capital to the SOEs, and the development 
objective was financing investment projects; therefore interest rates were kept 
artificially low when compared with the opportunity cost of returns on investment. The 
lag between cheap credits and relatively high investment returns not only created room 
for investment expansion, but it also created opportunities for the expansion of 
speculative investment activities, such as investment in real properties. One extreme 
example of such speculative activities was the collapsed Hainan real estate bubble in the 
late 1980s, which led to more than 30 credit co-operatives in the Hainan province to 
shut down, leading to the bankruptcy of the Hainan Development Bank in 1998. 
 
Given this background, and with the signal of deepening reforms during Deng’s tour to 
the southern part of China, financial sector reforms were focused on additional 
liberalization, or more accurately commercialization, of the SOBs. Reforms such as 
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 separating developmental banking from commercial banking were approved in 
December 1994 at the Third Plenary Session of the Fourteenth CPC Central Committee, 
in a document titled “Decision of the State Council on Reform of the Financial System.” 
The reform established independent policy banks; and so the China Development Bank 
(CDB), the Agricultural Development Bank of China, and the Export–Import Bank of 
China were formed in following year. With the establishment of these three policy banks, 
the four SOBs were no longer involved in developmental lending. However, this does 
not imply that SOB lending was becoming purely market-determined. For example, 
extending loans to unprofitable SOEs may have been done with the purpose of 
maintaining social stability: financially supported enterprises could continue to pay 
wages to their workers. It was hard to distinguish whether it is the willingness of banks 
to do so or not. One explanation provided by Ma (1996, p. 168) is that until the 1990s, 
local governments retained a strong influence on banks’ local branches. This was 
accomplished through the head officers of provincial branches, including those of the 
PBOC and SOBs: these officers were appointed by the provincial governments, not by 
the headquarter offices of each bank. Therefore, because local governments always had 
economic development as their primary objective, the SOBs worked as both 
development banks and commercial banks, as kind of quasi-fiscal agencies 
(Laurenceson & Chai, 2003, p. 60). This dual role continued until 1998. 
 
Formal institutionalization of the financial sector also occurred during this phase. The 
promulgation of the Commercial Banking Law and Central Banking Law in 1995 
legally fixed the PBOC’s role as a central bank and formally appointed it as the 
regulator and supervisor of both banking and nonbanking financial institutions. (These 
duties continued until a new regulatory body, the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC) was established in 2003.) Article 39 of the Commercial Banking 
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 Law covered the changing methods of bank lending regulations, from the previous 
credit plan model to a more assets-liability-based one. Four points were raised in article 
39: (a) the capital adequacy of commercial banks shall not be lower than 8%; (b) the 
outstanding loans to deposits rate shall not exceed 75%; (c) the ratio of the outstanding 
balance of liquid assets to that of liquid liabilities shall not fall short of 25%; and (d) the 
ratio of the outstanding loans to one borrower to that of the capital of the bank shall not 
exceed 10%. Bank control began to rely less on direct methods, and moved to a 
regulatory framework in accordance with common international practices, that is, the 
Basel Banking Supervision Accords. Consequently, credit plans, usually drafted by the 
PBOC, were eventually abolished in 1998, though a guiding plan on bank credit 
allocation still exists. 
 
Building a more competitive banking environment also deepened banking reform. 
Following the same strategy that created tiers in the banking industry during the second 
phase, starting in 1992, foreign banks were permitted to open branches in large cities. In 
1995, just three years later, there were more than 15 branches and 25 representative 
offices from different foreign banks operating in China, though mostly in the coastal 
areas. However, there were a wave of foreign branch closings after the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997. It was not until 2001, when China became a member of the WTO that 
foreign banks returned. By the end of 2011, after what was known as the “golden 
decade” (Luo, 2011) for the development of foreign banking in China, there were more 
than 180 foreign banking institutions across China, from 45 countries and regions 
(CBRC, 2012).  
 
Starting in 1995, banking competition was increased when the former UCCs became 
CCBs; and it rose again in 1996 with the approval to establish private banks. China 
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 Minsheng Bank became the first private bank established in China whose principal 
shareholders were mainly non-state related enterprises. Although the market share of 
CCBs and private banks was relatively small, a fourth tier of banking system was 
created. As a reminder, the two-tier system included the PBOC and SOBs; the three-tier 
added JSCBs, and now the fourth tier included medium-sized and small-sized banking 
institutions.  
 
Along with banking reforms, financial markets, especially the stock market, also grew 
rapidly during this third phase. During the early stage of stock market development, 
firms that publicly listed on the market were mainly SOEs. Though public listing was 
expected to generate positive impacts on improving SOEs’ corporate governance, the 
scale and ability of channeling investment funds was limited when compared with the 
banking sector. A radical position was held by the economist Wu Jinglian (2001): 
without establishing clear ownership and improving the governance structure of already 
listed firms, the Chinese stock market simply became a casino. This position, which was 
popular in the early 2000s, questioned the effectiveness of channeling investment funds 
and promoting firms’ productivity growth through the stock exchange in China.  
 
By the end of the 1990s, especially after the Asian financial crises in 1997, serious 
problems of the banking system were exposed once again; this time, however, the 
problem were NPLs. Although around 1985 the growth of bank credit dropped a bit 
following credit expansion, during the 1990s until 1997, the growth of bank loans was 
never below a rate of 20% per year (see Figure 3.2). What important to note is that a 
large portion of the bank loans were to support unprofitable and insolvent SOEs. As 
mentioned earlier, SOBs were still active quasi-fiscal agencies of the state. In discussing 
the composition of NPLs, Zhou Xiaochuan (2004), the governor of the PBOC, indicated 
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 that 20% of the NPLs were due to inappropriate internal management, and the 
remaining NPLs were mainly due to state planning, defaults by SOEs, and local 
government interventions.  
 
Figure 3.2 Bank loans growth rate, 1980-2005, % 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (various issues); 
China Statistic Yearbook (various issues) 
 
For the stock of NPLs of SOBs between 1997 and 2000, the estimates from outside 
observers vary wildly (see Anderson, 2006; Lardy, 1998, 2000, 2001; Studwell, 2003), 
but according to studies conducted at the end of 20th century, the average NPL ratio of 
SOBs was no less than 25%, with an extreme estimation of more than 50% made by 
Anderson (2005). The official data of NPLs at that time, however, does not reflect the 
real situation, because prior to 2002, the state was employing an internationally 
incompatible four-tier classification standard. After 2002, an internationally accepted 
five-tier NPL classification standard was used by China’s financial institutions. After 
re-estimating the historical data using the five-tier NPL classification standard, the 
president of ICBC, Jiang Jianqing (2005) stated that, in 1998, the NPLs of the ICBC, 
the largest SOB, were higher than 47.5%, and nearly 80% of bad assets related to 
lending to SOEs. To some observers, by the end of 20th century, the SOBs that 
dominated the Chinese banking system were technically bankrupt (Laurenceson & Chai, 
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 2003, p. 59).  
 
During the second half of this phase of reform, the objective switched to resolve the 
serious problem of NPLs. In spite of deepening reforms in the corporate sector by 
closing unprofitable and insolvent SOEs, the solution of dealing with NPLs, or more 
fundamental, the poor corporate governance and risk management of SOBs, consisted 
of several gradual steps. The first step was to recentralize banks so as to end the 
interventions from local governments on banks (Yang, 2004, p. 131). In 1998, the 
PBOC was restructured when its provincial branches across the nation were closed, and 
nine new regional branches were established. This action meant that provincial 
governments could no longer intervene, because they could no longer appoint the head 
officers of local branches of the PBOC. The vertical management restructuring has also 
been applied to the four SOBs. The benefits of recentralization were obvious: the 
objectives of economic reform from the central level could be implemented at the local 
level more effectively. Insolvent local SOEs were no longer granted bank credit and 
lending behaviors of SOBs were no longer manipulated by local governments.  
 
A second step, which was more straightforward, was to write off the NPLs and 
recapitalize the SOBs. To write off bad loans and clean up balance sheets, four asset 
management companies (AMCs), which each served one of the four SOBs,9 were 
established by the central government in 1999 to buy NPLs from the SOBs and three 
policy banks. At this first wave of write-offs, a total amount of nearly 1,400 billion 
CNY NPLs from the SOBs were sold to AMCs (see Table 3.7). The major source of 
funding for the AMCs was relending from the central bank, in the amount of more than 
9 The four AMCs are China Great Wall Asset Management Corporation for ABC; China 
Orient Asset Management Corporation for BOC; China Cinda Asset Management 
Corporation for CCB; and China Huarong Asset Management Corporation for ICBC. 
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 600 billion CNY. However, this was only the beginning of the story. Along with other 
waves of NPL write-offs after 2004, the AMCs were also absorbing problem assets from 
SOBs and the policy banks. It was not until the third National Financial Work 
Conference in 2007 that the AMCs first announced they completed their mission of 
disposing of the SOBs’ NPLs (Jia, 2007). According to Cousin (2011, p. 162), the total 
volume of NPLs written off to AMCs exceeded 2,000 billion CNY.  
 
Table 3.7 Four major waves of NPLs written-off from SOBs 
Date Sources Amounts, billion CNY 
1999-2000 SOBs and CDB 1393.9 
2004 BOC, CCB, BOCOM 278.7 
2005 ICBC 635.0 
2008 ABC 815.6 
 Total 3123.2 
Source: Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (various issues) 
 
In order to raise the capital adequacy of the SOBs to meet the minimum requirement of 
8% with reference to Basel I, between 1998 and 2005, the central government 
recapitalized the SOBs several times, with a total amount of 270 billion CNY in the 
form of issuing government bonds and injecting foreign exchange reserves (Cousin, 
2011, p. 280). In 2008, when the NPL ratio reached more than 35%, China Everbright 
Bank, usually labeled as a JSCB, was recapitalized by the central government through 
China Central Huijin, a state-owned investment company. Such banking sector 
recapitalization came at a cost, including the threat of fiscal unsustainability. Woo (2003, 
p. 390) commented that given the relatively low fiscal revenue but equally high 
government debt ratio of China, in comparison with OECD economies, rounds of 
recapitalization by the financial sector could raise the government debt to GDP ratio of 
China, resulting in an unaffordable economic crisis. 
 
The write-off of NPLs and the injection of quality capital into the SOBs, starting in 
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 1998, also served as the foundation to promote the third pillar of the SOBs’ corporate 
governance and risk management: public listing. By tightening the audit standard, 
opening financial information to the public, and imposing monitoring pressure from 
outside investors, public listing not only improved corporate governance but also helped 
with straightening out the ownership structure of SOBs, as share-holding reform was an 
essential step for an initial public offering (IPO). Because of the immaturity of China’s 
stock market, the Hong Kong stock exchange was considered ideal for the IPOs of 
SOBs. The CCB was the first SOB to land on Hong Kong’s stock market, while the 
BOC was the first on Shanghai’s stock market (see Table 3.8). Although the ABC was 
the last SOB to complete public listing reform, by the end of 2012, the ABC and the 
ICBC were the world’s two largest IPOs, raising USD 19.228 billion and USD 19.092 
billion, respectively (Renaissance Capital, 2014).  
 
Table 3.8 Public listing date of SOBs 
Activity CCB BOC ICBC ABC 
Completion of 
share-holding 
reform* 
Sept. 21, 2004 Aug. 26, 2004 Oct. 28, 2005 Jan. 6, 2009 
Hong Kong 
stock market 
IPO 
Oct. 27, 2005 June 1, 2006 Oct. 27, 2006 July 16, 2010 
Shanghai 
stock market 
IPO 
Sept. 25, 2007 July 7, 2006 Oct. 27, 2006 July 15, 2010 
Note: Data compiled from the Shanghai Stock Exchange, http://www.sse.com.cn and 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, http://www.hkex.com.hk. * Completion refers to the 
date of establishing share-holding firms. 
 
In addition, through public listing and share-holding reforms, the SOBs were able to 
meet strategic oversea investors, for the purpose of learning about and improving 
internal management. In 2005, Bank of America was invited to acquire a stake of 9% in 
the CCB; later Goldman Sachs and American Express were invited to buy stakes in the 
ICBC, and Royal Bank of Scotland and Temasek to buy stakes in the BOC. 
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In summary, the third phase of financial reform started with liberalization and 
commercialization, and both institutional and legal environments were strengthened. 
Policy lending and government interventions in the SOBs were restricted and then 
eliminated. In the second half of this phase of reform, despite dealing with insolvency 
and NPL issues, through public listings and meeting strategic oversea investors, 
“internationalization” of the banking system began. What is worth noting is that the 
PBOC continued to served multiple roles, including as monetary agency, the leader and 
governor of SOBs, and regulatory body of financial institutions. To a certain extent, the 
PBOC started to supervise itself. Therefore, the fourth phase of reform is to restructure 
and redesign the regulation frameworks accordingly.  
 
3.3.6 Current phase of reform: 2003 through the present  
 
The serious problem of NPLs at the end of the 20th century certainly reminded the state 
that a collapse of the financial system would be extremely expensive. Given the 
multiple roles of the PBOC, financial reform in this period started with forming new 
regulatory bodies, so as to diversify the responsibilities of the PBOC. In 2003, the 
PBOC’s regulation department was appointed by the central government to form the 
China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC). The CBRC, as well as the China 
Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) and China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) were authorized by the state council and given the same 
ministerial level as the PBOC. Since then, the term Yi Hang San Hui (one (central) bank 
and three commissions) has been used to describe the institutional settings of China’s 
financial regulation framework. Though the PBOC is the monetary agency responsible 
for macroeconomic and financial stability and is the Lender of Last Resort for Chinese 
 121 
 banks (Cousin, 2011), parts of its regulatory role was passed to the CBRC.  
 
To further strengthen the legal environment, the Commercial Banking Law was revised 
in 2003; and a new law, the Banking Supervision and Administration Law, promulgated 
in 2003, was revised in 2006. The latter law cleared the legal status of both the CBRC 
and PBOC as regulators of the banking industry.  
 
The establishment of the CBRC allowed for a more assets-liability-based, prudential 
regulatory framework. Although the Commercial Banking Law of 1994 first introduced 
capital adequacy to the banking sector, it was Regulation Governing Capital Adequacy 
of Commercial Banks, an article published by the CBRC in early 2004, that provided 
details on particular indicators and targets that banks need to comply with (CBRC, 
2004). According to Cousin (2012, p. 3), the CBRC article, though mainly based one 
Basel I, also included some spirit from Basel II. The reform and development of 
banking regulations started to follow the steps in the Basel Accords. On January 1, 2013, 
a modified version of Basel III was put into practice by the CBRC and state council. For 
a detailed implementation progress of the Basel regulatory framework in China, see 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013, p. 37) (see Table 3.9) 
 
3.4 Summary 
 
This chapter presented a comprehensive picture of China’s financial reforms by 
providing the background of overall economic reforms, starting in the late 1970s. 
During China’s economic transformations, reforms in different sectors have followed 
the principle of gradualism, including the financial sector. Given its dominant role in 
financial activities in China, the focus of this chapter’s analysis has been on the banking 
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 sector reforms. Furthermore, regarding the different reform targets pursued by the 
government throughout the stages of reform, this analysis in broke the overall financial 
reform process into four phases, according to the order and progress of each reform. 
Features of each phase of reform have been assessed. 
 
Reform of the financial sector has been taken place for more than 30 years. During this 
time, themes of “liberalization,” “commercialization,” and “internationalization” 
dominated the reform path, and these targets have been largely achieved: diversified 
financial institutions have been set up; market competition has been enhanced; and 
international experience and standards on corporate governance, operations, and 
regulations have been introduced. Today it is fair to say that China has a modern 
financial system, according to commercial criteria. 
 
However, it is still too early to know whether the direction or the speed of the reform 
would be retained or not. First, China’s financial reforms are largely affected by China’s 
macroeconomic condition and reforms in the corporate sector. The reform path of the 
financial sector in China suffered several serious problems, which were in stride with 
the “boom–bust” or “stop–go” cycles of the macroeconomy (Brandt & Zhu, 2007, p. 94; 
Lo et al., 2011, p. 277): the loss of control of the credit supply and high inflation in late 
1980s, and the problems of NPLs in late 1990s. Such problems also caused “stop–go” 
cycles within financial sector reform: a set of concentrated reforms was followed by a 
period of adjustment and adaptation. In this respect, China’s financial reforms 
accommodated, rather than lead, the overall economic transformation. Second, the 
transformation from a quantitative-based financial development path to a 
qualitative-based one may involve high cost and efficiency losses in the short-run. This, 
however, can be seen as a vital challenge for further financial reform in China. 
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 Table 3.9 Implementation progress of the Basel regulatory framework in China (through the end of July 2013)  
Basel III Regulation Date of issuance by 
Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision 
Transposed into Chinese 
rule 
Date of issuance 
in China 
Status 
Basel II     
Basel II: International 
Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital 
Standards: A Revised 
Framework - Comprehensive 
Version 
June 2006 The Capital Rules June 2012 Completed and rule in force 
Basel 2.5     
Enhancements to the Basel 
Framework 
July 2009 The Capital Rules June 2012 Completed and rule in force 
Guidelines for computing capital 
for incremental risk in the 
trading book 
July 2009 The Capital Rules June 2012 Completed and rule in force 
Revisions to the Basel II market 
risk framework 
July 2009 The Capital Rules June 2012 Completed and rule in force 
Basel III     
Basel III: global regulatory 
framework for more resilient 
banks and banking systems - 
revised version 
June 2011 (consolidated 
version) 
The Capital Rules June 2012 Completed and rule in force 
Pillar 3 disclosure requirements July 2011 The Capital Rules June 2012 Completed and rule in force 
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 for remuneration Guidance on Sound 
Remuneration of 
Commercial Banks 
Treatment of trade finance under 
the Basel capital framework 
October 2011 The Capital Rules June 2012 Completed and rule in force 
Composition of capital 
disclosure requirements 
June 2012 Notice on Enhancing 
Disclosure Requirements 
for Composition of 
Capital 
July 2013 Completed and rule in force 
Capital requirements for bank 
exposures to central 
counterparties 
July 2012 Notice on Measurement 
Rules of Capital 
July 2013 Completed and rule in force 
Requirements for Bank 
Exposures to Central 
Counterparties 
Regulatory treatment of 
valuation adjustments to 
derivative liabilities 
July 2012 Notice on Policy 
Clarification of the 
Capital Rules 
July 2013 Completed and rule in force 
Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013, p. 37, Table 3) 
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 Chapter 4 
Defining financial development in China: 
Monetization and financial liberalization 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Before assessing how the mechanisms of China’s financial system affected economic 
development, four general concepts of the term financial development need to be 
explained. The four concepts, which assess financial development from four different 
and contrasting perspective will be examined within the Chinese context in order.  
 
The first is that the development of a financial system is related to its scale expansion; 
in other words, the larger a financial sector, the more efficient its financial system. 
Quantitative development inevitably increases sophistication of the financial system, 
which in turn can provide higher-quality financial services.  
 
The second concept is financial liberalization. Financial liberalization is regarded as the 
fundamental basis for financial sector reform in many developing economies. The 
concept was becoming popular especially in 1970s when the wave of neoliberal 
economic reforms in Latin American’s developing countries occurred. In China, it 
became the dominant concept in assessing the finance–growth nexus. To certain extent, 
financial liberalization is understood as the same as financial development. In line with 
the Washington Consensus of 1989, the argument and policy implications of financial 
liberalization is straightforward: a less regulated but competitive market-oriented 
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 financial system may be a key determinant in sustaining long-term economic 
development in developing countries. 
 
The third concept, which takes the position of the functional view of finance (see 
Chapter 2), emphasizes and defines the development of finance as an improvement in 
allocative efficiency; in other words, the efficacy of allocating financial resources into 
investment projects with higher returns. According to this definition, it is not the scale 
and marketization level of a financial system that affects contributions to real sector 
development, but the efficiency of the system. Supported by theoretical models from the 
mainstream endogenous growth theory (see Chapter 2), this view of financial 
development focuses on the degree that a financial system can overcome market 
frictions and market failures, such as easing transaction costs and informational 
asymmetries, during financial activities.  
 
In contrast to the mainstream allocative efficiency view of financial development, the 
fourth concept of financial development is based on productive efficiency from the 
Schumpeterian–Keynesian’s idea of endogenous credits. The causal direction between 
savings and investment is the opposite of the allocative efficiency view. For productive 
efficiency, it is assumed that economic development is delivered through an expansion 
of financial resources. The focal point of financial development here is switched from 
the financial system itself to the dynamic interaction between financial investment and 
real sector development. That is to say, financial development is not defined by how 
well market frictions are reduced or erased, but by how well available financial 
resources are produced.  
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 4.2 Financial development: monetization and institution 
expansion 
 
One way to understand the level of monetization in an economy is to investigate the 
effects of financial assets and financial services within economic activities. If increased 
savings and investment are mobilized and facilitated through financial intermediations, 
there should also be increased financial assets, which implies a degree of financial 
development. According to this definition, monetization can be monitored by two 
actions: financial deepening and financial broadening (Naughton, 2007, p. 450). 
Financial deepening is defined as the ratio of financial assets to GDP, and it has been 
popularly used as the proxy for financial development in various empirical studies on 
the intersection of finance and growth, starting with Goldsmith (1969). For many 
studies, financial deepening is the only variable used to estimate financial development. 
Starting with King and Levine (1993a), the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP (M3/GDP) 
became the standard variable and a widely accepted measurement of financial 
deepening. The use of M3, rather than M2 (i.e., money versus quasi-money), is because 
M3 not only includes M2 but also securities issued by financial institutions and deposits 
in nonbanking financial institutions. This can reflect a more accurate level of 
monetization. However, at the same time, such indicators can only reflect the amount of 
financial assets involved in economic activities, not dynamic changes. While financial 
deepening offers a partial picture of financial development, it is not appropriate to use 
this as an indicator to make assumptions about the entire performance of a financial 
system, especially to assess how well it channels funds into investment with higher 
returns.  
 
Financial broadening is a term used to describe a financial system, from diversification 
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 of financial intermediations to financial services. There are two levels of diversification. 
The first concerns the quantity, or the total number, of financial institutions, and 
assumes that a greater number of financial institutions means greater accessibility of 
financial services by the public. The second level looks at the variety of financial 
institutions, especially nonbanking financial institutions, such as insurance companies 
and mutual fund companies. A variety of financial institutions imply the creation of 
financial instruments and financial services, and that financial innovation makes a 
financial system more sophisticated, as compared to only a bank-based financial system. 
Both levels affect the efficacy of a financial system, because an increase in the number 
of institutions increases competition and provides more choices for customers.  
 
4.2.1 Financial deepening 
 
There is no official M3 data for China because of a lack of state information, as 
discussed earlier in this thesis. There is data on the M2/GDP ratio, which has grown 
substantially from 25% at the beginning of the reforms in the late 1970s to more than 
180% by the end of year 2011 (see Figure 4.1). China’s real GDP increased nearly six 
times between 1978 and 2010; therefore, the change in the M2/GDP ratio implies an 
even faster process of monetization. From an international perspective, comparing 
China to the other four emerging economies (BRIC without the C) 10  and three 
representative advanced economies,11 China’s M2/GDP ratio is among the highest 
worldwide (see Table 4.1). India and Korea had a similar M2/GDP ratio as China’s in 
1980, but starting in the 1990s, China’s ratio was double that of these two countries. For 
the three advanced economies, the U.S. ratio is relatively low, which could be related to 
10 The BRIC countries are Brazil, Russia, India, South Africa, and China. 
11 Germany, Japan, and the United States. 
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 the fact that the United States has a market-based financial system and a large number 
of financial activities are by nonbanking financial institutions, which cannot be reflected 
in M2.  
 
Figure 4.1 M2/GDP Ratio and GDP of China 
 
Source: World Bank (2013). 
 
Table 4.1 M2/GDP International Comparison, % 
Country Name 1980 1990 2000 2005 2010 
China 36.76  78.65  137.04  153.03  180.78  
Brazil 11.89  30.39  47.26  54.58  68.84  
Russian --- --- 21.54  33.38  52.67  
India 33.87  41.46  53.92  64.46  77.28  
South Africa 53.67  53.80  54.09  69.88  78.27  
Korea 32.33  36.80  68.47  65.51  75.62  
Japan 142.18  187.36  240.56  206.85  226.64  
United States 71.76  73.85  70.95  74.91  83.53  
Germany --- --- 169.58  182.18  185.54  
Source: World Bank (2013). 
 
The relative high degree of the M2/GDP ratio in China may also indicate the presence 
of financial repression (Riedel, Jin, & Gao, 2007). This interpretation, first raised by 
Boyreau-Debray (2003), argues that a high ratio could be interpreted as a result of 
limited access to alternative non-monetary savings instruments in the household sector. 
More importantly, it may also be a result from pressure to accumulate savings deposits 
for investment, because of limited access to formal bank credits in the corporate sector.  
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 This thesis argues that the deepening process of money is largely in the form of issuing 
bank credits. Over the past nearly 30 years, the growth rate of bank loans has matched 
the money and quasi-money supply (see Figure 4.2). In periods of loan expansion, such 
as during the first boom of bank credits between 1984 and 1986, and when financial 
reform re-started in 1992,, money supply and credit expansion grew at the same level, 
which meant that bank lending was a major driver behind China’s rapid monetization. 
Total social financing statistics (see Table 4.2) shows a similar pattern: bank credit 
dominated the indirect financing market. When bank loans in RMB and foreign 
currency are totaled for 2011, bank credits contributed to more than 60 percent of total 
financing funds, with an average share of approximately 72 percent between 2002 and 
2011.  
 
Figure 4.2 Annual growth rate of M2 and bank loans in China, 1978–2011, % 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. World Bank (2013); Almanac of China’s Finance and 
Banking (various issues).  
 
 
The relative dominance of the banking sector within China’s financial system is easy 
see with an international comparison. The ratio of total banking credit to GDP in China 
has increased nearly three times during the past 30 years, from 50% in 1980 to around 
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 150% in 2011, which is distinctively fast when compare with other developing 
economies, as well as with several representative developed economies. By the end of 
2011, credit extended by banking institutions in China was nearly 1.5 times over the 
GDP, which is higher than the average of middle-income economies. 12  Among 
emerging economies, only South Africa shares a higher ratio than China.  
Table 4.2 Composition of Total Social Financing in China, 2002–2011, % 
Year Bank 
Loans in 
RMB 
Bank loans in 
foreign 
currency 
Entrusted 
loans 
Trusted 
loans 
Others Total 
social 
financing 
2002 91.86  3.63  0.87    1.49  100 
2003 81.06  6.70  1.76    8.99  100 
2004 79.20  4.82  10.89    2.97  100 
2005 78.46  4.72  6.53    7.91  100 
2006 73.83  3.42  6.31  1.93  12.52  100 
2007 60.88  6.48  5.65  2.85  22.32  100 
2008 70.26  2.79  6.11  4.50  14.20  100 
2009 68.97  6.66  4.87  3.14  14.61  100 
2010 56.67  3.46  6.24  2.76  28.67  100 
2011 58.24  4.45  10.10  1.59  22.06  100 
Source: China Statistics Yearbook (2012). Composition of Others includes undiscounted 
bankers' acceptances, net financing of corporate bonds, and equity financing on the 
domestic stock market by non-financial enterprises. 
 
The process of financial deepening can be captured by assets expansion of the financial 
sector. Starting in 2003, when the current multi-tier banking system under the 
supervision of China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was initially 
established, total assets of the banking system have grown nearly 5 times (see Figure 
4.3), yet still match the speed of China’s overall economic development, where the 
share of banking assets to GDP ratio is steady at two times the GDP. After the 
announcement by the central government in 2008 of a 4 trillion CNY stimulation 
package in infrastructure, largely financed through loans via the SOBs, banking assets 
to GDP ratio started to increase. 
12  Middle-income economies are defined by the World Bank (2013) as economies 
with gross national income per capita between 1,036 USD and 12,615 USD in 2012. 
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 Table 4.3 Domestic bank loans to GDP ratio, % 
 
1980 1990 2000 2005 2010 2011 
China 53.29 89.4 119.67 134.3 146.28 145.48 
Brazil 43.04 87.63 71.86 74.48 95.22 98.31 
Russian ---  ---  24.93 22.12 38.39 39.47 
India 37.03 49.97 51.39 58.36 71.84 74.12 
South Africa 76.35 97.8 152.46 185.89 191.51 174.98 
Korea 43.42 51.9 74.7 88.34 103.13 102.66 
Japan 185.66 255.9 304.01 317.52 327.96 341.69 
United States 120.22 151 198.41 225.44 231.12 232.51 
Germany 87.65 101.81 146.49 137.16 130.94 124.83 
Low income 20.55  28.26  28.87  33.20  38.90  40.39  
Middle 
income 
44.09  61.86  67.36  71.49  90.43  92.40  
High income 104.49  142.02  179.30  186.91  203.85  203.20  
Source: World Bank (2013). 
Figure 4.3 Banking assets and its ratio to GDP in China, 2003–2011 
 
Source: Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (various issues). 
 
4.2.2 Financial broadening 
 
China’s financial broadening, however, reflects a more complex picture. As discussed 
above, there are two levels of financial broadening: the number of financial institutions, 
and the variety of financial services provided. For the first level, broadening has been 
achieved to a certain degree, if measured only by the number of financial institutions 
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 (see Figure 4.4). Given that there was only one bank, the People’s Bank of China 
(PBOC) in 1979, and even by 1984, there were only five banks; by the end of 2011, 
there were 3,800 banking institutions (CBRC, 2012). This includes: 4 SOBs, 3 policy 
banks, 13 JSCBs, 13  144 CCBs, 3,359 rural financial institutions (rural credit 
cooperatives, rural commercial banks, new-type rural financial institutions), and other 
banks, such the single postal savings bank. Such a rapid spread of banking institutions 
no doubt eased the public’s access to financial services and improved competition 
within the banking industry. Currently there are more than 3 million people working in 
the banking industry; and the 4 SOBs and Bank of Communication (BOCOM) employ 
more than half of these employees, demonstrating these banks’ dominant position in the 
industry. 
Figure 4.4 Structure and number of institutions of China’s Banking System (by the end of 
2011) 
 
Source: CBRC (2012). 
 
13 Banks of Communication continue to be called joint-stock commercial banks; though 
the CBRC, together with the four SOBs, are labeled as large commercial banks. 
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 Financial markets, such as bond markets, stock markets, foreign currency markets, and 
other financial markets were also introduced in China during various reforms. By the 
end of 2011, there were 2,342 domestic companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges (CSRC, 2012), and more than 100 million Chinese citizens—on 
average, one in every 13 or 14 people—actively participate in the stock market (Wuhan 
Evening News, 2012). The Chinese stock exchange is becoming one of largest in the 
world. According to a report in Chinadaily.com.cn, at the end of 2009 the market 
capitalization of the Chinese stock exchange reached second place globally (Yu, 2010). 
 
Institutional environments, including both legal and regulatory, were gradually 
improved. Over the course of the 1990s, several laws, such as the Commercial Banking 
Law, Central Banking Law, Securities Law, and Insurance Law, were promulgated. The 
PBOC was the only financial sector regulator until the early 1990s, when a new 
regulatory framework was created that represented Yi Hang San Hui (one (central) bank 
and three commissions) (see Chapter 3), dividing responsibility for financial sector 
supervision among these banks. These entities, plus the Ministry of Finance and 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), jointly participated in 
additional cross-regulatory financial sector reform (see Table 4.4). 
 
 
All the foregoing shows that there was rapid institutional expansion of China’s financial 
sector. However, when compared with banks, financing through the financial markets 
did not play a dominant role. Over the past 30 years, the share of credit in terms of GDP, 
extended by Chinese banks in RMB, has always been higher than the sum of stock 
market capitalization and trading value of bonds. This was true except in 2007, when 
the domestic A-share market reached its peak value but then dropped off dramatically 
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 during a cool-down period the following year (see Figure 4.5). 
Table 4.4 The responsible entities during financial reform 
Reform responsibilities Principal entities 
Panda Bonds PBOC, MOF, NDRC 
Bank business model; mutual funds subsidiaries CSRC, CBRC 
Asset-backed securities MOF, PBOC, NDRC 
Forward bond trading PBOC, CBRC 
Commercial paper (CP) NDRC, PBOC 
Bank recapitalization MOF, PBOC 
Failed securities company rescues CSRC, PBOC 
Exchange and interest rate policy PBOC/SAFE, MOF, LGFEA 
Source: Walter & Howie (2011, p. 15). Leading Group for Financial and Economic 
Affairs (LGFEA), an inner group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China, supervises the economic work of both the CPC Central Committee and the State 
Council. National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is a macroeconomic 
management agency under the State Council. State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
(SAFE) is a department within the PBOC. 
 
Figure 4.5 Total outstanding bank loans, stock market capitalization, and total trading 
value of bonds, 1978–2011, in terms of GDP 
 
Source: Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (various issues); China Statistic 
Yearbook (various issues). Because of unavailable data, stock market capitalization and 
trading value of bonds were counted after 1992 and 1996, respectively. 
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0.00%
20.00%
40.00%
60.00%
80.00%
100.00%
120.00%
140.00%
Outstanding bank loans/GDP Stock market capitalization/GDP
Total trading value of Bonds/GDP
 136 
 2011, the Herfindahl Index14 for China’s entire banking industry was 0.052. However, 
for the SOBs and JSCBs, which operate nationwide, the index was 0.124; this implies a 
double-market structure: a national market and a local market (Cousin, 2011, p. 11). It is 
worth noting that a total number of 17 SOBs and JSCBs held 63.5 percent share of the 
banking sector (see Table 4.6). At the same time, the 144 CCBs were no higher than 9 
percent in 2011. A comparison of average assets per institutions tells the same story: 
SOBs held 12,255.61 billion CNY and JSCB held 1,768.51 in assets, while CCB held 
only 69.34. This data shows that China’s banking sector remained highly concentrated. 
It is worth noting that not only SOBs, but also other types of banks, are under state 
ownership; the majority of shareholders of JSCBs are government bodies and SOEs; 
and the majority shareholders of CCBs are local governments. 
 
Table 4.5 Assets of Chinese banking institutions, 2003–2011, bln CNY 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Banking Institutions 
(Total) 
27658.4  31599.0  37469.7  43950.0  53116.0  63151.5  79514.6  95305.3  113287.3  
Policy banks  2124.7  2412.3  2928.3  3473.2  4278.1  5645.4  6945.6  7652.1  9313.3  
State-owned banks 15122.6  16837.7  19581.6  22520.7  26397.1  29902.7  37560.1  42942.7  49022.4  
Joint-stock commercial 
banks 
3888.5  4791.6  5888.9  7160.3  9377.1  11506.1  15057.8  18855.3  22990.6  
City commercial banks 1462.2  1705.6  2036.7  2593.8  3340.5  4132.0  5680.0  7852.6  9984.5  
Rural commercial banks 38.5  56.5  302.9  503.8  609.7  929.1  1866.1  2767.0  4252.7  
Rural cooperative banks -- --- 275.0  465.4  646.0  1003.3  1279.1  1500.2  1402.5  
Urban credit 
cooperatives 
146.8  178.7  203.3  183.1  131.2  80.4  27.2  2.2  3.0  
Rural credit cooperatives 2650.9  3076.7  3142.7  3450.3  4343.4  5211.3  5494.5  6391.1  7204.7  
Nonbank financial 
institutions 
910.0  872.7  1016.2  1059.4  971.7  1180.2  1550.4  2089.6  2606.7  
Foreign banks 416.0  582.3  715.5  927.9  1252.5  1344.8  1349.2  1742.3  2153.5  
New-type rural financial 
institutions & postal 
savings bank  
898.4  1085.0  1378.7  1612.2  1768.7  2216.3  2704.5  3510.1  4353.6  
Source: CBRC (various issues). 
 
 
14 Herfindahl Index is a proxy to estimate the concentration of an industry: the higher 
the value of the Herfindahl Index, the higher the level of concentration of the industry.  
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 Table 4.6 Market share and average assets per institution of select types of bank, 2011 
 Policy 
banks 
SOBs JSCBs CCBs Foreign 
banks 
Total market share (%) 8.22 43.27 20.29 8.81 1.90 
# of institutions 3 4 13 144 39 
Average assets per 
institution (bln CNY) 
3,104.43  12,255.61  1,768.51 69.34  55.22  
Source: CBRC (various issues). 
 
One feature of the evolving formation of today’s bank-leading financial system in China 
is the rapid expansion and generation of new financial institutions; a second feature is 
that the financial sector is dominated by banks; and a third feature is that banks under 
state ownership dominate the banking sector. As a result, the SOBs ranked among the 
top ten largest banks in the world in 2012 (The Banker, 2012), which further verifies 
Walter and Howie’s statement about China: “[B]anks are the financial system” (Walter 
& Howie, 2011, p. 27). 
 
For all the success of financial deepening of China’s financial system, financial 
broadening was limited, as there was insufficient diversification of financial instruments. 
Rapid monetization and financial institution expansion with limited diversification leads 
to the conclusion that financial development in China was “deep but narrow” (Naughton, 
2007, p. 449).  
 
4.3 Financial development from the aspect of financial 
liberalization 
 
Assessing the degree of financial liberalization is vital in understanding financial 
development. Theoretically, there are two parts of financial liberalization: domestic and 
external. External financial liberalization is related to international finance, i.e., freeing 
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 international trade, capital account liberalization, and entry of foreign financial 
institutions. In this section, however, the focus is on domestic financial liberalization. 
According to the theory of financial repression (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973), 
reviewed in detail in Chapter 2, the main argument is that economic policies that lead to 
financial repression (e.g., control of interest rates and government interventions), will 
have a negative impact on economic growth, and even hurt long-term economic 
development. This occurs when there is low efficiency in allocating savings to 
investment and low levels of savings and investment (Arestis, 2005). Although the 
theory suffers from several weaknesses and has been questioned, especially its 
disappointing real-world application, it is still regarded as the theoretical foundation in 
the literature on the nexus of finance and growth, and a negative relationship between 
financial repression and long-term economic development has been widely confirmed 
and accepted in many studies (see King & Levine, 1993b; Roubini & Sala-i-Martin, 
1992).  
 
However, neither financial repression nor financial liberalization can be measured 
directly. Ideally, financial liberalization policies are a combination of relevant economic 
policies. There are many attempts to generate a single financial reform or financial 
repression index (FRI) (see Abiad, Detragiache & Tressel, 2008; Kaminsky & 
Schmukler, 2003; Williamson & Mahar, 1998). However, how to put weight on 
different dimensions in a grade-based index could be a problem. One way to calculate 
an estimation, as suggested by Demetriades and Luintel (1996, 1997), is to construct a 
FRI by means of principal component analysis (PCA). This method makes it possible to 
combine different financial sector indicators that contain information on the changes 
delivered by different financial policies, providing an overall assessment of the degree 
of financial repression or liberalization. Additionally, the PCA method, to a certain 
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 extent, helps overcome econometric problems such as multicollinearity and 
overparameterization, which usually occur during empirical studies on finance and 
growth (Ang & McKibbin, 2007).  
 
There is no strict model or standard for generating an FRI. According to representative 
applications for China (see Huang & Wang, 2011; Laurenceson & Chai, 1998, 2003), 
however, the following elements need to be considered: (a) control of interest rates, 
which is usually measured by a real interest rate or the degree of government regulation 
on the prices of credit; (b) control of financial intermediation, which can be reflected by 
credit ceilings or the central government’s reserve requirements of financial institutions; 
and (c) involvement of the government in banks’ lending decision making, which can be 
estimated by the proportion of SOBs lending to state sectors over total bank lending.  
 
In this thesis, the discussion of financial repression will be thus focused on the above 
three aspects. To construct a FRI to estimate China’s overall level of financial 
repression, we largely follow Huang & Wang (2011). In contrast to one of the most 
widely used FRI that constructed by Abiad, Detragiache, & Tressel (2008), the FRI 
generated in the thesis only focuses on domestic banking sector liberalization so that the 
influences from, for example, securities market liberalization, capital account 
liberalization are not covered.  
 
4.3.1 Interest rates control 
 
Interest rate liberalization is seen as the central to financial liberalization. Interest rate 
ceiling policies are widely adopted in the developing world to provide cheap working 
capital for developing targeted industries. This also occurred in China, prior to the 1978 
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 reforms: interest rates were kept artificially low to accommodate the economic strategy 
of developing heavy industries. When policies that manipulate interest rates are 
loosened or removed, it is anticipated that there will be increased competition among 
financial institutions to generate savings deposits. At the same time, if it is assumed that 
interest rates are market driven, then lending rates should become indicative of market 
risks.  
 
In 1979, China’s interest rates were restored to their pre-Cultural Revolution level (Lin, 
Cai, & Li, 2003, p. 176), and in 1996, the formal marketization process of interest rates 
was started when the interbank offered rates were opened. After 2012, 119 different 
interest rate ceilings, regulations, and controls were loosened or removed (People’s 
Bank of China, 2014a). Banks were given autonomy on interest rates starting in 2004, 
when ceilings on lending rates were abolished by the PBOC and floors for deposit rates 
were loosened. 
 
Although overall interest rate control was loosened, the trend of deposit rates is hard to 
capture (see Table 4.7). In years with high inflation, deposit rates were negative, which 
may suggest the limited progress of financial liberalization on the other hand.  
 
Although both positive real deposit rates and real lending rates were maintained in most 
of the four phases of reform (see Chapter 3), for Riedel et al. (2007, p. 78), these rates 
are far lower than the opportunity cost of returns on investment, which means that 
interest rates are not reflecting the real price of capital. When control over interest rates 
control is fully removed, interest rates thus can be used as market anchors.  
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 Table 4.7 China’s interest rates, 1980–2011, % 
Year NDR NLR Inflation RDR RLR 
1980 5.40 5.04 6.00 -0.57 -0.91 
1981 5.40 5.04 2.40 2.93 2.58 
1982 5.76 7.20 1.90 3.79 5.20 
1983 5.76 7.20 1.50 4.20 5.62 
1984 5.76 7.20 2.80 2.88 4.28 
1985 7.20 7.92 8.80 -1.47 -0.81 
1986 7.20 7.92 6.00 1.13 1.81 
1987 7.20 7.92 7.30 -0.09 0.58 
1988 8.64 9.00 18.50 -8.32 -8.02 
1989 11.34 11.34 17.80 -5.48 -5.48 
1990 8.64 9.36 2.10 6.41 7.11 
1991 7.56 8.64 2.90 4.53 5.58 
1992 7.56 8.64 5.40 2.05 3.07 
1993 10.98 10.98 13.20 -1.96 -1.96 
1994 10.98 10.98 21.70 -8.81 -8.81 
1995 10.98 12.06 14.80 -3.33 -2.39 
1996 7.47 10.08 6.10 1.29 3.75 
1997 5.67 8.64 0.80 4.83 7.78 
1998 3.78 6.39 -2.60 6.55 9.23 
1999 2.25 5.85 -3.00 5.41 9.12 
2000 2.25 5.85 -1.50 3.81 7.46 
2001 2.25 5.85 -0.80 3.07 6.70 
2002 1.98 5.31 -1.30 3.32 6.70 
2003 1.98 5.31 -0.10 2.08 5.42 
2004 2.25 5.58 2.80 -0.54 2.70 
2005 2.25 5.58 0.80 1.44 4.74 
2006 2.52 6.12 1.00 1.50 5.07 
2007 4.14 7.47 3.80 0.33 3.54 
2008 2.25 5.31 5.90 -3.45 -0.56 
2009 2.25 5.31 -1.20 3.49 6.59 
2010 2.75 5.81 3.10 -0.34 2.63 
2011 3.50 6.56 4.90 -1.33 1.58 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2013). NDR = nominal deposit rate of 
interest; NLR = nominal lending rate; RDR = real deposit rate; RLR = real 
lending rate. NDR is measured by official interest rates on institutional and 
individual deposits with one-year maturity. NLR is measured by the official rate 
on working capital loans with one-year maturity; prior to 1989, it was the official 
rate on working capital loans to state industrial enterprises. When the nominal 
interest rate changed during a year, a weighted average is constructed. The 
interest rate is calculated as (1+Nominal Interest rate) / (1+Inflation rate) –1. 
Inflation. It is measured by the overall Retail Price Index on an annual basis.  
 
Criticized by many observers, low real interest rates stimulate demands for bank loans, 
which leads to an inordinate supply of bank credit, and hence to excessive investment in 
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 the Chinese economy. However, an excessive supply of cheap bank credit causes high 
inflation, which results in even lower interest rates and cheaper bank credit, leading to 
an explosion in NPLs. Low deposit rates have also caused an “implicit” tax imposed on 
net savers (Lardy, 2008) that largely benefits SOEs, as they are the major borrowers in 
China’s banking system.  
 
4.3.2 Financial intermediation control and regulation 
 
A statutory reserve requirement ratio (RRR) is the most often used tool used by the 
PBOC (Ma, Yan, & Liu, 2011). An RRR was introduced in 1984, following the 
establishment of China’s two-tiered banking system. In 1984, the RRR was set at 20%, 
25%, and 40% for corporate, agriculture, and savings deposits, respectively, and in 1985, 
a unified RRR of 10% was adopted. In 2008, a more formal two–tiered reserve 
requirement system was established, in which different RRRs were created related to 
bank size. By the end of 2012, RRRs had been adjusted 45 times by the PBOC, though 
for most years the ratio was between 5% and 15% (see Figure 4.6). Starting in 2010, the 
RRR reached 20%, mainly due to high inflation pressure in China started in 2008 with 
the world financial crisis; this percentage is widely accepted as the boundary of a high 
or excessively high reserve requirement (Abiad, Detragiache, & Tressel, 2008). This 
may suggest that China’s statutory RRR is too high (Johansson, 2012). 
 
 
Reserve requirement ratios are not only tools for the state to control market liquidity 
and money supplies (Yan, Liu, & Ma, 2012), but also are tools to finance the 
government. As the return rate on required reserves is set lower than the rate of 
traditional savings deposits, as much as 50 percent lower, the high RRR provides cheap 
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 loans to the central bank. However, a side effect is low interest rates earned by the 
reserves, leading commercial banks to pass financial burdens onto depositors by 
lowering interests on deposits or raising rates on loans, thus imposing implicit taxes on 
both savers and lenders (Riedel et al., 2007). Several estimates have been made to 
understand the exact effect of such implicit taxes and to compare the change of deposit 
and loan ratios in major Chinese banks, and it was found that depositors, rather than 
lenders, carry a higher financial burden (see Ma et al., 2011). 
 
Figure 4.6 Statutory reserve requirement ratio, % 
 
Source: People’s Bank of China (2014b).  
 
The promulgation of the Central Banking Law and Commercial Banking Law in 1995, 
and the establishment of new regulatory bodies, such as the CSRC, SIRC and CBRC, 
have switched the methods and channels of banking control from an administrative 
framework to a modern regulatory framework. Direct credit control, including annual 
credit plans and lending ceilings for banking institutions, were abolished in 1998, 
though some alternative controls still exist. For example, article 39 of the Commercial 
Banking Law imposed a loan-to-deposit ratio regulation, so that the amount of loans to 
deposits in commercial banks cannot exceed 75 percent. This can be seen as a substitute 
policy on lending ceilings. The banking lending ceilings, known as credit scale 
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 regulations, imposed by the PBOC, were occasionally replaced by even broader 
regulation instruments, such as the growth of M2/GDP ratio (Ma, 2011). 
 
4.3.3 State influence on Lending 
 
Although official credit plans, legacies from central planning, were abolished in 1998, 
the influence of the state on bank lending remains significant. Despite the establishment 
of three policy banks, which are designed to be in charge of lending for developmental 
purposes so that SOBs handle commercial purposes (i.e. profits seeking), SOBs 
continue to lend to SOEs. However, this is not the same for banks that do not follow 
market principles. Over the course of all four reform periods, the target of 
commercialization has never changed. One reason, raised by Lu and Yao (2009), is that 
lending to SOEs is still a rational choice because they are usually large firms. Based on 
the commercial criteria in loan decision making in China, larger firms usually carry a 
lower risk of default. Conversely, private firms, most of which are small- or 
medium-sized firms, are assumed to carry a higher risk and, thus, are not favored by 
loan officers.  
 
As mentioned earlier in this thesis, it is hard to measure the degree of direct government 
involvement in lending practices because of the lack of available and accurate state 
instruments. Laurenceson and Chai (2003, p. 18) introduced two assumptions: all 
credits extended by SOBs to SOEs involve government intervention, and all credits 
extended by other financial institutions are market-determined. Laurenceson and Chai 
then constructed a rough proxy to see whether or not direct lending has improved. 
Despite the potential of inaccurate measurements, Laurenceson and Chai found that 
between 1978 and 1999, lending decisions with government intervention decreased 
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 from nearly 90% to 75%. Huang and Wang (2011) found another possible measurement, 
which is to split government influence in credit allocation into two parts that can be 
measured separately by two indicators. The first measurement is the proportion of loans 
extended by SOBs to all bank loans, and the second is the share of total loans allocated 
to the state sector over total loans. Although Huang and Wang did not provide details 
about how their indicators were constructed, according to publicly available data, the 
first measurement may tend to underestimate state influence on banks. While the four 
SOBs and three policy banks are fully under state control, the JSCBs and CCBs are hard 
to classify. Meanwhile. the second measurement may overestimate the share of loans 
granted to the state sector according to the aggregated loan classification. There is no 
category for direct “loans to state sector” or “loans to SOEs”; only short-term loans to 
Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs), the agricultural sector, private enterprises, 
and individuals are labeled. Additionally, there is no classification by ownership given 
to industrial, commercial, and construction loans, or to medium- and long-term loans. 
The inaccuracy of such measurements is certainly due to the structure and features of 
the raw data. This potential for underestimation or overestimation affects not only 
Huang and Wang and Laurenceson and Chai, but all the studies that focus on credit 
allocation by ownership type in China. Even so, the evolving information can be useful.  
 
Adding up the loan statistics of the four SOBs and three policy banks15 allows for a 
narrow estimation about the influence of state banks in total bank lending. The share of 
state banks in total banking lending has gradually declined from nearly 100% in 1978, 
to about 60% in 2010 (see Figure 4.7). Although they still account for the majority of 
bank lending, this shows that the influence of state banks in China’s banking system has 
decreased. However, to what extent a pure commercial profit-and-risk lending standard 
15 Rural credit cooperatives and postal deposit bank are not included here. 
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 has been adopted in state banks remains unclear.  
 
To measure the proportion of loans allocated to the state sector, it is important to first 
know which loans are made to non-state sectors. These include loans to the agricultural 
sector; TVEs; foreign-funded, joint venture, and cooperative enterprises; private 
enterprises; individuals; and non-classified. (Additionally, before 1989, this included 
loans from the RCCs, UCCs, and TICs.) By subtracting the loans in these categories 
from the total number of loans, a broad estimation of the percentage of total credits 
allocated to the state sector is possible. As seen in Figure 4.8, the share of state sector in 
total credits extended has declined from nearly 90% in 1978 to approximately 70% in 
the early 1990s. The ratio has since fluctuated, though it has remained around 70%. 
 
Figure 4.7 Proportion of loans extended by state banks to total bank lending, 1980–
2010, % 
 
Source: ICBC (various issues); BOC (various issues); CCB (various issues); ABC 
(various issues); CDB (various issues); EXIMB (various issues); and ADBC (various 
issues); Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (various issues). Data is available 
only for the four SOBs prior to 1994, not the three policy banks; and aggregated loan 
data became available only after 1989. Aggregated loan data for UCCs and TICs 
became available only in 1986. To measure total banking lending prior to 1989, the loan 
data from SOBs, RCCs, UCCs, and TICs were combined (see Laurenceson & Chai, 
2003, p. 10).  
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 Figure 4.8 Proportion of loans extended to state sector over total bank lending, 1980–
2009, % 
 
Source: Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (various issues). Aggregated loan 
data became available only after 1989. Aggregated loan data for UCCs and TICs 
became available only in 1986. To measure total banking lending prior to 1989, the loan 
data from SOBs, RCCs, UCCs, and TICs were combined (see Laurenceson & Chai, 
2003, p. 10).  
 
However, as mentioned above, this measurement may be overestimation. That is to say, 
the actual share of the state sector in all bank loans granted would be no greater than 
70%. Furthermore, this estimation does not show how SOBs and SOEs are linked. 
There is no consistent, aggregated data publicly available on the amount SOBs have lent 
to SOEs. The only data is from banks’ annual reports, and these data are not published 
in the reports every year. The SOBs are not willing to report specific data on lending 
practices to SOEs, as they are labeled as “commercial banks.” For example, the CCB 
reported lending to SOEs in its annual reports between 2004 and 2008, but in other 
years such data is not included. Although the amount the CCB lent to SOEs nearly 
doubled between 2004 and 2008, the share in CCB’s total loan portfolio slightly 
declined, from 37.66% in 2004 to 33.28% in 2007 (see Table 4.8). The increase in 
lending to SOEs in 2008 is a unique case; it was a 4 trillion CNY stimulus package 
pushed by the Chinese government to counter the global financial crisis.  
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 Table 4.8 Loan portfolio of China Construction Bank, 2004–2008, % 
Year State-owned 
enterprises 
Joint-stock 
enterprises 
Private 
enterprises 
Personal 
loans 
Total 
Loan 
2004 37.66  15.72  6.85  18.53  100 
2005 34.35  15.23  8.73  18.48  100 
2006 33.45  13.63  11.34  20.86  100 
2007 33.28  12.71  12.76  22.60  100 
2008 35.07  10.42  14.03  22.02  100 
Source: CCB (various issues). 
 
For more than a decade, the literature has described the lending behaviors of Chinese 
banks as, “80% of state-owned bank loans have been extended to state-owned 
enterprises” (Laurenceson & Chai, 2003, p. 9; see Boyreau-Debray, 2003). This implies 
that for each SOB, the proportion of loans to SOEs should be around 80%. However, 
the loan statistics for the CCB tell a different story. In 2011, the CCB, one of the four 
major SOBs, was responsible for more than 10% of total banking sector lending, yet the 
number of its personal loans accounted for more than 20% of its loan portfolio (CCB, 
2012).  
 
The above analyses lead to two interpretations. The first is that the credit allocated to 
the state sector, in proportion to total credit, has declined throughout the four phases of 
reform. The second is that by combining broad estimations and data from the CCB, the 
percentage of loans to the state sector from the second half of 2000s was between 35% 
and 70%. The low percentage of lending to SOEs by the CCB, and the broad 
measurement of 70% from the other SOBs, suggests that non-SOBs also lend heavily to 
the state sector.  
 
The decreased share of SOBs in total lending, and the decreased share of the state sector 
in all credit allocated, certainly indicate that the influence of the state sector in lending 
decisions has declined. One possible reason is that all the four SOBs are now publicly 
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 listed, not only on the domestic A-share markets but also on the Hong Kong stock 
exchange. This means that these banks face increased pressure from both boards of 
directors and shareholders. Being audited by stricter accounting principles not only 
increased corporate governance in the SOBs, but also lessened state sector interventions 
in lending decisions. At the same time, senior management in the SOBs are under 
pressure to not make any faulty decisions in order to protect their careers, as senior staff 
are still considered to be state officials. A loan officer is more willing to lend to an SOE 
as a “safer” choice, because a loan default by a private firm can lead to a loan officer 
being investigated for possible “under-the-table benefits,” which can disastrous in a 
professional career (Lu & Yao, 2009, p. 2). The above two reasons, from the two 
different side, combine together and leave the decision of loan extending in SOBs an 
even more complex circumstance. 
 
4.3.4 Financial liberalization 
 
Financial liberalization in China has been shown from three different angles: control of 
interest rates, control of financial intermediation, and state intervention in lending 
decision making. However, to capture the overall trend of financial liberalization in 
China, a principal component analysis must be applied so as to construct a financial 
repression index. 
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 Table 4.9 Summary of data for FRI construction 
Year RDI FIC SOB SSL 
1980 0.5 0.340  0.967  0.864  
1981 0 0.350  0.967  0.859  
1982 0 0.350  0.963  0.854  
1983 0 0.330  0.956  0.845  
1984 0 0.200  0.931  0.783  
1985 0.5 0.100  0.925  0.791  
1986 0 0.100  0.894  0.757  
1987 0.5 0.120  0.856  0.724  
1988 1 0.130  0.805  0.715  
1989 1 0.130  0.829  0.728  
1990 0 0.130  0.820  0.730  
1991 0 0.130  0.808  0.721  
1992 0 0.130  0.782  0.695  
1993 0.5 0.130  0.761  0.684  
1994 1 0.130  0.690  0.679  
1995 0.5 0.130  0.739  0.668  
1996 0 0.130  0.759  0.672  
1997 0 0.130  0.777  0.724  
1998 0 0.080  0.774  0.722  
1999 0 0.060  0.765  0.702  
2000 0 0.060  0.739  0.717  
2001 0 0.060  0.715  0.722  
2002 0 0.060  0.702  0.699  
2003 0 0.070  0.678  0.688  
2004 0.5 0.075  0.663  0.691  
2005 0 0.075  0.658  0.649  
2006 0 0.090  0.651  0.701  
2007 0 0.145  0.660  0.723  
2008 0.5 0.155  0.634  0.711  
2009 0 0.155  0.633  0.725  
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
In this thesis, four variables were considered in generating the FRI. Variable 1, real 
deposit interest rates (RDI) (see Table 4.7) is treated as dummy variable set to 0 if the 
RDI is positive, set to 0.5 if RDI is between -5% to 0; and set to 1 if the RDI is lower 
than -5%. Variable 2, which measures financial intermediation control (FIC), is the 
statutory RRR16 (see Figure 4.6), given that a higher RRR implies stricter control on 
16 To measure FIC prior to 1989, when there were no statutory RRR policies, the FIC 
was set as the ratio of deposits that the central bank could not allocate itself. These 
deposits included deposits of basic construction, fiscal deposits, and deposits of 
non-profit institutions (see Huang and Wang, 2011, p. 838). 
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 financial intermediation. Variable 3 is the ratio of bank loans extended by state banks to 
total bank lending (SOB), and Variable 4 is the ratio of bank loans extended to state 
sector over total bank lending (SSL). Variables 3 and 4 are jointly applied as an 
indicator of state intervention in bank lending (see Figures 4.7 and 4.8). In this thesis, 
the lower the value of the variables, the lower the FRI, which implies lower repression 
of the financial system; a value of 0 implies a totally liberalized system. This sample 
covers from 1980 to 2009, because an SSL for 2010 is not available. The summary of 
data is shown in Table 4.9; the correlation of these variables is shown in Table 4.10. 
 
Table 4.10 Correlation matrix of FRI variables and relevant appropriation tests 
Variable RDI FIC SOB SSL 
RDI 1    
FIC -0.0132 1   
SOB 0.0043 0.6863 1  
SSL -0.1155 0.8455 0.8317 1 
Source: Author’s calculations. Result of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test is 0.639. Result of 
the Bartlett test is Chi2 = 67.430, p-value = 0. These indicate the suitability of applying 
PCA into the analysis when compared with suggestive critical values. 
 
The results of the PCA analysis for generating an FRI are in Tables 4.11 and 4.12. As 
the eigenvalue for the third and fourth components are lower than 1, the first two 
components were selected, as they explain nearly 90% of the total variance.  
 
Table 4.11 PCA Results 
Component Eigenvalue Proportion Cumulative 
1 2.5813  0.6453  0.6453  
2 1.0055  0.2514  0.8967  
3 0.3137  0.0784  0.9751  
4 0.0995  0.0249  1.0000  
Source: Author’s calculation 
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 Table 4.12 PCA Results 
Variables Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 4 
RDI -0.0471  0.9939  0.0215  0.0977  
FIC 0.5659  0.0553  0.6934  -0.4426  
SOB 0.5619  0.0815  -0.7199  -0.3993  
SSL 0.6016  -0.0503  0.0218  0.7969  
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
The FRI is formulated as: FRI = 0.7196 ∗ Component 1 + 0.2804 ∗ Component 2 (Eq. 4.1) 
Where FRI𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶1 =  −0.0471 ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼 + 0.5659 ∗  𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹 + 0.5619 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 0.6016 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆  
(Eq. 4.2) FRI𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2 =  0.9939 ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼 + 0.0553 ∗  𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹 + 0.0815 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 − 0.0503 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆  
(Eq. 4.3) 
 
By setting the value of FRI for 1980 as 1,17 Figure 4.9 shows the movement of the FRI. 
Included is a 3-year moving average value of the constructed FRI, so as to smooth or 
eliminate short-term shocks, that is, dramatic variation due to the use of dummy 
variables. Generally, the gradual decrease of the FRI from 100% in 1980 to around 60% 
in 2009 indicates significant financial liberalization in China. Despite substantial 
fluctuation between the late 1980s into the early 1990s, the major trends have been 
moderate, which mimics the gradual financial reforms assessed earlier in this thesis. 
However, although 2005 had the lowest FRI, with a ratio of 59%, the significantly high 
value of FRI may suggest that the progress of financial liberalization remains limited. 
 
17 Though reforms started in 1978, data is only available starting in 1980. 
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 Figure 4.9 Financial repression index for China, 1980–2009, %, 3-year moving average 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
By linking the FRI with the three angles of financial liberalization discussed above, 
some important ideas can be drawn. First, over the 30 years’ of reform, various kinds of 
interest rates have been liberalized to certain extents, though the major deposit and 
lending rates remain regulated by the central bank, leading to limited floatation. A 
positive real deposit rate can be found for most years, but it is still not sufficient to 
reflect the real opportunity cost of investment returns on the market. Second, the 
statutory reserve requirement is frequently used as a monetary tool by the state; and 
since the end of direct credit quota control, it is becoming a major tool for financial 
intermediation control. The main side effect, implicit taxes — caused by the relatively 
high reserve requirement ratio over the past few years — have passed from the 
commercial banks to depositors. Third, it is impossible to know which loans are 
generated by state intervention and which by banks without state pressure. What is 
known is that the decrease in shares of SOBs in total banking lending and the decrease 
in lending to the state sector shows that SOBs’ dominance in the banking sector has 
gradually diminished over the last 30 years. Finally, the FRI, based on the constructed 
PCA, confirms that financial liberalization, though limited, has occurred in China. It 
needs to be pointed out that financial repression still occurs in China. However, China’s 
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 economic growth over the last 30 years leaves inconclusive the question of whether this 
financial repression will be harmful to China’s long-term economic development. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, China’s financial development was assessed and defined from a standard 
approach. This occurred by emphasizing the role of monetization and financial 
liberalization in the financial sector’s development. In the first section, the degree of 
financial development in China was estimated using the concepts of financial deepening 
and financial broadening. Monetary expansion occurred quickly, which is reflected in 
the substantial increase of the M2/GDP ratio. However, the speed of the monetization 
process was largely due to an expansion in bank credit, as seen in the nearly uniform 
rate of growth between M2 and total bank loans. Additionally, it was pointed out the 
banking sector has remained the dominant player among all financial intermediations, 
which leaves little room for the development of financial markets.  
 
In Section 4.2, the level of financial liberalization in China was evaluated from the 
perspectives of interest rate liberalization, control of financial intermediation (through 
the use of statutory RRRs), and state intervention in bank lending. A financial 
repression index was constructed using PCA to show the evolving degree of financial 
liberalization in China. Based on this empirical result, it was concluded that, although 
significant financial liberalization has occurred over the four phases of financial reform, 
financial repression remains relatively high.  
 
Rapid monetization and financial repression are two factors in China’s financial 
development. High degrees of financial deepening and broadening do not suggest that 
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 China has achieved an overall high level of financial development, as these two aspects 
are only one dimension of financial development——from a quantitative angle. 
Conversely, it does not mean that China’s economic growth has been undermined 
because there has not been complete financial liberalization. Before further assessment 
can be made, to conclude the positive correlations between monetization and economic 
development and between financial liberalization and economic development in 
post-1978 China is not convincing. 
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 Chapter 5 
Defining financial development in China 
from the aspect of allocative efficiency 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 2, it was discussed that an allocative efficiency view of financial 
development is built on a theoretical framework, which Levine (1997, 2005) called the 
“functional view of finance.” Taking advantage of both the financial repression models 
(McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973) and the endogenous financial intermediation models 
(Diamond, 1984; Diamond & Dybvig, 1983), in the functional view of finance, the 
objectives of developing a financial system are to overcome informational asymmetry 
and transaction costs involved in financial activities. Several basic functions of financial 
intermediation, such as mobilizing savings, processing information, and risk 
amelioration, are assumed to smooth market frictions. In other words, the development 
of a financial system will contribute to the overall efficiency of finance processes; that 
is, the transfer of savings into investment funds.  
 
However, it is hard to directly estimate efficiency. One frequently used indicator, first 
developed by King and Levine (1993a), is the ratio of credit issued to the private sector 
to GDP. Under the assumption that the private sector is always more efficient than the 
rest of the economy, an increasing share of credit issued to the private sector over GDP 
implies improved efficiency through the process of allocating financial resources. When 
applied to case studies that include China, if this assumption holds (emphasizing a more 
efficient private sector), the proportion of credit extended by non-state-owned banks 
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 (non-SOBs) and the proportion credit extended to non-state-owned enterprises 
(non-SOEs) can be used as an indicator to illustrate allocative efficiency in China’s 
financial system. The logic behind is straightforward: a higher proportion of credits 
extended by non-SOBs or to non-SOEs would imply a more market-based loan-granting 
mechanism throughout the financial sector and thus improved allocative efficiency.  
 
In Figure 4.7 in Chapter 4, the share of state banks loans to total bank credit declined 
from nearly 100 percent in 1980 to around 60 percent in 2010. This may imply an 
amendment in overall banking resource allocation, if non-SOBs are assumed to be more 
efficient than SOBs in facilitating investment. A similar interpretation can be made from 
Figure 4.8; from the allocative efficiency view of finance development, decreasing 
shares of both SOBs in total loans provision and shares of SOEs in total credit issues 
may indicate potential improvement in the efficiency of financing. Allocating financial 
resources into more productive investment projects, from both supply and demand sides 
of investment financing, may cause this efficiency.  
 
However, one problem with using a static measurement of efficiency is the validity and 
robustness of the preconditions, such as whether non-SOBs and non-SOEs are really 
more productive, or at least more profitable, than SOBs and SOEs. Without a 
comparative analysis of the performances of SOBs and non-SOBs, and SOEs and 
non-SOEs, assuming a more efficient private sector can be misleading. Therefore, in 
this chapter, focus will be given to determining if the assumption of a “more efficient 
private sector” holds.  
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 5.2 SOEs and non-SOEs  
 
A common view is that China’s market-oriented reforms are the only reasons for the 
state’s distinct economic achievements over the past 30 years, yet the literature 
continues to mark the state-owned sector, especially the SOEs, as “inefficient” 
institutions, especially when compared to private firms, which are driven by 
market-based principles. However, because of ongoing SOE reforms, especially ones 
concerning improved productivity and profitability, the solidity of this view must be 
questioned.  
 
5.2.1 Profitability of SOEs 
 
Stronger financial performances by non-SOEs over SOEs can be observed, even within 
the past few years. That is not to say, however, that SOE improvement has been 
insignificant. Anderson (2006, p. 24) points out the net profit margin (as a share of 
revenue) of SOEs began to exceed that of other types of industrial enterprises starting in 
2000. Using an industrial-level dataset, Lu et al. (2008), among others, examined the 
profitability of Chinese firms. By classifying firms into SOEs, private enterprises, or 
foreign-invested enterprises, according to ownership structure, Lu et al. documented 
that although the pre-tax profitability on equity and net fixed assets of private 
enterprises remain higher than that of SOEs in their firm-level data sample, the gap in 
profitability is diminishing. For example, in 1998, there was a 10% gap in pre-tax 
profitability on equity between private enterprises (at 12%) and SOEs (at 2%), which 
narrowed to around 5% in 2005 (at 17% and 13% respectively). The narrowing gap of 
profitability can be seen as one outcome of SOE reforms. 
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 Furthermore, an overall trend in profitability — a U-shaped curve of pre-tax 
profitability on equity for SOEs — has been recorded since 1993 (Lu et al., 2008). SOE 
profitability decreased from 8% in 1997, down to nearly 2% in 1998, and then it rose to 
approximately 14% in 2006. Given the background of SOE ownership reform under the 
principle of Zhua Da Fang Xiao (grasping the large and letting the small go), the sharp 
rise in profitability illustrates the efficacy of the SOE reforms. Knight and Ding (2012, 
p. 158) interpreted this as a policy response to the concerns over slashed state revenue, 
bad nonperforming loans (NPLs) in the banking sector, and the possible slowdown of 
economic growth caused by SOE unprofitability. 
 
Table 5.1 summarizes several key financial proxies of SOEs from 1997 to 2011. 
Starting in 1997, which is the first year aggregated data is available, the percentage of 
SOEs with net profits increased substantially, from 34.1% in 1997 to 60% in 2011. 
During this same time period, the total number of SOEs was nearly halved, from 
262,000 to 136,000. Despite this decline, which implies mergers, bankruptcies, or 
reorganizations of SOEs during this period, there was also a rapid accumulation of 
SOEs’ total assets and increased ability to make profits. The growth in SOEs’ 
profitability can be illustrated by deconstructing net profits into profits and losses (see 
Figure 5.1), with the result that total profits contributed by profit-making SOEs 
increased dramatically. However, the total losses from struggling SOEs became worse. 
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 Table 5.1 Major financial indicators of SOEs, 1997–2011 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Consolidated number of enterprises (10,000) 26.2 23.8 21.7 19.1 17.4 15.9 14.6 13.6 12.6 11.6 11.2 11 11.1 11.4 13.6 
Total assets (100 million CNY) 124975.2 134779.9 145288.1 160068 179244.9 180218.
9 
199709.8 215602.3 255687.2 291278.2 362058.1 416219.2 514137.2 640214.3 759081.8 
Total net assets (100 million CNY) 46164.6 50370.7 53813.2 57975.6 61436.2 66543.1 70990.8 76763.2 87386.9 98014.4 144595.6 166510.8 198720.3 234171.1 272991 
Sales revenue (100 million CNY) 68132 64685.1 69136.6 75081.9 76355.5 85326 100160.9 120722 140726.6 162390.3 194835.3 229397.9 243015.4 314993.9 386341.4 
Total profit (100 million CNY) 791.2 213.7 1145.8 2838 2811.2 3786.3 4769.4 7368.8 9579.9 12193.5 17441.8 13335.2 15606.8 21428.2 24669.8 
Profit-making enterprises (%)  34.1 31.3 46.5 49.3 48.8 50.1 47.4 48 50.1 53.6 56.5 56.8 58.6 60 59.6 
Assets-liabilities ratio (%) 67.1 65.5 65.4 66 65 64.8 65.9 65.7 65.1 67.4 68.7 61.6 62.8 63.4 64 
Return on total assets (%) 2.3 2.1 2.7 3.3 3.3 3.6 3.5 4.5 5 5.5 6.4 4.6 4.2 4.6 4.6 
Profit margin on net assets (%) 1.7 0.4 2.1 4.9 4.6 5.7 6.7 9.6 11 12.4 12.1 8 7.9 9.2 9 
Profit margin on sales (%) 1.2 0.3 1.7 3.8 3.7 4.4 3 6.1 6.8 7.5 9 6 6.6 7 6.6 
Current ratio (%) 100.7 99.5 99.8 105.2 104.4 104.7 104.1 103.6 103.1 103.7 108.2 98.1 102.2 107.7 106.3 
Profit earning multiple (%) 1.2 1.1 1.4 1.9 1.9 2.2 3 4 5 5.3 5.8 2.9 4.3 4.8 4.3 
Ratio, unhealthy assets to equity (%) 22.6 24.8 27.5 31.4 31.2 31.2 28.5 -- --- --- -- -- -- -- -- 
Total state-owned assets  
(100 million CNY) 
44340.2 48051.6 53306 57554.4 59827.2 65476.7 70405.6 77345.6 87831.6 96170.6 112205.8 134365.5 157398.3 185364.6 217307.7 
Source: Finance Yearbook of China (1999, 2008, 2012).  
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Figure 5.1 Total profits and losses of SOEs, 1998–2011 
 
Source: Finance Yearbook of China (1999, 2008, 2012). 
 
There have been several changes in the SOEs’ financial condition between 1998 and late 2010s, 
primarily due to the reforms. As already noted, the number of SOEs was halved, yet profitability 
improved. However, while the percentage of profit-making SOEs increased, the net losses of 
profit-losing SOEs also increased. One interpretation to such a mixed picture is that the overall 
financial performance of SOEs is ameliorating, mainly due to the early successful SOEs. For the 
unsuccessful SOEs, some were shut down by the state, which is reflected in the decreased number 
of SOEs. Some were able to make up deficits and gain surpluses with the help of the reforms; this 
number is reflected in the increased share of profit-making SOEs. For the rest, their balance sheets 
became worse around 1998 with a wave of SOE ownership reforms. As a result, by multiplying the 
total number of SOEs by the share of profit-making SOEs, the number of unprofitable SOEs can be 
derived. In 1998, 163,500 SOEs had a net loss of 306.7 billion CNY, while in 2011, 54,900 SOEs 
had a net loss of 921.9 billion CNY.  
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 decade’s time. First, as discussed in Chapter 3, ownership reform under the principle of Zhua Da 
Fang Xiao encouraged transforming small- and medium-sized SOEs into private firms or other 
ownership structures, while profit-losing SOEs were allowed to shut down. This shows that the 
self-adaptive capacity of SOEs has been strengthened. Second, and also due to Zhua Da Fang Xiao 
ownership reform, most of the remaining large SOEs are resource-based, capital-intensive 
monopolies or industries protected by the state for national security. Given the difficult entry 
barriers, these industries, of course, easily earn profits with less competition. Third, corporate 
governance and operational efficiency of the remaining SOEs were advanced through share-holding 
reforms and by public listing. Stricter audits and supervision from public investors, and more 
efficient information, also contributed to these improvements. However, compared with non-SOEs, 
the profitability of SOEs remains low.  
 
Between 1999, which is the first year that data is available, and 2009, the Return on Total Assets 
ratio (ROA) of SOEs nearly doubled, which is the same timeframe as non-SOEs (see Table 5.2). 
Prior to 2007, the SOEs’ profitability was able to match that of the non-SOEs, as is shown in this 
table. In 2007, the ROA for SOEs reached its peak of 12.41%, while the ROA for Hong Kong-, 
Macao-, and Taiwan-funded enterprises was 13.04%; foreign- invested enterprises was 11.77%; and 
joint-ownership enterprises was 12.71%. This certainly indicates that the profitability of SOEs was 
nearly the same for foreign-funded enterprises, which are commonly considered the most efficient 
institutions. However, convergence in profitability did not continue after 2007, which may be a 
result of SOEs’ expanding assets and overinvesting, because of the central government’s 4 trillion 
CNY stimulus package in 2008. However, some of the collective-owned, joint ownership, and 
share-holding enterprises are still under central or local government ownership. State-controlled 
share-holding enterprises, for example, have better financial performances than other SOEs because 
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 they are publicly listed. Table 5.2 reflects the lowest end of SOEs’ profitability because some of the 
better performing state-controlled firms are classified into other categories, based on official 
statistical standards. 
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 Table 5.2 Return on Total Assets ratio (ROA) and Profits to Cost Ratio (POC) of Chinese Industrial Enterprises with different ownership structure, 1999–
2010 
 State-owned Collective-owned  Cooperative  Joint 
Ownership  
Limited 
Liability 
Corporations 
Share-holding  Private  Hong Kong, 
Macao, Taiwan 
funded  
Foreign 
funded 
 ROA, % POC, % ROA, % POC, % ROA, % POC, % ROA, % POC, % ROA, % POC, % ROA, % POC, % ROA, % POC, % ROA, % POC, % ROA, % POC, % 
1999 6.57  1.76  10.39  3.93    6.67  1.43    8.84  8.20  12.36  4.40  7.34  4.03  8.46  4.71  
2000 7.24  3.48  10.98  4.39    8.50  4.48    14.41  14.88  11.33  4.17  8.89  5.62  10.52  6.37  
2001 6.75  2.51  10.93  4.17  11.64  4.60  9.52  5.73  7.17  4.52  12.85  11.77  12.04  4.10  8.68  5.15  10.74  6.39  
2002 7.67  3.01  11.77  4.97  11.73  5.02  9.52  5.50  7.40  4.57  12.59  11.26  12.20  4.30  9.35  5.77  11.30  6.86  
2003 8.44  3.70  12.76  5.42  11.54  5.01  10.21  5.14  8.36  5.41  14.65  12.36  12.24  4.59  9.68  5.87  12.71  7.43  
2004 9.18  4.80  12.48  5.57  10.64  5.04  10.51  5.51  12.22  7.21  15.09  10.64  15.44  4.48  10.96  5.74  14.01  6.65  
2005 10.86  7.23  16.80  6.23  12.55  5.07  10.13  5.31  11.75  7.80  13.26  8.09  13.85  4.93  9.71  5.36  11.05  5.70  
2006 11.32  7.09  17.50  6.39  13.50  5.25  11.93  6.52  12.42  8.25  15.01  9.21  14.95  5.27  10.97  5.82  11.83  5.80  
2007 12.41  8.11  19.47  7.06  14.72  6.14  12.71  7.74  13.58  8.73  16.46  10.33  17.18  6.08  11.77  6.55  13.04  6.41  
2008 11.30  5.83  21.43  7.66  16.03  6.59  9.90  3.62  13.03  7.23  13.08  7.11  19.67  6.87  12.81  6.33  12.60  5.81  
2009 10.23  4.54  21.21  7.34  19.03  7.51  7.68  4.74  11.40  6.77  14.44  9.16  18.33  6.71  12.10  7.24  13.63  7.26  
2010 11.88  6.07  22.72  8.51  19.64  9.41  10.09  6.12  13.47  8.18  17.00  10.97  20.82  7.92  14.35  8.52  15.74  8.70  
Source: China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook (various issues); China Economic Census Yearbook (2004). ROA and POC for Cooperative 
Enterprises and Limited Liability Corporations are not available 1999–2000. Since 2001, the data covers all industrial enterprises earning revenue 
above a designated amount, defined as more than 500 million CNY per annum. For 1999–2000, the data covered non-SOEs earning above this 
designated amount and all SOEs.  
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 Bai, Li, and Wang, (1997) explained that the relatively low profitability of SOEs could 
be because of residual developmental objectives. Although the main SOE reforms have 
been market-oriented, market-supplanting elements in the SOEs still exist, which means 
that profit-making has never been a primary target. For example, social development is 
still considered a task of the SOEs; before the creation of a more functional social 
security system, SOEs were acting as the alternative to state finance in order to provide 
retirement benefits, housing, and medical care benefits to their employees (Hu, 1996, pp. 
126–129; Bai et al., 2000). It was believed that SOEs could be treated as the “primary 
social safety net” in China (Laurenceson & Chai, 2003, p. 57).  
 
Additionally, the social costs of economic reforms have always been paid by the SOEs, 
not the state. In the early reform years, to retain the employment rate for national 
security reasons, profit-losing SOEs that would not survive under market competition 
were kept open anyway. This created a domino effect because the only way these 
insolvent enterprises could stay in business was to continuously borrow from the SOBs, 
which first generated a large volume of NPLs and then encumbered the performance of 
the SOBs for many years to come.  
 
Third, throughout all the reform phases, the income tax rate for SOEs was set higher 
than non-SOEs. To stimulate economic development and encourage foreign investment, 
foreign-funded enterprises and firms based in six special economic zones18 enjoyed 
favorable income tax rates. Tax preferences were also given to non-SOEs several times 
during the reform periods. By comparing pretax profit rates among different types of 
industrial enterprises, Lo and Zhang (2011, p. 48) illustrated that from 1978 to 2007, 
SOEs were sharing nearly the same pretax profit rates as the average of all industrial 
18 The special economic zones are Shenzhen, Guangdong; Zhuhai, Guangdong; 
Shantou, Guangdong; Xiamen, Fujian; Hainan Island; and Pudong, Shanghai. 
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 enterprises. The tax burden of SOEs, however, implies a transfer from SOEs’ profits to 
state revenue. If the state sector is treated as a whole, there is no significant difference 
for such a transfer, but it does significantly affect the balance sheets of particular SOEs.  
 
Fourth, the remaining SOEs are in industries with high entry barriers, mostly because 
these industries require intense capital investment or specific technology needs. The 
significant initial capital and the cost of technology, which would lower down of the 
returns on capital per capita, keeps many companies from entering these industries.  
 
A fifth argument was raised by Laurenceson and Chai (2003, p. 34): the relative low 
profitability of SOEs is caused by the deterioration of the terms of trade. In adopting the 
theoretical framework developed by Waters (1997), Laurenceson and Chai split the 
change of industries’ profitability into TFP (total factor productivity) and TPP (total 
price performance). TPP is defined as the change in the price of firms’ outputs relative 
to the price for inputs; in other words, the change in the terms of trade. In Laurenceson 
and Chai’s study, an overall upward trend of industrial SOEs’ TFP growth was captured, 
while the TPP showed a downward trend, with an average rate of 3.02% per year over 
the study’s time period of 1980 to 1997. Therefore, the SOEs’ profitability growth can 
be explained by the improvement in TFP. Meanwhile, the deterioration of the terms of 
trade contributed negatively to profitability growth. 
 
This not only points to the potential reasons behind the SOEs’ relatively low 
profitability in comparison with non-SOEs, but also suggest that a pure commercial 
criteria-based comparison of SOEs to non-SOEs may be biased, given the SOEs’ 
developmental objectives of the state. 
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 5.2.2 Productivity and output growth 
 
Despite concerns about the profitability of SOEs, the situation appears a little different 
when reviewing productivity or output growth. Most mainstream studies found that the 
SOEs’ TFP went from negative to positive during reform periods, though average TFP 
was still lower than that of non-SOEs (Dollar, 1990; Jefferson, Rawski, & Zheng, 1992, 
1995; Lin, Cai, & Li, 2001, p. 64). The same argument held in a recent firm-level study 
by Liu and Cao (2011), which focused on SOEs’ productivity since the ownership 
structure reform of SOEs in the late 1990s. Liu and Cao found that although SOEs had a 
higher growth rate in TFP, their average remained lower than that of non-SOEs. 
Interestingly, they also documented a higher growth rate of SOEs’ labor productivity, 
and starting in 2004, the average labor productivity of SOEs began to exceed that of 
non-SOEs. It is worth noting that TFP cannot be observed directly. Different production 
functions and different price indices largely affect final results. Using a Cobb-Douglas 
production function and the net value of fixed assets as capital input, Lo (2014) found 
that the relative TFP of industrial SOEs to non-SOEs was quickly restored, and 
exceeded non-SOEs after the 1998 reform of SOEs, even when elasticity of capital and 
labor input were not fixed (see Figure 5.2). 
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 Figure 5.2 Relative TFP of industrial SOEs to non-SOES, 1978–2010 
 
Source: Lo (2014). TFP is estimated by TFP = Y/𝐾𝐾𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏, where Y is total output; K the 
net value of fixed assets; L the labor employment; and a and b are the output elasticity 
of capital and labor.  
 
Highlighting the concept of productive efficiency from the tradition of post-Keynesian 
and neo-Schumpeterian theories (the importance of technological progress and 
increasing returns in economic growth), Lo and Li (2011) found more efficient delivery, 
from labor productivity growth to output growth in SOEs, in comparison with 
non-SOEs. They argued that as long-term-oriented institutions, market-supplanting 
elements strengthen SOEs’ abilities to generate productive efficiencies. However, this 
means losing allocative efficiencies because of inflexible short-term adjustments. 
 
Table 5.3 records the Industrial Value-Added (IVA) rate by types of industrial 
enterprises. According to its definition, the IVA rate reflects the ratio of industrial-added 
value, a direct contributor to GDP, over the total industrial output value. In the table, the 
SOEs share the highest IVA rate, an average of 34.5% in all sample years, which 
implies an efficient vertical integration of SOEs and that all SOE output contributed to 
the GDP.  
0
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 Table 5.3 IVA of Chinese Industrial Enterprises with different ownership structure, select years 1994 to 2007 
Year State-owned  Collective-owned  Cooperative  Joint 
ownership  
Limited 
Liability 
Corporations 
Share-holding  Private  Hong Kong, 
Macao, Taiwan 
funded  
Foreign- 
funded 
1994 31.24 26.04  23.73  28.90 30.61 23.38 26.78 
1997 33.00 26.58  24.88  28.99 29.36 24.27 25.68 
2000 35.78 25.79 25.22 28.07 28.93 35.52 25.26 27.31 24.84 
2003 38.72 26.98 26.41 29.77 29.76 34.43 25.64 26.86 25.69 
2006 33.72 28.77 27.15 34.22 31.69 29.44 27.86 26.41 25.07 
Source: China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook (various issues). IVA rate is defined as industrial-added value over gross industrial output value.
 170 
  
The comparison of the relative share of total IVAs of SOEs over total IVA is shown in 
Figure 5.3. Since the reforms in late 1990s, the SOEs’ share in total IVA has fluctuated 
between 33% and 36%. Starting in 2000, SOEs’ share in total IVA gradually grew until 
2010, when nearly 40% of total IVA was due to SOEs. The increasing contribution to 
the GDP made from SOEs can be seen as a reflection of SOEs’ specific property as 
long-term-oriented institutions that focus more on development than profits (Lo & Li, 
2011). 
 
Figure 5.3 SOEs’ share in total IVA, 1996–2010 
 
Source: China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook (various issues); China Statistic 
Yearbook (2012). 
 
5.2.3 Summary 
 
All the factors discussed in this section have focused on the same issue:  using the 
financial criteria of Western modern enterprises, including, profitability, does not reflect 
the complete performance of SOEs. Since the reforms, SOEs’ profitability has largely 
improved—though it is still low when compared with with non-SOEs—and has enjoyed 
substantial productivity and output growth. The importance and position of SOEs in 
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 China’s industrial sector has even been strengthened. By linking SOEs’ financial 
performances and their increasing share in total IVA, it certainly appears that SOEs are 
out-competed by non-SOEs, according to certain financial criteria. However, the SOEs 
have shown their advantage and strength in delivering development and contributing to 
economic development. It is important to remember that profitability was never a 
primary target for the SOEs, and several market-oriented reforms were directed for their 
survival and viability. Marketization was never the final target, but always the method.  
 
From the perspective of the banking system, SOEs are now enterprises that can meet a 
certain level of profit, with enhanced productivity, and that contribute significantly to 
China’s economic development. This is considerably different from the insolvency of 
SOEs in pre-2000. One major feature of SOEs has remained: they are still directly or 
indirectly guaranteed by different sectors of the state, which means that the risk of loan 
default is nearly zero.  
 
Banks’ lending to SOEs or non-SOEs became a choice between making low risk and 
low return or high risk and high return loans. It is not to say that state intervention in 
bank lending has been totally removed, and SOBs may still prefer to lend to SOEs. But 
as discussed in Chapter 3, in 2010, 60% of total bank credit was extended by SOBs, 
while more than 70% of total bank credit was to non-SOEs. The 10% gap, therefore, 
can be seen as non-SOBs lending to SOEs. If the presumption is that non-SOEs are 
more market-conforming than SOEs, then why lend to SOEs rather than enterprises 
with better financial performances? By considering both profitability and risks, an 
answer can be drawn. Both SOBs and non-SOBs face trade-offs between returns and 
risks, and while it can be argued that state intervention in lending still exists, it is also 
fair to say that most SOB lending now takes all factors into account, such as enterprises’ 
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 financial condition and risks. It is unreasonable to presume that all SOB lending to 
SOEs violated market principles, when it could simply be the inefficiency of SOBs. 
 
5.3 SOBs and non-SOBs 
 
If the assumption holds that SOBs are less efficient in resource allocation than other 
banking institutions, it follows that there’s deviation in lending practices between SOBs 
and non-SOBs. These deviations may be reflected in several banking performance 
benchmarks: higher capital adequacy ratios (CAR), lower NPL ratios, and higher 
profitability of non-SOBs. However, if the SOBs and non-SOBs showed a convergence 
during the reforming years, especially after institutional liberalization and 
commercialization became central for financial reform, it thus can be argued that the 
differences in SOB and non-SOB lending behaviors diminished.  
 
The establishment of the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) as the 
banking regulatory authority in 2003 solidified the regulatory framework. Along with 
the request to make annual reports available to the public (reports that were previously 
only internal), commercial banks were also asked to include information on their 
operational performances, financial conditions, and risk diversification. For example, 
given the NPL issue at the end of 20th century, all banking institutions were requested 
by the CBRC to report details on their NPL stock on a seasonal basis, after the 
introduction of international compatible NPL classification standards in the early 2000s. 
Since then, additional performance and risk indicators that concern asset quality, 
liquidity, and profitability have been added to CBRC’s regulation requirements. Finally, 
public listing the SOBs can be seen as increasing their competitiveness.  
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 Introducing and reinforcing banking industry competition are tools used by the state to 
improve SOBs performances to better match those of non-SOBs. Intra-industry 
competition through the adoption of international standards of banking supervision and 
regulation also lead to comparability between SOBs and non-SOBs. However, SOBs 
still follow developmental attributes, not simply commercial objectives (Lo et al., 2011, 
p. 268). This makes an assessment based only on commercial criteria still biased. 
 
In the following sections, the comparison between SOBs and non-SOBs focuses on a 
capital adequacy ratio, the NPL ratio, and financial performances. 
 
5.3.1 Capital adequacy ratio 
 
5.3.1.1 The banking sector 
 
The concept of a capital adequacy ratio (CAR) in China was first raised in the 
Commercial Banking Law in 1995, which set a minimal of 8% as the required CAR for 
commercial banking, with reference to Basel I. At that time, however, articles from the 
Commercial Banking Law were significant only on paper, not in practice. It was not 
until the establishment of the CBRC in 2003, and the publication of its article, titled 
“Regulation governing capital adequacy of commercial banks” in 2004, that the 
requirement of minimum CAR became an enforced banking practice. Even so, detailed 
CAR for the banking industry was not publicly available for several years. The concern 
from the state was that a weak CAR could harm public confidence in the Chinese 
financial system.  
 
The compromises the CBRC made to make CAR look better is shown in Table 5.4. In 
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 2003, the first year that CAR regulation took place, only 8 out of 194 commercial banks, 
with a share of lower than 1% of total banking assets, met the minimum CAR 
requirement of 8%. With the help of government recapitalization and public listing, the 
injection of new and healthier assets in the banking sector largely improved asset 
quality across banks. It took only five years, from 2003 to 2008, for nearly all 
commercial banks to meet the legal CAR requirement.  
 
Table 5.4 Capital adequacy ratio of commercial banks 
Year # of institutions 
meeting 8% CAR 
requirement 
Share in total 
banking assets, % 
2003 8 0.60 
2004 30 47.5 
2005 53 75.1 
2006 100 77.4 
2007 161 79.0 
2008 204 99.9 
2009 239 100 
2010 281 100 
2011 390 100 
2012 509 100 
Source: CBRC (various issues). Only SOBs, JSCBs, CCBs, RCBs, and foreign banks 
are included here. 
 
However, it can be argued that the actual change in asset quality of domestic banking 
institutions was even severe and faster than what is presented in Table 5.4. At first, 
foreign banks were included in constructing the official CAR data, while banking 
institutions such as the Urban Credit Co-operatives (UCCs) and Rural Credit 
Co-operatives (RCCs) were not. It is reasonable to deduce that if the 64 foreign banks 
were not included, in the first few years the number of qualified institutions was lower. 
Furthermore, after the PBOC made its own CAR calculation formula in 1996 according 
to Basel I, how it estimated CAR, such as the weight of various risks and the definition 
of net capital, was modified several times because of the principle of prudential 
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 regulation. For example, the 2004s CAR, based on the 2004 CBRC article mentioned 
above, reported lower net capital than that of previous versions; in an extreme case, the 
affect of the 2004s CAR calculating methods was more than 30% (Jing, Li, & Chen, 
2004, p. 18). The CAR formula has been revised several more times with the 
introduction of Basel II and Basel III, making the requirement for banks to meet a 
minimum of 8% CAR more difficult. For each bank, even though the CAR has 
remained the same across years, it would imply a higher capital quality in recent years 
than previous years, of the bank.  
 
It was only in 2008, after nearly all commercial banks met the official CAR requirement 
that the CBRC began to report the actual numbers of the weighted average CAR on a 
seasonal basis and that government officials began to talk about the CAR of earlier 
years. It was not until a 2010 speech made by the-then president of CBRC, Liu 
Mingkang, that it was announced that the weighted average CAR for all commercial 
banks at the end of 2003 was -2.98% (Mingkang, 2010). 
 
5.3.1.2 CAR for different types of banks, according to ownership structure 
 
The historical weighted average CARs were not systematically released by the state. It 
was with publication of the CBRC’s first annual report that the CAR for the banking 
system as a whole became available. Table 5.5 includes the weighted average CAR 
from 1995 to 2012 for all different types of banks, collected from official sources 
available to the public. However, it is hard to identify which type of banks held a better 
position in terms of the quality of assets.  
 
What is known is that because CAR was labeled as a key financial regulation indicator 
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 by the state in the early 2000s, the CAR for banks has been raised substantially. For the 
four SOBs, their CAR remained around 3% to 4% through the end of 20th century, and 
then increased rapidly when recapitalization and public listing occurred in the first half 
of 2000s. A rough comparison is possible by focusing on the years between 2003 and 
2005.  
 
Although the data for 2003 is not available, in 2004 the CAR for the SOBs increased by 
2.62%, and again by 6.17% in 2005. This means that SOBs’ CAR in 2005 was higher 
than 8.79%. However at the same time, the CAR for joint-stock commercial banks 
(JSCBs) and city commercial banks (CCBs), which were usually assumed to be more 
market-conforming than SOBs, were 7.42% and 5.13%, respectively, meaning that they 
were 1% to 3% lower than that of the SOBs. Furthermore, even for the year 2003, with 
-2.98% representing the CAR for China’s banking system as a whole, a positive (albeit, 
unknown) CAR for the SOBs suggests that their asset quality and capacity to prevent 
risks exceeded the average level of the banking sector, from the aspect of CAR.  
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 Table 5.5 Capital adequacy ratio for the Chinese banking system, 1995–2012, % 
Year Commercial banks (all) Major Banks* SOBs JSCBs CCBs Rural financial 
institutions** 
Rural 
commercial 
banks 
Rural 
cooperative 
banks 
1995   4      
1996   3      
1997   3      
1998   5      
1999   4      
2000   5      
2001   5.07      
2002   4.27    8  
2003 -2.98 X Y 2.87  ＜ 0% 7  
2004  X+2.87 Y+2.62 6.59 4.94 negative to positive   
2005   Y+8.79 7.42 5.13 10.03   
2006     8.48  8.58 13.69 
2007 8.4        
2008 12        
2009 11.4 (core CAR 9.2)        
2010 12.2 (core CAR 10.1)        
2011 12.7 (core CAR 10.2)        
2012 13.25 (core CAR 10.62)        
Source: Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (various issues); CBRC Annual report, (various issues); Liu (2010). *Major banks: SOBs and major 
JSCBs: Bank of Communication, CITIC Bank, China Everbright Bank, Huaxia Bank, China Minsheng Bank, China Merchants Bank, Shanghai Pudong 
Development Bank, Guangdong Development Bank, Shenzhen Development Bank, Industrial Bank, Evergrowing Bank, and China Zheshang Bank. ** 
Rural financial institutions: rural credit cooperatives, rural commercial banks, and rural cooperative banks.  
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 5.3.1.3 CAR for individual banks 
 
Since the CBRS required that commercial banks report CAR in their financial reports, it 
is possible to compare the changing CARs for particular banks, though data for 
pre-2000 years is not available.  
 
Along with listing the CARs for the SOBs, CARs for Bank of Communication 
(BOCOM), Shenzhen Development Bank (Shenzhen), China Minsheng Bank 
(Minsheng), and China Merchants Bank (Merchants) are jointly presented here in order 
to make a clear comparison between SOBs and JSCBs. It should be noted that the banks 
listed here by name are widely regarded as the backbone of China’s JSCBs. The moving 
trend of Bank of Shanghai is given as well, as a representative of the CCBs. Detailed 
data of CAR for each bank between 2000 and 2011 can be found in Table 5.11 at the 
end of this chapter. 
 
In the first three years (2000 through 2002) that consistent data is available, commercial 
banks sharing the highest CARs were Minsheng, Shenzhen, Merchants, and Shanghai, 
with an average ratio of more than 10%. The SOBs, however, were among the bottom, 
as none met the 8% requirement. For the year 2000, BOC, the highest performing SOB, 
was nearly half that of the Shanghai and Merchants, which were sharing third and 
fourth place, respectively, in that year. It is quite clear that at the start of the new century, 
the JSCBs shared an average higher CAR than SOBs, which suggests a better position 
in asset quality and risk amelioration for the JSCBs (see Figure 5.4).  
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 Figure 5.4 CAR for selected banks, 2000–2011, % 
 
Source: GTA Data Online (2014). 
 
A change occurred in 2005, when share-holding reform for SOBs (except for 
Agriculture Bank of China (ABC) was completed. With the help from the state in 
writing off historical NPLs, the SOBs were reshaped into modern share-holding 
companies, and the pressure from ongoing reforms on public listing enhanced their 
internal efficiency. As seen inn Figure 5.4, by the end of 2005, the CAR ratio for SOBs 
began to exceed that of JSCBs. At the same time, only Bank of Shanghai, the 
representative of the CCBs, reported a CAR of more than 10%. The top ranking banks 
in these early years (Shenzhen, Minsheng, and Merchants) all recorded lower CARs 
than the SOBs. In an extreme example, Shenzhen reported a CAR of 3.7%, less than 
one-third of that of the China Construction Bank, the SOB which record the highest 
CAR in 2005.  
 
After 2005, although the CAR for different banks fluctuated, a convergence trend 
occurred, especially after 2009. SOBs maintained their CAR advantage over the second 
half of the 2000s, and the JSCBs’ CAR improved. By the end of 2011, the top five 
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 CARs were shared by the four SOBs and BOCOM (a former JSCB that was officially 
reclassified as an SOB in 2007).  
 
5.3.1.4 Summary 
 
Due to the data availability issues, summarizing the comparison of capital adequacy 
ratio among Chinese banking banks is difficult, particularly identifying the relative 
differences between SOBs and more market-conforming banks (i.e., JSCBs and CCBs) 
pre-2000. What is clear is that pre-2000, very few banks could meet the requirement of 
a minimum 8% CAR set in the Commercial Banking Law. The only available data, 
weight-averaged CARs for the major SOBs, fluctuated between 3% and 5%. 
Circumstance changed in the 21st century. In only five years, from 2003 to 2008, the 
share of total banking sector assets that met the 8% requirement increased dramatically 
from less than 1% to nearly 100%. Since 2005, the capital adequacy condition for SOBs, 
began to surpass the banking sector average and outperform the JSCBs.  
 
The reasons behind the success of the SOBs’ CAR is related to public listing reforms. 
Although some market-supplanting elements remain, the establishment of modern 
share-holding companies within the SOBs, combined with several events, such as 
introducing internationally comparable management structures and foreign strategic 
investors, have imposed strong market-conforming factors into the SOBs. Market 
competition between SOBs and other banks has further accelerated the process. In 
analyzing the changing CARs among commercial banks, it can be seen that there are no 
longer any differences in CARs between the SOBs and JSCBs, as they face the same 
regulation requirements and are under the supervision of the same regulatory body, the 
CBRC.  
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On the one hand, the SOBs are endorsed by the state, which implies that JSCBs must 
consider risks more prudentially than SOBs. One the other hand, a higher CAR for 
SOBs implies SOB improvement from various aspects, such as risk control, corporate 
governance, and operational strategies.  
 
5.3.2 Nonperforming loans (NPLs) 
 
5.3.2.1 NPL ratio of the banking sector as a whole 
 
NPLs created serious problem in the banking sector by the end of 20th century, as 
argued in previous chapters. Most of the NPLs generated before 2000 are due to SOBs’ 
lending to insolvent SOEs, as also discussed in earlier chapters. Therefore, through the 
Zhua Da Fang Xiao reform, SOEs were no longer required to play multiple roles, but 
operate more on market principles. SOBs were also no longer requested, or even 
required, to lend to unprofitable SOEs under local government pressure. This also 
means that SOBs gained autonomy in their lending decision-making processes, though 
their loans to SOEs were still a large stake in their loans portfolios However, they could 
choose to lend to more profitable SOEs, or SOEs with better financial standing 
(Laurenceson & Chai, 2003, p. 54). 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, before 2004, the NPL classification standard applied in 
China’s banking system was a four-tier standard, rather than the internationally 
comparable five-tier standard. According to the four-tier standard, loans are classified as 
performing, overdue, doubtful and unrecoverable, and loans under the last three 
categories are marked as NPLs. For simplicity, the major differences between the two 
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 classification systems is that the four-tier system marks NPLs according to the age of 
the loans and overdue days, not the possibility of paying them off, which is the principle 
in the five-tier system. The change of classification standards resulted in inconsistent 
historical NPL data for China’s banking sector. Although the NPL ratio under the 
five-tier standard for some individual banks was back-tracked to 2000 by the 
commercial banks themselves, when considering the banking sector as a whole, 2003 is 
the first year that consistent NPL data is available. To generate comparable data series, a 
commonly used research method is to add an additional 5% to the NPL ratio data 
reported under the four-tier standard (Shi, 2005, p. 28). This is based on the practical 
experience that between 2001 and 2003 when a trial five-tier NPL classification 
standard was introduced in SOBs, a 5% difference has been recorded between the two 
standards. 
Table5.6 NPL ratio of Chinese banking system, 2003–2012, % 
Year NPL ratio 
2003 17.8 
2004 13.21 
2005 8.61 
2006 7.09 
2007 6.17 
2008 2.41 
2009 1.58 
2010 1.14 
2011 1 
2012 0.95 
Source: CBRC (various issues).The NPL ratio in 2003 and 2004 are the ratio for major 
commercial banks, defined as SOBs plus JSCBs. For the other years, NPLs are for 
commercial banks as a whole.  
 
In Table 5.6, it can be seen that the NPL ratio for the banking sector as a whole declined 
from nearly 18% in 2003 to less than 1% in 2012, which implies a gradual and 
successful improvement in prudential loans being generated by commercial banks. 
However, it can be argued that the major motivation for banks was heavy pressure from 
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 the state, along with increased market competition (Cousin, 2011, p. 163), to avoid the 
serious NPL problems of late 1990s.  
 
The NPLs written-off from SOBs are also reflected in this table. The years with massive 
NPL deductions, such as 2003–2004, 2004–2005, and 2007–2008, were also the years 
that the state concentrated on writing off the SOBs’ NPLs (see also Table 3.7).   
 
5.3.2.2 NPL ratio for different types of banks, according to ownership structure 
 
Figure 5.5 NPL ratio for Chinese banking system, classified by ownership type, 2003–
2012, % 
 
Source: CBRC (2014). The NPL ratio in 2003 and 2004 is the ratio for major 
commercial banks, defined as SOBs plus JSCBs. For the other years, NPLs are for 
commercial banks as a whole. Before 2007, BOCOM was classified as a JSCB but is 
now an SOB.  
 
By breaking down the banking industry’s NPL data according to types of banks, the 
evolution of NPLs can be understood (detailed NPL data for each bank from 2000 to 
2011 can be founded in Table 5.12). SOBs shared a higher-than-average NPL ratio; 
although moving in same direction, a substantial 2% to 3% gap between SOBs and 
commercial banks occurred until the end of 2008 (see Figure 5.5). 
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Between 2003 and 2008, as seen in changing slope of the curve, it is obvious that there 
were three sharp declines of the SOBs’ NPL ratio — Q2 2004, Q2 2005, and Q4 2008 
— which were caused by the NPLs being written-off by the state. Between 2003 and 
2008, for example, from Q4 2005 to Q3 2008, a smoother yet still downward NPL ratio 
change occurred, which can be regarded as the SOBs’ increased ability to process NPLs. 
For the same periods, the slope for JSCBs is parallel with the SOBs, which may suggest 
that, despite the remaining high stock of historical NPLs, SOBs had similar capability 
and efficiency in handling NPLs as the JSCBs.  
 
After four major waves of administrative-level write-offs by the state, in 2009 the NPL 
ratio for SOBs, for the first time, approached the average level, with a ratio of 2%. The 
trend has continued, and as seen in Figure 5.5, the NPL ratio for all banks, except rural 
banks, became similar in 2011 and 2012, 
 
For the JSCBs and CCBs, neither enjoyed administrative level support, such as NPL 
write-offs.19 The CCBs, however, have shown better capability in dealing with NPLs, 
reflected in the sharper slope in Figure 5.5. JSCBs started from a better position, with 
few historical NPLs. For 2005, when detailed NPL data for CCBs first became available, 
the NLP ratio for CCBs was kept around 10%, which was similar to SOBs but twice the 
JSCBs. Thereafter, the gap narrowed gradually and in 2011 and 2012, the difference 
became hard to identify.  
 
5.3.2.3 Effects of NPL write-offs 
 
The analysis above shows that the several waves of NLP write-offs by the state were 
19 While NPL writes-off did not occur, capital injection did. 
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 vital for SOBs to lower their NPL ratio, and were key for the SOBs to attain the NPL 
average in less than 10 years. By restoring the stock of written-off SOB NPLs into the 
data of total book-value NPLs, and then dividing by the total bank loans, the direct 
effects of policy write-offs can be seen. As seen in Figure 5.6, if the effects of these 
write-offs were controlled, the NPL ratio for SOBs in 2010 would have remained at 
14.6% (having been reduced from its peak in 2000 of a ratio of nearly 60%). The 
downward trend of SOBs’ NPLs ratio that exclude the write-off effect is prove of the 
SOBs’ capacity to handle the problem of NPLs. Dropping from nearly 60% to less than 
15% in 10 years implies that nearly 45% of NPLs were absorbed and handled by the 
SOBs themselves. Being aware of the accuracy of Chinese banks’ official NPLs data 
before 2003 (see Anderson, 2006; Lardy, 1998, 2000, 2001; Studwell, 2003), what is 
worth noting is that, the real circumstances of SOBs’ NPLs between 1994 and 2003 
could be even worse.  
 
Figure 5.6 NPL ratio for SOBs, including effects of policy write-offs, 1994–2010, % 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (various issues); 
CBRC (various issues); CBRC (2014); Shi (2005). The calculation and adjustment of 
NPL ratio under the four- and five-tier standard between 1994 and 2000 follows Shi 
(2005). 
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 5.3.2.4 Summary 
 
Although SOBs suffered from high levels of historical NPLs, four waves of 
administrative support have removed this problem to a large extent. The improved slope 
of banks’ NPL ratio is a reflection of the banks’ efficiency in handling NPLs. For 
periods without concentrated write-offs, the parallel curve between SOBs and JSCBs 
indicate there were few differences in their capabilities to handle NPLs, though it was 
suggested that CCBs performed better. When the effects of write-offs is removed, a 
rapid decline in the SOB’s NPL ratio over the course of 10 years suggests that SOBs 
have shown great effort and capacity to directly handle NLPs. 
 
5.3.3 Financial performance 
 
The comparison of the capital adequacy ratio and nonperforming loans of SOBs and 
JSCBs, and the discussion on the banking sector averages, were from the perspectives 
of soundness and solvency of commercial banks. The analysis clearly indicates that, 
from these two perspectives, the differences among SOBs and other banks have 
lessened across the reforming periods. It is fair to say that SOBs now operate as 
commercial banks. Given the importance of SOBs in China’s banking sector and the 
entire economy, SOBs and the state authority concentrated more on prudential 
operations and risk management.  
 
In reviewing financial performances, the comparison between SOBs and other 
commercial banks provides some useful information. Because financial instruments and 
financial markets are not developed to a high level in China, especially when compared 
to advanced economies such as the United States and the United Kingdom, the profit 
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 model for China’s banks remains mainly interest rates spread based. That is to say, there 
is a strong correlation between banks’ lending behaviors and their earnings, and more 
efficient lending creates more profits. If SOBs’ lending decision-making processes were 
not as market-oriented as other Chinese banks; or, in other words, if SOBs were less 
able to determine efficient use of their lending funds than other banks (i.e., lower 
allocative efficiency), then they would record weaker financial performances than other 
banks. Conversely, the same would hold true if SOBs showed little difference from 
non-SOBs in financial performances. There would be a convergence of the lending 
behaviors between SOBs and non-SOBs, which would imply no or little difference in 
allocative efficiency.  
 
5.3.3.1 Total assets 
 
By the end of 2011, the 4 SOBs shared nearly 50% of China’s banking market, while 
the 13 JSCBs and 144 CCBs recorded a market share of only around 20% and 9%, 
respectively, if measured by total assets (see Table 4.6). The comparison between assets 
levels is more obvious (year 2011), as the average scale per SOB was nearly 7 times 
that of the JSCBs and nearly 180 times the CCBs. At the same time, the JSCBS and 
CCBs enjoyed a faster expansion in assets (see Table 5.7). The asset scale of the SOBs 
grew at a rate of 14.21% each year (2000 through 2011); while the JSCBs recorded a 
growth rate in total assets that exceeded 25% during the same time period. Because of 
data unavailability, the rate for the CCBs is hard to know. The only available CCB 
information, from the Bank of Shanghai, averaged an annual growth rate of 19% of total 
assets, which is higher than all four SOBs.  
 
 
From the aspect of scale expansion of banking assets, the SOBs remain the dominant 
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 players in Chinese banking system; although the JSCBs and CCBs experienced faster 
expansion in the past few years. Given the size of each SOB as compared to the other 
banks in China’s banking system, the SOBs should remain the dominant players for 
years to come. 
Table 5.7 Average annual growth, assets of Chinese commercial banks, 2000–2011, % 
SOBs  14.21% 
 BOC 12.72% 
 CCB 15.44% 
 ICBC 13.09% 
 ABC 16.46% 
JSCBs  25.33% 
 cBOCOM 19.87% 
 Industrial Bank 35.44% 
 Guangdong Development Bank 17.99% 
 Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 31.62% 
 Shenzhen Development Bank 30.51% 
 China Minsheng Bank 37.32% 
 China Merchants Bank 26.02% 
 CITIC Bank 25.14% 
 China Everbright Bank 21.29% 
 Huaxia Bank 25.78% 
CCBs   
 Shanghai Rural Commercial Bank Unknown 
 Bank of Chongqing Unknown 
 Yinzhou Bank Unknown 
 Bank of Beijing Unknown 
 Bank of Shanghai 19.05% 
Source: Author’s calculation. GTA Data Online (2014).  
 
5.3.3.2 Net profits 
 
When reviewing the net profits of the commercial banks, the situation is quite similar to 
total assets: SOBs earn the highest, JSBCs the second highest, and CCBs the third 
highest. As seen in Table 5.8, the average net profits of the SOBs were more than seven 
times the JSCBs’ average. Except for BOCOM and the China Merchants Bank, between 
2000 and 2011, the JSCBs did not record average profits of more than 10 billion CNY. 
In contrast, the average net return for the worst performing SOBs, the ABC, was over 
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 30 billion CNY.  
 
Table 5.8 Average annual net profits and growth rates of Chinese commercial banks, 
2000–2011 
Type Bank Name Average annual net 
profits 
(100 million CNY) 
Average 
annual 
growth (%) 
SOBs   38.28 
 BOC 455.02  34.99 
 CCB 628.09  32.69 
 ICBC 665.93  39.81 
 ABC 300.22  72.81 
JSCBs   39.05 
 BOCOM 163.72  34.02 
 Industrial Bank 72.21  68.83 
 Guangdong 
Development Bank 
20.54  39.64 
 Shanghai Pudong 
Development Bank 
75.28  35.59 
 Shenzhen Development 
Bank 
23.72  31.48 
 China Minsheng Bank 69.80  46.17 
 China Merchants Bank 113.90  42.91 
 CITIC Bank 83.43  37.55 
 China Everbright Bank 48.86  46.44 
 Huaxia Bank 25.36  33.52 
CCBs    
 Shanghai Rural 
Commercial Bank 
13.17   
 Bank of Chongqing 6.17   
 Yinzhou Bank 4.33   
 Bank of Beijing 37.67   
 Bank of Shanghai 23.75  19.16 
Source: Author’s calculation. GTA Data Online (2014). Starting data dates for CCBs: 
Shanghai Rural Commercial Banks: 2005; Bank of Chongqing: 2004; Yingzhou Bank: 
2005: Bank of Beijing: 2003).  
 
There is no doubt that the difference in the size of the institutions affects the differences 
in net gains. However, in analyzing the growth in net profits, with the exception of the 
ABC and Industrial Bank, there is little difference between the SOBs and JSCBs in their 
average annual profit growth (Table 5.8). These two types of banks each had an annual 
growth of net profits of around 40%. For the CCBs, industrial-level information was 
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 unavailable, which makes it impossible to conduct a comparison. The only available 
data was from the Bank of Shanghai, which recorded an average annual growth in net 
gains of 19.16%, which was slightly lower than the SOBs and JSCBs.  
 
5.3.3.3 ROA and ROE 
 
In order to compare the return rates between SOBs and non-SOBs, two financial 
performance indicators, Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) were 
applied in a comparative analysis. The 4 SOBs, 10 JSCBs, and 5 CCBs were included, 
and the time period analyzed was 2000 to 2011.  
 
The major change of each bank’s ROA and ROE are shown in Figures 5.7 and Figure 
5.8 (detailed ROA and ROE data for each bank from 2000 to 2011 can be founded in 
Table 5.13 and Table 5.14). Generally, an upward trend is captured in both the ROA and 
ROE, which indicates improved profitability in China’s banking system over the past 10 
years. The two exceptions, with negative ROA and ROE in particular years, are two 
JSCBs, the Guangdong Development Bank and the China Everbright Bank. In 2005 and 
2006 the Guangdong Development Bank recorded a net loss in its year-end financial 
report. China Everbright Bank’s negative figures were caused by negative shareholders' 
equity in years 2004 and 2005.  
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 Figure 5.7 ROA for Chinese Commercial Banks, 2000–2011, % 
 
Source: GTA Data Online (2014). 
 
Figure 5.8 ROE for Chinese commercial banks, 2000–2011, % 
 
Source: GTA Data Online (2014). 
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 By adding up net profits, total assets, and shareholders’ equity, according to bank 
ownership types, the ROA and ROE present more details (see Table 5.9). It was not 
until 2005 that consistent data for the sampled five CCBs became available, therefore 
the ROA and ROE for CCBs are only reported since 2005. The main comparison 
analyzed is between the SOBs and JSCBs.  
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 Table 5.9 ROA and ROE comparison between banks with different ownership structure, 2000–2011, % 
ROA 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average annual 
Change (%) 
SOBs 0.15  0.16  0.16  0.19 0.41  0.53  0.60  0.80  1.02  0.98  1.11  1.22  21.07  
JSCBs 0.35  0.33  0.28  0.24  0.26  0.47  0.55  0.83  0.95  0.82  0.94  1.08  10.95  
CCBs      0.35  0.60  0.84  0.99  0.94  0.93  0.97  18.47  
ROE 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average annual 
Change (%) 
SOBs 2.93  3.05  3.50  1.33  10.95  12.32  10.95  14.46  17.12  17.93  18.22  19.61  18.86  
JSCBs 7.82  8.92  8.41  7.16  11.78  14.51  11.40  16.56  19.26  17.25  17.35  18.82  8.31  
CCBs      8.29  13.75  13.89  14.90  15.99  15.37  16.80  12.49  
Source: Author’s calculations. GTA Data Online (2014). 
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 Between 2000 and 2003, the JSCBs recorded higher ROA than the SOBs, but the 
situation changed in 2004, when the ROA for SOBs began to exceed that of JSCBs, 
with a ratio of 0.41% and 0.26%, respectively. SOBs continued to record better ROA in 
each of remaining sampling years (except for 2007). Over the period being analyzed, 
the SOBs improved their ROA with an annual rate of 21.1%, nearly double that of the 
JSCBs. The CCBs also achieved remarkable change in ROA, with an annual growth 
rate of 18.5%.  
 
For ROE, the situation is similar: the SOBs started with a lower percentage but then 
caught up and exceeded the JSCBs. In 2000, ROE for JSCBs was 7.82%, which was 
nearly three times that of the SOBs, but this disappeared through SOB reforms. By 2011, 
the average ROE for SOBs was 19.61%, nearly 1% higher than for JSCBs. For selected 
CCBs, although the ROE improved, with an annual growth rate of about 12.5%, (lower 
than SOBs but higher than JSCBs), in absolute terms, the CCBs recorded much lower 
ROEs than either the SOBs or JSCBs. 
 
This information clearly shows that the SOBs experienced profitability improvement. 
From a neoliberal perspective, non-state owned, market-determined, and more 
commercialized banks would achieve higher efficiency and better performance in risk 
control, corporate governance, and higher return rates. However, the SOBs have 
enjoyed faster growth in profit rates, which is reflected in both higher ROA and ROE as 
compared to their non-state controlled competitors, the JSCBs and CCBs. If we 
deconstruct ROA and ROE for the SOBs and JSCBs into separate parts and review their 
average annual change of net profits, total assets, and shareholder equity over the same 
time period (see Table 5.10), it is clear that the SOBs’ net profits grew slightly slower 
than the JSCBs, and that the JSCBs experienced faster expansion in total assets and 
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 shareholder equity. Therefore, although the JSCBs enjoyed net profits growth at the 
same speed as the SOBs, their relative return rates — ROA and ROE — were lower.  
 
Table 5.10 Average annual change in net profits, total assets, and shareholder’s equity, 
2000-2011, % 
Factor SOBs JSCBs 
Net profits 38.28  39.05  
Total assets 14.21  25.33  
Shareholder equity 16.34  28.39  
Source. Author’s calculations. 
 
5.3.4 Summary 
 
The analysis in this section focused on the assumptions made by mainstream finance–
growth literature in regards to China’s banking system. The assumption is that the 
inefficiencies in China’s financial system are caused by the relative allocative 
inefficiencies of the SOBs because of continuous lending to SOEs. These assumptions 
lead to the suggestion that both SOBs and SOEs have relative week performances in 
comparison to non-state competitors.  
 
By examining the performances of SOEs, non-SOEs, SOBs, and non-SOBs, the solidity 
of such assumptions have been brought into question. First, through the reform periods, 
the SOEs experienced significant improvement in their financial performances and 
contributed greater to overall economic development as long-term oriented institutions. 
Lending to SOEs then should be economically logical choices for banks, as SOEs have 
similar performance records as non-SOEs and have lower levels of risks, as loans are 
directly or indirectly guaranteed by the state. The improvement in SOEs’ performances 
may explain the phenomenon observed in Chapter 4: that non-SOBs also significantly 
grant loans to state sector. 
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 Second, SOBs have enjoyed remarkable growth and development. In comparison with 
the JSCBs and CCBs, the differences in risk control and asset quality continue to 
diminish, and the performance of SOBs have surpassed non-SOBs in recent years. Third, 
and the most important, is that SOBs have shown improved profitability over the JSCBs, 
when estimated by ROA and ROE. Therefore, if the neoclassical-style assumption of 
allocative inefficient SOBs is true, then how can SOBs generate more profits if they are 
less efficient in lending practices?  
 
Given the problem of data limitation, for non-SOBs, this section mainly emphasizes on 
JSCBs and CCBs. However, one should notice that although there is no business 
restrictions among SOBs, JSCBs and CCBs, the expansion policies for these three kinds 
of banks are somehow different. SOBs and JSCBs are regarded as national-wide banks 
while CCBs are mainly treated as regional banks. In view of that, the existence of a 
potential level playing field may affect the performances of different types of banks to 
certain extent. 
 
Above that, an “inefficient” financial system, based on the assumption of inefficient 
SOEs and SOBs, is not as weak as expected. Extending funds to SOEs, or the state 
sector, can now be considered solid economic decisions for commercial banks. Given 
that the SOBs have now achieved stronger financial performances than non-SOBs, it is 
no longer reasonable to assume an allocative inefficiency in China’s banking system.  
 
5.4 Dynamic and overall allocative efficiency 
 
Although allocative efficiency cannot be estimated directly, by excavating and 
reconsidering the intension of allocative efficiency, an assessment of aggregate banking 
 197 
 loans and total investment can provide some insights indirectly. 
 
5.4.1 Deviations in allocative efficiency 
 
As discussed earlier in this thesis, the definition of allocative efficiency of financial 
resources implies that in a fully competitive market with no market frictions, all 
financial resources (such as bank loans) would be channeled to the most productive or 
profitable low-risk enterprises in order to gain maximum returns. Therefore, there are 
two situations of allocative inefficiency: (a) supplying bank credit to all firms, no matter 
their level of efficiency and financial condition; and (b) making it difficult for firms to 
obtain bank credit, no matter how profitable they are.  
 
It is fair to argue that the above assumption and inference neglect one important 
dimension: the accessibility to finance of small and medium enterprises in China. 
However, if we look back to Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8, a declining share of state sector 
in loan distribution over the past 30 years would definitely indicate an improvement in 
credit accessibility of non-SOEs, which, are usually small and medium enterprises. 
Given so where the accessibility to credits for the private sector has experienced 
continuously improvement, a deviation from the equilibrium amount of loans extended 
under ideal conditions, e.g., more severe fluctuations between periodic aggregated bank 
loans, can be seen as a reflection of allocative inefficiency. In contract, if the fluctuation 
in credits growth goes from dramatic to gentle, it can be seen as a process of growing 
allocative efficiency.  
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 5.4.1.1 Overall trend 
 
As seen in Figure 5.9, there has been a significant transformation from violent to 
moderate fluctuations in the percentage of change of domestic credits, both 
quarter-to-quarter and year-to year basis. The interval of quarter-based change has been 
reduced from nearly 30% in mid-1980s to around 10% in the past 10 years. For 
year-to-year (see Figure 5.10), more than 10% growth has been recorded for credit 
growth in most quarters, and the fluctuation between the peak and bottom has decreased 
from 40% to 20% between 1978 and 2010. According to the above definition of 
allocative (in)efficiency, Figure 5.10 indicates that when the banking sector is taken as a 
whole, there has been a gradual process of allocative efficiency amelioration, as 
moderate credit growth implies fewer financial resource mismatches from banks to 
enterprises.  
 
Figure 5.9 Quarter-to-quarter change of domestic credits, 1978–2010, % 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. International Monetary Fund (2013). 
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 Figure 5.10. Year-to-year change of domestic credits, 1978-2010, % 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. International Monetary Fund (2013). 
 
5.4.1.2 Comparison according to ownership 
 
In comparing the annual growth of outstanding bank loans between SOBs and the 
banking sector as a whole, the two curves in Figure 5.11 provide detailed information. 
In the first phase of financial reform, from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, when 
independent SOBs were established, the curves of loan growth of the SOBs and Chinese 
financial sector move at nearly the same rate. This can be explained because at this 
early stage of financial reform, there were only three types of banks that comprised the 
formal financial sector: the PBOC, the SOBs, and the RCCs.  
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 Figure 5.11 Annual growth of bank loans between SOBs and banking sector, 1978–
2010, % 
 
Note: Author’s calculations. Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (various issues). 
 
However, between the mid-1980s and mid-2000s, banking institutions with different 
ownership structures were established, and marketization, commercialization, and 
internationalization in the financial sector was pushed by the state. SOBs’ banking 
credit growth was more volatile than the whole banking system, which suggests lower 
efficiency in allocating financial resources when compared to the industry’s average. 
Starting in 2005, with reforms on public listing the SOBs nearly complete, and with 
prudential regulation in financial reforms, a convergence in the growth of bank lending 
between SOBs and banking sector average can be seen, which can be interpreted as the 
SOBs improving their allocative efficiency.  
 
To summarize, by defining allocative inefficiency as the deviation from the ideal 
amount in supplying financial resources, Figures 5.9, Figure 5.10 and Figure 5.11 tell 
two important things. The first is that since the late 1970s, the fluctuation of domestic 
credit growth has changed from severe to gentle, which implies less deviation from the 
ideal amount of credit supply. Second, SOBs also experienced increased allocative 
efficiency, which is reflected in the convergence of loan growth curves between SOBs 
and banking sector averages.  
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5.4.2 Efficiency of investment 
 
A more efficient use of funds provided by banks can be also understood as transferring 
funds to productive and profitable enterprises. From the aspect of investment, it implies 
investing bank credit into projects with the highest returns. The return on investment, or 
the efficiency of investment, therefore, can be used as the proxy to estimate allocative 
efficiency.  
 
For measuring the efficiency of gross investment, researcher commonly apply the 
incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR) (see Keidel, 2009; Kwan, 2004, Ren, 2007; Toh 
& Ng, 2002). ICOR is first defined as the change of capital formation (investment) in 
one period over the change in output in the subsequent period. The meaning of ICOR is 
straightforward: it reflects the amount of capital required as to guarantee per unit output 
growth. In other words, the ICOR shows that for any year, how much additional capital 
has been donated to productive processes, and at the same time, how much extra output 
is generated. For example, an ICOR of 5 simply implies that every 5% of GDP invested 
would result in 1% of GDP growth. The lower the ICOR is, the more efficient the 
capital is being utilized. According to this definition, ICOR is equivalent to the 
reciprocal of the marginal product of capital for a certain period (or IOCR, incremental 
output-capital ratio).  
 
5.4.2.1 Overall trends 
 
From the definition earlier in this section, the ratio of ICOR can be calculated by the 
equation ICOR = ∆𝐾𝐾
∆𝑌𝑌
. Applying this formula, the evolution of ICOR for China, which is 
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 based on GDP and total social investment data, is reported in Figure 5.12. In addition, a 
5-year moving averaged ICOR is in the same figure, to control for the effects of 
potential short-term shocks; and two major downward trends and two major upward 
trends of ICOR have also been captured in Figure 5.12. The downward and upward 
trends can be seen as reflections of the process of gaining or losing allocative efficiency. 
By linking economic reform, it is possible to explain the improvement in allocative 
efficiency.  
 
Figure 5.12 ICOR for Chinese economy, 1980-2010, annual data, and 5-year moving 
average 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. China Statistic Yearbook (2012). 
 
There was a decreasing trend of ICOR from 1980 to 1994 and from 1998 to 2007, 
which both happened when key SOE reforms were occurring: the price liberalization 
reform in the early 1980s and Zhua Da Fang Xiao reform in the late 1990s. These two 
reforms promoted market competition and natural elimination through competition, 
with the result that productivity and financial performances, or in other word, the 
viability of SOEs, were largely improved. This improvement is key to understanding the 
increased aggregate investment efficiency.  
 
The two upward trends of increasing ICOR, from 1994 to 1998 and from 2007 and 
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 continuing, are likely related to the pace of reforms in the financial sector. From 1994 
onward, fiscal reforms and the establishment of development banks largely removed the 
quasi-fiscal agency role of the financial sector, allowing the financial sector to pursue 
more commercial goals. However, the state continued to issue annual credit plan to 
guide banks’ lending behaviors, leading to continuing credit provision to insolvent 
SOEs. Although SOE ownership reforms had been raised by the state in 1994, nothing 
happened until the late 1990s, and annual credit plans were not discontinued until 1998. 
Between 1994 and 1998, when the reforms of the financial sector and SOEs were not at 
the same pace, huge investment inefficiencies occurred. The reduction in investment 
efficiency starting in 2007, however, is the side effect of the economic stimulus plan 
adopted by the central government in 2008 to avoid the global financial crisis and 
recession. By the end of 2010, 4 trillion CNY have been invested in infrastructure and 
social welfare. 
 
5.4.2.2 Comparison according to ownership 
 
In order to investigate the differences in investment efficiencies between economies 
with different ownership structure, this thesis follows Zhang, J. (2003, 2005), who used 
industrial sector data (that is, IVA data and data of fixed investment by ownership) to 
calculate the relative ICOR for state and non-state economies. Due to the change in 
statistical standards, detailed IVA data that classifies ownership structure is not 
comparable before 1998. Therefore, the focus in this section is 2000 and onward, when 
a second wave of investment efficiency improvement occurred (see Figure 5.12). 
 
Starting in 2000, the state-owned industrial sector experienced a gradual decreasing 
trend until 2007, when the curve began to raise again; in contrast, the ICOR for 
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 non-state industrial sector has increased gradually over the years (Figure 5.13). In 2003, 
there was a turning point when the ICOR from the state sector was lower than that of 
the non-state sector. A lower ICOR implies higher marginal products of capital, i.e., a 
higher return on capital. Starting in 2003, industrial SOEs were becoming more efficient 
in their investment, the result of both efficiency enhancement of the state sector and 
gradual inefficiency in the non-state’s sector.  
 
Accordingly, the ICOR improvement in the state sector is largely in line with this 
thesis’s analysis of allocative efficiency improvements between 1998 and 2007, as SOE 
reform contributed considerably to the economy. The impact of a massive 
government-led investment plan in 2008, however, is reflected by the increase in ICOR 
for both state-owned and non-state-owned industrial sectors. 
 
Figure 5.13 Industrial sector ICOR, classified by ownership structure, 2000–2010 
 
Note: Author’s calculations. China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook (various 
issues); China Statistic Yearbook (2012). 
 
In contrast to Zhang (2005), who documented a lower ICOR, or higher investment 
efficiency of non-state sector over the state sector between 1980 and 2000, this thesis 
found the reverse. One reason might be differences in data coverage. In this thesis’s 
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 estimation, the IVA for non-state sector is calculated from the gross IVA data in national 
income accounting minus SOEs. This means that both formal and informal non-state 
industrial sectors are covered in this sample, while in Zhang, only the formal sector was 
included.  
 
5.4.2.3 Validity of ICOR as an efficiency indicator 
 
From the aspect of factor inputs in economic activities, an increasing or decreasing 
ICOR can be understood as a reflection of different developmental paths. The relative 
low ICOR from 1980 to1994, in comparison to 1995 to 2010, may suggest a higher 
share of labor input in economic development in the first half of the reforms (see Figure 
5.14). 
 
One assumption behind the effectiveness of ICOR as an efficiency indicator is a steady 
share of either labor input or capital input in economic activities over years, which has 
not held true in the case of China. In Figure 5.14, the share of capital in total input had 
substantial increased in the post-1994 period as compared to the entire reforming period. 
This suggests a rapid capital deepening process during the second half of the reform 
periods. If the change in relative share of capital and labor is not controlled, the use of 
ICOR as a proxy of investment efficiency may be biased. In Figure 5.14, the capital 
stock is estimated via the perpetual inventory method (PIM), Following Zhang (2008), 
the initial benchmark capital stock in 1978 was estimated as gross fixed capital 
formation divided by 10%, and the series of capital stock was deflated to real 1978 
price.20 The depreciation rate was is set at 4%, given that the official rate of 3.6% could 
20 The implicit deflator for capital in China is only available after 1991. To generate the 
deflator before 1991, this thesis uses the method in Zhang (2008). For any year, the 
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 be biased due to expansionary capital booming during the reform period. 
 
Figure 5.14 Capital-labor ratio of China, 1980–2010 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. China Statistic Yearbook (2012).  
 
A more fundamental problem for using ICOR as an efficiency indictor is the existence 
of aggregate production function and the measurement of capital stock. The using of 
different production functions could largely change the result of ICOR. Furthermore, 
from the Keynesian tradition, there is no way to measure aggregate capital stock to meet 
theoretical satisfaction. 
 
Analyzing the ICOR in China’s economy, it is clear that the aggregated investment 
efficiency fluctuated frequently. Given that the change in ICOR was affected by many 
factors, such as structural changes in the economy, the division of labor and the naturals 
of different industries, it is hard to know whether or not the overall efficiency of 
aggregate investment improved throughout the reform periods. The same issue in a 
comparison between the state-sector and non-state sector. 
 
implicit deflator for fixed capital formation (1978 = 1) is constructed by  
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙 𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺 𝑡𝑡 (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓)
𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙 𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺 𝑡𝑡 (1978=1)
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺 1978 (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓)  . The index of fixed capital 
formation was collected from National Bureau of Statistics (1997b). 
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 Particular time periods that recorded an obvious decrease of ICOR, such as from 1980 
to 1994 and from 1998 to 2007, but with an increase in the capital–labor ratio, would 
indicate significant improvement in allocative efficiency during that period. Clearly, 
SOE reforms made significant and positive contributions to this period of time.  
 
5.5 Summary 
 
When efficiency attributes are taken into consideration in China’s financial 
development, the method to measure allocative efficiency is almost the same as the 
method to measure financial liberalization, which emphasizes a more efficient private, 
or non-state, sector in the economy. In this respect, under neoliberalism, financial 
development thus equals financial liberalization and improved allocative efficiency. In 
the Chinese context, it is thus vital to verify the assumption of more efficient non-SOEs 
and non-SOBs. If such assumptions are held, indicators such as the proportion of bank 
credit extended by SOBs and to SOEs in total banking lending would be proxies for 
allocative efficiency.  
 
In this chapter the validity of the assumptions of inefficient SOEs and inefficient SOBs 
were examined. Based on industrial SOEs, it was found that the financial conditions of 
SOEs improved considerably. With increased market competition, the performances of 
SOEs are now at the same level as non-SOEs. Furthermore, as long-term-oriented 
institutions, an increased share of total IVAs of SOEs, as well as higher productivity, 
indicate that industrial SOEs make a direct contribution to the growth of the whole 
economy. In the discussion of SOBs and non-SOBs, it was also found that after 
shareholding reforms and public listing was completed, from the aspect of CAR, the 
NPL ratio and profitability of SOBs increased, allowing SOBs to outperform the JSCBs 
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 or CCBs, which are two types of banks that are usually assumed to be more efficient 
than SOBs.  
 
Linking these findings, it certainly suggests that using indicators with the assumption of 
a more efficient non-state sector to assess the allocative efficiency of the financial 
system in China is biased. Furthermore, despite the relative efficiency and profitability 
of SOEs and non-SOEs, if non-SOBs are more efficient in allocating resources than 
SOBs, a divergence in their lending behaviors would simply mean better financial 
positions for the non-SOBs. The improvement and then outperformance by the SOBs 
suggests that their lending to SOEs cannot simply be judged as an inefficient use of 
resource allocation, but is rather contains market-conforming attributes.  
 
Finally, this chapter adopted two alternative methods to estimate changes in allocative 
efficiency in China from an aspect of financial development: through deviation from 
market-level credit provision, and by efficiency of investment. From these two 
measurements, evidence indicated an increased allocative efficiency process throughout 
all the reforming period. 
 
As argued in Chapter 2, allocative efficiency is only part of the efficiency attributes a 
financial system embodies. Analyzing interactive transformations between savings and 
investment also offers some insights. In Chapter 6 and 7, Chinese financial development, 
from the nexus of savings–investment and deposits–loans are analyzed.   
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 Table 5.11 CAR for individual banks, 2000–2011, % 
Type Bank Name 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
SOBs              
 BOC 8.31 8.3 8.15 7.69 10.04 10.42 13.59 13.34 13.43 11.14 12.58 12.97 
 CCB  6.88 6.91 6.51 11.29 13.57 12.11 12.58 12.16 11.7 12.68 13.68 
 ICBC 5.38 5.76 5.54 5.52  9.89 14.05 13.09 13.06 12.36 12.27 13.17 
 ABC         9.41 10.07 11.59 11.94 
JSCBs              
 BOCOM   8.83 7.41 9.72 11.2 10.83 14.44 13.47 12 12.36 12.44 
 Industrial Bank 9.9 9.49 8.14 8.97 8.07 8.13 8.71 11.73 11.24 10.75 11.22 11.04 
 Guangdong Development Bank        7.14 11.63 8.98 11.02 11.1 
 Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 13.5 11.27 8.54 8.64 8.03 8.04 9.27 9.15 9.06 10.34 12.02 12.7 
 Shenzhen Development Bank 17.56 10.57 9.49 6.96 2.3 3.7 3.71 5.77 8.58 8.88 10.19 11.51 
 China Minsheng Bank 21.45 10.1 8.22 8.62 8.59 8.26 8.12 10.73 9.22 10.83 10.44 10.88 
 China Merchants Bank 11.71 10.26 12.57 9.49 9.55 9.06 11.4 10.67 11.34 10.45 11.47 11.53 
 CITIC Bank   5.85 8.9 6.05 8.11  15.27 14.32 10.14 11.31 12.27 
 China Everbright Bank    4.65  -1.47 -0.39 7.19 9.1 10.39 11.02 10.57 
 Huaxia Bank  7.63 8.5 10.32 8.61 8.23 8.28 8.27 11.4 10.2 10.58 11.68 
CCBs              
 Shanghai Rural Commercial Bank      8.26 7.32 9.16 11.8 11.95 17.23 16.12 
 Bank of Chongqing     4.29 9.71 12.07 10.65 10.77 13.75 12.41 11.96 
 Yinzhou Bank      4.08 7.23 10.24 12.37 11.52 12.35 12.92 
 Bank of Beijing    7.37 5.27 10.83  20.11 19.66 14.35 12.62 12.06 
 Bank of Shanghai 12.26 13.27 10.59 10.79 10.89 11.11 11.62 11.27 11.27 10.29 10.7 11.75 
Source: Author’s calculation. GTA Data Online (2014). There is no official CAR for ICBC in 2004, so it is left blank. 
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 Table 5.12 NPL ratio for individual banks, 2000-2011, % 
Type Bank Name 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
SOBs               
 BOC 27.2 27.51 23.37 16.28 5.13 4.62 4.04 3.12 2.65 1.52 1.1 1 
 CCB 20.27 19.35 15.17 9.12 3.92 3.84 3.29 2.6 2.21 1.5 1.14 1.09 
 ICBC 34.43 29.78 25.41 21.24 18.99 4.69 3.79 2.74 2.29 1.54 1.08 0.94 
 ABC   30.07 30.66 26.73 26.1
7 
23.43 23.5 4.32 2.91 2.03 1.55 
JSCBs              
 BOCOM 35.15 23.58 19.65 13.31 2.91 2.37 2.01 2.06 1.92 1.36 1.12 0.86 
 Industrial Bank 7.37 4.14 3.13 2.49 2.5 2.33 1.53 1.15 0.83 0.54 0.42 0.38 
 Guangdong Development Bank       5.8 4 2.85 2.4 1.58 1.34 
 Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 10.7 7.57 3.38 1.92 2.45 1.97 1.83 1.46 1.21 0.8 0.51 0.44 
 Shenzhen Development Bank 21.76 14.84 10.29 8.49 11.41 9.33 7.98 5.62 0.68 0.68 0.58 0.53 
 China Minsheng Bank 4.39 2.8 2.04 1.29 1.31 1.28 1.23 1.22 1.2 0.84 0.69 0.63 
 China Merchants Bank 13.62 10.25 5.99 3.15 2.87 2.58 2.12 1.54 1.11 0.82 0.68 0.56 
 CITIC Bank   10.35 8.12 5.96 4.11  1.48 1.36 0.95 0.67 0.6 
 China Everbright Bank   13.13 9.34  9.57 7.58 4.49 2 1.25 0.75 0.64 
 Huaxia Bank 7.18 7.05 5.97 4.23 3.96 3.04 2.73 2.25 1.82 1.5 1.18 0.92 
CCBs              
 Shanghai Rural Commercial Bank      4.07 2.91 2.34 2.29 1.88 1.35 1.17 
 Bank of Chongqing     20.03 4.93 81.06 1.06 0.77 0.47 0.36 0.35 
 Yinzhou Bank      6.11 4.05 2.16 1.93 1.51 0.56 0.48 
 Bank of Beijing    6.06 4.91 4.22  2.06 1.55 1.02 0.69 0.53 
 Bank of Shanghai 8.27 6.77 8.75 5.97 4.99 3.92 3.48 2.41 2.23 1.59 1.12 0.98 
Source: Author’s calculation. GTA Data Online (2014). 
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 Table 5.13 ROA for individual banks, % 
c Bank Name 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
SOBs               
 BOC 0.14  0.24  0.26  0.12  0.49  0.58  0.79  0.94  0.91  0.92  1.00  1.05  
 CCB 0.30  0.19  0.14  0.63  1.24  1.03  0.85  1.05  1.23  1.11  1.25  1.38  
 ICBC 0.13  0.14  0.14  0.05  0.04  0.52  0.65  0.94  1.14  1.09  1.23  1.35  
 ABC 0.01  0.05  0.10  0.06  0.05  0.02  0.11  0.20  0.73  0.73  0.92  1.04  
JSCBs              
 BOCOM 0.32  0.29  0.16  0.01  0.08  0.65  0.71  0.98  1.06  0.91  0.99  1.10  
 Industrial Bank 0.09  0.39  0.27  0.38  0.32  0.52  0.61  1.01  1.12  1.00  1.00  1.06  
 Guangdong Development Bank 0.16  0.14  0.14  0.13  0.04  -0.20  -0.17  0.61  0.51  0.51  0.76  1.04  
 Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 0.32  0.29  0.16  0.01  0.08  0.65  0.71  0.98  1.06  0.91  0.99  1.10  
 Shenzhen Development Bank 0.73  0.61  0.46  0.42  0.42  0.43  0.49  0.60  0.96  0.81  0.88  1.02  
 China Minsheng Bank 0.75  0.33  0.26  0.16  0.14  0.15  0.50  0.75  0.13  0.86  0.86  0.82  
 China Merchants Bank 0.63  0.47  0.36  0.39  0.46  0.49  0.55  0.69  0.75  0.85  0.96  1.25  
 CITIC Bank 0.32  0.52  0.47  0.44  0.52  0.54  0.76  1.16  1.34  0.88  1.07  1.29  
 China Everbright Bank 0.39  0.31  0.42  0.37  0.06  0.49  0.53  0.82  1.12  0.81  1.03  1.11  
 Huaxia Bank 0.13  0.07  0.08  0.11  0.31  0.51  0.46  0.68  0.86  0.64  0.86  1.04  
CCBs              
 Shanghai Rural Commercial Bank      0.26  0.29  0.24  0.43  0.93  0.88  1.03  
 Bank of Chongqing     0.33  0.33  0.39  1.25  1.16  1.08  1.00  1.15  
 Yinzhou Bank      0.13  0.35  1.05  1.42  1.17  1.55  1.72  
 Bank of Beijing    0.42  0.16  0.24  0.78  0.95  1.30  1.06  0.93  0.94  
 Bank of Shanghai 0.88  0.70  0.46  0.59  0.67  0.53  0.62  0.95  0.84  0.78  0.89  0.89  
Source: Author’s calculation. GTA Data Online (2014). 
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 Table 5.14, ROE for individual banks, % 
Type Bank Name 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
SOBs               
 BOC 2.80  3.58  3.99  2.18  8.99  10.47  10.03  12.36  12.86  14.82  15.44  16.43  
 CCB 6.57  4.30  4.01  12.02 24.85  16.37  14.03  16.35  19.80  19.10  19.24  20.73  
 ICBC 2.77  3.17  3.59  1.43  1.38  13.09  10.33  14.93  18.24  18.94  20.10  21.74  
 ABC 0.22  0.87  2.13  1.39  2.57  1.31  6.91  13.40  17.72  18.95  17.50  18.76  
JSCBs              
 BOCOM 6.59  5.89  3.77  0.20  1.74  11.12  13.56  15.93  19.52  18.29  17.46  18.60  
 Industrial Bank 2.16  8.21  7.51  14.07  10.52  20.26  23.45  22.07  23.22  22.29  20.13  21.97  
 Guangdong Development Bank 5.14  5.21  5.42  6.80  -0.37 -19.47 -4.89 17.30  14.20  15.26  14.43  18.19  
 Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 12.87  15.03  16.15  13.04  14.15  16.01  13.57  19.43  30.01  19.41  15.56  18.25  
 Shenzhen Development Bank 10.69  11.09  11.47  7.98  6.19  6.97  20.12  20.37  3.74  24.58  18.75  13.64  
 China Minsheng Bank 7.16  11.91  14.85  14.42  15.79  17.48  19.85  12.62  14.42  13.62  16.70  20.82  
 China Merchants Bank 20.11  28.00  10.82  12.21  15.06  15.93  12.88  22.42  26.42  19.65  19.23  21.90  
 CITIC Bank 10.79  9.94  15.17  9.17  1.62  13.97  11.71  9.85  13.97  13.38  17.27  17.24  
 China Everbright Bank 2.16  1.40  2.12  3.25  -23.45  -86.38 3.75  20.41  22.02  15.88  15.70  18.79  
 Huaxia Bank 26.35  30.55  19.59  9.29  10.58  12.33  12.51  16.09  11.20  12.44  16.87  14.43  
CCBs              
 Shanghai Rural Commercial Bank 
     
5.32  6.14  4.31  6.36  15.08  9.56  12.71  
 Bank of Chongqing 
    
4.38  5.27  5.37  21.17  19.90  21.70  21.70  22.91  
 Yinzhou Bank 
     
3.13  8.74  23.10  24.62  19.45  24.31  23.54  
 Bank of Beijing 
   
11.99  4.71  6.22  21.75  12.56  16.02  14.99  15.98  17.74  
 Bank of Shanghai 15.08  11.79  9.44  13.28  20.05  13.04  13.34  19.88  16.33  16.84  17.05  16.46  
Source: Author’s calculation. GTA Data Online (2014). 
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 Chapter 6 
Financing investment in China 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The allocative efficiency view of finance mainly focuses on how well a financial system 
overcomes market frictions to achieve an efficient use of financial resources. The 
objective in the mainstream finance–growth theory is only the financial system itself, 
and it is assumed its only role is financial intermediation. Under this view, the 
interaction between a financial system and the real sector is largely neglected, and 
particularly important features of the financial system and banking system are not 
considered: money, credit, or financial resources creation.  
 
The credit creation view of financial development can be traced to Schumpeter (1934), 
who first highlighted that only banks have the function of creating money (see Chapter 
2). This view of financial resources creation, also known as the Keynesian–
Schumpeterian theory of endogenous finance, is mainly held by post-Keynesian 
economists. According to the endogenous finance theory, the development of finance is 
defined by the ability to provide increased financial resources to facilitate real sector 
investment and, hence, achieve development. By channeling financial resources into the 
real sector, the efficiency gains in the endogenous finance process can be understood as 
productive efficiency. 
 
Theoretically, the major differences between the allocative efficiency view of finance 
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 and productive efficiency view of finance is the starting point of the business cycle. 
From the allocative efficiency view, the quantity of available investment funds is 
predetermined by savings; and savings are assumed to correlate only with the 
propensity to save, which is exogenously determined. The quantity of loanable funds is 
treated as a given number, so possible increases in total savings—the result of economic 
successes from previous investment—are not even considered. In contrast, from the 
aspect of productive efficiency, the starting point is the willingness of investment by 
entrepreneurs. Given the willing to investment, the financial system creates credit “out 
of nothing” (Herr, 2010) to fulfill demands, and the outcome of investment—economic 
development—generates additional savings that become available financial resources 
for future investment projects. The difference in views of whether it is savings that 
cause investment or investment that cause savings is the difference between the 
allocative efficiency and productive efficiency views of finance. 
 
Before analyzing the causal direction between investment and savings, a comprehensive 
understanding of their features is vital. Accordingly, in this chapter concentration is 
given to the changes in aggregate savings and investment in China from a macro view, 
and to deposits and loans from a meso-level view. By assessing the features of savings 
and investment, and deposits and loans in China, this chapter provides a solid 
background for the analysis in Chapter 7, in which both productive and allocative views 
of financial development in China, from the angle of efficiency attributes, is discussed. 
The interactions between savings and investment, and deposits and loans, as well as 
their causal relationships, will also be assessed in this chapter. 
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 6.2 Investment 
 
6.2.1 General investment in China 
 
There are two methods to estimate gross investment in an economy, according to 
different statistical methods. The first way to measure investment is to use capital 
formation data, which includes both gross fixed capital formation and change in 
inventory stocks, to account for national income through an expenditure approach. The 
second method adopts the data from total investment in fixed assets in the entire 
economy. A general overview of investment in China from both methods is displayed in 
both level terms (see Figure 6.1) and in terms of GDP (see Figure 6.2). 
 
Figure 6.1 Gross investment in China, 1978–2010, billion CNY 
 
Source: China Statistic Yearbook (2012). 
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 Figure 6.2. Investment to GDP ratio in China, 1978–2010, % 
 
Source: China Statistic Yearbook (2012). 
 
As can be seen from Figure 6.1, throughout all reform periods, whether in absolute or 
relative terms, there is an upward arch for both gross investment and the ratio of 
investment to GDP. In 1980, the nominal volume of total capital formation and fixed 
capital formation were 160 billion CNY and 132 billion CNY, respectively. In 2010, 
they were 19,360 and 18,361 billion CNY, which is an increase of more than 100 times. 
The investment to GDP ratio shows the same tendency in that the rate of gross capital 
formation and fixed capital formation over GDP rose nearly 14%, from 34.8% to 48.3%, 
and nearly 17%, from 28.8% to 45.7% (see Figure 6.2). The changes in the fixed assets 
investment show an even sharper increase, where during the same period, fixed 
investment to GDP ratio tripled, from 20% in 1980 to more than 65% in 2010. Even 
when the change in price and inflation have been controlled, real fixed investment in 
absolute terms increased more than 50 times.21  
 
What is worth noticing here is that, among gross capital formation, the fixed capital 
contributed the majority and changes in inventories gradually diminished throughout all 
21 Author’s calculation by adjusting official nominal data to 1980 constant price.  
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 reform periods, which can be observed by the convergence of gross capital and fixed 
capital formation in GDP terms. Although diminishing inventories are usually 
interpreted as a reflection of enhanced efficiency in business cycles, according to Riedel 
et al. (2007), the high stock of inventories accumulated before 2000 is attributable to 
social security reasons; that is, to maintain employment in insolvent state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). When the government finally allowed SOEs to reduce the number 
of employee in 1998 so as to achieve better financial performance, there was stiff 
competition from private firms; inventories declined as more financial resources were 
allocated to fixed investment (Lardy, 2005, p.12).  
Table 6.1 Investment world comparison, 1978–2010, % of GDP 
Country Gross capital 
formation 
Gross fixed capital 
formation 
 1978-
1990 
1991-
2000 
2001-
2010 
1978-
1990 
1991-
2000 
2001-
2010 
China 36.18  38.95  42.59  28.93  33.61  40.32  
Brazil 21.24  18.58  17.72  21.24  17.86  17.12  
Russia 31.98  24.30  21.58  30.23  19.62  19.64  
India 22.05  23.85  32.63  20.22  23.04  29.25  
South Africa 23.33  16.47  18.63  23.21  15.90  18.05  
Korea 31.59  34.69  29.39  30.76  34.90  28.86  
Japan 30.06  28.07  22.22  29.62  27.93  22.27  
United States 19.92  18.50  18.08  19.41  17.99  18.02  
Germany 22.72  22.30  18.18  22.22  22.00  18.06  
Low income 16.52  18.01  21.43  16.04  17.44  20.94  
Middle income 26.96  27.41  29.08  23.98  24.90  27.13  
High income 22.90  21.37  20.13  22.35  20.90  19.89  
Source: World Bank (2013). 
 
From the perspective of an international comparison, Table 6.1 shows that the 
investment rate in China remained high. Among the BRICS emerging economies, only 
China and India have recorded growing investment rates over the last 30 years. When 
classified by national income level, the share of investment in GDP for low-income 
economies grew faster than for middle-income economies, and high-income economies 
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 recorded a negative trend. However, comparing investment rates of economies at 
different stages of development can lead to biased results. According to Ma and Yi 
(2010), similar to China and India, East Asian economies also experienced rapid and 
sustained growth in investment rates during their “catch-up” phases. For example, over 
the course of 20 years, starting in the mid-1950s, the investment rate for Japan increased 
by more than 10%, from nearly 25% to more than 35%. Korea also reported more than 
10% growth in investment rates from 1970 to the mid-1990s.  
 
6.2.2 Investment by ownership structure 
 
Due to unavailable data and changes in statistical standards, discussed earlier in this 
thesis, the only consistent data throughout all the reform periods is the fixed investment 
data of the SOEs. In Figure 6.3, it can be seen that fixed asset investment contributed by 
the state sector declined sharply, from over 80% in 1980 to nearly 30% in 2010. One 
possible explanation for the declining shares of investment by SOEs is the decreased 
number of SOEs, starting in the late 1990s. According to Knight and Ding (2012, p. 
157), the total number of SOEs was halved, from nearly 238,000 in 1998 to 112,000 in 
2007.  
 
Given the improvement in financial performances, and that shares in total industrial 
value–added (IVA) of SOEs was maintained (see Chapter 5), the declining share in 
investment of SOEs implies an increase in overall investment efficiency of SOEs. This 
is reflected in this thesis’s analysis based on the incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR; 
see Chapter 5). However, Riedel et al. (2007, p. 40) point out that if investment per 
capita is used, the picture is different. SOEs’ share in total fixed investment remained at 
about 30% by the end of 2010; their share in total employment, however, was only 
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 around 8.53% between 2006 and 2010. It is not fair to conclude from this data that 
SOEs had invested too heavily. Today’s large SOEs are mainly in resource industries, 
which are capital-intensive industries. Therefore, the higher per capita investment by 
SOEs could simply reflect the nature of these industries.  
 
Figure 6.3 Share of total fixed investment by state sector, 1980–2010, % 
 
Source: China Statistic Yearbook (2012); National Bureau of Statistics of China (2013) 
 
6.2.3 Investment by source of funds 
 
Table 6.2 shows the gross domestic investment in fixed assets from 1981 to 2010 by 
different sources of funds. According to the official definition (China Statistic Yearbook, 
2012), self-raising funds in fixed investment refer mainly to retained earnings, while the 
“Others” category consists mostly of funds raised by issuing bonds and stocks. Funds 
raised through internal finance and equity finance are considered direct finance; it is 
clear that internal finance is the main method China’s firms use to raise investment 
funds. 
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 Table 6.2 Investment by source of funds, 1981–2010, % 
Year State 
budget 
Domestic 
loans 
Foreign 
investment 
Self-raising 
funds and 
Others 
# of 
self-raising 
funds 
# of 
Others 
1981 28.07  12.69  3.79  55.45  --- --- 
1982 22.70  14.31  4.92  58.07  --- --- 
1983 23.75  12.27  4.66  59.32  --- --- 
1984 22.97  14.10  3.86  59.07  --- --- 
1985 16.03  20.07  3.60  60.30  --- --- 
1986 14.60  21.10  4.40  59.90  --- --- 
1987 13.10  23.00  4.80  59.11  --- --- 
1988 9.28  21.01  5.92  63.79  --- --- 
1989 8.30  17.30  6.60  67.80  53.41  14.39  
1990 8.70  19.60  6.30  65.40  51.57  13.83  
1991 6.80  23.50  5.70  64.00  51.46  12.54  
1992 4.30  27.40  5.80  62.50  49.81  12.69  
1993 3.70  23.50  7.30  65.50  47.57  17.93  
1994 2.97  22.42  9.92  64.68  44.88  19.80  
1995 3.03  20.46  11.19  65.33  51.88  13.45  
1996 2.68  19.58  11.76  65.98  47.74  18.24  
1997 2.76  18.93  10.63  67.68  49.71  17.97  
1998 4.17  19.30  9.11  67.42  48.81  18.61  
1999 6.22  19.24  6.74  67.79  49.20  18.59  
2000 6.37  20.32  5.12  68.19  49.28  18.91  
2001 6.70  19.06  4.56  69.68  52.39  17.29  
2002 7.02  19.67  4.63  68.69  50.65  18.04  
2003 4.59  20.55  4.43  70.43  53.65  16.78  
2004 4.37  18.49  4.41  72.74  55.35  17.39  
2005 4.39  17.25  4.21  74.15  58.26  15.89  
2006 3.93  16.47  3.64  75.96  59.75  16.21  
2007 3.88  15.28  3.40  77.43  60.59  16.84  
2008 4.35  14.46  2.90  78.29  64.79  13.50  
2009 5.07  15.71  1.85  77.38  61.35  16.03  
2010 4.72  15.20  1.60  78.48  63.38  15.10  
Source: China Statistic Yearbook (2012); National Bureau of Statistics of China (2013). 
 
Along with the funds raised internally, for external finance (which include direct 
government capital transfers from the state budget, loans extended from the banking 
system, and foreign funds), it is clear that bank financing has dominated the entire 
financial sector (see Figure 6.4). The share of state budget in all sources of investment 
funds dropped from 28% in 1981 to no more than 5% in 2010. There has been a similar 
occurrence in all methods of external finance. Foreign investment shows an upward 
curve in the first half of the sample years, but there is a downward curve starting in 
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 1996, which shows the highest share at a rate of 12% of all investment sources. By the 
end of 2010, foreign funds contributed only 1.6% to total fixed investment.  
 
Figure 6.4 Composition of external finance, 1981–2010, % 
 
Source: China Statistic Yearbook (2012); National Bureau of Statistics of China (2013). 
 
To explain the relatively high share of “self-raising funds” and “others” among all 
sources of funds in investment financing, Riedel et al. (2007, p. 43), argued that these 
two categories also include funds raised by informal financial markets. Therefore, 
despite both direct and indirect financing, the high share of self-raising funds and others 
in all source of investment may reflect the emergence of informal finance. Allen Qian, 
and Qian (2005, 2008) found that informal finance positively promoted economic 
development in China through easing financial constraints, especially for non-SOEs. 
However, according to a firm-level study by Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Maksimovic (2010), although most of the firms in their data sample relied on informal 
financing rather than formal bank financing, it was the formal financing that promoted 
higher firm-level growth. One possible reason for this conflicting evidence is the high 
cost involved with informal finance: loans extended by informal financial markets are 
associated with higher interest rates. In some extreme cases, that rate could be more 
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 than 10 times the official lending rate.  
 
These explanations for the high ratio of “self-raised and others” in all investment funds 
highlight the importance of financial development in China. However, it is not 
necessary to assume that a more competitive, market-based financial system can reduce 
the share of self-raised funds in all total investment. As Knight and Ding (2010) found, 
risk aversion by borrowers and limited information on borrowers can also result in a 
high share of self-raised funds in investment. In a representative case by Mayer (1988), 
retained earnings financed 70% of corporate investment in the United Kingdom 
between 1970 and 1985, yet the UK’s financial sector was labeled as more efficient. 
 
6.2.4 Investment by sources of funding and ownership structure 
 
Detailed official data of investment (see Table 6.5 and Table 6.6 at end of this chapter) 
in fixed assets by both ownership and source of funding is only available between 1985 
and 2003, but by analyzing the evolution of the composition of gross investment — for 
example, the changing position of the state and non-state sectors, and the changing role 
of internal and external financing in total fixed investment over years — it is possible to 
examine the earlier interpretations. 
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 Figure 6.5 Investment financing by ownership, 1985–2003, % 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. China Statistic Yearbook (various issues). Data of 
foreign-funded enterprises is only available starting in 1993. Before 1993, the 
private-owned and others category only included individually owned enterprises. After 
1993, this category also included firms with joint ownership, shareholding enterprises, 
and other firms. 
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In comparing entities with different ownership, Figure 6.5, surprisingly shows that 
self-raising funds were the largest source of investment funds for SOEs, contributing on 
average nearly half of total fixed investment every year between 1985 and 2003. The 
share of bank loans remained stable over this period, for a weight of 20% to 30%. The 
declining share of state budget is quite significant, from more than 20% in 1985 to 10% 
at 2003, with its lowest share being 4.6% in 1996. 
 
For private-owned and other firms, the situation was largely different before 1992. 
Self-raising funds were the only type available for privately owned enterprises looking 
to create investment plans. Starting in 1993, there was an increase in both bank credit 
and funds raised from “others,” which mainly refers to issuing bonds and stocks, and an 
informal or even underground financial market. By the end of 2003, more than 40% of 
all investment funds were raised by bank credit (20%) and “other” funds (20%). 
Interestingly, along with decreased capital transfers from the state, foreign investment 
also rarely flowed to private-owned firms, especially when compared to SOEs and 
collective-owned enterprises. 
 
Collective-owned enterprises recorded a drop in shares of formal bank lending in all 
investment funds over the period being analyzed. Meanwhile, approximately 18% to 20% 
of investment of foreign-funded enterprises were supported by domestic banks.  
 
When a comparison of different sources of funds (see Figure 6.6) is linked to the 
comparison of different ownerships, a comprehensive picture is formed. First, the 
majority of state capital was channeled to the SOEs, and since 1994, a small proportion, 
between 10% and 15%, has been given to collective-owned enterprises. Second, looking 
 225 
 at the distribution of bank credits, fewer loans in fixed investment have been extended 
to SOEs, especially after 1992; and that share dropped from nearly 80% in 1990 to 46% 
by the end of 2003. This decrease fits with this thesis’s analysis for the share of SOEs in 
total bank lending (Figure 4.8). 
Figure 6.6 Investment financing classified by source of funds, 1985–2003, % 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. China Statistic Yearbook (various issues). The data for 
foreign-funded enterprises is only available after 1993. Before 1993, the private-owned 
and others category included only individually owned enterprises. After 1993, it also 
included firms with joint ownership, shareholding enterprises, and other firms. 
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Third, a growing proportion of bank credit was granted to private-owned and 
foreign-funded firms, which is the converse for SOEs and collective-owned enterprises. 
By 2003, loans extended to both private-owned and foreign firms exceeded loans to 
SOEs. Although the data for 2004 is not available, a continuing tendency can be 
expected, in reference to both decreasing shares of state-owned commercial banks 
(SOBs) in total bank lending and SOEs in total loans granted (see Figure 4.7 and Figure 
4.8). Fourth, SOEs were becoming less favored by foreign funders, who were 
channeling increasing shares to foreign-owned firms. An increasing stake of foreign 
funds flowed to private-owned enterprises, though small, occurred as well. 
 
These findings of investment by ownership and source of funds lead to several points. 
The first is that the state sector decreased its financing investment, as seen by the 
declining shares of SOEs and lowered state budget in gross fixed investment and 
sources of investment funds. There was also a drop in the flow of the share of funds 
from formal bank lending and foreign sources to SOEs. However, the majority of state 
budget financing kept transferring to SOEs.  
 
The second point that can be drawn is that bank loans contributed 15% to 20%, on 
average, to fixed assets investment, and dominated external financing of Chinese firms. 
This increase was particularly strong in the non-state sector, that is, to private-owned 
and foreign-owned firms. However, the increase of “other funds” in the investment of 
private-owned firms, starting in 1994, suggests frequent use of informal financing to 
raise funds. Generally, firms usually use formal bank financing because interest rates 
from informal financial markets are generally higher than the price of credit from banks. 
More bank loans have been granted to the private sector while non-SOEs still face 
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 difficulties in accessing formal bank financing.  
 
The third and final point, from the aspect of sources of funding is that self-raising funds 
have remained the largest source of fixed investment funds for both state and non-state 
sectors (though not for foreign-funded firms). There are two possibilities.. The first 
possibility is the existence of financial constraints for both state and non-state sectors, 
such as credit rationing in banking practices, if it is assumed that firms prefer bank 
financing to internal financing. The second possibility is that the dominance of 
self-raising funds in fixed investment simply reflects the preference for internal finance; 
or it may suggest the relative inefficiency of the financial sector as a whole, which 
stresses the importance of continued financial reforms.  
 
6.3 Savings 
 
6.3.1. Savings from expenditure-based GDP and world comparison 
 
Unlike the account held by Feldstein and Horioka (1980) that the linkage between 
domestic savings and investment could be weak in a highly integrated capital market, 
for economies with strict restrictions on cross-border capital movement, such as 
China’s,22 high investment rates may be associated with high savings rates. This can be 
observed by the analogous annual growth rate of gross investment and savings (see 
Figure 6.7). Derived from a definition of national account, S = I + CA, where gross 
savings are equal to the sum of gross investment and the balance of current account, 
China’s gross national savings can be estimated by totaling the data of gross capital 
formation and net exports of goods and services from expenditure-based GDP.  
22 As of June 2013, China’s capital account was still not fully open and convertible. 
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Figure 6.7 Annual growth rate, gross investment and savings, 1980–2010, % 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. China Statistic Yearbook (2012). Investment is measured 
by gross capital formation data from expenditure-based GDP. 
 
As seen in Figure 6.8, there was a substantial expansion of gross national savings over 
the entire reform period, which is reflected in the increased share of gross savings in 
GDP, from less than 35% in 1980 to 52% by the end of 2010. What is worth noting, 
however, is that the savings rate did not increase continuously. There was an unusual 
drop in the savings rate, from 42% in 1995 to 38% in 2000, when saving rate began to 
rise again.  
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 Figure 6.8 Gross national savings and the saving rate (from expenditure-based GDP), 
1980–2010, billion CNY and % 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. China Statistic Yearbook (2012). 
Table 6.3 Savings rate, world comparison, 1980-2010, %  
Country/Country-Type 1980-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010 
China 36.44  40.42  47.89  
Brazil 19.78  16.25  16.78  
Russia N/A 26.80  29.49  
India 21.12  24.18  32.21  
South Africa 23.88  16.28  15.35  
Korea 30.69  35.75  31.39  
Japan 31.79  30.59  25.60  
United States 17.05  16.64  13.88  
Germany 19.81  20.75  22.67  
Low income 13.41  16.76  20.76  
Middle income 25.79  26.67  30.55  
High income 21.24  20.80  19.79  
Source: World Bank (2013). 
 
In a comparison of world savings rates (see Table 6.3), there is a similarity in the 
comparison of investment rates between China and other countries. First, among BRICS 
countries, only China and India have recorded a rising savings rate, with an increase of 
more than 10% over the 30-year period. The selected developed economies, except for 
Germany, reported a decreased or wavering savings rate over the sample period. A 
faster growing savings rate has been captured in low-income economies, when 
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 compared with middle-income economies, and high-income economies have shown, on 
average, a negative tendency.  
 
6.3.2 Composition of savings from production-based GDP 
 
Gross national savings can be estimated not only from expenditure-based national 
accounting, but also from production-based national income. According to the structure 
of Flow of funds statistics, gross savings can be broken down into sectors, such as 
household, corporate, and government, which can provide in-depth details on the gross 
savings in China. However, as the official Flow of funds data in China only became 
available starting in 1992, there is only partial insight into the composition of savings, 
as the features of savings in the early stages of reform are unknown.  
 
The annual savings rate by sector, generated from Flow of funds statistics, is found in 
Table 6.4. It should be noted that in both 2008 and 2012, the National Bureau of 
Statistics updated the Flow of funds statistics for previous years. This means there are 
three versions of Flow of funds statistics (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2008; 
China Statistic Yearbook, various issues). In order to keep consistency in the data series 
in Table 6.4, all three versions were consulted.  
 
The saving rate series based on expenditure GDP and the production-based saving rates 
each had an upward direction, and these two curves became nearly identical, especially 
starting in 2000 (Figure 6.9). 
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 Figure 6.9 Savings rates according to different methods, 1980-2010, % 
 
Note: Author’s calculations. China Statistic Yearbook (2012); National Bureau of 
Statistics of China (2008). 
 
Table 6.4 Saving rate (from production-based GDP) and composition of savings by 
sector, 1992–2008, % 
 % of gross national disposable income % of total savings 
Year Total savings Household Government Corporate Household Government Corporate 
1992 36.29 20.19 4.39 11.70 55.65 12.10 32.25 
1993 38.01 18.16 4.12 15.73 47.77 10.84 41.39 
1994 39.36 21.67 3.17 14.53 55.04 8.05 36.90 
1995 38.68 19.89 2.57 16.22 51.43 6.63 41.94 
1996 37.54 20.15 3.71 13.69 53.67 9.87 36.46 
1997 38.66 21.56 4.01 13.10 55.76 10.36 33.88 
1998 38.13 21.37 3.31 13.45 56.04 8.68 35.28 
1999 37.41 20.04 2.67 14.70 53.57 7.13 39.30 
2000 37.56 20.99 -1.37 17.94 55.89 -3.64 47.75 
2001 38.46 20.62 -1.08 18.92 53.61 -2.81 49.19 
2002 40.24 20.28 0.62 19.34 50.39 1.54 48.06 
2003 43.05 21.71 1.40 19.94 50.43 3.25 46.32 
2004 45.74 20.63 2.59 22.51 45.11 5.67 49.22 
2005 46.46 21.53 3.33 21.60 46.34 7.16 46.50 
2006 48.15 22.39 4.22 21.54 46.51 8.76 44.74 
2007 50.89 23.11 5.68 22.10 45.42 11.16 43.42 
2008 51.91 23.28 5.89 22.74 44.84 11.35 43.81 
2009 50.57 24.44 4.94 21.19 48.33 9.76 41.90 
Source: Author’s calculation. National Bureau of Statistics of China (2008); China 
Statistic Yearbook (2012). Savings from the corporate sector is calculated by the sum of 
savings from non-financial corporations and financial institutions. China’s Flow of 
funds statistics became available starting in 1992. For 1992 to 1999, Flow of funds data 
was adopted from National Bureau of Statistics of China (2008); for 2000 onward, data 
adopted from China Statistic Yearbook (2012). 
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 The corporate sector recorded the fastest growth in savings, over household and 
government sectors. What is worth noting is that only since 1998 has continuous and 
steady savings expansion occurred in the corporate sector, as seen in the increasing 
share of corporate sector savings in both total savings and GDP. Given the SOE reforms 
at that time, the growth in corporate savings may, to a certain extent, be explained by 
the enhanced efficiency and financial performances of the SOEs. Whatever the reasons, 
the savings rate of the corporate sector over GDP nearly doubled between 1992 and 
2009, from 11.7% to 21.2%, and more than 8% was achieved after 1998.  
 
Savings from the government sector, however, experienced a U-shaped pattern that 
touched bottom in 2000 and 2001, when negative numbers were reported. Although 
government savings were nearly restored in 2007 and 2008 to its initial 1992 level, its 
importance and contribution to total savings remains minor. 
 
Although the savings rate of household sector to GDP slightly increased from 20.2% to 
24.4% during the sample period, its share in total savings recorded a falling trend. 
Though the household sector continues to save the most, since the late 1990s, the 
driving force behind China’s substantial accumulation in savings has been the corporate 
sector.  
 
6.3.3 Savings from the Flow of funds statistics 
 
The Flow of funds statistics provided both disposable income and savings by sectors, 
making it possible to study the evolution of gross savings and the savings rates in 
different sectors. Figure 6.10 shows the total share of disposal income by household, 
government, and corporate sectors.  
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Figure 6.10 Share of total disposable income by sector, 1992–2009, % 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. National Bureau of Statistics of China (2008); China 
Statistic Yearbook (2012). 
 
The gross savings rate is equal to gross savings over gross national income, which is a 
reflection of the overall propensity to save. The change in savings rates of each sector 
can thus be interpreted by two factors: the sector’s share in total disposable income 
(Figure 6.10) and the propensity to save (see Figure 6.11).  
 
Figure 6.11 Propensity to save by sector, 1992–2009, % 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. National Bureau of Statistics of China (2008); China 
Statistic Yearbook (2012). 
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 Given that in the corporate sector there is no concept of consumption, its disposable 
income is always equal its savings; thus, the corporate sector figure for the propensity to 
save is not reported. Its growing savings rate can be attributed to its increased share in 
total disposable income (see Figure 6.10).  
 
In contrast, the household and government sectors have shown a different picture. For 
the government sector, its share in disposable income has been steady, between 16% 
and 19% for most years (Figure 6.10); meanwhile there’s been fierce fluctuation in the 
proportion of savings of the government sector (Figure 6.11). The propensity to save 
can be regarded as the major reason for the U-shaped growth of government savings. 
Fewer savings, however, can be related to higher spending. One possible explanation 
for the government’s abnormal drop in 2000 and 2001 may be linked to the number of 
NPLs written-off at that time (see Chapter 5). At the end of the 20th century, the first 
and largest wave of NPLs write-offs occurred (see Table 3.7), when nearly 1,400 billion 
CNY worth of NLPs—fully financed by the central government—were transferred from 
the SOBs to the Asset Management Companies (AMCs). A second possible explanation 
is the changing attributes of the so-called “local government financing platform” or 
“local government financial vehicle.” Normally, investment projects under the local 
government financial platform, for example, infrastructure investment in power, water, 
or transportation, are classified as undertaken enterprises. However, when the original 
Flow of funds statistics is compared with the 2012 revised version, it was found that the 
changes in the 2012 version were from a combination of increased government 
expenditures, increased corporate sector savings, and decreased government savings. 
Therefore, in the 2012 Flow of funds statistics, it is doubtful whether the investment 
under the local government-financing platform were classified under government 
expending.  
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For the household sector, a mixed situation occurred. The combination of decreased 
shares of gross disposable income (68.3% to 60.5%) and an increased propensity to 
save (29.5% to 40.3%) resulted in simultaneous growth in its saving rate and decrease 
in its share in total savings. The reason behind the declining income share has been 
explained by the continuous fall of the labor share in the national income (Ma & Yi, 
2010). The increasing propensity to save from the household sector, however, could be 
interpreted as a circumstance of insufficient social security systems, such as education, 
healthcare, permanent jobs (iron rice bowl) and so on. 
 
Along with enhancement in efficiency and improvement in financial performances of 
enterprises, the substantial increase in corporate savings in China can be explained by 
two other factors. The first is the difficulty in accessing external finance (that is, 
financial constraints), and the second is the low dividend payment by publicly listed 
Chinese firms, especially SOEs (Zhou, 2005). Listed SOEs are not required to pay 
dividends to the state, which is the SOEs’ single largest shareholder, so a large part of 
net profits have become retained earnings, and thus, savings. 
 
In Ito and Volz (2013), China’s overall high savings rate is resulted by financial 
repression and negative real deposit rates especially since late 1990s. Financial 
constraints and lacking of financial means are also suffered by the household sector. 
However, on the other hand, Ma and Yi (2010) argued that China’s high savings rate not 
only facilitates investment and serves economic development via low inflation and by 
avoiding external shocks, but it also helps in formulating China’s investment-led growth 
model. A higher savings rate implies less consumption, and hence “a highly 
investment-incentive internal demand structure” (Ma and Yi, 2010, p. 6). 
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6.4 Banking loans 
 
From the perspective of financial system development, in the practice of financial 
intermediation, the process of financing (transforming savings to investment) can be 
interpreted by the transition between deposits and loans. Breaking down loan and 
deposit portfolios from the banking sector can provide a detailed look at whether banks 
have performed well in delivering basic functions, such as mobilizing savings and 
channeling savings to facilitate credit demand for investment. It also helps to inspect the 
degree of disparity in the meaning of the term “financing” between the aggregated level, 
savings–investment circulation, and real banking practices. Disparities may imply 
possible distortions, for example, caused by efficiency loss that occurs in the conduction 
of financial activities. 
 
The general features of financial development, from the aspect of monetization, were 
reviewed in detail in Chapter 4. To summarize those findings, the money supply in 
China’s economy is among the highest worldwide (see Table 4.1), and such rapid 
monetary expansion, with an average annual growth of more than 20%, was largely 
driven by the expansion of bank credit. This can be observed from the identical moving 
tendency between the annual growth of money and quasi-money (M2) and bank credit 
(see Figure 4.2). 
 
Second, equity financing (financing through issuing corporate bonds and via the stock 
exchange) has shown an increased share in all methods of finance, though bank finance 
dominated the system until 2011, when more than 60% of total new financial resources 
supplied to the market were bank loans (see Table 4.2). An international comparison 
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 showed that China’s banking system provided more funds than most low- and 
middle-income economies, though China’s was still lower, on average, than that of 
high-income economies (see Table 4.3).  
 
Third, among the banking system, SOBs remained the single largest market player, 
though an upward market share occurred for both the JSCBs and CCBs (see Table 4.6). 
It is quite likely that the SOBs will retain their dominant position for the foreseeable 
future in terms of total assets. In 2011, nearly 45% of total banking assets belonged to 
the 4 SOBs, while the 13 JSCBs and 144 CCBs shared 20% and 9%, respectively (see 
Table 4.6).  
 
From an institutional aspect, the influence of the state sector (the state government, 
SOBs, and SOEs) has been slightly undermined because the share of total bank credit 
allocated to the state sector declined, while the share of credit extended by non-SOBs 
increased (see Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8). The interesting thing is that both SOBs and 
non-SOBs lend heavily to SOEs and other related state sector businesses. According to 
the findings in Chapter 5, given the improvement in efficiency and financial 
performances of industrial SOEs (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2), lending to SOEs became 
based on commercial criteria. The preference of lending to SOEs can be interpreted as a 
reflection of the outcome of a market-oriented, comprehensive loan approval process. 
The SOBs surpassed the profit rates of the JSCBs and CCBs (see Figure 5.7 and Figure 
5.8), and industrial SOEs surpassed the non-state industrial sector surpassed in 
investment efficiency (see Figure 5.13).  
 
The composition of all loans made by the banking system during the entire reform era 
appears in Figure 6.12. As aggregate loan data only became available starting in 1989, 
 238 
 the approach in Laurenceson and Chai (2003, p. 10) was followed: loan data from the 
SOBs, Rural Credit Co-operatives, Urban Credit Co-operatives (UCCs), and Trust and 
Investment Corporations (TICs) were totaled. It should be noted that aggregated loans 
data for the UCCs and TICs were available starting only in 1986. Additionally, because 
of the change in statistical standards, sectors with consistent data series are clearly 
marked in Figure 6.12. Inconsistent data has been classified under “Others,” which 
includes: loan data of township enterprises (1997–2009); enterprises with foreign funds 
(1994–2009; other short-term loans (1997–2009); trusted loans (1997–2009); other 
loans (1985–2009); loans to urban collective enterprises (1980–1996); and loans to 
township enterprises and rural public institutions (1980–1988). 
 
Figure 6.12 Composition of Chinese bank loans, 1980-2009, % 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (various issues). 
 
In reviewing the portfolio of bank lending, several changes can be observed. First, over 
time the term structure switched from short-term to medium- and long-term loans.  
 
Starting at nearly 0% in 1980, by 2009 medium- and long-term loans accounted for 
more than 50% of banks’ total loan portfolio. It is not clear whether the supply side or 
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 the demand side affected this increase; most likely, it was both. The phrases 
“medium-term loans” and “long-term loans” were only introduced by the state after 
1999, and efforts to trace loan data has shown that loans under these phrases were 
previously called “loan to fixed investment.”23 Medium- and long-term loans can be 
treated as loans channeled to finance investment in fixed assets; therefore, over the last 
30 years, there was a tendency to channel bank credit to fund investment in fixed assets. 
 
On the one hand, firms prefer stable and long-term financing to facilitate investment 
expenditures, given that an investment cycle is commonly longer than a production 
cycle. On the other hand, with the cost of liquidity, extending long-term credit to 
low-risk enterprises is favored by banks. One reason may be the underdevelopment of 
the non-bank financial market in China. Given the high degree of using retained 
earnings to finance fixed investment, which indicates a certain level of financial 
constraints faced by Chinese firms, without an advanced capital market to provide 
continuous and stable long-term funds for firms, long-term banking credit was the only 
alternative. According to Brandt and Zhu (2007, p. 124), the increasing role of medium- 
and long-term loans may also be the result of writing off NPLs, which are usually 
short-term loans.  
 
The amount of bank credit flowing into the industrial and commercial sectors has 
declined gradually. Classified as short-term loans, these credits were treated as working 
capital. This is not to imply that the industrial sector received less support from the 
financial sector over the reform period. It is reasonable to think that most fixed 
investment are used by industries, so the falling share of credit for working capital and 
23 The disaggregated loan data reported in 1999’s Almanac of China's Finance and 
Banking traced a regenerated loan portfolio to 1994. Comparing data between 1994 and 
1997 under two statistical standards, the quantity of “medium-term” and “long-term” 
loans equals “loans to fixed investment.” 
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 the rise in financing fixed investment may suggest that industrial enterprises prefer 
investments. For the commercial sector, the ongoing decrease in consumption 
expenditures in the national income, due to high investment rate, is a partial reason for 
why fewer loans are granted to the commercial sector.  
 
A substantial amount of bank credit was granted to other sectors or through other 
loan-granting mechanisms. Because of the change in statistical standards in the 
accounting of bank loans, the “Others” category in Figure 6.12 mainly consists of loans 
to enterprises with collective or foreign ownership, and new loan types, such as trusted 
and entrusted loans, extended to non-bank financial institutions. Therefore, the share of 
“Others” loans is, to a certain extent, a reflection of financial diversification. 
 
Comparing aggregated loans in the financial system with total use of funds of the 
financial sector, as illustrated in Figure 6.13, it is clear that most financial resources 
were allocated in the form of loan extensions. Portfolio investment saw solid growth 
starting in the early 1990s, with a stake of 12% of total application of funds by the end 
of 2010. More interesting is the rapid accumulation of foreign exchanges, also starting 
in the early 1990s. Responsible for 30% of all use of funds over the last several years, 
such a large composition of funds outstanding on foreign exchanges could weaken the 
total capacity of the Chinese financial system.  
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 Figure 6.13 Composition of total use of funds, 1980–2010, % 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (various issues). 
 
6.5 Savings deposits 
 
From the supply side, rapid bank credit expansion over the last 30 years, as presented 
above, correlated to a rapid expansion of savings deposits. Furthermore, the high 
savings rate presented in the previous section indicates a high number of savings 
deposits. Total deposits held in the banking system, however, achieved an even higher 
annual growth than loan expansion (see Figure 6.14).  
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 Figure 6.14 Annual growth rate of total loans and deposits, 1980–2010, % 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (various issues). 
 
As face value, a pattern that looks like an exponential curve on the deposits series, from 
less than 200 billion CNY in 1978 to nearly 60,000 billion CNY in 2009 (see Figure 
6.15). 
 
Figure 6.15 Total savings deposits, 1980–2010, billion CNY 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (various issues). 
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 held by the four SOBs declined, from more than 85% in 1980, to less than 50% in 2010 
(see Figure 6.16), which confirms the growing competition among Chinese banks in 
absorbing deposits. 
 
Figure 6.16 Share of savings deposits held in SOBs, 1980–2010, % 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (various issues). 
The SOBs only include BOC, ICBC, BOA, and CCB, as the three policy banks do not 
accept deposits. Prior to 1985, deposits data for each bank is not available; this thesis 
adopted the deposits series from the aggregated table of state banks’ sources of funds.  
 
By decomposing total savings deposits from all the sources, additional information is 
illustrated (see Figure 6.17). There were mainly four sectors that contributed to total 
savings deposits: corporate, government, agriculture, and household. First, the corporate 
sector steadily contributed, on average, a share of 35% of total deposits annually. 
Although the majority of bank loans were granted to the corporate sector, a substantial 
number of corporate deposits may imply an inadequate supply of credit. Recalling the 
uncommonly high share of “self-raising funds” in investment in fixed assets (see Table 
6.2), it is possible that those deposits saved by firms were used on other investment 
projects, given the difficulties in accessing more bank credit.  
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 sample period, from 20% in 1980 to no more than 3% in 1997, which was its bottom. 
Since then, government deposits rose again, and in recent years, account for a stake 
between 9% and 10%. This increased share is a result of China’s re-adoption of an 
expansionary fiscal policy starting in 1998, against the background of the Asian 
financial crises (Lin, 2011, p.78) 
 
Substantial expansion of savings deposits can be found only in the household sector, 
which became the largest sector saver in 1987, the year when a higher composition of 
total deposits from the household sector over the corporate sector was recorded. Since 
then, the proportionate share of household deposits gradually increased, and reached its 
peak in the late 1990s. Although in the 21st century there has been a slightly downward 
trend in the share of household deposits, this sector continues to hold the dominant 
position. For the household sector, savings are largely represented in the form of 
savings deposits, therefore the changing share in household sector total deposits can be 
understood as a combined effect of a 10% decrease in its share of national disposable 
income and a 10% increase in the propensity to save (see Figure 6.10 and Figure 6.11).  
 
The agricultural sector was the only sector that recorded a gradual declining share in 
deposits, from 12.4% in 1980 to 2.4% in 2010. 
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 Figure 6.17 Composition of savings deposits, 1980–2010, % 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (various issues). 
Deposits of the government sector are defined as the sum of fiscal deposits and deposits 
of government departments and organizations.  
 
6.6 Summary 
 
In this chapter, from the aspect of both source and use of funds (meaning the supply and 
demand sides of finance), an examination of investment and savings, and bank loans 
and savings deposits in aggregated terms, was undertaken. A financial pathway, where 
funds flowed from the household sector (major depositor) to the corporate sector (major 
user) was illustrated; this flow highlights the potential role of financial intermediation in 
channeling financial resources across sectors under the China context. From this chapter 
it is clear that from both the supply side and demand side of finance, and from the angle 
of SOEs and SOBs, the state has had a decreasing influence in the economy. 
 
The term “finance” describes the process of financing investment; that is channeling 
savings into investment projects. Along with emphasizing both supply and demand 
sides of finance, an important task is assessing financial interactions. The analysis in 
this chapter provided a comprehensive foundation for the analysis presented in Chapter 
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 7. That chapter focuses on the causal directions between savings and investment, and 
deposits and loans, by emphasizing the allocative efficiency and productive efficiency 
views of financial development in China, from the mainstream doctrine and the 
Keynesian–Schumpeterian view of endogenous finance, respectively. Without an ample 
assessment of the evolving features and characteristics of investment, savings, loans, 
and deposits in post-1978 China, an analysis of the savings–investment nexus and 
deposits–loans nexus would be fragile and inadequate. 
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 Table 6.6. Investment financing classified by ownership, 1985-2003, % 
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
SOEs                    
State budget 26.42  23.68  20.55  14.67  13.36  13.21  10.23  6.30  5.96  4.95  4.94  4.61  4.69  7.09  9.98  10.79  12.59  14.24  10.41  
Domestic loans 23.04  22.74  24.56  24.20  20.85  23.62  28.06  30.37  25.44  25.58  23.39  23.58  23.05  23.48  23.98  26.11  23.70  24.39  25.67  
Foreign investment 2.83  4.97  7.33  8.96  10.15  9.11  8.34  7.99  6.08  7.14  7.80  6.71  5.08  4.37  3.93  2.50  2.01  2.20  1.57  
Self-raising 40.43  38.43  38.20  40.49  42.80  42.15  43.11  46.60  48.01  50.77  48.15  50.79  52.88  50.30  47.74  46.93  49.10  47.81  50.75  
Others 7.29  10.18  9.37  11.68  12.84  11.91  10.26  8.74  14.51  11.57  15.71  14.32  14.29  14.75  14.37  13.67  12.60  11.37  11.61  
Collective-owned                     
State budget 1.47  0.55  0.62  0.68  0.51  0.42  0.28  0.13  0.15  1.87  1.68  1.42  1.76  2.15  5.56  6.54  5.44  6.87  4.16  
Domestic loans 37.60  38.00  40.42  36.27  26.71  27.50  31.67  36.72  31.00  27.83  25.31  20.48  17.41  14.89  13.23  12.15  10.95  10.56  11.41  
Foreign investment 0.89  0.99  1.28  1.59  2.94  2.32  1.96  2.65  5.73  8.07  6.22  8.17  7.21  6.23  4.42  3.91  3.29  4.46  4.95  
Self-raising 
60.04 
47.31  39.13  41.64  47.97  47.66  45.84  39.67  42.24  19.17  54.80  55.30  59.71  55.63  63.48  65.63  58.92  68.53  71.65  
Others 13.16  18.54  19.82  21.87  22.10  20.26  20.82  20.88  43.07  11.99  14.63  13.91  21.11  13.30  11.77  21.39  9.58  7.83  
Private-owned and others                    
State budget 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.10  0.38  0.36  0.27  0.15  0.33  0.71  0.69  0.72  0.60  0.42  
Domestic loans 0.00  6.08  6.34  0.00  3.43  3.58  4.49  4.21  7.30  9.36  10.35  11.17  12.24  14.22  12.65  14.95  16.26  17.80  19.28  
Foreign investment 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.65  1.63  1.83  2.05  2.64  3.03  1.80  2.03  1.33  1.35  0.91  
Self-raising 100.00  83.60  82.08  100.00  96.57  84.60  84.08  84.10  77.30  83.66  79.86  78.83  77.20  68.22  70.85  61.55  60.38  52.02  54.88  
Others 0.00  10.32  11.57  0.00  0.00  11.82  11.43  11.69  14.64  4.96  7.60  7.69  7.78  14.20  13.99  20.78  21.32  28.23  24.51  
Foreign-funded                    
State budget N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.31  0.30  0.26  0.25  0.25  0.15  0.08  0.21  0.14  0.17  0.08  
Domestic loans N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 19.82  17.18  15.92  15.02  14.80  14.83  18.92  19.70  18.29  19.24  19.29  
Foreign investment N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 38.60  46.90  47.78  52.22  51.80  48.02  39.46  31.91  30.80  29.22  29.24  
Self-raising N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 28.04  26.12  21.83  20.04  20.10  21.63  24.13  27.42  30.55  31.33  33.79  
Others N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 13.22  9.50  14.20  12.48  13.04  15.37  17.40  20.75  20.21  20.04  17.61  
Source: Author’s calculation. China Statistic Yearbook (2012). The data of foreign-funded enterprises became available only in 1993. Before 1993, the 
category “private-owned and others” included individual-owned enterprises. After 1993, it also included firms with joint ownership, shareholding 
enterprises, and other firms.
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 Table 6.7 Investment Financing classified by source of funds, 1985–2003, % 
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Distribution of State budget                    
SOEs 98.93  99.55  99.29  98.81  99.15  99.42  99.47  99.47  98.38  87.54  87.75  88.44  87.94  90.25  84.00  81.50  84.97  83.50  83.65  
Collective-owned 1.07  0.45  0.71  1.19  0.85  0.58  0.53  0.53  0.72  9.47  9.05  8.43  9.82  7.71  13.19  15.11  11.44  13.16  12.57  
Private-owned and others 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.38  1.97  2.17  1.98  1.12  1.67  2.69  3.11  3.40  3.12  3.62  
Foreign-funded N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.52  1.02  1.03  1.15  1.12  0.38  0.12  0.29  0.19  0.22  0.16  
Distribution of loans                    
SOEs 75.87  70.49  67.51  71.77  73.80  79.17  78.79  74.41  66.59  64.69  61.40  62.30  62.90  64.55  65.28  61.84  56.26  51.02  46.06  
Collective-owned 24.13  23.32  26.45  28.23  21.25  16.72  17.10  23.20  23.64  20.16  20.21  16.69  14.17  11.54  10.16  8.80  8.10  7.22  7.70  
Private-owned and others 0.00  6.19  6.04  0.00  4.95  4.11  4.11  2.39  4.45  6.84  9.18  11.36  13.36  15.55  15.58  20.95  27.04  32.94  37.23  
Foreign-funded N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.31  8.31  9.21  9.65  9.57  8.36  8.98  8.40  8.60  8.81  9.02  
Distribution of Foreign 
investment 
                   
SOEs N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 51.28  37.81  37.43  29.52  24.71  25.44  30.51  23.50  20.00  19.54  13.03  
Collective-owned N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 14.09  12.24  9.08  11.09  10.46  10.23  9.69  11.25  10.17  12.96  15.47  
Private-owned and others N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.29  2.49  2.96  3.47  5.13  7.01  6.34  11.28  9.24  10.61  8.17  
Foreign-funded N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 33.35  47.45  50.52  55.92  59.70  57.32  53.46  53.97  60.58  56.89  63.33  
Source: Author’s calculation. China Statistic Yearbook (2012).  The data on foreign-funded enterprises became available only in 1993. Before 1993, 
the category “private-owned and others” included individual-owned enterprises. After 1993, it also included firms with joint ownership, shareholding 
enterprises, and other firms. 
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 Chapter 7 
Financial development from the perspective 
of allocative and productive efficiency: 
savings–investment reconsideration 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter concentrates on the interactions, or the transmission mechanisms, between 
(a) savings and investment from a macro view, and (b) loans and deposits from a middle 
view. It also discusses the relative efficiency attributes involved in each interaction.  
 
As argued in Chapter 2, different theoretical schools emphasize different causal 
directions between savings and investment. In the neoclassical tradition, the 
concentration is on market frictions involved in the process of transferring savings into 
investment funds through financial intermediations. The alternative literature—the 
endogenous finance view from the Keynesian-Schumpeterian school—emphasizes 
banks’ ability to create credit; hence, how investment dynamically interacts with the 
real sector development to generate new savings. A causal relationship from deposits to 
loans, and from savings to investment is held by the mainstream finance-growth theory. 
A reverse causal direction is advocated by post-Keynesian theorists.  
 
7.2 Savings and investment, theoretical perspectives 
 
Starting from a typical neoclassical setting, for example, the Solow model, economic 
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 development is delivered not only through productivity growth and labor growth, but 
also through capital accumulation, which is determined by investment. The key factors 
that determine the speed of capital accumulation, that is, the productivity of capital, are 
assumed to be exogenous. Various resources, such as capital stocks, savings, and the 
saving rate, are also assumed to be exogenously determined endowments. Accordingly, 
the level of investment is largely constrained by the financial endowments of the 
economy, for example, the propensity to save. From a neoclassical perspective, the level 
of investment is thus constrained and largely determined by savings and the saving rate, 
which guide the capacity of the financial system in facilitating and financing potential 
investment. With the process of transforming savings into investment, there is no need 
either for money or banks, if the (unlikely) presumption of a perfect competitive market 
with no market frictions is held. It is not until the introduction of the theory of 
transaction costs that the importance of banks, as well as financial markets—or more 
broadly, financial intermediations—is raised via allocation of savings into investment: 
the process of financial investment.  
 
By synthesizing the theory of imperfect markets (which emphasizes the existence of 
market frictions) with the finance-growth theory, it is argued that expertise in financial 
intermediations will highlight investment projects with high returns but low risks, 
which will lead to access to bank credit.24 Only with the support of the financial system 
can more efficient allocation of financial resources and more effective investment be 
achieved.  
 
This account is largely held in recent versions of finance-growth theories that are based 
24 Market frictions include, for example, transactions cost and the costs of 
informational asymmetry. Financial intermediations include, for example, mobilizing 
savings or monitoring and improving corporate governance. 
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 on endogenous growth theories, with an endogenous financial sector. In this school of 
thought, a representative simple AK model developed by Pagano (1993) derived the rate 
of economic growth using the following equation: g = A∅s − δ, where A measures the 
level of technology (the marginal productivity of capital), ∅ equals the degree of 
market frictions involved in the financing process, s denotes the saving rate, and 𝛿𝛿 
means the depreciation rate over certain periods. From this equation, economic 
development delivered through financial development is jointly affected by two factors: 
a higher saving rate and ameliorated market friction during the financing process. 
 
In order to ease market frictions and achieve more efficient financial resource allocation, 
financial development is carried out through improvements in several functions, such as 
better savings mobilization, more efficient monitoring of corporate governance, and 
better risk diversification. The major mechanism, however, is assumed to be market 
competition. In the context of financial development in China, the elimination of market 
frictions has been emphasized through the introduction of non-state attributes, such as 
enlarging the market share of non-state-owned financial institutions or shifting the 
lending standard of financial institutions from a preference of lending to state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) to more commercial enterprises.  
 
While this has been discussed in detail in previous chapters, what is worth mentioning 
here is that the existence of pre-determined and known quantity of total financial 
resources is a pre-condition. This could be, for example, total social savings that guide 
the maximum capacity of the financial system and set the cap for potential investment. 
Along with affecting each sectors’ propensity to save, the assumed role of easing and 
correction of market frictions implies that financial intermediations can deliver more 
efficient conversion only from savings into investment, and that no further interaction is 
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 expected between the financial sector and capital accumulation.  
 
According to the representative agent approach in the neoclassical tradition, there are no 
assumed differences between institutions with different properties that are acting as 
financial intermediaries. Two extended interpretations can be made. First, a private 
investor or private funds provider is recognized as delivering the same function as 
formal financial institutions, such as banks. The only difference is their capability. 
Second, the presence of a central bank is largely neglected, which implies the 
fundamental function of banks—money creation—is not considered.  
 
If we take a look from the demand side of finance, the post-Keynesian theory of 
endogenous finance starts from the willingness of entrepreneurs to invest and how the 
financial sector satisfies the needs of investment; this is the supply side (Lavoie, 2006). 
 
On the supply side, closer interaction between financial investment and real sector 
development is emphasized, in which investment not only contributes to capital stock 
accumulation, but also stimulates effective aggregate demand (Nell, 1992). Any income 
expansion that resulted from investment in the previous period would thus influence the 
direction of gross savings in the current period. That is to say, the nexus between 
finance and development is based on a causal linkage from investment to savings. 
 
The role of the financial system in this circulation shifts from easing market frictions to 
creating money and credit “out of nothing” (Herr, 2010). From the aspect of efficiency 
attributes, the neoclassical view of finance and growth takes the position of generating 
more efficient use of given quantities of available financial resources, such as 
maximizing the return on investment at each time period. However, the alternative view 
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 concerns a dynamic process of continuous economic capacity enhancement driven by 
credit expansion. In other words, it implies increasing the output-to-input ratio, rather 
than maximizing the output (return on investment) in each period, otherwise known as 
productive efficiency (Lo et al., 2011, p. 269). 
 
Using this framework, the financial system’s ability to create money and credit thus 
becomes the driving element in delivering productive efficiency. From the 
Keynesian-Schumpeterian view of banking and finance, the financial system, especially 
banks, have two major unique characteristics that are different from other economic 
agents. The first is that there are at least two tiers in a financial system: the central bank 
is the upper tier, and other deposit-taking, loan-extending banking institutions (which 
link borrowers and lenders) constitute the lower tier (Dullien, 2009, p. 10). The second 
characteristic is that the function of creating credit can only be performed by banks.  
 
The underlining presence of the central bank, as raised in the first point, is crucial in 
explaining how financial institutions can create bank credit without a savings 
prerequisite. After the entrepreneurs’ willingness to investment in projects and 
commercial banks granting credit to finance the projects, the next step is a refinancing 
process from the central bank to commercial banks. By providing base money to the 
lower tier, the central bank accommodates the liquidity requirement and credit 
expansion of commercial banks. However, the debate of whether or not the central bank 
can fully or partially accommodate banking sector money expansion by extending loans 
remains in the post-Keynesian school (see Moore, 1989, 1998; Rousseas, 1989, 1998). 
Only with collaboration between both tiers, by means of supplying base money, can 
credit be created. This leads to the second characteristic raised above.  
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 The Keynesian-Schumpeterian view of finance takes the transforming process between 
savings and investment as a dynamic circulation, not a single-round interaction. 
Investment projects financed by banking sector credit contributes to capital 
accumulation and generates new capacity in the economy, and, thus, creates additional 
savings. It does not mean that market frictions involved in the financing process are not 
important; as a matter of fact, the financial sector simultaneously generates allocative 
and productive efficiencies. However, in any given time period, policy-makers could be 
inclined to enhance one efficiency over the other, creating a trade-off between both 
efficiencies (Lo et al., 2011, p. 279). In this case, Lo et al. (2011, p. 279) emphasized 
that different growth paths, for example short-term optimization and long-term 
development, were behind the allocative and productive efficiency views of financial 
development. Both efficiencies can explain part of China’s success, though in different 
periods and different stages of reform; the emphasis is always shifting. 
 
7.3 Deposits and loans, from the scope of banking practice 
 
When put into banking practice, stylized T-accounts are used to illustrate the difference 
between the two theoretical traditions, from a deposit–loan aspect.  
 
In Table 7.1, the financing process starts with the endowment of the economy, which is 
reflected by household sector wealth. For simplicity, it is assumed that the household 
sector holds 100 units of money deposited at a bank (step 1). In order to achieve more 
efficient use of funds provided by the household sector, the banking sector, in the role of 
financial intermediary, then applies various technologies to eliminate transaction costs 
and asymmetric information, given the imperfection of the market. In step 2, deposits 
from the household sector are transformed into loans that are granted for particular 
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 investment projects from selected firms, in the form of firm’s deposits at the bank. The 
final step occurs when the firms use the loans extended by banks to invest in projects, 
which is reflected by the addition of capital good.  
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 Table 7.1 T-accounts of financing investment, mainstream approach 
Financial institution  Firm 
Assets   Liabilities    Assets   Liabilities   
Step 2 Loan to 
Firm 
+100 Step 1 Deposit from 
household 
+100  Step 2 Deposit at 
bank  
+100 Step 2 Bank 
loan 
+100 
   Step 2 Deposit from 
firm 
+100  Step 3 Deposit at 
bank  
-100     
    Step 3 Deposit from 
firm 
-100  Step 3 Capital good +100     
Household        
Assets   Liabilities          
Step 1 Deposit 
at bank 
+100 Step 1 Household 
wealth 
(endowment) 
+100        
 
Source: Dullien (2009, p. 11). 
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During the entire process, the financial sector’s upper limit in financing investment is 
determined by the endowment of the economy, which is in the form of household 
deposits. It should be pointed out that this leaves no room for the central bank. 
 
The Keynesian-Schumpeterian view of banking and finance begins with firms’ 
requirement of bank credit (see Table 7.2). As in step 1, even though there is no deposit 
held by the bank in advance, issuing credit to the firm can still keep the bank’s assets 
and liabilities in balance. The most important thing for the second step, in order to 
fulfill credit expansion and keep liquidity, is that commercial banks must ask the central 
bank for an injection of base money. Assuming that the reserve requirement is set at 100% 
of the bank’s total deposit, in the second step—through open market operations or other 
instruments—the central bank re-finances the commercial bank by booking the credit to 
the commercial bank as assets and the reserve created as liabilities. Commercial banks 
book their accounts in the opposite way. Up to this point, investment has been financed 
from credit created “out of nothing.” In step 3, firms’ production of capital goods are 
recorded, and households earn income by providing human capital (workers) in the 
production process, thus generating new deposits for the bank.  
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 Table 7.2 T-accounts of financing investment, Keynesian-Schumpeterian approach 
Financial institution  Firm 
Assets   Liabilities    Assets   Liabilities   
Step 1 Loan to Firm +100 Step 1 Deposit from firm +100  Step 1 
Deposit at 
bank  +100 Step 1 
Bank 
loan +100 
Step 2 Reserve at central bank +100 Step 2 
Loan from 
central bank +100  Step 3 
Deposit at 
bank  -100     
    Step 3 
Deposit from 
firm -100  Step 3 
Capital 
good +100     
   Step 3 Deposit from household +100        
             
Household  Central bank 
Assets   Liabilities    Assets   Liabilities   
Step 3 Deposit at bank +100 Step 3 
Household 
wealth (new 
income) 
+100  step 2 
Loan to 
bank +100 Step 2 Reserve +100 
Source: Dullien, 2009 (p. 11). 
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 According to this financial investment mechanism, the role of the central bank is 
emphasized, and collaboration between the both upper and lower tiers of the financial 
system is key to facilitating investment without compulsory pre-existing deposits. 
However, the financial system still faces the issue of identifying high return–low risk 
investment projects in order to obtain higher returns on investment. While technology 
constraints and market friction continue to play important roles in the financing process, 
emphasis is more on expanding available financial resources than on capacity.  
 
7.4 Savings and investment, evidence from the perspective of 
financial development 
 
The two theoretical perspectives provide different scopes to assess the relationship 
between savings and investment and between deposits and loans. In this section, a 
detailed savings-investment nexus (S-I nexus) and deposits-loans nexus (D-L nexus) are 
assessed. 
 
The Flow of funds statistics, which was available between 1992 and 2009, provide 
some insights into China’s S-I nexus by breaking down aggregate data into sectors (see 
Figure 7.1). Theoretically, the decision to save or invest is undertaken independently by 
economic entities for different purposes. According to national income accounting, the 
difference between savings and investment equals the balance of current accounts; that 
is, total export minus total input: S − I = (X − M) . As both S  and I  can be 
decomposed into sectoral levels, the equation S − I = (X − M) can be derived as (𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻 − 𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻) + (𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺 − 𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺) + (𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 − 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸) = (X − M) (Eq. 7.1) 
In this equation, 𝐻𝐻 is the household sector, 𝐺𝐺 is the government, and 𝐸𝐸 reflects the 
aggregate of both financial and non-financial enterprises.  
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Figure 7.1 S-I/Y by sector, 1992–2009, % 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. China Statistic Yearbook (2012); National Bureau of 
Statistics of China (2008). S = savings; I = investment; Y = year. 
 
In Figure 7.1, the household sector is the only net saver. Over the sample period, the net 
savings contributed by this sector was between 10% and 15%. Unlike the finding that 
suggested the government sector saved more than it invested (see Riedel et al., 2007, p. 
46), this thesis found that, starting from 2.2% of GDP, the S-I balance of the 
government sector decreased between1992 and 2000, and only recovered its initial level 
between 2007 and 2008. The net deficit of government S-I balance, especially between 
1999 and 2006, implies that government investment expanded faster than its savings 
accumulation. The corporate sector is the only net borrower among the three sectors, 
and is it mainly financed by the household sector. Further, financial transactions 
confirms that funds mainly flow from the household sector to the corporate sector; 
though from the deposits-loans view, the government sector tends to be a net saver (see 
Figure 7.2).  
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 Figure 7.2 D-L/Y by sector 1992–2010, % 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. China Statistic Yearbook (2012); National Bureau of 
Statistics of China (2008). D = deposits; L = loans; Y = year. 
 
The similar moving tendencies of both the sectoral savings–investment balance and 
deposits–loans balance further address the importance of financial development in 
facilitating resources allocation across sectors in the economy. The S-I balance can be 
interpreted as the changing dynamic between aggregate supply and demand, while the 
D–L balance can be seen as the performance of the financial sector in achieving its role 
as the financial intermediation. The more substantial fluctuation of the D-L balance 
curve in terms of GDP, compared with the S-I curve, suggests that financial activities 
such as savings deposit mobilization and loan granting are crucial in determining the 
macrobalance of the Chinese economy.  
 
From the Keynesian-Schumpeterian view of finance, by creating credit to finance 
investment projects, the financial system made great strides in stimulating effective 
demand. In this way, the S-I gap can be understood as the inadequacy of investment, 
given that savings are affected by the change in aggregate effective demand. A much 
narrower S-I gap reflects the better match between aggregate supply and effective 
demand, suggesting a more efficient monetary circulation and overall efficiency of 
economic activities.  
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From the allocative efficiency view of finance, investment is a function of savings. This 
means the quantity of mobilized deposits determine the supply of loans. Therefore, both 
S-I and D-L balances suggest changing lending behaviors of the financial system: a 
negative S-I and D-L gap implies excessive supply of funds, a positive S-I and D-L gap 
indicates a more sophisticated investment selection process. This process can include 
credit rationing or the application of prudential lending criteria, as financial institutions 
improve how financial resources are allocated for more efficient use.  
 
Both S-I and D-L balances, in terms of GDP, are illustrated in Figure 7.3. From the 
moving tendency of both balances, two phases can be distinguished: the pre-1995 
period and post-1995 period. In the first phase, which ran from 1980 to 1994, the S-I 
gap fluctuated up and down, so both positive and negative numbers have been recorded. 
The D-L balance remained negative throughout this period, though in the mid-1980s the 
D-L gap gradually narrowed. Year 1995 can be seen as the turning point as both gross 
savings and the stock of deposits began to exceed investment and total loans stock; no 
further negative value was recorded. During the second phase, from 1995 onward, 
despite fluctuations, a major positive tendency can be observed on both S-I and D-L 
curves.  
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 Figure 7.3 S–I balance and D–L balances, 1980–2010, in terms of GDP, % 
 
Note: Author’s calculation. China Statistic Yearbook (2012); Almanac of China's 
Finance and Banking (various issues). S = savings; I = investment; D = deposits; L = 
loans; Y = year. 
 
Before analyzing the interaction between the financial system and real sector 
development in detail for both the pre- and post-1995 periods, several features of 
China’s economy throughout the reform periods needs to be highlighted. 
 
The first feature is the “stop–go,” or “boom–bust,” aspect of China’s economic 
development (Brandt & Zhu, 2007, p. 94; Lo et al., 2011, p. 277). Economic 
development in China has experienced several of these cycles over the past 30 years, 
which implies both excessive expansions and contractions during the sample years (see 
Figure 7.4). Furthermore, it is quite clear that the most violent fluctuations occurred in 
the first half of reform, before 1995. The mid-1980s, mainly 1984 to 1986, and the early 
1990s witnessed the entire economy overheating, which was largely related to the credit 
boom occurring at these times. Figure 6.14 showed that the annual growth of total loans 
extended by the financial sector during these two periods was over 25%. In the 
neoclassical tradition, a “stop–go” development path implies resource misallocation, 
given that during an expansionary period, all investment projects, including those with 
low returns and high risks, were issued as bank credit. At the contractive period, even 
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 high return–low risks investment projects crowded out the capital market. However, 
from the Keynesian–Schumpeterian tradition, the interpretation could be different. The 
“stop-go” cycle that driven by the development entrepreneurship would suggest a 
certain process of creative destruction.  
 
Figure 7.4 Economic growth and inflation, 1978–2010, % 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2009); China Statistic Yearbook, (2012). 
There is no composite CPI before 1985; the data applied before 1985 is CPI in the urban 
area. 
 
The second feature is the evolving role of the banking system in the process of 
economic development. Although independent status was given to the four state-owned 
commercial banks (SOBs) during the first half of the 1980s, and the second half of that 
decade witnessed the establishment of the two-tier financial system with the People’s 
Bank of China (PBOC) (discussed in detail in Chapter 3), the primary objective of the 
system has remained as a kind of quasi fiscal agency of the central government. The 
PBOC and the four SOBs were de-centralized and the influence from local governments 
remained. A contradiction appeared because a centralized structure, as the alternative to 
a fiscal agency, was vital for the financial system to perform its income redistribution 
function. At the same time, decentralization stimulated banks to earn higher profits by 
allocating credit to more efficient firms. If banks’ major function was to allocate credit 
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 to profit-making investment projects, the only way to keep performing its redistribution 
role was to continuously re-finance from the central bank. This behavior was a 
significant factor in the “stop–go” cycles (see Brandt and Zhu 2007, p. 97).  
 
As a reminder of the events in Chapter 3, at the end 1994 and the beginning of 1995, the 
Commercial Banking Law and Central Banking Law were promulgated by the central 
government. The four SOBs were legally defined as commercial banks, and their role as 
redistribution agencies was gradually removed. To take over commercial banking duties, 
first, three development banks were founded in 1995 by the central government, and 
each bank handled different specialized business areas. Second, the financial system 
procedures were recentralized in the late 1990s, in which a vertical management 
structure was introduced to both the PBOC and the SOBs. The key event during this 
process was the restructuring of the PBOC in 1998, which largely disassociated local 
governments from the PBOC. Third, the state credit plan was abolished in 1998; from 
that point forward, the SOBs were granted more autonomy in their lending practices.  
 
Throughout these reforms, there have been considerable changes in both the central 
government’s focus of the financial system and the SOBs’ lending behaviors. Figure 7.5 
shows that for the pre-1995 period, the SOBs had greater credit expansion than the 
average level of the financial system. However, starting in 1994 and continuing, the 
SOBs became more conservative as financial intermediaries than the average of other 
financial institutions. The recommercialization of the SOBs during the second half of 
the reform phases gave them room to improve their ability to allocate financial 
resources more efficiently by following a more market-based lending criteria. However, 
this same recentralization weakened the SOBs’ activities in credit expansion. As a 
matter of fact, in late 1990s, when the SOBs began to show strong contraction in loan 
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 extension, due to the introduction of prudential banking regulations, a rare deflation 
period—from roughly 1996 to 2002—was observed in China (Lo et al., 2012, p. 20). In 
other words, the insufficient supply of credit created insufficient effective demand. 
 
Figure 7.5 Loan-to-Deposit ratio comparison, SOBs to financial sector, 1980–2010 
 
Note: Author’s calculation. Almanac of China Finance and Banking (various issues). 
SOBs defined as the aggregation of the four SOBs. Separate loan and deposit data for 
each SOB prior to 1985 is not available; author adopted the series from the aggregated 
table of state bank’s sources of funds.  
 
A third feature is that the fiscal reforms in 1994 provided a solid foundation for the 
changing objectives of the financial system. From 1980 to 1993, total fiscal revenues, in 
terms of GDP, declined sharply from more than 25% to around 10%; clearly, local 
governments took a larger stake than the central government (see Figure 7.6). The 
traditional revenue remittance system, adopted during the pre-1995 period, was largely 
through negotiations on a case-by-case basis (Naughton, 2007, p. 432). This means that 
not only were the revenue-retention rates negotiated between government and 
enterprises, but also that the share of total fiscal revenues were negotiated between the 
central and local governments. As local governments tended to preserve their 
development projects at the local level, they were reluctant to impose heavier taxation 
on enterprises, especially the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This behavior can be 
observed in the decreasing share of total fiscal revenues in national income and, more 
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 importantly, the insufficient fiscal income of the central government.  
 
Figure 7.6 Share of fiscal revenues in national income, classified by government level, 
1980–2010, % 
 
Source: China Statistic Yearbook (2001); China Statistic Yearbook (2012).   
 
This insufficient fiscal income explains why prior to 1994 the central government relied 
heavily on the financial system to redistribute income. It is reasonable to argue that if 
the situation in fiscal revenues had remained unchanged, additional financial sector 
reform would have received very little effort, as banks could not pursue more 
commercial-based objectives.  
 
The effect of fiscal reforms, such as the taxation reform in 1994, is obvious from 
introduction of new taxes (e.g., VAT) and a new tax sharing system between local and 
central governments. Total fiscal income began to climb, and by the end of 2010, fiscal 
revenue contributed to more than 20% of GDP. Furthermore, the relationship between 
the central and local governments was rebalanced when revenue sharing was switched 
from a negotiation process to a tax-basis one. Starting in 1994, total fiscal revenues 
shared by central and local governments tend to be equal (see Figure 7.6).  
 
Linking the changing role of the financial system and the central government’s fiscal 
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 reforms for the pre-1995 period, the inefficiency of the SOBs in properly allocating 
resources was largely due to continuously acting as quasi fiscal agencies. However, the 
central government had no choice but to rely on the financial system to redistribute 
income, given its weak position in revenue-sharing negotiations with local governments. 
The recentralization of the financial sector itself, as well as the recentralization of the 
fiscal and taxation systems, laid the foundation for the financial system to improve its 
investment efficiency. Without such complementary reforming events, the central 
government would be forced to use excessive lending to adjust macro balances between 
aggregate supply and effective demand. From this aspect, banking sector credit 
expansion effectively rebalanced aggregate supply and effective demand, as observed 
by an S-I balance that remained around 0, and by the steady, even increasing, D-L gap 
between 1980 to early 1990s (see Figure 7.3). 
 
A fourth feature is SOE reform. The most important of these was ownership reform, 
which mainly occurred between 1998 and 2000, nearly as important was what occurred 
at the Third Plenary Session of the 14th CPC (Communist Party of China) Central 
Committee in November 1993, when the concept of establishing a modern enterprise 
system in the SOEs was raised. Following that meeting’s approval of the “Decision of 
the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Setting Up the Socialist 
Market Economic System,” the National People’s Congress later that year promulgated 
the Company Law, which legally defined SOEs as corporations.   
 
The conversion of SOEs into modern corporations through a uniform legal framework 
not only laid the foundation for further shareholding and public listing reforms, but it 
also granted deeper autonomy to SOEs. First, introducing a modern enterprises system 
with reference to Western experience largely improved the operational efficiency and 
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 corporate governance of the SOEs, as profitability became a higher priority. Second, 
being defined as corporations implied the feasibility of ownership restructuring. By 
selling shares to private enterprises or oversea strategic investors, for example, SOEs 
benefitted from diversification of ownership by drawing on the advanced knowledge 
and experiences of modern company management. Small, and especially insolvent, 
SOEs were privatized, and some were shut down, as would happen with Western 
corporations.  
 
As argued in previous chapters, it was only since 1998, when the principle of Zhua Da 
Fang Xiao was adopted, that significant profitability and productivity occurred in the 
SOEs. As SOE reforms were initially designed only in late 1993 and early 1994, it 
should be pointed out that it took longer for SOE reforms to produce significant effects 
when compared with the financial sector and fiscal reforms., However, given the time it 
took to transmit from micro to macro, that is, from banking credit provision to 
aggregate effective demand, the SOEs’ gradual reform further suspended such 
transmission mechanism.  
 
In order to accommodate this gradual reform, the financial system, especially the SOBs, 
were required to retain market-supplanting elements, including credit plans and policy 
lending, rather than immediately switching to a development path based only on market 
criteria. However, the limited progress of SOE reform in the mid-1990s and the 
continuous support from SOBs in the late 1990s helped stimulate effective demand with 
developmental attributes. Figure 7.7 charts the S-I rebalancing between 1998 and 2004, 
which happened through accommodation between the SOEs and SOBs. This shows that 
the pace of the reforms of the SOEs and SOBs were mutually connected. 
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 Figure 7.7 S-I/Y of the Chinese economy, 1980–2010, % 
 
Source: China Statistic Yearbook (2012). S = savings; I = investment; Y = year.  
 
Generally, financial sector reforms were largely constrained by the reform progress in 
other sectors. First, the changing behavior of the banking system not only depended on 
the reform progress of the SOBs, but also on the consequences of fiscal and SOE 
reforms. Second, neither fiscal nor SOE reforms could have occurred smoothly if the 
financial sector reform had stagnated. Although recentralization of the financial system 
(that is, PBOC restructuring) and the new revenue-sharing system weakened local 
governments’ ability to raise funds and facilitate local investment, other financial 
reforms had the opposite effect. Diversification in the financial system, for example 
with the establishment of City Commercial Banks (CCBs), of which local governments 
were usually the largest shareholders, provided new channels for local government to 
meet their own targets. 
 
In the first round of reforms, the SOE reforms largely released the SOBs to pursue 
profit-oriented targets. In the second round, market-criteria-based lending standards of 
the financial system made strong externalities and induced the SOEs to pursue 
improvements in corporate governance, operational efficiency, and financial conditions. 
 
A fifth feature is the external position of the Chinese economy. Increasing savings 
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 surplus that caused increasing S-I gap, on the other hand, also implies the surplus of 
China’s current account. The pursuing of an export-led growth path by the central 
government since mid-1990s stimulated disposable income through a process of income 
creation by introduction external demand. The increasing in disposable income, 
however, did not smoothly transfer into increasing consumption but increasing savings. 
As argued in Chapter 6, this could be largely resulted by financial repression policies 
and insufficient social security systems in the Chinese economy. In other words, it was 
insufficient domestic effective demands that resulted such enlarging S-I gap. From this 
perspective, China’s high investment rate is not high enough: it is inadequate 
investment that leads to insufficient effective demand.  
 
7.5 The interaction between allocative efficiency and 
productive efficiency 
 
With the four features detailed above as background, this section examines the S-I and 
D-L balances of China’s economy from a financial development aspect. It does this by 
emphasizing allocative efficiency and productive efficiency. Given the importance of 
1994, which witnessed dramatic changes in both S-I and D-L balances from negative to 
positive, it can be argued that 1994 was the turning point for the different phases of 
financial development.  
 
7.5.1 Pre-1995 
 
Between 1980 and 1994, the S-I curve fluctuated no more than 4% in terms of GDP, and 
a negative D-L curve floated between -10% and -20% of GDP (see Figure 7.3). This 
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 implies the coexistence of excessive lending in the financial sector and a mostly 
balanced aggregate demand and supply. This is not say that the macroeconomic 
conditions worked smoothly. On the one hand, excessive credit from the financial 
system facilitated aggregate investment well, as seen in the steady S-I gap. On the other 
hand, as observed in Figure 7.4, overall economic stability was shaky, as observed by 
the several “stop–go” cycles in that period, as well as serious inflation following those 
cycles.  
 
From the supply side, SOBs were the driving force behind the extravagant credit 
expansion, as their primary role at that time was as the cashier of the government. From 
the demand side, although SOBs may have shown interest in more efficient use of funds, 
the majority of credit still flowed to the SOEs, according to arrangements with the state. 
The incentive to earn profits and the enforced policy lending thus raised the problem of 
soft budget constraints for the SOBs. This can be seen in the two waves of credit boom, 
from 1984 to 1986 and again in the early 1990s. From the productive efficiency view of 
finance, the explosion of credit supply, with a growth rate of more than 30% on an 
annual basis between 1984 and 1986, stimulated aggregate demand; this was because 
funds were granted to both efficient and inefficient investment projects when compared 
with previous years. The result was that real GDP growth rate was pushed as high as 18% 
in 1986, which stimulated growth in savings deposits in the following years, which was 
then followed by another cycle with a longer delay (see Figure 6.14).  
 
From the aspect of allocative efficiency, the economic development driven by these 
credit booms resulted in crucial resources being misallocated, as both good and bad 
investment projects received credit from the financial system. Furthermore, 
government-led credit expansion meant that it was not possible to properly allocate 
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 financial resources, even during the years when credit supply slowed. When 
overheating occurred in the economy after a massive credit expansion, government-led 
monetary tightening would follow. The state thus adopted tough credit plans for the 
SOBs on a bank-by-bank basis. During cool-down periods, not only were inefficient 
investment projects rationed out to the capital market, but so were low risk–high return 
projects. In other words, an insufficient credit supply combined with credit rationing 
caused additional allocative inefficiency. 
 
A period of credit expansion, followed by a period of contraction, and then once again 
expansion laid the foundation for the “stop–go” cycles of China’s economic 
development in the 1980s and early 1990s. During this period, the financial sector’s 
function to create credit was emphasized. Through expansionary credit provision by the 
SOBs, effective demand was generated; the fact that gross savings and investment were 
nearly equal implies that the financial sector was successful in creating savings through 
investment. This fits with the main argument of productive efficiency from the 
Keynesian–Schumpeterian view of finance. However, it also came with certain costs, 
such as unstable growth, high inflation, and the efficiency loss in investment. From the 
mainstream view of finance, it suggests that if China’s financial system at that time 
could have allocated resources in a more efficient way, even greater economic 
achievement would have occurred. Another cost of this credit expansion was the 
accumulation of nonperforming loans (NPLs). Although the financial sector showed a 
shift to use more market-conforming elements, the problem of historical NPLs burdened 
the SOBs continued development. The NPLs were mainly generated during the two 
credit booms in the mid-1980s and early 1990s. It was not until the late 1990s, when 
these NPLs were gradually written-off to asset management companies that the SOBs 
began to show vitality again (see Table 3.7). 
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As argued in this section, for the pre-1995 period, the financial sector was heavily 
restricted from pursuing a more profit-oriented development path, which would set 
allocative efficiency for prior consideration. When such restrictive conditions were 
removed starting in 1994, the mechanism the financial sector used to interact with the 
real sector development changed.  
 
7.5.2 Post-1995 
 
From 1995 and onward, overall economic development in China has been steadier. The 
“stop–go” cycles mostly disappeared, and inflation moderately controlled. Contrary to 
stable economic growth, however, what was observed from the circulation of monetary 
was a widening S–I gap, which means excessive gross savings over total investment. A 
similar gap can be observed between aggregate savings deposits and loans in the 
financial system. 
 
As pointed out, financial sector reform, as well as other reform events that took place 
around 1994, is responsible for the dramatic changes in both S-I and D-L balances, and 
hence the evolution of economic development. First, recommercialization of the SOBs 
occurred because fiscal and SOE reforms created feasible preconditions. In order to 
coordinate with the pace of SOE reforms, state credit plans were abolished after 1998. 
During the recommercialization process of the SOBs, the lending behavior of the 
financial system, especially of the SOBs, shifted to be more profit-oriented. However, 
the SOBs only began to outperform the banking sector average, in both financial 
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 conditions and other aspects,25 ten years later, starting in 2004 and 2005. It is argued 
that this is due to the burden of the historical NPLs, which were mainly produced in the 
pre-1995 period. When the shareholding and public listing reforms of the four SOBs 
was completed in late 2000s, and as those historical NPLs were written-off, it became 
difficult to distinguish the SOBs from the other large commercial, and even foreign, 
banks. They were all publicly listed companies, with boards at their centers, competing 
with other banks on the market, and suffering from even tougher state regulations based 
on the latest version of the Basel Banking Supervision Accords.  
 
Second, the slowing down of credit provision from the financial sector after 1994, 
reflected in the widening S–I gap, was not only caused by SOBs’ pursuing of 
profit-oriented targets; the new regulatory framework also played a vital role in that 
process. Article 39 of the Commercial Banking Law, promulgated in 1995, was an 
important regulatory instrument. The “Loan to Deposit ratio” was introduced as a 
substitution method to lending ceilings. According to this article, the total outstanding 
loans to total deposits shall not exceed 75%. Given the serious problems of inflation and 
NPLs caused by excessive credit expansion prior to 1995, the reason for the adoption of 
this article was because the financial sector changed roles and the state moved from a 
quantitative development path to a more qualitative one. In other words, through Article 
39, the state required that banks, especially the SOBs, shift their developmental strategy 
to a qualitative growth of credit provision. Given the extra attention paid by the 
regulatory body to SOBs starting in 1994, as seen in Figure 7.5, the loan to deposit ratio 
of the SOBs decreased at an even faster pace than the average of the financial sector.  
 
Third, the adoption of a more prudential strategy concerned about quality lending led to 
25 See Chapter 5, section 5.3. 
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 more efficient allocation of resources. As previously argued, allocative inefficiency, 
caused by a period of excessive credit expansion followed by a period of excessive 
credit contraction, was the fundamental reason for the “stop-go” feature of China’s 
economic development pre-1995. Therefore, a steady GDP annual growth, with an 
average rate of around 10%, as well as moderate inflation that wavered between 0% and 
5% on an annual basis, indicated improved allocative efficiency. A gentle credit growth 
rate post-1995 and an improved investment efficiency from 1998 to 2007 (see Figure 
5.12 and Figure 5.13) further confirm the gain in allocative efficiency. By pursuing 
allocative efficiency, the financial sector spurred real sector development in the 
post-1995 period; this finding fitted mainstream view on the finance–growth nexus. By 
correlating market imperfections, that is, easing transaction costs and informational 
asymmetry costs, resources were allocated for most efficient use, such as high return–
low risk projects. Given the ongoing commercialization and marketization reforms, the 
SOBs and SOEs also pursued allocative efficiency. 
 
However, the improvement in allocative efficiency, which was largely achieved through 
more prudential lending strategies, came with costs of macro imbalance. Such 
imbalance is reflected in the imbalance between gross savings and investment, or the 
imbalance between aggregate effective demand and supply. Recall that in Figure 7.7 the 
S-I balance during the pre-1995 period suggested an efficient monetary circulation, 
given that gross savings and investment fluctuated around 0%. The post-1995 period 
thus indicates a less efficient monetary flow. From the Keynesian–Schumpeterian view 
of monetary circulation, where investment creates savings, more savings and 
comparatively less investment and hence enlarging S-I gap can be also understood as a 
circumstance of insufficient effective domestic demand. On the one hand, to overcome 
demand insufficiency, during the post-1995 period China began to push an export-led 
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 growth strategy; on the other hand, a shifting from domestic to foreign consumption 
further weaken domestic investment-savings creation cycle through credit creation. 
 
Given the uncertainties in international trade, such as changing terms of trade, exchange 
rate risks, and so on, the declining share of domestic expenditure in GDP caused by 
insufficient effective domestic demand and more reliance on foreign demand inevitably 
produced negative effects on China’s economic growth in the mid- to long-term.. As a 
result, as the engine of China’s economic development, the average industrial annual 
growth rate from 1995 to 2010 was more than 1% lower than between 1978 and 1994, 
when it was 11.13% and 12.30%, respectively (Figure 7.4).  
 
This is not to say that during the post-1995 period, productive efficiency has not been 
emphasized. One good example could be the 4-trillion-CNY stimulus package. As a 
response to the outbreak of the Global Financial Crisis in 2007 and 2008, the central 
government launched a huge stimulus program amounting to 4 trillion CNY (around 
586 billion USD) in late 2008, much of which was de facto channeled through credit 
creation via the banking system. The resulting massive expansion of domestic bank 
lending led to an increase of the share of domestic credit to GDP from around 96.63% 
in 2008 to more than 119% in 2010. At the same time, China's investment rate increased 
from 41.61% of GDP in 2007 to about 48% in 2010, while the savings rate remained 
above 50% of GDP throughout, thereby shrinking the current account surplus. Such 
massive credit booming once again illustrated the productive efficiency of Chinese 
financial sector in stimulating investment and employment by credit creation, though 
allocative inefficiency accompanied by at the same time. 
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 7.5.3 Summary 
 
This analysis has shown the interactions between productive efficiency and allocative 
efficiency in China’s financial system throughout the reform periods. Productive 
efficiency emphasizes the function of credit creation in the financial system, and it 
draws on the Keynesian–Schumpeterian view of endogenous finance. This efficiency 
dominated the pre-1995 period, with the effect of efficiency loss in investment and 
instability in economic growth. Greater attention was paid to allocative efficiency in the 
post-1995 reform period. The gain in more efficient resource allocation, however, came 
at the cost of insufficient effective demand.  
 
The relationship between these two types of efficiencies tends to be complementary 
rather than substitutive, though it can be quite difficult or even impossible to distinguish 
one from the other during interactions between the financial system and economic 
development. However, by emphasizing the relative importance of one efficiency over 
the other during different development periods, the economic outcome was largely 
different, as seen in the analysis of both the pre- and post-1995 periods. In the next 
section, formal economic tests are adopted to examine the two efficiencies and the 
connection with real sector development.  
 
7.6 Savings and investment, evidence from cross-regional 
capital mobility, and S-I causality 
 
Fundamentally, the allocative efficiency and productive efficiency views of finance, 
from the two theoretical traditions, hold different perspectives on the causal direction 
between savings and investment. The neoclassical school insists that savings determine 
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 investment; scholars from the Keynesian–Schumpeterian school advocate the reverse.  
 
In accordance with the above analysis, it is clear that China’s overall economic reforms 
since 1978 showed different efficiency attributes during the pre- and post-1995 periods. 
Therefore, a direct test of the causal nexus between savings and investment during these 
periods can be adopted to verify this analysis and the relative fitness between the two 
theoretical frameworks in relation to China.  
 
However, before the application of the causality test between gross savings and 
investment, the consequences of cross-regional integration between savings and 
investment in China must be considered. The changing level of regional capital 
integration over the past three decades illustrates the evolving efficiency in 
cross-regional capital facilitation from the aspect of capital mobility and allocative 
efficiency. 
 
On the one hand, for the pre-1995 period, the function of credit creation was 
emphasized in financial practices. The mechanism for coordinating nationwide savings 
and investment—cross-regional capital movement— occurred through excessive credit 
provision in particular regions. This was due to the quasi fiscal role the financial system 
assumed via the state. From 1987 to the late 1990s, less developed central and western 
provinces recorded much higher shares of total new bank loans as compared to their 
share of total deposits, while the reverse occurred in the more developed coastal regions 
(Brandt & Zhu, 2007, p. 99). During the pre-1995 period, although financial resources 
were not allocated fully by market principles by means of a cost-return rate, the 
mechanism of financial resources redistribution—channeling savings to facilitate 
investment across regions—was guaranteed through state-administered credit provision.  
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On the other hand, for the financial reforms post-1995, when the quasi fiscal role of the 
SOBs was largely abolished through the establishment of specialized development 
banks and the fiscal system was recentralized, market-determined lending practices 
implied a change in the mechanism for national savings–investment coordination, from 
formerly administrated cross-regional credit provisions to a domestic capital market. 
With the development of a formal national capital market, profit seeking played an 
important role in the cross-regional capital flows after 1995, given the change in lending 
behaviors of the banks. There was better capital mobility as the capital market became 
more efficient. Although the mechanism behind the savings–investment transformation 
changed over time, this better mobility of capital was jointly affected by the two 
efficiencies during different phases of financial reform. 
 
Argued by Watanabe (2006, p. 70), this switch in mechanisms created further efficiency 
loss, as it took time to carry out new reforms that were largely dependent on the 
development degree of the market economy as a whole; such as with the corporate 
sector’s pace of reforms. For example, the speed of the reforms that took place in 1994 
varied: the abolishment of administrative control of SOBs’ lending practices occurred 
immediately, while the establishment and maturity of a national capital market took 
time. It was not until January 1996 that an interbank market was set up by the central 
bank, and it took another five months for the liberalization of interbank interest rates. To 
accommodate the SOEs’ reform pace, the state’s credit plan was not officially abolished 
until 1998. 
 
Accordingly, the positive effects generated by the development of capital markets and 
the negative influence from the SOBs no longer playing the role of fiscal agency both 
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 affected the integration of capital flows across regions. The most likely situation was an 
n-shaped capital mobility over the reforming periods, caused by the lags between the 
step-by-step, time-consuming market-oriented reforms and the change in function of the 
SOBs. 
 
In order to estimate the coordination between savings and investment across regions in 
China, a “savings retention coefficient” (SRC) was adopted, based on the seminal work 
of Feldstein and Horioka (1980, p. 317). In their pioneer paper, Feldstein and Horioka 
made a simple regression between gross savings and investment for 16 OECD 
economies between 1960 and 1974, with the rationality that if capital mobility is perfect 
in a world with perfect competitive markets and no market frictions, capital will always 
move to the regions with the highest returns across economies. Therefore, a higher 
international capital mobility can be observed by a relatively small or close to zero S-I 
coefficient in regression, which they named SRC.  
 
Surprisingly, Feldstein and Horioka were unable to find a low or insignificant SRC in 
their study, leading to the famous “Feldstein-Horioka puzzle”. Their hypnosis on capital 
mobility can be extended to studies on the integration of capital flows in one particular 
economy. Furthermore, with the application of regional or provincial-level data within 
one economy, problems such as currency conversion, currency devaluation, and the 
targeting of current accounts by the government can be excluded (Boyreau-Debray & 
Wei, 2004, p. 10; 2005). The empirical literature on the study of capital mobility in 
economies with a highly integrated capital market has documented either negative or 
insignificant correlations between regional savings and investment. This provided 
substantial evidence to verify the original hypothesis from Feldstein and Horioka 
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 (1980).26 
 
7.6.1. Data description and the basic model 
 
Given the dominant role of the banking system in channeling financial resources in 
China, this section examines cross-provincial savings and investment data, and the 
cross-provincial deposits and loans relationship. 
 
All the data are collected from the official sources. The provincial-level GDP figures, 
capital formation, and expenditures are via the China Statistical Database (National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, 2013). Provincial deposits and loans data are from 
Statistical Yearbooks from each province. There is the issue of a lack of data availability, 
as explained earlier in this thesis. As there are no consistent disaggregated 
expenditure-based GDP data for Hainan and Tibet before the 1990s, only 27 provinces 
and 4 municipalities of China’s total 29 provinces and 4 municipalities are used in the 
data sample, and the year range is from 1980 to 2010. In these tests, investment, I/Y, is 
defined as the rate of gross capital formation over expenditure-based GDP (see 
Boyreau-Debray & Wei, 2004, 2005; Li, 2010). Savings, S/Y, is derived from the 
difference between expenditure-based GDP and total consumption, which includes 
private consumption and government expenditure over GDP. Year-end stock of deposits 
are denoted by D/Y, and L/Y denotes outstanding loans at the provincial level. A 
cross-sectional look of the data is in Figures 7.8 and 7.9 and Table 7.2. 
 
26 See Sinn (1992) for the United States; Dekle (1996) for Japan; Bayoumi and Rose 
(1993) for the United Kingdom; and Helliwell and McKitrick (1999) for Canada. 
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 Figure 7.8 Cross-provincial S and I, 29 regions, 1980–2010 average, in terms of GDP, % 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Figure 7.9 Cross-provincial D and L, 29 regions, 1980–2010 average, in terms of 
GDP, % 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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 Table 7.2 Cross-provincial savings, investment, deposits and loans, 1980–2010 average, 
in terms of GDP, %  
Province Investment Savings Deposits Loans 
Beijing 52.43  48.03  254.50  136.30  
Tianjin 49.68  55.33  110.56  119.14  
Hebei 40.74  50.00  73.55  63.30  
Shanxi 45.61  45.47  110.63  92.19  
Inner Mongolia 46.84  36.47  64.49  78.38  
Liaoning 38.42  48.17  97.04  96.44  
Jilin 43.81  37.78  78.81  107.26  
Heilongjiang 36.88  46.24  80.98  83.06  
Shanghai 44.19  57.18  146.61  120.76  
Jiangsu 44.78  52.73  79.58  71.21  
Zhejiang 40.34  45.97  95.21  82.84  
Anhui 37.28  36.99  70.50  72.83  
Fujian 39.50  39.07  80.34  70.92  
Jiangxi 39.40  36.60  75.51  77.21  
Shandong 44.31  49.86  70.10  71.30  
Henan 42.72  45.32  69.39  73.44  
Hubei 38.99  42.14  78.64  86.21  
Hunan 31.86  32.06  65.62  66.31  
Guangdong 36.84  43.17  110.09  89.29  
Guangxi 37.73  30.34  79.69  73.14  
Chongqing 42.27  37.43  90.73  91.82  
Sichuan 35.78  34.34  101.15  96.74  
Guizhou 39.68  19.92  86.34  84.32  
Yunnan 41.84  33.55  101.50  83.55  
Shaanxi 47.49  36.97  108.34  98.42  
Gansu 42.57  32.05  108.39  95.91  
Qinghai 56.89  30.46  101.52  104.73  
Ningxia 62.38  29.65  107.47  111.33  
Xinjiang 54.56  39.88  107.11  86.25  
Note: Author’s calculations. China Statistical Database (2013). Provincial Statistical 
Yearbooks (various issues). 
 
According to Feldstein and Horioka (1980), the basic model to capture capital mobility 
is:  
𝐼𝐼/𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 ∗ 𝑆𝑆/𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓 + 𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓 (Eq. 7.2) 
where 
𝐼𝐼/𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓 = 𝑇𝑇−1 ∑ 𝐼𝐼/𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1 , 𝑆𝑆/𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓 = 𝑇𝑇−1 ∑ 𝑆𝑆/𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1 ,  (𝑖𝑖 denotes province) (Eq. 7.3) 
 
However, given the dramatic economic evolution of China over the last 30 years, a 
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 mathematical averaged investment or savings rate may not necessarily capture 
time-specific effects. To deal with that, one possible method is to divide the entire 
sample period into several parts and then compare the relative change of SRC in 
different time phases (see Boyreau-Debray & Wei, 2004, 2005; Watanabe, 2006). 
Another possible method is to apply a panel dataset so as to contain both regional and 
sectional attributes (see Chan et al., 2011; Li, 2010).  
 
Compared with a pure cross-section or time-series data, a panel dataset that pools cross 
section and time series together provides several benefits. First, the main advantage of 
introducing a panel technique is to make it possible to explore the dynamics changes of 
the target variables in short periods. Second, panel data can increase the quantity of 
observers. Third, a panel dataset can effectively control for unobserved 
sectional-specific effects that are classified as the error terms in models with the 
cross-section data. To summarize, by applying a panel dataset, the combination of a 
cross section and time series can improve both the quantity and quality of data. 
 
As discussed in the previous section, the logic and mechanisms behind the 
cross-provincial capital movement in China is distinctively different in the pre- and 
post-1995 periods, based on the relative dominance of the allocative or productive 
efficiency. Accordingly, this thesis’s sample was broken into two groups: 1980 to 1994 
and 1995 to 2010. The panel technique was then applied in both sub-datasets.  
 
Therefore, the original model from Feldstein and Horioka (1980) can be rewritten as 
follow  
𝐼𝐼/𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 = 𝜆𝜆1𝑓𝑓 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝑆𝑆/𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀1𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡    (Eq. 7.4) 
where 𝑖𝑖 stands for province, 𝑡𝑡 stands for time, and the regional-specific effect is 
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 captured by 𝜆𝜆𝑓𝑓. 
 
Similarly, there is: 
𝑆𝑆/𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 = 𝜆𝜆2𝑓𝑓 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝑅𝑅/𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀2𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡   (Eq. 7.5) 
 
Before applying the dataset into the regressions, it was necessary to apply a unit root 
process into each variable to examine the stationary of the variables. There are many 
unit root tests for panel datasets, which hold different assumptions (see Breitung, 2000; 
Chang, 2004; Im, Pesaran, & Shin, 2003; Levin, Lin, & Chu, 2002; Maddala & Wu, 
1999). But as argued by Chan et al. (2011, p. 1508), the provinces in China not only 
suffered from common policy shocks but also from several regional specific shocks. 
These include the “opening door” policies in the coastal provinces at the start of the 
reforms, and the “develop-the-west” strategy from the central government in the 2000s.  
The analysis for this thesis uses the method in Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) and the test 
in Hadri (2000) because these relax the assumption of cross-section independence in 
unit root processes. All the tests contain time trends and a demeaned process, which 
subtract the cross-sectional averages from the series. As argued by Levin, Lin, and Chu 
(2002), such demeaned process could reduce the impact from cross section dependence. 
Unit root test results are in Table 7.3. 
 
By testing each individual unit root within an ADF-style model, the null hypothesis of 
the Im–Pesaran–Shin test is that all panels contain unit roots. In contrast, the null 
hypothesis for the Hadri test is the stationarity of all panels. As seen in Table 7.3, both 
tests suggest the existence of unit roots for the four variables in the two sub-samples, 
which is in line with the result from Li (2010, p. 17). Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2004, 
2005), who used a similar Im–Pesaran–Shin root process, suggested that both provincial 
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 investment and savings rates were stationary between 1978 and 2001.  
 
Table 7.3 Im-Pesaran-Shin / Hadri unit root tests, 1980–2010 
  Im-Pesaran-Shin test   Hadri test   lag1 lag2 lag3 lag4   1980-1994 I/Y -0.862 0.805 0.802 -1.844**  9.995***    (0.194) (0.790) (0.789) (0.033)  (0.000)  S/Y -0.143 0.360 -0.192 0.578  9.554***    (0.443) (0.640) (0.424) (0.719)  (0.000)  L/Y 0.436 -0.713 -0.207 1.134  12.821***   (0.669) (0.238) (0.418) (0.872)  (0.000)  D/Y 0.498 0.425 0.937 2.482  7.8005***    (0.691) 0.664 (0.826) (0.994)  (0.000) 1995-2010 I/Y 0.890 1.454 -0.120 0.666  17.685***    (0.813) (0.927) (0.452) (0.747)  (0.000)  S/Y 2.004 0.0373 0.588 -1.507*  17.461***    (0.978) (0.515) (0.722) (0.066)  (0.000)  L/Y -1.404* -0.585 -0.670 -2.199  16.514***    (0.080) (0.279) (0.252) (0.014)**  (0.000)  D/Y -0.097 1.251 -0.228 1.670  16.368***    (0.463) (0.895) (0.410) (0.953)  (0.000) 1980-2010 I/Y 1.453 2.271 1.716 1.524  35.741*** 
  (0.927) (0.988) (0.957) (0.936)  (0.000) 
 S/Y -0.413 -1.350* -0.1435 0.262  33.365*** 
  (0.340) (0.089) (0.443) (0.603)  (0.000) 
 L/Y 3.544 2.952 2.398 2.276  47.834*** 
  (1.000) (0.998) (0.992) (0.989)  (0.000) 
 D/Y 2.823 2.894 2.230 1.965  40.513*** 
  (0.998) (0.998) (0.987) (0.975)  (0.000) 
Source: Author’s calculation. P-values in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01. The statistics obtained from Im, Pesaran, and Shin denote normalized t-statistics; 
results from Hadri test denote LM statistics. I = investment; S = savings; L = loans; D = 
deposits; Y = GDP. 
 
Following the unit root process, the cointegration relationship between S-I and D-L was 
tested, concerning the possibility of spurious regressions suggested by Granger and 
Newbold (1974). Generally, there are no common consensus on the panel data 
cointegration test, as this area remains quite new. The analysis in this thesis adopted the 
eight tests from Pedroni (1999, 2004) and Kao (1999), who each based a two-step 
Engle-Granger cointegration process with the null hypothesis of no cointegration 
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 between variables; the results are presented in Table 7.4. The three ADF tests (two from 
Pedroni and one from Kao) rejected the null hypothesis at 1% level, and suggested the 
existence of a cointegration relationship between savings and investment between 
deposits and loans in the two periods (1980–1994 and 1995–2010), except for the panel 
ADF test for deposits and loans between 1980 and 1994. The results for the rest tests 
vary. But for each column, which contains two variables in one time span, at least three 
out of the eight tests indicate cointegration between variables. 
 
Table 7.4 Pedroni and Kao panel cointegration test, 1980–1994 and 1995–2010 
  S/Y–I/Y (Eq. 7.4) D/Y–L/Y (Eq. 7.5) 
 1980-1994 1995-2010 1980-1994 1995-2010 Pedroni tests         
Panel 
(within-dimension)     
  Variance ratio statistic -1.801 -1.253 1.899** 3.730*** 
 (0.964) (0.105) (0.029) (0.000) Phillips-Perron Rho 
statistic 0.847 2.402 3.178 1.412 
 (0.802) (0.992) (0.999) (0.921) Phillips-Perron t-statistic -2.068** 0.665 2.800 -1.125 
 (0.019) (0.747) (0.997) (0.130) ADF t-statistic -3.523*** -5.615*** -0.386 -3.378*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.350) (0.000) Group 
(between-dimension)     
  Phillips-Perron Rho 
statistic 2.767 3.022 4.609 3.160 
 (0.997) (0.999) (1.000) (0.999) Phillips-Perron t-statistic -1.974** -0.783 3.983 -1.743** 
 (0.024) (0.217) (1.000) (0.041) ADF t-statistic -3.805*** -5.830*** -2.166** -4.479*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) 
     Kao test         
ADF t-statistic -3.447*** -2.826*** -3.065*** -4.022*** 
  (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
Source: Author’s calculations. P-values in parentheses. All Pedroni tests contain time 
trends.  
I = investment; S = savings; L = loans; D = deposits; Y = GDP. 
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 7.6.2 Results from panel estimation 
 
After a unit root and cointegration process, which suggested the existence of a long-run 
relationship between savings and investment, and deposits and loans, regressions were 
applied into the analysis. The estimation results of Equation 7.4 ad Equation 7.5 are 
shown in Tables 7.5 through 7.8. Given that the primary objective of this estimation is 
to compare the value of the coefficient, that is, 𝛽𝛽 in different time periods, a variety of 
commonly used panel data estimators were jointly applied, including pooled ordinary 
least squares (OLS) estimator, fixed effects, random effects, first-difference GMM and 
system GMM estimators. 
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 Table 7.5 Cross-provincial savings-investment estimation, 1980–1994 and 1995–2010 
 Pooled OLS Fixed effects Random effects First-difference 
GMM 
System GMM 
 1980- 
1994 
1995- 
2010 
1980- 
1994 
1995- 
2010 
1980- 
1994 
1995- 
2010 
1980- 
1994 
1995- 
2010 
1980- 
1994 
1995- 
2010 
𝛽𝛽1 0.171*
** 
0.313*
** 
0.431*
** 
1.184*
** 
0.375*
** 
1.059*
** 
0.402*
** 
0.347*
** 
0.301*
** 
0.142*
** 
 (3.51) (5.70) (7.42) (21.25) (7.06) (19.07) (6.65) (6.96) (6.16) (3.85) 
N 435 464 435 464 435 464 377 406 406 435 
Note: t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
Table 7.6 Cross-provincial deposits-loans estimation, 1980–1994 and 1995–2010 
 Pooled OLS Fixed effects Random effect First-difference 
GMM 
System GMM 
 1980- 
1994 
1995- 
2010 
1980- 
1994 
1995- 
2010 
1980- 
1994 
1995- 
2010 
1980- 
1994 
1995- 
2010 
1980- 
1994 
1995- 
2010 
𝛽𝛽2 0.443*
** 
0.419*
** 
0.862*
** 
0.354*
** 
0.795*
** 
0.372*
** 
0.363*
*** 
0.0972
*** 
0.269*
*** 
0.0970
*** 
 (9.59) (23.19) (23.29) (14.00) (22.16) (16.55) (10.18) (5.61) (8.69) (7.23) 
N 435 464 435 464 435 464 377 406 406 435 
Note: t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
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 Table 7.7 Hausman test and Sargan test for savings–investment 
 
Chi- 
squared 
Fixed effects and 
random effects 
First-difference 
GMM 
System  
GMM 
 1980- 
1994 
1995- 
2010 
1980- 
1994 
1995- 
2010 
1980- 
1994 
1995- 
2010 
Huasman 
test 
5.65 778.86     
 (0.017) (0.000)     
Sargan test   230.077 260.302 321.635 287.753 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Note: P-values in parentheses. The null hypothesis for Hausman test is that there is no 
systematical difference in coefficients between fixed effects and random effects models. 
The null hypothesis for the Sargan test is that over-identifying restrictions are valid. The 
estimations are made through Stata11. 
 
 
Table 7.8 Hausman test and Sargan test for deposits-loans 
Chi- 
squared 
Fixed effects and 
random effects 
First-difference 
GMM 
System  
GMM 
 1980- 
1994 
1995- 
2010 
1980- 
1994 
1995- 
2010 
1980- 
1994 
1995- 
2010 
Huasman 
test 
53.86 2.35     
 (0.000) (0.125)     
Sargan test   397.204 368.104 475.947 515.167 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Note: P-values in parentheses. The null hypothesis for Hausman test is that there is no 
systematical difference in coefficients between fixed effects and random effects models. 
The null hypothesis for the Sargan test is that over-identifying restrictions are valid. The 
estimations are made through Stata11. 
 
First, Table 7.5, includes estimations for two periods via different methods, which 
recorded a positive and significant correlation between cross-provincial savings and 
investment at the 1% level. Second, except for the estimations from first-difference and 
system GMM, by comparing the results between 1980–1994 and 1995–2010, what is 
found is the 𝛽𝛽1: the SRC shows a substantial increase over the two periods, from 0.171 
to 0.313, by pooled OLS model; from 0.431 to 1.184 by fixed effects; and from 0.375 to 
1.059 by random effects model. According to the original assumption, an enlarged SRC 
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 suggests weakened capital integration across the provinces.  
 
Third, in contrast to what is observed in the S-I correlation, the estimations on 
cross-provincial deposits and loans document a different picture (see Table 7.6). For the 
periods 1980–1994 and 1995–2010, the coefficient 𝛽𝛽2 declined according to all five 
estimators. Despite the quite small differences obtained by pooled OLS, the other four 
panel estimators recorded a more than 50% decrease of the coefficient 𝛽𝛽2, which 
implies a more integrated loans–deposits flow across China over these years.  
 
To test the efficiency of the different panel techniques applied, the Hausman test is used 
to identify the relative fitness between fixed and random effects models, and the Sargan 
test is used to test the effectiveness of instrument variables used in GMM models. The 
results of the Hausman test in Table 7.7 and Table 7.8 suggest the fixed effects models 
for estimations at the 5% level, except for the deposits–loans regression in the period 
1995-2010. Meanwhile, the outcome from the Sargan test suggests a weakness in 
applying GMM methods in the models; when a lagged dependent variable is used as an 
instrument variable, the null hypothesis that the instrument variable is exogenous is 
rejected. 
 
Linking the empirical results obtained in the analysis of the S-I and D-L balance, the 
following interpretations were found. First, an increasing value of the coefficient 𝛽𝛽1 
between the pre- and post-1995 periods indicate decreased capital mobility across 
regions in China. It implies that in a comparison with the post-1995 period, the 
pre-1995 period’s coordination between aggregate supply and effective demand across 
regions tended to be smoother, given the relative dominance of the productive 
efficiency of the system. In other words, the mechanism of cross-region resources 
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 allocation in pre-1995 China was more effective than during the post-1995 period, 
though the efficiency remains unclear. Second, a decreasing 𝛽𝛽2  between the two 
periods suggests that deposit-taking financial institutions, that is, the banking sector, 
achieved more effective integration of financial resources during the reforms, which can 
be seen as an outcome of market-oriented financial sector reform during the post-1995 
period. Put simply, the regression results confirmed the analysis that the pre-1995 
period can be characterized as a period with a more effective aggregate supply-demand 
match but with less efficiency in resource allocation. Similarly, reverse attributes can be 
illustrated from the post-1995 period as well. 
 
7.6.3 Evolution of the SRC 
 
In order to provide a detailed look at the evolution of the SRC during the sample 
periods, cross-sectional analyses were applied for each yearly sub-panel. To control for 
the effect of a changing macroeconomic climate, provincial-level annual real GDP 
growth rate (g) was used as the control variable, so that for every year there is: 𝐼𝐼/𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓 =
𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝑆𝑆/𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝑔𝑔 + 𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓. The changing value of 𝛽𝛽1 is reported in Figure 7.9.  
 
It is obvious from Figure 7.9 that at the beginning of the reforms, the correlation 
between provincial-level investment and savings tended to be relatively weak, where 
the SRC wavered between -0.2 and 0.2 until the mid-1980s. The SRC then increased, 
reaching its peak at nearly 0.7 in 1994; this implies the deterioration of cross-regional 
capital integration during that period. After 1994, the SRC declined sharply and 
investment was negatively correlated to savings after 2000. After 2006, however, the 
SRC began to recover, and in 2009 a positive SRC value was once again recorded. 
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 Figure 7.9 Evolution of cross-provincial SRC in China, 1980–2010 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
Turing back to the aspect of efficiency attributes of the Chinese financial system during 
the different reform phases, the n-shaped movement of the SRC across the years is 
largely in line with this thesis’s analysis: the savings-investment nexus is a joint effect 
by emphasizing the productive efficiency or the allocative efficiency in either the pre- 
or post-1995 periods. As a matter of fact, 1994 recorded the highest SRC over the 
30-year period, meaning the lowest degree of cross-provincial capital movement. This 
was not only the year that the quasi fiscal redistribution role of the financial system 
began to be de-emphasized by the central government, but it was also the year when a 
wave of market-oriented financial reforms occurred.  
 
The development of modern and efficient capital markets obviously generated positive 
effects on smoother and more efficient capital flows across the regions. However, the 
entire process took quite a long time because of the financial sector’s gradual 
commercialization, marketization, and internationalization reforms. For the pre-1994 
period, when the development of the financial sector and capital markets was at its 
primary stage, cross-provincial resources allocation was largely guaranteed 
administratively, mainly in the form of direct or policy-oriented (and excessive) credit 
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 provision from the SOBs.  
 
Accordingly, the movement of the SRC over the reform periods can be understood as 
the interaction between the relative paces of the following two processes: the 
defiscalization process and the development of a modern, sophisticated financial system. 
In Figure 7.9, the SRC’s upward trend during the pre-1995 period implies a faster pace 
of abolishing the old, quasi fiscal mechanisms of resource allocation, in comparison to 
the pace of constructing new, market-oriented, allocative vehicles. This is the case even 
though excessive credit provision remained dominant. After 1994, the financial system 
was largely freed from its quasi fiscal agency role; the declining SRC suggests new 
capital-channeling mechanisms through a more efficient nationwide capital market.  
 
Linking with the results obtained from the panel estimation in Table 7.5 (the 
deterioration of cross-provincial savings-investment coordination in both the pre- and 
post-1995 periods), the state plan and administrative intervention on bank lending in the 
early stages of reform helped maintain a high level of financial integration. But it also 
came with huge costs, such as instability in the macroeconomic environment and low 
investment efficiency. Furthermore, the transition to a new financing mechanism—from 
the old policy-oriented mechanism to a market-determined one—brought periodic costs, 
such as the lowered capital mobility illustrated above. It should be noted that these 
reforms eventually led to long-term development.  
 
In addition, the study’s estimations suggest a more integrated loans–deposits 
relationship from the pre-1995 to the post-1995 period. Deposits-taking financial 
institutions, more specifically the banking system, achieved substantial improvement in 
coordinating loans and deposits across the regions, which is largely due to the adoption 
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 of market-oriented lending standards. During this process, allocative efficiency was 
gained, as banking credit was not restricted for local purposes, but used to seek and 
identify strong investment projects nationwide.  
 
7.6.4 Error-correction model-based estimation and the Granger 
causality 
 
The previous section adopted the panel technique to explore cross-provincial capital 
coordination in China by estimating the S-I and D-L relationship in both the pre- and 
post-1995 periods. However, as the results from the panel unit root tests suggest (see 
Table7.3), the non-stationarity of all four variables, the linear regression model may 
only reflect part of the picture because it neglects short-run dynamics. In this section, an 
Error-correction model (ECM) framework, adopted to the panel dataset, is discussed. 
This framework was applied so as to determine the potential differences for the S-I 
relationship, both in short-run and long-run. 
 
There is no common consensus on testing Granger causality in a panel dataset,27 and 
the prerequisite for applying the Granger causality test is the stationarity of variables. 
One approach (based on cointegration relationships between variables) is to construct a 
pair of ECMs that have different dependent variables, that is, one that places investment 
on the left side in equation A, and one that places savings on the left side in equation B. 
By comparing the relative size and significance of the error-correction term in the pair 
of models, a relative causal relationship can be examined. In Granger (1988, p. 199), if 
two series are co-integrated in order 1, that is, I(1), there should be causation between 
the two series in at least one direction.  
27 The most recent development of panel Granger causality was achieved in 
Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012). 
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Consequently, according to the two-step method introduced by Engle and Granger 
(1987), to figure out the error-correction terms, the following two equations that 
estimate the long-run equilibrium S-I relationship are adopted: 
 
𝐼𝐼/𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽31 + 𝛽𝛽32 ∗ 𝑆𝑆/𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀3𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡    (Eq. 7.6) 
𝑆𝑆/𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽41 + 𝛽𝛽42 ∗ 𝐼𝐼/𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀4𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡    (Eq. 7.7) 
 
The residuals, 𝜀𝜀3𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 and 𝜀𝜀4𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 are employed into the ECMs as error correction terms 
(ECTs):28 
 
∆𝐼𝐼/𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽51 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽52∆𝐼𝐼/𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗)𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽53∆𝑆𝑆/𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡−ℎ)𝐶𝐶ℎ=0 + 𝛽𝛽54 ∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇5𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝜇𝜇5𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡   
(Eq. 7.8) 
∆𝑆𝑆/𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽61 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽62∆𝑆𝑆/𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡−�)𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽63∆𝐼𝐼/𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡−ℎ)𝐶𝐶ℎ=0 + 𝛽𝛽64 ∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇6𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝜇𝜇6𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡   
(Eq. 7.9) 
 
Here, i and t denote provinces and time; 𝜇𝜇 stands for the new error terms; and 𝛽𝛽54 and 
𝛽𝛽64 are the coefficients of the error correction terms, which represent the potential 
deviation of short-run dynamics from long-run equilibrium.  
 
As for Equation 7.8, if the ECT is significant and the coefficient 𝛽𝛽54 is non-zero, it 
suggests that aggregate savings is the Granger cause of aggregate investment in the 
long-run. This interpretation can be extended to Equation 7.9 as well: if the coefficient 
of ECT 𝛽𝛽64 is significantly non-zero, a long-run Granger causation would exist from 
aggregate investment to savings. The coefficients 𝛽𝛽53 and 𝛽𝛽63 show the short-run 
28 The ECTs of both models are estimated via fixed-effects panel estimators. 
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 relationship, where the null hypothesis of Equations 7.8 and 7.9 is: savings/investment, 
which does not Granger cause investment/savings in the short-run would be rejected if 
the coefficient 𝛽𝛽53/𝛽𝛽63 is significant.  
 
7.6.5. ECM Result 
 
As both variables contain unit root (see Table 7.3), a two-step residual-based panel 
cointegration tests was applied into Equations 7.6 and 7.7, and most of the eight tests 
rejected the null hypothesis of no cointegration between variables at the 10% level (see 
Table 7.9). The existence of long-run cointegrated relationship between I/Y and S/Y 
indicates the applicability of the ECMs. 
Table 7.9 Pedroni and Kao panel cointegration test for savings and investment, 1980–
2010 
 Savings and investment 
 Equation 3 Equation 4 Pedroni tests     
Panel (within-dimension)     Variance ratio statistic 1.938 1.499** 
 (0.133) (0.034)   Phillips-Perron Rho statistic -0.045 0.135* 
 (0.194) (0.083)   Phillips-Perron t-statistic -0.830*** -1.985*** 
 (0.001) (0.000)   ADF t-statistic -1.718*** -3.951*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) Group (between-dimension)     Phillips-Perron Rho statistic 0.840 -0.023 
 (0.780) (0.491)   Phillips-Perron t-statistic -2.406*** -4.535*** 
 (0.008) (0.000)   ADF t-statistic -3.748*** -5.88*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
   Kao test     
  ADF t-statistic -4.416*** -4.231*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Source: Author’s calculations. P-values in parentheses. All Pedroni tests contain time 
trends. 
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Table 7.10 shows the estimation results for Equations 7.8 and 7.9. First, the coefficient 
of ECTs for both models show negative values and become significant at the 1% level, 
which indicates the efficacy of applying ECMs and the existence of an error correction 
mechanism. Furthermore, the relative small value of the two ECTs’ coefficient, which 
measures the speed of adjustment, with -0.177 and -0.114 for Equations 7.8 and 7.9, 
respectively, suggests that the influence of long-run equilibrium on short-term dynamics 
between savings and investment could be little. Nevertheless, the significant ECTs for 
both equations indicate a bi-directional causal relationship between savings and 
investment during the reforming era, which is in line with this thesis’s argument that 
both productive and allocative efficiency of the financial system have contributed to 
overall resource allocations across regions in China.  
 
Table 7.10 Estimation for Savings-investment by Error-correction model, 1980–2010 
 Equation 7.8 
Equation 
7.9 
Dependent 
variable  ∆𝐼𝐼/𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡  ∆𝑆𝑆/𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 
 Coefficient Coefficient 
Intercept 0.007*** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡−1) -0.177*** -0.114*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
∆𝐼𝐼/𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡  0.162*** 
  (0.000) 
∆𝑆𝑆/𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 0.415***  
 (0.000)  
∆𝐼𝐼/𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡−1) 0.141*** -0.012 
 (0.000) (0.557) 
∆𝑆𝑆/𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡−1) -0.025 0.113*** 
 (0.626) (0.001) Source: Author’s calculations. t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01. Both equation are estimated by fixed effects panel estimators. Lag 1 is selected 
according to the estimated results of models with different lagged terms.  
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 Second, for Equation 7.8, with a coefficient of 0.415, ∆𝑆𝑆/𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡   show a positive 
correlation with the dependent variable ∆𝐼𝐼/𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 at the 1% level. That is to say, in the 
short-run, savings also can be seen as the Granger cause of investment. The positive and 
significant coefficient recorded from ∆𝐼𝐼/𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡−1) suggests that investment in a previous 
period affects investment in the current period, with an elasticity of 0.141. The 
insignificance of ∆𝑆𝑆/𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡−1), however, implies that the influence of savings in the 
previous period on current investment is limited. For Equation 7.9, which sets savings 
in the first-difference form as a dependent variable, the 1% significance of both ∆𝐼𝐼/𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 
and ∆𝑆𝑆/𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡−1), with an elasticity of 0.162 and 0.113, respectively, suggests a Granger 
causation from investment to savings is short-run. Similar to the results obtained from 
Equation 7.8, the insignificance of ∆𝐼𝐼/𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡−1) shows that the change in savings is only 
affected by the current change of rate of investment and by savings in the previous 
period.  
 
Overall, the ECM-based estimation shows the bi-directional causality between savings 
and investment, in both short-run dynamics and long-run equilibrium. Whether savings 
cause investment or investment causes savings, has been laid for the foundation of how 
the different mechanisms in China’s financial system and financial development effect 
for economic development, as advocated by the mainstream finance-growth school and 
the Keynesian-Schumpeterian view of banking and finance. The bi-directional causality 
from this thesis’s estimation suggests that both productive efficiency and allocative 
efficiency played roles in the context of China’s reforms over the past 30 years. These 
empirical results support the interpretation that the two mechanisms are complementary, 
rather than substitutive, and the relative dominance of one over the other changes with 
time.  
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 7.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter began with an analysis of the theoretical differences between the 
mainstream view and the Keynesian-Schumpeterian view of the interaction between 
savings and investment from a micro practice scope, by means of stylized T-account 
banking practices.  
 
When this analytical framework is put into context, it was found that financial reform 
over the last 30 years in China can be clearly distinguished into two periods: pre-1995 
and post-1995. In the former period, productive efficiency dominated the path of reform, 
while in the latter period, allocative efficiency was emphasized. Although it is 
impossible to discretely distinguish these two efficiencies during China’s financial 
reforms, their relationship is complementary to each other, rather than a strict 
substitution, given that their attributes focus on the same thing but from different logical 
beginnings.  
 
According to this thesis’s analysis, a productive efficiency, emphasizing the function of 
credit creation and drawing on the Keynesian-Schumpeterian view of endogenous 
finance, dominated China’s financial reforms in the pre-1995 period. It was pointed out 
that there were costs in efficiency loss in investment and instability in delivering growth 
during this period. In the post-1995 reform era, it was shown that allocative efficiency 
dominated, and that while there were gains in more efficient resource allocation, the 
cost was insufficient effective demand. This interactive relationship between the two 
efficiencies is confirmed by the n-shaped SRC curve throughout China’s entire reform 
period.  
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 In the empirical discussion, the panel technique was used to regress the coefficients 
between cross-provincial savings and investment in China. Additionally, the panel ECM 
model was used to explore the long-term relationship between these variables in 
provincial-level data, and a two-way causal direction between savings and investment 
was identified. This proves that both types of efficiencies played roles in these reforms. 
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 Chapter 8 
Financial development and economic 
development in China 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapters, financial development in China was assessed from the 
perspective of monetization (or financial deepening and broadening), from the 
perspective of financial liberalization and at the nexus of investment and savings. By 
introducing the Keynesian-Schumpeterian view of endogenous credit supply, this thesis 
argued that the development of China’s financial sector spurred economic development, 
not only through improvement in efficiency in resource allocation. What is more 
important is that financial development had a dynamic impact on economic 
development by supporting aggregate investment through an expansion of credit 
provision. Previous chapters focused on the evolving development of the financial 
system itself, and this chapter emphasizes the linkage between finance and economic 
development through econometric tests.  
 
8.2 Capital accumulation as the engine of economic 
development 
 
In the standard Solow model, investment is assumed to have only level effects, not 
growth effects. Based on the typical neoclassical assumption that savings can smoothly 
transfer into investment provided there are no market frictions, the role of a financial 
system is largely ignored. The financial repression thesis introduced by McKinnon 
(1973) and Shaw (1973) first pointed out the importance of financial development on 
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 the determination of savings and investment. In their views, investment is key for 
economic development, and insufficient investment caused by “financial repression” 
constrains low-income countries from high-speed growth. By using logarithms and 
differentiating according to time yields under the framework of Solow’s model, which 
in heart is the Cobb-Douglas production function, the output growth rate can be 
interpreted by the growth of capital stock, labor, and technological progress (see 
Equation 8.1). The technological progress here, however, is treated as exogenously 
determined, so that an increase in investment may have limited effects on technological 
and productivity change. In other words, long-term economic growth is largely 
determined by exogenous factors: the growth in total factor productivity (TFP) and 
natural population growth. 
 
𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦 = 𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿 + 𝑎𝑎𝐾𝐾 ∗ 𝑔𝑔𝐾𝐾 + 𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴 (𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡ℎ)     and 𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘 + 𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿 = 1 (Eq. 8.1) 
 
where Y is output, K and L represent capital and labor, A, known as Solow residual, 
denotes TFP. Constant return on scales is assumed as 𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘 + 𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿 = 1. 
 
By relaxing the assumption of diminishing returns on capital stocks but emphasizing 
increasing or constant return on scales, the mainstream endogenous growth theory 
argued that the determinant of economic growth is the “positive function of the 
investment ratio” (Fry, 1995, p. 69). Pagano (1993) offered a simple growth 
determination model based on an AK production function. Output growth can be 
interrupted as: 
 g = 𝐴𝐴∅s − δ      and       ∅s = ∅ 𝑆𝑆
𝑌𝑌
= ∅ 𝐼𝐼
𝑌𝑌
 (Eq. 8.2) 
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 where A is the technology growth, s denotes savings rate, ∅ denotes the proportion of 
investment transferred into savings due to financial frictions, and δ is the depreciation 
rate. A more detailed version of this equation is in Chapter 2. 
 
In Equation 8.2, aggregate investment is assumed to be a function of gross savings. It is 
clear that an increase in savings or an investment rate affects long-term growth rate. The 
efficiency of financial intermediation, measured by ∅ , may also be crucial for 
long-term growth determination.  
 
The role of capital accumulation, or investment, has been heavily emphasized in the 
neoclassical growth theory, as well as in other theoretical traditions.  Alternative 
theories, however, have emphasized the interactive relationship between investment and 
technological progress. In the Kaldorian tradition, with the assumption of increasing 
returns to scale, it is assumed that technological progress is endogenously determined 
and embodied in capital accumulation.29 Technological change is inclusively reflected 
by the amount of investment, or the capital stock accumulated between two periods. As 
with the New Cambridge School’s criticism of the concept of capital in neoclassical 
aggregate production function, Scott (1989) argued that investment and the Solow 
residual—technological change—are different parts of the same thing. Scott held that 
technological change and productivity growth cannot be measured separately from 
investment because investment is required for technological development, and 
investment itself involves technological change. In both the Keynesian-Schumpeterian 
credit creation framework and the post-Keynesian’s theory of endogenous credit 
(finance) (Dullien, 2009; Herr, 2010), a similar view is held: it is the willing investment 
by entrepreneurs that begins the business cycle, and accumulated capital from 
29 For a detailed Kaldor-Verdoorn model, see Wulwick (1993, p. 331). 
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 investment that spurs economic development. 
 
In the case of China, which has taken an investment-driven, capital-deepening 
development path (Lo & Li, 2011, p. 75), there is no doubt that capital accumulation 
played a vital role in China’s “miracle” over the last 30 years. But most studies on 
growth in China follow the neoclassical production function approach: there is no room 
for the contribution of investment on technological progress and productivity growth. In 
nominal terms, the scatter plots of GDP and gross investment measured in two different 
ways all indicate a strong and positive relationship between investment and economic 
development in China (see Figure 8.1 and Figure 8.2).  
 
Figure 8.1 Correlation between gross capital formation and GDP in China, 1980–2010, 
billion CNY 
 
Source: China Statistic Yearbook (2012). 
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 Figure 8.2 Correlation between total fixed assets investment and GDP, 1980–2010, 
billion CNY 
 
Source: China Statistic Yearbook (2012). 
 
An additional check of the role of capital accumulation can be made by simple growth 
accounting; these results are reported in Table 8.1. With the assumption of constant 
return to scale, the following equation, as a transformation of the Cobb-Douglas 
production function, was applied. 
 ln(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡/𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) = 𝑎𝑎31 + 𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘 ∗ ln(𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡/𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) + 𝑔𝑔 ∗ 𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆 (Eq. 8.3) 
 
For data processing, series of output (Y) and labor (L) are taken from the official sources 
(China Statistic Yearbook, various issues), and Y is adjusted to constant 1978 prices. 
Based on the perpetual inventory method (PIM), in which 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡 = 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡−1 ∗ (1 − 𝜆𝜆) + 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 
where K is the net capital stock, I is the gross investment, and 𝜆𝜆 is the depreciation rate, 
this thesis’s analysis uses the series of gross fixed capital formation derived from 
expenditure-based GDP as the measurement of gross investment. The initial benchmark 
capital stock in 1978 is estimated as gross fixed capital formation in 1978, divided by 
10%, and the series of capital stock is deflated to real 1978 prices30 (see Zhang 2008) 
30 The implicit deflator for capital in China is available only after 1991. To generate the 
deflator before 1991, this thesis follows the method from Zhang (2008). For any year, 
the implicit deflator for fixed capital formation (1978=1) is constructed by 
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 The depreciation rate is set at 4%, given that the official rate of 3.6% could be biased 
due to explosive capital utilization during the reforming era. Logged value of all the 
three variables, Y, K, and L, are adopted into the regression model.  
 
Table 8.1 China’s standard growth accounting, 1980–2010 
 1980-2010 
 ln(Y/L) 
ln(K/L) 0.561*** 
 (8.469) 
Constant -1.634*** 
 (-14.536) 
Time trend 0.032*** 
 (5.948) 
AR(1) 1.206*** 
 (7.775) 
AR(2) -0.630*** 
 (-4.098) 
R-squared 0.999 
F-statistic 7599.684 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000 
D.W. test 1.825 
Source: Author’s calculation. t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 
0.01. 
 
The result is reported in Table 8.1. This study’s regression confirmed the contribution of 
capital accumulation in output determination, where the coefficient, 𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘, as the elasticity 
of capital, reported a significant value of 0.561. Furthermore, with the assumption of 
constant return to scale, the elasticity of labor input, 𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿 , derived by 𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿 = 1 − 𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘 , 
equals 0.439. By estimating the elasticity of capital and labor, the annual growth rate of 
TFP can be calculated according to the Cobb-Douglas production function.31 With the 
assumption of constant return to scale, then 𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 = 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡/(𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡1−𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘). TFP growth of the 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙 𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺 𝑡𝑡 (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓)
𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙 𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺 𝑡𝑡 (1978=1)
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺 1978 (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓) . The index of fixed capital 
formation is collected from National Bureau of Statistics (1997b). 
31 With the assumption of constant return to scale, the elasticity of capital 𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘 can be 
estimated from ln(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡/𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) = 𝑎𝑎1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘 ∗ ln(𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡/𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) + 𝑔𝑔 ∗ 𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆, and TFP can be 
calculated as 𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 = 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡/(𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡1−𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘). 
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 Chinese economy is reported in Figure 8.3. During the first half of the reform period, 
from 1980-1994, the Chinese economy had a severe fluctuation in TFP growth. The 
pre-1995 period recorded a higher average rate of TFP growth, 3.83% annually, which 
is on average 1% faster than that of the post-1995 period. The latter period recorded an 
annual average rate of 2.75% of TFP.  
 
Figure 8.3 Total factor productivity growth of China, 1980–2010, % 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. China Statistic Yearbook (2012). 
 
8.3 The role of investment efficiency in capital accumulation 
 
8.3.1 Estimate investment efficiency 
 
Alongside the scale of accumulated capital, reflected by the aggregate investment to 
GDP ratio, the efficiency involved in capital generation, or more specifically, 
investment efficiency, can be crucial for overall capital accumulation. The traditional 
way to evaluate the efficiency of capital generation is to use the “capital-output ratio” 
(K/Y), derived from the standard neoclassical production function. By rewriting 
Equation 8.1, the growth rate of the capital-output ratio can be identified as:  
 
𝑔𝑔𝐾𝐾 − 𝑔𝑔𝑌𝑌 = 𝛼𝛼 ∗ (𝑔𝑔𝐾𝐾 − 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿) − 𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴     (Eq. 8.4) 
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Figure 8.4 and Figure 8.5 shows both K/Y and its growth rate for the Chinese economy 
between 1980 and 2010. A U-shaped moving tendency of the capital-output ratio was 
recorded during the reform era. Starting around 2.9 in 1980, the ratio of K/Y decreased 
gradually over the next 15 years, reaching its bottom of approximately 2.3 during the 
mid-1990s. Year 1994 was the turning point; from that point forward, substantial 
recovery of the K/Y ratio occurred, reaching a ratio of 3.1 in 2010. At a first glance, as 
the reciprocal of the productivity of capital, the distinctive different moving tendencies 
of the K/Y ratio between pre-1995 and post-1995 periods suggests an enhancement in 
capital productivity in the first half of the reform period, followed by deterioration in 
the second half.  
 
Figure 8.4 Capital-output ratio of China, 1978 constant price, 1980–2010 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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 Figure 8.5 Growth rate of capital-output ratio, 1980–2010 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
Looking at the right-hand side of Equation 8.4, the change in the K/Y ratio, shown on 
the left-hand side, can be interpreted as the combined effects of the change in the 
capital–labor ratio—𝑔𝑔𝐾𝐾 − 𝑔𝑔𝑌𝑌 and 𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴—the technological progress, or TFP growth. The 
change in the K/Y ratio largely depends upon the relative change in pace between capital 
intensity (the capital–labor ratio) and TFP growth. A dramatic capital deepening process 
can be identified during the entire reform period (see Figure 8.6 and Figure 8.7). Using 
the capital–output ratio as the efficiency indicator of capital formation may be biased 
and reflect only a partial picture. 
 
Figure 8.6 Capital–labor ratio of China, 1980–2010 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
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 Figure 8.7 Growth rate of capital–labor ratio (capital intensity), 1980–2010 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
Another commonly used proxy to measure investment efficiency is to assess the 
marginal terms of the K/Y ratio: the incremental capital–output ratio (ICOR; see Chapter 
5). Equal to the reciprocal of marginal product of capital during two time spots, the 
meaning of ICOR is easy to understand as a reflection of the amount of capital required 
to guarantee per-unit output growth. The lower the ICOR, the higher the investment 
efficiency (productivity of investment). As in Xiong (2010), the use of ICOR as the 
proxy of investment efficiency can avoid several difficulties; the most crucial is to avoid 
an estimation of capital stocks. The ICOR in China during the reform era fluctuated up 
and down, though significant direction is hard to capture (see Figure 5.12). 
 
The relationship between ICOR and the capital–output ratio can be interpreted as the 
product of ICOR and the output elasticity of capital32 (Zhang, 2010). Therefore, if a 
normal change in capital’s output elasticity over the years is assumed, ICOR and the 
capital–output ratio should move in the same direction. By comparing the two curves in 
Figure 8.4 and Figure 5.12, it is observed that the moving tendency of ICOR and the 
K/Y ratio between 1980 and 1995 showed a decreasing trend, and it was only prior to 
the late 1990s that they tracked each other well. On the one hand, the divergence of the 
ICOR and K/Y ratio after the late 1990s indicates that the output elasticity of capital 
32 The output elasticity of capital is equal to the product of 𝑑𝑑𝑌𝑌/𝑑𝑑𝐾𝐾 and 𝐾𝐾/𝑌𝑌. 
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 changed during the second half of the reform period. On the other hand, it may also 
suggest that the ICOR was sufficient to indicate proper investment efficiency.  
 
One crucial prerequisite for using the K/Y ratio and ICOR as the investment efficiency 
indicators is the steady share of capital and labor in total input. As seen in Figure 8.5, 
the Chinese economy suffered a dramatic capital deepening process, especially in the 
post-1995 period. Therefore, if the change in capital–labor ratio is not controlled, both 
the K/Y ratio and the ICOR would be insufficient indicators of the productivity of 
capital yet would indicate the changing share of capital in total input. It is possible that 
the K/Y ratio and ICOR, and any marginal change of the K/Y ratio, contain two pieces of 
information. One is that the K/Y ratio and ICOR reflect the efficiency of investment, 
highlighting efficient resources allocation. The other is that the K/Y ratio and ICOR 
reflect a change in capital intensity, indicating a structural change in China’s economy 
during the reform periods. A simple equation-based test of the relationship between TFP 
and ICOR can be applied to verify whether ICOR is qualified to be an efficiency 
indicator in the following form:  
𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼51 + 𝛼𝛼52 ∗ 𝑔𝑔𝑌𝑌(𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝛼𝛼53 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆 (Eq. 8.5) 
 
where 𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴 is the growth of TFP of China’s economy reported in Figure 8.3, 𝑔𝑔𝑌𝑌(𝑡𝑡−1)is 
the growth rate of total output in previous period, and 𝜆𝜆 the error term.  
 
The rational of Equation 8.5 is straightforward: if the coefficient of ICOR, 𝛼𝛼53, is 
significantly negative, a lower ICOR implies more efficient use of each unit of capital. 
This suggests that the ICOR contains more information about investment efficiency. 
Conversely, if a significantly positive 𝛼𝛼53 is captured, then the change in ICOR may 
be the result of a change in capital intensity.  
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The coefficient of output growth in the previous period, 𝛼𝛼52 , captures induced 
technological change in economic development, while 𝛼𝛼51  accounts for other 
unexplained information. The results in Table 8.2 record a significantly negative 𝛼𝛼53, 
with a value of -0.006, meaning that the TFP and ICOR are not moving in the same 
direction. In other words, the ICOR contains more information about investment 
efficiency, while the affect from a changing capital intensity tends to be limited.  
 
Table 8.2 Estimation results of Equation 8.5 
𝛼𝛼51 0.0116 
 (0.560) 
𝛼𝛼52 0.389** 
 (2.374) 
𝛼𝛼53 -0.006* 
 (-1.922) 
R-squared 0.296 
F-statistic 5.891 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.007 
D.W. test 1.477 
Source: Author’s calculation. t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 
0.01. 
 
8.3.2 The interaction between investment and investment efficiency 
 
In the standard neoclassical framework, productivity growth is assumed to be 
exogenously determined. The literature that focuses on China mainly holds the view 
that the growth in China’s economy relies on capital accumulation and that 
improvement in the TFP is weak.33 The deduced conclusion from these particular 
studies is that China cannot sustain its high growth rate. This conclusion is largely based 
on the assumption of diminishing return to scales of capital: the decreasing marginal 
productivity of capital will lead to convergence and re-equilibrium of China’s growth 
33 For a detailed estimation of TFP, see Blanchard and Giavazzi (2006); Woo (1998); 
Young (2003). For a more recent accounting, see Li and Liu (2011).  
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 path. 
 
The contradictive empirical results derived from the standard growth accounting 
framework cannot explain that China has sustained its rapid growth for at least 30 years; 
yet investment-driven capital accumulation is considered the major factor, not the TFP 
growth behind such economic achievements (see Lo & Li, 2011, p. 65). The 
problematic results from the neoclassical framework could be from the weakness of the 
framework itself, even when the assumption of decreasing returns is relaxed.34  
 
Recall that the alternative theoretical tradition emphasizes the endogeneity of 
investment and accompanied technological progress, which induces the capital 
deepening process. If improvement in investment efficiency is embodied in the process 
of technological progress, caused by capital formation, a two-way causal relationship 
between aggregate investment and investment efficiency can be assumed (Scott, 1989). 
This can be tested in the following equations: 
 
𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼61 + 𝛼𝛼62 ∗ 𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡/𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆 (Eq. 8.6) 
𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡/𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼71 + 𝛼𝛼72 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆 (Eq. 8.7) 
 
The results are reported in Table 8.3. Statistically, in Equation 8.6, the fixed investment 
had a significantly positive impact on the determination of the ICOR, at a confidence 
34 By modifying the standard growth equation, as in Equation 8.1, Lo and Li (2011, p. 
63) designed the following equation: 𝑑𝑑𝑌𝑌/𝑌𝑌 − 𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆/𝑆𝑆 = 𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴/𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽 ∗（𝑑𝑑𝐾𝐾/𝐾𝐾 −
𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆/𝑆𝑆) + (𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 − 1) ∗ 𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆/𝑆𝑆. The coefficient (𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 − 1) is used to test whether 
there exists increasing returns during China’s growth. The results found that the positive 
value of (𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 − 1) was insignificant, while the TFP growth was insignificant with a 
negative value. The only positive and significant coefficient observed is 𝛽𝛽 of 
（𝑑𝑑𝐾𝐾/𝐾𝐾 − 𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆/𝑆𝑆), with a value of 1.125, which implies a strong affection of capital on 
growth determination.  
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 level of 5%. In contrast, the impact of the ICOR on gross investment appears weak. A 
lower ICOR implies a higher investment efficiency, so this result suggests that an 
increase in the level of investment would distort investment efficiency. 
 
Table 8.3 Estimation results for Equations 8.6 and 8.7 
 Equation 8.6 Equation 8.7 
𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡/𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 13.859**  
 (2.106)  
𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡  0.002 
  (0.718) 
Constant -1.801 0.381*** 
 (-0.792) (4.641) 
AR(1) 0.811*** 1.333*** 
 (4.033) (7.361) 
AR(2) -0.307 -0.408** 
 (-1.440) (-2.067) 
R-squared 0.601 0.893 
F-statistic 12.559 69.659 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 
D.W. test 1.897 1.717 
Source: Author’s calculation. t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 
0.01. 
 
These results are partially in line with the empirical results from He (2003, p. 383), who 
also failed to find a positive long-term relationship between investment expansion and 
its efficiency for the first 20 years of China’s overall reform, from 1981 to 2001. 
Therefore, two additional deduced interpretations can be drawn. First, if the 
endogeneity of technological progress is still assumed in the expansion of investment, 
then an insignificant causation from investment expansion to its efficiency improvement 
implies that investment, more accurately, capital formation, generates dynamic 
efficiency in productivity growth through other channels, not investment efficiency. 
One important possible channel, as pointed out by Lo and Zhang (2011, p. 49), is 
collective learning. It is worth noting that one feasible condition for generating such 
dynamic productive efficiency is that economic institutions be oriented for the 
long-term, not for short-term profit seeking. 
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Second, the weak connection between gross fixed investment yet overall investment 
efficiency in China may be the mixed results from other sectors. Xiong (2010) started 
from the perspective of financial liberalization, as did Gelb (1989). 35 An overall 
positive relationship between financial development and investment efficiency was hard 
to find until particular focus was given to different sectors and regions of China. Using 
a provincial-level panel dataset between 1987 and 2004, Xiong (2010) documented a 
positive and significant connection between increasing real interest rates and improved 
investment efficiency in China’s service sector. Meanwhile, such a connection in the 
industrial sector was hard to find. Xiong (2010) also reported a positive interaction 
between financial deepening and investment efficiency in China’s coastal areas, which 
are better developed, though interaction for the entire sample tended to be insignificant. 
 
8.4 Financial development in resource allocation and 
investment efficiency 
 
In the neoclassical school, the main growth effect delivered by financial development is 
improved efficiency in financing investment. This refers to allocating financial 
resources to high return–low risk investment projects by implementing various financial 
functions associated with financial intermediaries. Although the test results above show 
a weak connection between quantity of investment and investment efficiency, it is still 
35 Gelb (1989) suggested causation from real interest rates, to financial deepening, to 
investment efficiency, and finally to economic growth in developing economies from 
the perspective of financial liberalization. He used a dataset across 34 developing 
countries and a timeframe of 1965 to1985. The direct interaction between investment 
efficiency and economic growth was used by applying first-order approximation (Gelb, 
1989, p. 20). The original equation of IOCR calculation, IOCR = growth rate of 
GDP/Investment rate, can be derived into the following forms: ∆growth rate of GDP = ∆IOCR ∗ Investment rate + ∆Investment rate ∗ IOCR, where the underlined variables 
denote the average value.  
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 reasonable, on the one hand, to assume a potential strong correlation between 
investment efficiency and the development of a financial sector.  
 
On the other hand, through enhanced productive efficiency, 36  financial sector 
development could have both growth and development effects on overall economic 
development. Therefore, this section assesses the relative relationship between financial 
development and gross investment, and between financial development and the 
investment efficiency. 
 
8.4.1 Financial development indicators 
 
Although in different schools, the term “financial development” is measured in different 
way according to different theoretical perspectives, for some of the measurements, there 
are strict assumptions behind. One representative perspective is the using of the 
proportion of credit issued to non-SOEs (non-state-owned enterprises) and the share of 
non-SOBs (non-state-owned banks) in total credit provision as indicators of China’s 
financial development. The construction of such proxies are based on the assumption 
that Chinese financial development is the result of efficient non-SOEs and non-SOBs. 
Without testing the robustness of such an assumption, the adoption of certain financial 
development indicators may be misleading.  
 
Being aware of the restrictions in applying financial development indicators from 
different theoretical perspective, the three basic financial development indicators 
employed here are indicators can be safely applied with no further restrictive 
36 Productive efficiency refers to sufficient, or even excessive, credit provision to the 
real economy. More importantly, this refers to the induced and embodied productivity 
growth involved in the investment process. 
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 assumptions. The first two indicators, M2/GDP and outstanding total bank credit/GDP 
(LOAN/GDP) are standard financial development estimators. The M2/GDP ratio 
measures financial development from the level of monetization, and the LOAN/GDP 
ratio is a reflection of the level of involvement of bank credits and the banking sector in 
the real economy. Both indicators measure the degree of financial deepening. The 
assumption behind both variables is straightforward: a deeper level of interaction 
between money and the real economy can only be implemented with the support of a 
large and powerful financial sector. A larger financial sector is associated with a higher 
degree of sophistication, as well as better efficiency throughout the entire financial 
system.  
 
A financial repression index (FRI) is the third indicator of financial development 
employed in this analysis from the view of neoliberalism (see Figure 4.9). Using the 
technique of principal component analysis (PCA), the major points according to the 
financial repression thesis, originated by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), are used 
in this thesis’s FRI. These include real interest rates, financial intermediation control, 
and state intervention in bank lending. Although the relationship between financial 
repression or liberalization and economic growth, especially in the context of China’s 
economy, remains a controversial issue (see Chapter 2), the FRI can measure the levels 
of marketization, commercialization, and liberalization level in the financial sector.  
 
8.4.2 Results 
 
As discussed above, the quality and the quantity of investment are measured by ICOR 
and gross fixed investment/GDP. The variable applied here is annual data, between 
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 1980 and 2009, given that the generated FRI is not available for 2010 to the present.37  
 
To begin, unit root tests were applied to all five variables (see Table 8.4). In combining 
the information obtained from the three tests, all five variables are stationary in 
first-order forms, that is, I(1).  
 
Table 8.4 Unit root tests for ICOR, gross investment/GDP, M2/GDP, LOAN/GDP, and 
FRI, 1980–2009 
Variables ADF test PP test 
 t-Statistics Form 
(C,T,P) 
Adj. 
t-Statistics 
Form 
(C,T) 
ICOR -1.375 C,0,1 -1.200 C,0 
 (0.580)  (0.661)  
∆ICOR -3.184*** 0,0,1 -2.573** 0,0 
 (0.003)  (0.012)  
Gross fixed 
investment/GDP 
-3.414* C,T,1 -1.513 C,T 
 (0.07)  (0.802)  
∆ Gross fixed 
investment/GDP 
-3.671*** 0,0,1 -2.684*** 0,0 
 (0.001)  (0.009)  
M2/GDP -2.567 C,T,6 -2.881 C,T 
 (0.297)  (0.183)  
∆M2/GDP -4.825*** C,0,1 -3.419** C,0 
 (0.001)  (0.019)  
LOAN/GDP -2.244 C,T,6 -2.269 C,T 
 (0.445)  (0.437)  
∆LOAN/GDP -3.306*** 0,0,1 -2.781*** 0,0 
 (0.002)  (0.007)  
FRI -1.551 C,0,5 -2.754* C,0 
 (0.491)  (0.077)  
∆FRI -5.059*** 0,0,2 -7.586*** 0,0 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  
Source: Author’s calculation. P-values in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 
0.01. C = constant, T = time trend, and P = period of lags. The period of lags in ADF 
test are selected according to Akaike Info Criterion. The number of observations for 
each variable is 30. 
37 This due to the change in the reporting format of total loans of all financial 
institutions reporting to the People's Bank of China and China Banking Regulatory 
Commission. As for the data in previous years, a series of detailed short-term loans by 
classification was reported; this was then used in the analysis to estimate the degree of 
state intervention in allocating bank loans. 
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In the next step, the potential cointegration of variables was tested based on the 
following two equations. The results are in Table 8.5.  
 
𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = α + β ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹 𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝐹𝐹𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 + ε (Eq. 8.8) 
𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡/𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 = α + β ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹 𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝐹𝐹𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 + ε 
(Eq. 8.9) 
 
Long-term relationships were captured among the three financial development 
indicators and two investment indicators (see Table 8.5 and Table 8.6). As a lower 
ICOR implies higher investment efficiency, the positive correlation coefficient between 
ICOR and the three financial development indicators suggests a negative affect from 
monetary expansion and financial liberalization to investment efficiency.  
 
Table 8.5 Engle-Granger two-step cointegration tests for ICOR, gross fixed 
investment/GDP, M2/GDP, LOAN/GDP and FRI, 1980–2009 
Equation 8.8    Equation8.9   
Independent 
variable 
tau-stati
stic 
z-statistic  Independent 
variable 
tau-stati
stic 
z-statistic 
M2/GDP -3.090 -31.146***  M2/GDP -3.501* -31.315*** 
 (0.121) (0.000)   (0.057) (0.000) 
LOAN/GDP -2.314 -18.196**  LOAN/GDP -2.502 -16.666* 
 (0.385) (0.032)   (0.303) (0.052) 
FRI -2.737 -28.893***  FRI -2.558 -20.105** 
 (0.217) (0.000)   (0.281) (0.017) 
Source: Author’s calculation. MacKinnon (1996). P-values in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** 
p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
After analyzing for potential relationships between variables, simple regressions were 
considered (see Equation 8.8 and 8.9). Given that completing the investment financing 
process is time consuming, regression results with one-period lagged financial 
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 development indicators are reported in Table 8.7 and Table 8.8. 
Table 8.6 Correlation matrix of ICOR, gross fixed investment/GDP, M2/GDP, 
LOAN/GDP and FRI, 1980–2009 
 ICOR Gross fixed 
investment/GDP 
M2/GDP LOAN/GDP FRI 
ICOR 1     
      
Gross fixed 
investment/GDP 
0.521*** 1    
 (3.234)     
M2/GDP 0.667*** 0.888*** 1   
 (4.731) (10.197)    
LOAN/GDP 0.607*** 0.721*** 0.909*** 1  
 (4.039) (5.513) (11.524)   
FRI -0.568*** -0.610*** -0.832*** -0.855*** 1 
 (-3.655) (-4.077) (-7.937) (-8.741)  
Source: Author’s calculation. Note: t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; 
*** p < 0.01. 
 
First, though, several points must be addressed. One is that, in Equation 8.8, a 
significantly positive correlation between M2/GDP and ICOR and between LOAN/GDP 
and ICOR was captured in the current period (in time t) regressions at a confidence 
level of 1%. In addition, FRI recorded a significant negative coefficient at 5%. For the 
three regressions with lagged independent variables, the connection is weak. Given that 
the lower the ICOR, the higher the investment efficiency, the positive value of β 
recorded in the regressions suggests that financial development, measured by both 
monetary expansion and financial liberalization, had surprisingly negative effects on 
investment efficiency, as positive effects were expected. 
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 Table 8.7 Estimation results for Equation 8.8 
 Financial development indicators (Independent variables) 
 M2/GDPt M2/GDPt−1 LOAN/GDPt LOAN/GDPt−1 FRIt FRIt−1 
α -0.985 0.393 -5.764** 1.963 6.253*** 1.636 
 (-0.743) (0.395) (-2.705) (0.507) (4.417) (0.796) 
β 3.684*** 2.543*** 9.376*** 1.466 -4.486** 2.928 
 (3.249) (2.809) (4.372) (0.370) (-2.343) (1.440) 
AR(1) 1.125*** 1.075*** 1.13*** 1.207*** 1.183*** 1.293*** 
 (5.388) (4.527) (5.596) (4.298) (4.830) (5.270) 
AR(2) -0.485** -0.591** -0.407** -0.477* -0.555** -0.448* 
 (-2.233) (-2.499) (-2.095) (--1.805) (-2.337) (-1.835) R2 0.756 0.671 0.787 0.611 0.674 0.640 
F-statistic 24.846 15.650 29.602 12.060 16.578 13.606 
Prob. 
(F-statistic) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
D. W. test 1.771 1.574 1.974 1.433 1.580 1.425 
Source: Author’s calculation. t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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 Table8.8 Estimation results for Equation 8.9 
 Financial development indicators (Independent variables) 
 M2/GDPt M2/GDPt−1 LOAN/GDPt LOAN/GDPt−1 FRIt FRIt−1 
α 0.218*** 0.221*** 0.235*** 0.253** 0.413*** 0.451** 
 (12.751) (10.775) (3.403) (2.193) (2.915) (2.197) 
β 0.110*** 0.112*** 0.123** 0.138* -0.004 -0.039 
 (7.446) (5.907) (2.097) (1.907) (-0.094) (-0.946) 
AR(1) 1.147*** 1.102*** 1.338*** 1.411*** 1.351*** 1.366*** 
 (6.858) (5.267) (7.552) (6.639) (6.433) (6.214) 
AR(2) -0.587*** -0.586** -0.492** -0.482** -0.409* -0.415* 
 (-3.478) (-2.649) (-2.484) (-2.094) (-1.833) (-1.844) R2 0.929 0.894 0.887 0.880 0.870 0.867 
F-statistic 104.577 64.635 62.491 56.209 53.525 49.895 
Prob. 
(F-statistic) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
D. W. test 1.653 1.756 1.651 1.689 1.539 1.561 
Source: Author’s calculation. t statistics in parentheses and * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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 A second point is that for Equation 8.9, more reliable results were documented with the 
reference of 𝑅𝑅2  and F statistics. All six regressions reported strong and positive 
relationships between the level of investment and financial development indicators, 
both in contemporaneous and lagged terms, except for the relationship between FRI and 
gross fixed investment/GDP. Put simply, the estimation results from Equation 8.9 
suggest that monetary expansion, measured by M2/GDP (growth in banking credits) 
and reflected by LOAN/GDP, played a significant role in China’s investment growth 
over the reform period. At the same time, the effects of financial liberalization policies, 
denoted by FRI on promoting gross investment, seems limited. 
 
A third point is that by linking the estimation results from Equations 8.8 and 8.9, an 
interpretation can be made that the development of China’s financial system, from the 
perspective of both monetization and financial liberalization, mainly effected 
investment expansion, but did not improve efficiency. However, the connection between 
a larger, more mature, and more sophisticated financial sector and a more efficient 
allocation of financial resources remains unclear. 
 
8.5 Financial development and economic growth  
 
In the previous three sections, the relationships between capital accumulation and 
economic growth, investment and investment efficiency, and investment, investment 
efficiency, and financial development were discussed. In this section, the interaction 
between financial development and economic development is assessed directly through 
econometric tests.  
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 8.5.1 Methodology and the regression model 
 
8.5.1.1 The system GMM method 
 
As reviewed in Chapter 2, a Barro-style (Barro, 1991) single equation approach has 
been widely adopted in the mainstream empirical literature on the finance–growth 
nexus, including in both cross-country and China-specific studies. The baseline model 
with financial development indicators (FINANCE) in the growth equation; emphasizing 
financial development as part of technological progress usually takes the form:  
 
∆Y = α + β ∗ X + γ ∗ FINANCE + λ (Eq. 8.10) 
 
where Y is the indicator of economic development, X is the set of traditional long-term 
growth determinants, and λ is the error terms.  
 
There are two challenges in adopting the empirical framework presented above. The 
first is the endogeneity of financial development in empirical tests. With the 
development of the theoretical models from both mainstream’s endogenous financial 
intermediation view of finance and the endogenous credit view from the 
Keynesian-Schumpeterian school, a bi-directional causation has been emphasized. 
Assuming a statistical causal direction from finance to growth, such as in Equation 8.10, 
inevitably causes a certain level of bias in determining the influence of financial 
development on economic growth. To address the problem of endogeneity, some early 
cross-country studies adopted an instrumental variable approach. One such commonly 
used instrument is legal origins, first introduced by La Porta et al. (1998).  
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 With the development of econometric techniques, recent finance-growth studies use a 
panel dataset applied to the generalized method of moments (GMM) panel estimator to 
control for the endogeneity of explanatory variables. In Roodman (2009), the GMM 
estimator was initially designed to adapt panel datasets, which consisted of a few time 
periods but many individual effects. Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed the 
first-difference GMM, which consisted of eliminating fixed individual effects in 
proposed models by taking the first difference of the given equation.  
Consider Equation 8.10, with a panel structure that contains only financial development 
indicators as explanatory variables. Therefore, Equation 8.10 can be rewritten as: 
 
𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 = α + β ∗ 𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡−1 + γ ∗ FINANCE𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡+µ𝑓𝑓 + 𝜈𝜈𝑡𝑡 + λ𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡  (Eq. 8.11) 
 
where i and t represent time and regions, µ𝑓𝑓 and 𝜈𝜈𝑡𝑡 denote regional and time invariant 
individual-specific effects, and λ𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 (the idiosyncratic component) are error terms.  
 
With the assumption there are no serially correlated error terms and no predetermined 
initial conditions of the dependent variable 𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡, the following two moment restrictions 
are proposed (see Arellano and Bond, 1991): 
 E�𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡−𝐺𝐺�λ𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 − λ𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡−1�� = 0       s ≥ 2 and t = 3, … , T (Eq. 8.12) E�𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡−𝐺𝐺�λ𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 − λ𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡−1�� = 0       s ≥ 2 and t = 3, … , T (Eq. 8.13) 
 
By applying these two moment restrictions, the values of both 𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 and FINANCE𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 
(with lagged two periods or more) are thus correlated with (𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡−2)  and (FINANCE𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡−1 − FINANCE𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡−2) , respectively, but are not correlated with (λ𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 −
λ𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡−1). Therefore, 𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 and FINANCE𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 are valid instruments for estimating Equation 
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 8.11 in first differenced form, shown as:  
 
𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡−1 = β ∗ �𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡−2� + γ ∗ �FINANCE𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 − FINANCE𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡−1�  + (𝜈𝜈𝑡𝑡 −
𝜈𝜈𝑡𝑡−1) + (λ𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 − λ�,𝑡𝑡−1) (Eq. 8.14) 
 
Through this process, the regional specific effects—that is µ𝑓𝑓, which is omitted in the 
OLS estimator—are now eliminated in the first-difference GMM estimator, and the 
endogeneity of the explanatory variable—that is FINANCE𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡—is controlled.  
 
However, as argued by Blundell and Bond (1998), the efficiency of the first difference 
GMM estimator becomes weak, especially when using lagged values of both dependent 
and independent variables as instruments in small samples. To address this problem, a 
System GMM estimator designed to estimate a combination of the first difference and 
the level equations was introduced and recommended by Blundell and Bond (1998). 
The System GMM estimator combines moment conditions for the proposed equation in 
first difference form (see Equation 8.14), with two additional moment conditions for the 
equation in levels (see Equation 8.11). The two additional moment restrictions are 
proposed as: 
 E��𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡−𝐺𝐺 − 𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡−𝐺𝐺−1��µ𝑓𝑓 + λ𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡�� = 0     s = 1 and t = 3, … , T (Eq. 8.15) E��𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡−𝐺𝐺 − 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡−𝐺𝐺−1��µ𝑓𝑓 + λ𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡�� = 0     s = 1 and t = 3, … , T (Eq. 
8.16) 
 
In applying the System GMM estimator, the difference equation still employs the same 
instruments as in the first-difference GMM estimator. For the equation in levels, 
corresponding variables in both lagged and differenced forms are used as instrumental 
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 variables to control for the potential of endogeneity. 
 
It must be highlighted that in using provincial-level annual data to explore China’s 
finance–growth nexus post-1978, the time span is relatively short, 38 and it only 
provides a maximum of 33 observable periods for each variable between 1978 and 2010. 
This relatively small panel sample is ideal, however, and fit the original intention of 
GMM estimators. Therefore, the System GMM estimator was applied to study the 
relationship between financial development and economic growth in China. Based on 
both Equations 8.10 and 8.11, the regression model can be expressed as:  
 
𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 = α + β ∗ 𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡−1 + γ ∗ FINANCE𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡+δ ∗ 𝑋𝑋𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 + µ𝑓𝑓 + 𝜈𝜈𝑡𝑡 + λ𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡  
(Eq. 8.17) 
 
where Y is the growth indicator, i and t mean provincial and time subscripts. FIINANCE 
denotes financial development indicators; X is a set of traditional growth indicators as 
control variables; µ and 𝜈𝜈 are sectional (province) and time fixed effects, respectively; 
and λ is the error term. To view the level of change of Y, Equation 8.17 is rewritten as: 
 
Δ𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 = α + (β − 1) ∗ 𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡−1 + γ ∗ FINANCE𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡+δ ∗ 𝑋𝑋𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 + µ𝑓𝑓 + 𝜈𝜈𝑡𝑡 + λ𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡  (Eq. 8.18) 
 
8.5.1.2 Financial development indicators 
 
The second challenge faced in adopting this thesis’s empirical framework is measuring 
financial development. As argued in previous chapters, financial development indicators 
38 Not all economic indicators are available from the start of the reform period (1978) 
and onward, given that the national statistic system changed often after 1978. For 
example, the data for total social fixed investment became available after 1981, while 
the index of total social fixed investment became available after 1991.  
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 constructed with restrictive assumptions may lead to bias if the robustness of the 
assumptions is not tested. This is the case for China in adopting financial development 
indicators designed to simplify the different levels of efficiency according to different 
institutional ownership. As discussed in Chapter 5, it became harder to distinguish the 
differences between the four SOBs and the medium and small banks after most of the 
SOBs and joint-stock commercial banks, and some of the city commercial banks, 
became publicly listed, and when regulatory standards were imposed by the state 
mainly based on corresponding versions of the Basel Banking Supervision Accords. 
 
Accordingly, to capture the overall effects of financial development on economic 
development, China’s financial system is treated as a whole, so that the major indicators 
are constructed on the aggregate level but are not classified by ownership types. The 
influence of state-ownership in financial development, however, will be assessed 
through the financial liberalization indicator.  
 
Three groups of financial development indicators are employed in the estimation. The 
first indicator is Size, which includes the variables: the ratio of outstanding total bank 
credits over GDP (credit), the ratio of total bank deposits over GDP (deposit), and ratio 
of total households’ savings deposits over GDP (household deposits). As traditional 
financial development indicators, the loan-to-GDP ratio (credit) is used to capture the 
level of monetization and financial deepening. Inspired by Hao (2006, p. 353), the 
second deposits variable is employed here to capture how well China’s financial system 
is achieving the function of mobilized savings. Self-raising funds have accounted for 
more than 50% of total fixed investment in most years between 1980 and 2010 (see 
Table 6.2). Financial development reflected by more efficient mobilization of savings 
deposits from financial intermediation, as a side channel, could generate positive effects 
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 on promoting economic development. To verify the robustness of the expectations, the 
variable of household deposits is employed because the household sector is usually the 
driving force behind China’s high savings rate. If a larger financial sector implies a 
higher degree of financial development, then it is assumed that all three variables are 
positively correlated with economic development. 
 
The second financial development indicator employed is Intermediating, and is 
designed to capture the impact of changes in lending behaviors in the financial system 
on economic development. This indicator includes two variables: deposits-to-loans ratio 
(DLR) and the savings-to-investment ratio (SIR). By assuming the role of financial 
intermediation in coordinating both supply and demand sides, DLR as a ratio of the 
source of funds over the use of funds not only contains information about how well 
financial intermediations mobilize resources, but also how well they allocate them. 
Furthermore, as argued in Chapter 7, there was an observable change in China’s DLR 
from less than 1.0 in the first half of the reform period to above 1.0 in the second half 
(see Figure 7.5). This may be because of changes in lending behaviors in the financial 
system: the adoption of more market-oriented lending criteria, or more prudential 
regulations, or both. The conversation rate—the efficacy of transformation between 
deposits and loans—thus not only reflects the system’s ability to match both supply and 
demand sides of financial resources, but also reflects the marketization and 
commercialization levels of the financial system as a whole.   
 
The logic behind the SIR is similar to that of the DLR, though it takes a macro view of 
the economic cycle of matching aggregate demand and supply. In other words, the DLR 
and the SIR variables are the narrow and broad measurements, respectively, of how well 
China’s financial system coordinates and integrates financial resources between supply 
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 and demand. 
 
The third financial development indicator is Liberalization, which measures the 
liberalization, marketization, and commercialization of the Chinese financial system. 
This largely takes the perspective of the financial liberalization theories of McKinnon 
(1973) and Shaw (1973). The three variables here are the financial repression index 
(FRI) constructed in Chapter 4 (see Figure 4.9) to measure China’s financial 
development from three aspects. The first is the liberalization of interest rates. The 
second is financial intermediation control, which measures both the statutory reserve 
requirement ratio of banks and state intervention on bank lending. Third, state 
intervention is measured by the SOBs’ share of total credits provision and the SOEs’ 
share of total issued credit. Using PCA, it was found that the FRI contains nearly 90% 
of original information. According to the key argument from the financial liberalization 
theory, the FRI is assumed to be negatively correlated with economic growth. 
 
Following Hao (2006) and Guariglia and Poncet (2008), the other two variables 
designed for this analysis are the share of bank loans over the state budget in total social 
fixed investment (loan/budget ratio, or LBR) and the share of self-raising funds in total 
social fixed investment (SRF). The LBR captures the change in investment intuitions of 
the real economy of China. In the initial reform stage, the state budget held the majority 
stake of all external finance sources in facilitating investment assets (see Table 6.2). 
Therefore, the substitution of bank credits for state budget expenditures can be treated 
as a proxy for the level of financial sector marketization, because the lending criteria of 
formal bank credit is more profit oriented when compared to budget expenditures.  
 
For SRF, although the impact of firms’ capital structure on their performances remains a 
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 controversial issue, generally speaking bank financing is more efficient in capital 
utilization than self-raising funds due to implicit budget constraints. This argument is 
supported by Ayyagari et al. (2010), who found that, in Chinese firms, bank financing 
generates more positive growth effects than other channels. However, it is also argued 
that informal finance continues to play a vital role in providing financial support, 
especially to private firms (Allen et al., 2005). This implies Chinese firms continue to 
face financial constraints. Accordingly, the SRF was used to capture the degree financial 
constraints were eased by financial development. 
 
8.5.1.3 Growth indicator and control variables 
 
For the left-hand-side of the regression-based estimation, the growth rate of real GDP 
(GG) is considered as the growth indicator. For the right-hand-side of the equation, a 
one-period lagged real GDP per capita (LGPER) in logarithm terms was introduced to 
control for convergence. A set of traditional growth determinants was also introduced as 
control variables. Bond, Hoeffler, and Temple (2001) introduced an instrumental 
variable based system GMM methodology, to make it possible to consistently estimate 
parameters in models with endogenous variables on the right-hand side. Thus, four 
control variables, which are assumed to be weakly exogenous, are now introduced. The 
first control variable is the total social fixed investment/GDP (capital) and the second is 
the rate of enrollment in higher education per 10,000 people (education); these control 
for physical and human capital input, respectively. The third variable is the density of 
roads (infrastructure), defined as the number of kilometers of road per 100 km2, which 
is used to capture improvements in infrastructure. The fourth variable is the ratio of 
foreign direct investment to GDP (FDI), which tracks the impact of the levels of 
openness and world integration in China’s regional economic development. 
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8.5.2 Data Description 
 
The provincial-level data for growth indicators, control variables, and the first two sets 
of financial development indicators were adopted. Due to a lack of data availability, for 
the three variables in the third indicator, Liberalization, only national-level series were 
collected. This means that these three particular variables will not vary across provinces. 
Being aware of the potential heterogeneous effects this imposes, further robustness 
checks were carried out. 
 
All of the data are collected from official sources: China Statistic Yearbook (various 
issues); Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (various issues); National Bureau of 
Statistics of China (1997a, 1997b, 1999, 2005, 2009, 2013); and Statistic Yearbooks of 
individual provinces (various issues). Detailed data source for the created FRI is in 
Chapter 4.  
 
Due to data limitations, it was necessary to exclude Hainan province and Tibet 
autonomous region. This dataset thus uses a total of 27 provinces (out of 29) and 4 
municipalities in the dataset, and uses a year range of 1980 to 2010. The average data 
for each province is summarized in Table 8.8. 
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 Table 8.8 Provincial data description, 1980–2010, average 
 Growth indicators Size Intermediating Liberalization Control Variables 
Province GG Credit Deposit Household Deposits DLR SIR FRI LBR SRF LGPER Capital Education Infrastructure FDI 
 % % % % % %  % % LN (CNY) % Per 10000 population Km road per 100 KM2 land % 
Beijing 10.62  136.30  254.50  65.52  188.03  97.06  72.45  349.65  67.02  8.30  39.01  194.70  76.37  4.62  
Tianjin 11.28  119.14  110.56  47.43  92.05  118.30  72.45 349.65  67.02  8.06  38.87  135.35  56.28  6.47  
Hebei 10.95  63.30  73.55  55.97  116.02  124.56  72.45 349.65  67.02  7.14  35.37  46.74  35.45  1.28  
Shanxi 10.18  92.19  110.63  60.77  115.42  102.24  72.45 349.65  67.02  7.06  36.08  51.24  33.89  0.63  
Inner Mongolia 12.58  78.38  64.49  36.23  84.05  74.75  72.45 349.65  67.02  7.14  37.22  42.51  5.54  2.02  
Liaoning 10.15  96.44  97.04  55.15  97.50  133.60  72.45 349.65  67.02  7.63  36.33  73.66  33.89  3.53  
Jilin 10.67  107.26  78.81  53.26  74.63  87.59  72.45 349.65  67.02  7.20  36.37  70.23  21.34  2.35  
Heilongjiang 8.85  83.06  80.98  50.53  100.89  128.98  72.45 349.65  67.02  7.35  30.13  62.09  13.99  1.80  
Shanghai 10.38  120.76  146.61  48.54  114.31  146.05  72.45 349.65  67.02  8.57  36.39  140.56  79.57  5.07  
Jiangsu 12.76  71.21  79.58  37.92  107.78  118.81  72.45 349.65  67.02  7.56  33.53  68.02  48.82  4.95  
Zhejiang 13.04  82.84  95.21  42.46  110.52  115.74  72.45 349.65  67.02  7.60  33.39  53.68  43.01  2.23  
Anhui 10.83  72.83  70.50  37.41  92.13  98.98  72.45 349.65  67.02  6.79  34.57  40.88  40.36  1.19  
Fujian 13.11  70.92  80.34  38.49  112.46  97.39  72.45 349.65  67.02  7.32  31.06  50.81  41.20  6.36  
Jiangxi 10.20  77.21  75.51  44.77  95.92  91.98  72.45 349.65  67.02  6.80  33.23  55.03  32.36  2.07  
Shandong 12.30  71.30  70.10  39.07  97.04  113.15  72.45 349.65  67.02  7.34  33.40  49.63  50.03  2.38  
Henan 11.39  73.44  69.39  44.43  92.49  107.79  72.45 349.65  67.02  6.85  31.83  38.72  48.70  0.83  
Hubei 10.60  86.21  78.64  39.32  90.31  113.39  72.45 349.65  67.02  7.05  33.24  72.00  41.82  2.47  
Hunan 9.89  66.31  65.62  37.58  97.13  102.24  72.45 349.65  67.02  6.90  29.13  48.61  39.21  1.46  
Guangdong 13.78  89.29  110.09  57.66  119.62  117.62  72.45 349.65  67.02  7.59  30.46  43.70  52.90  6.28  
Guangxi 10.46  73.14  79.69  43.97  106.15  82.12  72.45 349.65  67.02  6.72  30.26  31.72  21.48  1.69  
Chongqing 10.74  91.82  90.73  44.98  93.79  90.28  72.45 349.65  67.02  6.87  35.86  53.01  45.55  1.71  
Sichuan 10.35  96.74  101.15  51.55  104.37  96.86  72.45 349.65  67.02  6.78  33.80  40.65  21.38  0.92  
Guizhou 9.78  84.32  86.34  38.05  98.44  52.59  72.45 349.65  67.02  6.35  34.41  24.51  27.83  0.72  
Yunnan 10.15  83.55  101.50  41.96  120.11  82.87  72.45 349.65  67.02  6.72  34.62  27.18  25.70  0.56  
Shaanxi 11.06  98.42  108.34  61.10  107.32  76.97  72.45 349.65  67.02  6.86  38.10  79.41  26.97  1.31  
Gansu 9.94  95.91  108.39  55.40  113.56  75.12  72.45 349.65  67.02  6.70  35.60  41.85  11.05  0.38  
Qinghai 9.58  104.73  101.52  46.97  107.20  54.04  72.45 349.65  67.02  6.99  51.09  30.02  3.40  1.55  
Ningxia 10.05  111.33  107.47  56.64  95.56  47.22  72.45 349.65  67.02  6.97  49.05  39.94  16.28  1.39  
Xinjiang 10.32  86.25  107.11  50.82  127.94  72.84  72.45 349.65  67.02  7.15  44.15  44.37  3.33  0.25  
Source: See text in this section for details. 
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As observed from Table 8.8, the growth rate of economic development among the 
provinces between 1980 and 2010 averaged 10.9% per year, with Guangdong province 
among the top in this sample, with a rate of 13.8%. Heilongjiang recorded the lowest, at 
8.9% annually. Roughly speaking, the economic growth rate at the province level did 
not deviate much, and largely retained convergence. The growth rate of real per capita 
GDP shows a similar trend, with an average rate of only 1.3% lower than the real GDP 
growth rate. 
 
In contract to the convergence of economic growth across provinces, the financial 
variables are observed to have a different outcome. Credit varied from 63.3% in Hebei 
to 136.3% in Beijing. The gap in deposits is even wider, from 64.5% in Inner Mongolia 
to 254.5% in Beijing, which is a nearly quadrupled percentage. Even with household 
deposits, though the variance is narrowed, Beijing, had the highest rate of 65.5%, which 
is nearly double that of the lowest recorded provinces. For LDR and SIR, a gap across 
the provinces is also captured: from a low of 54.2% and 52.6%, and high of156.9% and 
146.1%, respectively.  
 
Similar to the financial variables, all four control variables varied across provinces. For 
capital, the gap is more than 20%, from 29.1% in Hunan to 51.1% in Qinghai. What is 
worth noting is that the three provinces that recorded the highest fixed investment rates 
are the inner provinces in northwest China: Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang. This 
certainly suggests the role the state played in balancing regional income equality 
through investment, given the Western Development Strategy adopted by the central 
government in the late 1990s. Education, infrastructure, and FDI show even greater 
divergence among the regions. There is a difference of nearly 8 times for education 
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 across the provinces, and for infrastructure and FDI, the differences between highest 
and lowest provinces were 24 times and 26 times, respectively.  
 
8.5.3 Descriptive analysis 
 
To review the relationship between economic development and the financial 
development indicators, the 29 provinces in the sample were broken into 4 groups 
according to to their real GDP growth rates, from highest to lowest. Three of these 
groups, labeled high, upper-middle, and lower-middle, each contain 7 provinces, while 
the fourth group, labeled low, includes 8 provinces (see Table 8.9). The four control 
variables and the first two set of financial development indicators (except FDI, LBR, 
and SRF), classified by GDP, are reported in Figure 8.8 through 8.10.  
 
Table 8.9 Regional classification according to GDP growth rate, 1980–2010 average, % 
Group  Average GDP Provinces  
High 12.71  Fujian, Guangdong, Henan, Inner Mongolia, 
Jiangsu, Shandong, Zhejiang 
Upper- 
middle 
10.88  Anhui, Beijing, Chongqing, Hebei, Jilin, 
Shaanxi, Tianjin 
Lower- 
middle 
10.36  Guangxi, Hubei, Jiangxi, Shanghai, Shanxi, 
Sichuan, Xinjiang 
Low 9.80  Gansu, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Hunan, Liaoning, 
Ningxia, Qinghai, , Yunnan 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
In Figure 8.8, it becomes clear that the provinces with the highest economic growth rate 
are not associated with the highest level of credit, deposits, or household deposits. 
However, if the high group is excluded, a positive nexus between financial deepening 
and economic growth is captured, as all three indicators show a decrease from the 
groups with higher economic growth rates to the group with lower rates.  
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 Figure 8.8 Size indicators of financial development, classified by GDP growth, 1980–
2010 average, % 
 
Note: Author’s calculations. 
 
Figure 8.9 Intermediating indicators of financial development, classified by GDP growth, 
1980–2010 average, % 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Figure 8.10 Control variables, classified by GDP growth, 1980–2010 average, % 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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There are several observations that need to be highlighted. First, the upper-middle group 
recorded the highest average DLR as compared with the other three groups, though the 
differences are relatively small. Second, the differences in SIR among three of the 
groups (except the low group) are also small (see Figure 8.9). Generally, the 
relationship between these two Intermediating variables and economic growth remains 
quite unclear.  
 
Similar to the situation shown in Figure 8.8, for the most part the provinces with the 
highest value of the four control variables are not the provinces with the highest growth 
rate. The exceptions to this observation is for FDI. For education and infrastructure, a 
positive correlation with economic growth exists in all but the high group (see Figure 
8.10). For capital, its nexus with economic growth is hard to identify among all groups.  
 
Figures 8.8, 8.9, and 8.10 suggest a roughly positive finance–growth nexus if the high 
group is excluded from the sample. In reviewing the province composition of the high 
group, it is found that 5 out of the 7 provinces are in coastal areas, which are usually 
assumed to be more receptive to the world economy than inland areas. One possibility 
for this, according to Guariglia and Poncet (2008), may be the substitution of foreign 
financing over bank financing, especially in provinces receiving a large amount of FDI. 
Supportive evidence in Figure 8.10 shows that the high group enjoys the largest share of 
FDI in terms of GDP terms over all other groups.  
 
The correlation matrix between growth and financial development variables are in Table 
8.10. The financial development variables show greater variation than the two growth 
variables, according to their standard errors. All financial development variables, except 
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 credit and FRI, show a positive correlation with growth indicators. Although credit’s 
correlation coefficients with the two growth indicators recorded negative values, the 
absolute value of the coefficient is relative small. A small correlation coefficient is also 
obtained between SIR and the growth indicators. FRI shows a negative relationship with 
most of the other variables, which is in line with the assumption of a positive financial 
liberalization–growth nexus.  
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 Table 8.10 Descriptive statistics and correlations between financial development indicators and economics, growth, 1980—2010, % 
Descriptive statistic  GG Credit Deposits Household Deposits DLR SIR FRI LBR SRF 
Mean 10.88 89.58 96.31 48.27 105.37 96.81 71.50  350.61 66.62 
Max. 25.6 225.22 439.63 120.73 256.02 348.76 92.09  754.83 78.29 
Min. -8.4 40.05 24.08 4.32 39.81 7.45 56.16  45.22 55.45 
Std. Dev. 3.98 27.47 51.86 24.15 35.7 30.89 11.04  208.88 6.09 
          
Correlations          
GG 1.00          
Credit -0.06  1.00         
Deposit 0.11  0.76  1.00        
Household Deposit 0.12  0.66  0.78  1.00       
DLR 0.22  0.20  0.75  0.62  1.00      
SIR 0.00  -0.14  -0.08  -0.08  -0.02  1.00     
FRI -0.15  -0.46  -0.55  -0.75  -0.48  0.06  1.00    
LBR 0.25  0.32  0.25  0.50  0.17  -0.06  -0.40  1.00   
SRF 0.20  0.39  0.61  0.77  0.62  -0.08  -0.64  0.36  1.00  
Source: Author’s calculation. 
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 8.5.4 Test results 
 
8.5.4.1 Overall result 
 
The System GMM estimator in Equation 8.17 was adopted individually with each of the 
eight financial development variables; the results are reported in Table 8.11. Several 
points can be drawn. First, in Columns 1, 2, and 3, the Size variables record either 
negative or insignificant coefficients that correlate with the growth indicator GG. This 
shows that the expansion of the Chinese financial system and its monetization process 
generated negative effects on economic growth. Such results, especially the negative 
relationship between banking credit expansion and economic growth, has been observed 
and confirmed in many pioneer finance-growth studies on China, including those of 
Boyreau-Debray (2003), Hao (2006), and Ren (2007).  
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 Table 8.11 Finance and growth estimation results, 1980–2010 
Dependent variable: GG (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Credit -0.0267        
 (-1.39)        
Deposits  -0.00421       
  (-0.61)       
Household deposits   -0.0219***      
   (-8.14)      
DLR    0.0644***     
    (-2.83)     
SIR     0.0401**    
     (-2.15)    
FRI      -0.0221***   
      (-5.55)   
LBR       0.0130***  
       (-9.23)  
SRF        -0.206*** 
        (-12.20) 
Lagged real GDP per capita -0.0137* -0.0167*** -0.00947*** -0.0509*** -0.0336*** -0.0481*** -0.0466*** -0.0203*** 
 (-1.75) (-3.50) (-2.80) (-3.09) (-3.10) (-9.59) (-12.18) (-3.95) 
Capital 0.0587*** 0.0558*** 0.0454*** 0.0518*** 0.0718*** 0.0770*** 0.0744*** 0.0635*** 
 (-5.51) (-6.96) (-6.32) (-5.24) (-7.59) (-13.14) (-18.22) (-9.19) 
Education -0.00192 -0.00282 0.0034 0.00348 0.00927 0.0055 0.0117*** 0.0111*** 
 (-0.14) (-0.42) (-1.34) (-0.21) (-1.43) (-1.4) (-3.58) (-2.92) 
Infrastructure 0.00540* 0.0118*** 0.00502 0.0157*** 0.00297 0.0190*** 0.0180*** 0.0184*** 
 (-1.75) (-4.66) (-1.51) (-3.7) (-1.08) (-12.1) (-6.22) (-9.09) 
FDI 0.00619*** 0.00490*** 0.00799*** 0.00414*** 0.00639*** 0.00653*** 0.00112* 0.00648*** 
 (-5.21) (-6.8) (-8.36) (-4.25) (-3.51) (-5.62) (-1.69) (-7.24) 
CONSTANT 0.291*** 0.309*** 0.243*** 0.570*** 0.478*** 0.587*** 0.546*** 0.299*** 
 (-4.7) (-6.95) (-7.28) (-4.05) (-4.33) (-13.39) (-15.41) (-6.25) Sargan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
AR(2) 0.3129 0.3404 0.3026 0.9054 0.8321 0.6780 0.3456 0.6636 
         Observations 773 773 773 773 773 744 773 773 
Province 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Source: Author’s calculation. t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. All right-hand-side variables are expressed in Logarithms 
term. Two-step System GMM estimator are employed in all regressions Being aware of the potential problem of autocorrelation, 2 lags of dependent 
variable used for all eight regressions, according to the AR(2) test. 
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Second, in Columns 4 and 5, the coefficients of both the Intermediating variables, DLR 
and SIR, are reported with positive and significant numbers, with a confidence level 
above 5%. As DLR and SIR are used to capture how well the financial system 
coordinates the supply and demand of financial resources, this regression result suggests 
that during all four reform periods, China’s financial system successfully integrated 
resources from both macro- and micro views. Linking the seemingly contradictive 
results from Size and Intermediating suggests that evaluating the impact of financial 
development on economic growth through the use of funds, or the source of funds in 
isolation, tells only a partial story, because the role of the financial system in 
coordinating supply and demand sides is neglected. At the same time, the strongly 
positive values of DLR and SIR captured in the regression are not implicated in a highly 
efficient financial system, as these two indicators denote the effectiveness of financial 
system in resources allocation.  
 
Turning to Liberalization, the third financial development indicator, in Columns 6 
through 8 of Table 8.11, the coefficient of all three of its variables document significant 
values at 1% confidence level, though the FRI and SRF each recorded negative numbers, 
while the LBR recorded a positive one. The negative financial repression-growth nexus 
is in line with the predictions from financial liberalization theory: the liberalization of 
real interest rates eliminate state intervention in credit allocation, and more formal, 
market-based financial regulations generate positive effects on economic development. 
Furthermore, a positive LBR suggests that switching from budget-based financing to 
loan-based bank financing promoted overall economic growth in China. A negative SRF, 
meanwhile, indicates a relatively higher efficacy of other sources of financing, 
compared with self-raising funds, such as bank loans and FDI in growth determination. 
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For the control variables, a significantly positive capital has been observed in all 8 
regressions, indicating the contribution of capital accumulation in China’s economic 
progress. Education, on the other hand, appears to be insignificant in most regressions. 
What is worth noting is that a positive FDI–growth relationship has also been captured 
in all 8 regressions, at a significance level of 1%, with the exception of regression 7, 
which is only significant at 10%. This further emphasizes the role of FDI as a growth 
determinant.  
 
In addition, the Sargan test, which tests the validity of instrument variables, is reported. 
The null hypothesis of the Sargan test is that instrumental variables are not correlated 
with residuals. To test autocorrelation, the results of the AR(2) test are reported, with the 
null hypothesis that errors exhibiting no second order serial correlation. The null 
hypotheses of Sargan test and AR(2) cannot be rejected in any of the 8 regressions. 
 
8.5.4.2 Sub-period results 
 
Referring to the analysis in Chapter 7, the mechanism of resource allocation in China’s 
financial system changed overtime from a quasi fiscal agency to a more market-oriented 
one. This mainly occurred in two periods, with 1994 being a turning point, when more 
fundamental financial and economy reform took place. Accordingly the regression 
results for these two sub-periods are in Table 8.12, Table 8.13 and Table 8.14. 
 
In comparing the results obtained for the Size indicator during the two periods, Table 
8.12 show that the negative effects of monetary expansion of the financial system on 
economic growth mainly occurred in the pre-1994 period. The negative effects were 
nearly halved after 1994, given that the coefficients for all three Size variables declined 
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 from -0.137 to -0.0076 (credit), -0.0128 to -0.0056 (deposits), and -0.0381 to -0.0179 
(household deposits). Given that excessive credit provision is a major tool of the state 
and that China’s financial system facilitated capital accumulation in the first half of the 
reform, the negative impact of banking credit on economic growth implies loss of 
allocative efficiency during credit provision. When market-oriented financial reform 
occurred, the situation was ameliorated.  
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 Table 8.12 Finance and growth estimation results, 1980–1994 and 1995–2010 (Size indicator) 
Dependent variable: GG 1980–1994 1995–2010 1980–1994 1995–2010 1980–1994 1995–2010 
  (1) (2) (2) (4) (5) (6) 
       Credit -0.137*** -0.0076      (-5.52) (-0.76)     Deposit   -0.0128 -0.00555      (-0.72) (-0.48)   Household deposits     -0.0381** -0.0179***      (-2.37) (-3.01) Lagged real GDP per capita 0.0214 -0.0158*** 0.00328 -0.0137*** 0.0572 -0.0173*** 
 (-1.06) (-3.45) (-0.18) (-3.37) (-1.49) (-3.52) 
Capital 0.162*** 0.0149* 0.138*** 0.0159*** 0.143*** 0.0155*** 
 (-13.41) (-1.91) (-10.02) (-2.78) (-12.36) (-3.2) 
Education -0.0598** 0.0177*** -0.0723*** 0.0155*** -0.118*** 0.0200*** 
 (-2.23) (-7.13) (-3.43) (-5.29) (-3.17) (-8.42) 
Infrastructure -0.0169 -0.00308 0.0306 -0.00163 -0.00307 -0.00333 
 (-0.42) (-1.61) -1.57 (-0.66) (-0.07) (-1.28) 
FDI 0.0105*** 0.00402** 0.00583*** 0.00216 0.0106*** 0.00139 
 (-6.44) (-2.28) (-3.67) (-1.21) (-7.64) (-0.99) 
CONSTANT 0.104 0.213*** 0.227 0.189*** -0.27 0.208*** 
  (-0.45) (-4.23) (-1.35) (-4.52) (-0.72) (-4.33) 
Sargan 1 1 1 1 1 1 
AR(2) 0.9168 0.0464 0.9975 0.0777 0.9126 0.0686 
       Observations 309 464 309 464 309 464 
Province 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Source: Author’s calculations. t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p<0.01. All right-hand-side variables are expressed in Logarithms 
term. Two-step System GMM estimator are employed in all regressions. Being aware of the potential problem of autocorrelation, 2 lags of dependent 
variable used for all 6 regressions, according to the AR(2) test.  
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 Table 8.13 Finance and growth estimation results, 1980- 1994 and 1995-2010 (Intermediating) 
Dependent variable: GG 1980–1994 1995–2010 1980–1994 1995–2010 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     DLR 0.118*** 0.000912    (-5.1) (-0.07)   SIR   0.00515 0.0425***    (-0.26) (-3.2) Lagged real GDP per capita -0.0595 -0.0265*** -0.0102 -0.0693*** 
 (-1.58) (-2.64) (-0.48) (-2.94) 
Capital 0.132*** 0.0224* 0.135*** 0.0504*** 
 (-11.58) (-1.76) (-17.55) (-3.19) 
Education -0.00461 0.0194** -0.0844*** 0.0323** 
 (-0.16) (-2.52) (-2.61) (-2.41) 
Infrastructure 0.0358 -0.00033 0.0540* 0.00514 
 (-0.24) (-0.13) (-1.73) (-1.1) 
FDI 0.00138 0.00166 0.00886*** 0.00349 
 (-0.72) (-1.27) (-4.92) (-1.27) 
CONSTANT 0.783 0.296*** 0.371** 0.693*** 
  (-1.52) (-3.22) (-2.16) (-3.34) 
Sargan 1 1 1 1 
AR(2) 0.4103 0.0532 0.5474 0.4812 
     Observations 309 464 309 464 
Province 29 29 29 29 
Source: Author’s calculation. t statistics in parentheses and * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. All right-hand-side variables are expressed in 
Logarithms term. Two-step System GMM estimator are employed in all regressions. Being aware of the potential problem of autocorrelation, 2 lags of 
dependent variables used for the first 3 regressions, and 3 lags for the fourth, according to the AR(2) test. 
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 Table 8.14 Finance and growth estimation results, 1980- 1994 and 1995-2010 (Liberalization) 
Dependent variable: GG 1980–1994 1995–2010 1980–1994 1995–2010 1980–1994 1995–2010 
  (1) (2) (2) (4) (5) (6) 
FRI -0.00016 -0.00954**      (-0.01) (-2.01)     LBR   -0.00042 0.0185***      (-0.06) (-13.34)   SRF     -0.343*** -0.00315      (-13.53) (-0.10) Lagged real GDP per capita -0.00125 -0.0432*** -0.0202 -0.0240*** 0.0374*** -0.0369*** 
 (-0.10) (-12.25) (-0.81) (-7.12) (-3.05) (-6.45) 
Capital 0.185*** 0.00236 0.180*** 0.0222*** 0.113*** 0.0143** 
 (-16.94) (-0.5) (-13.99) (-4.96) (-11.44) (-2.56) 
Education -0.0979*** 0.0320*** -0.0924*** 0.0237*** -0.0873*** 0.0280*** 
 (-4.08) (-14.2) (-4.85) (-15.99) (-4.20) (-13.39) 
Infrastructure 0.0280** 0.0034 0.0794* 0.000956 0.00961 0.00185 
 (-2.14) (-1.44) (-1.93) (-0.4) (-0.76) (-0.81) 
FDI 0.00460*** 0.00460*** 0.00536*** 0.000544 0.00963*** 0.00378*** 
 (-3.22) (-4.22) (-4.31) (-0.51) (-6.41) (-3.52) 
CONSTANT 0.288** 0.409*** 0.507** 0.264*** -0.221** 0.371*** 
  (-2.35) (-12.55) (-2.36) (-8) (-2.21) (-6.14) 
Sargan 1 1 1 1 1 1 
AR(2) 0.6278 0.1001 0.5318 0.1161 0.8054 0.3187 
       Observations 309 435 309 464 309 464 
Province 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Source: Author’s calculations. t statistics in parentheses; and * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. All right-hand-side variables are expressed in 
Logarithms term. Two-step System GMM estimator are employed in all regression. Being aware of the potential problem of autocorrelation, 2 lags of 
dependent variable are used for the first 5 regressions, and 3 lags for the sixth one, according to the AR(2) test. 
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The two Intermediating variables, DLR and SIR, show consistent results in both periods 
when they have a positive correlation with economic growth, though the significance 
varies (see Table 8.13). The banking sector’s resource coordination between deposits 
and loans generates significantly more positive effects in the growth rate in the first 
period, while significant integration between aggregate demand and supply appear in 
the post-1994 period.  
 
Interesting results are obtained for the three Liberalization variables (see Table 8.14). 
The FRI has significant negative correlation with the growth indicator, but only in the 
post-1994 period. Its coefficient for the 1980–1994 period, though, negative, is close to 
zero, demonstrating that the distortion effects from financial repression were quite 
limited in the first half of the reform, and became severe over time. Furthermore, the 
coefficient of LBR moved from negative to positive across the two periods, imply that 
the changing investment vehicle39 was a continuous process, not a one-off reform event 
and it takes time to produce positive influence on economic development. Surprisingly, 
the estimation results for the SRF show that the negative effects from financial 
constraints on economic development mainly occurred in the first half of the reform, as 
the coefficient for SRF became insignificant over time.  
 
For the control variables, according to the results from all 16 regressions in Table 8.12, 
Table 8.13 and Table 8.14, the insignificant effects of education captured in regressions 
over all phases can be interpreted as a combination of significantly negative effects of 
human capital on growth in the 1980–1994 period, though positive effects were 
generated in the second half of the reform. Infrastructure remains insignificant in most 
39 This refers to replacing administrative-based financing with more market-based bank 
financing. 
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 regressions, while capital is the reverse. These findings are consistent with the results 
obtained from full-period regressions. Furthermore, 10 out of the 16 regressions 
recorded positive and significant FDI across the two periods.  
 
8.5.5 Robustness check 
 
Given that using annual data in the regression-based panel estimation can suffer from 
short-term shocks and business cycles, the results based on averaged data is reported in 
Table 8.15. All periods contains 31 observations, averaged into six 5-year periods, with 
the final period being a 6-year period. 
 
Generally, consistent estimation results can be found in the second set of financial 
development variables: DLR and SIR. For the three Size variables, the 5-year averaged 
estimation illustrates more significant but negative effects of monetization and financial 
deepening on economic growth. Contradictive results, however, are found for the two of 
three Liberalization variables, as FRI and SRF are positively correlated with the growth 
rate of the Chinese economy. This thesis argues that this could largely be due to the lack 
of observation and variance of the three variables, as only national-level data are 
employed in this estimation. For this reason, two alternative panel estimators, pooled 
OLS and fixed effects estimators were used on these three variables to check for 
robustness (see Table 8.16). As can be seen, for LBR and SRF, both pooled OLS and 
fixed effects estimators reported consistent outcomes. This matches the results obtained 
in Table 8.11. 
 
However, the robustness check illustrated that the FRI has either a significantly or 
insignificantly positive relationship with economic growth, which is in line with the 
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 results from the 5-year averaged system GMM estimation, but in contrast to the annual 
system GMM estimation results. This means that the role of financial repression on 
growth determination remains unclear. Given that the variable FRI is constructed by 
PCA, any missing information caused by the PCA method and any potential 
heterogeneous problems caused by using national-level, rather than province-level, data, 
could lead to these conflicting results.
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 Table 8.15 Finance and growth estimation results, 1980–2010, 5-year average 
Dependent variable: GG (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Credit -0.0203***         (-4.47)        Deposits  -0.0432***         (-10.11)       Household deposits   -0.0180***         (-6.11)      DLR    0.0116**         (-2.19)     SIR     0.0124***         (-5.62)    FRI      0.125***         (-5.13)   LBR       0.00265         (-0.98)  SRF        0.255***         (-5.3) Lagged real GDP per capita 0.00163 0.00983** -0.00721*** -0.00563* 0.0036 0.00814* -0.0163*** -0.0378*** 
 (-0.25) (-2.48) (-2.70) (-1.75) (-0.9) (-1.65) (-3.45) (-4.59) 
Capital 0.0312*** 0.0270*** 0.0357*** 0.0456*** 0.0393*** 0.0295*** 0.0411*** 0.0230*** 
 (-16.17) (-8.64) (-20.28) (-13.59) (-14.33) (-8.9) (-9.1) (-6.1) 
Education -0.0000355 0.00941*** 0.00313 -0.00662*** -0.00315 0.00881*** 0.00142 0.00036 
 (-0.01) (-3.66) (-1.52) (-2.75) (-1.27) (-3.52) (-0.38) (-0.11) 
Infrastructure 0.00241 0.000823 0.00708*** 0.00958*** 0.00267 -0.00131 0.0141*** 0.0118*** 
 (-0.88) (-0.44) (-4.25) (-5.87) (-1.12) (-0.31) (-4.66) (-2.74) 
FDI 0.00468*** 0.0111*** 0.0103*** 0.00410*** 0.00274*** 0.0123*** 0.00491*** 0.00734*** 
 (-4.91) (-11.88) (-8.82) (-3.84) (-3.07) (-6.19) (-3.17) (-4.25) 
CONSTANT 0.154*** 0.133*** 0.246*** 0.228*** 0.137*** 0.182*** 0.297*** 0.532*** 
  (-2.81) (-3.95) (-10.83) (-7.45) (-3.93) (-4.44) (-7.1) (-6.34) 
Sargan 0.7969 0.7808 0.8445 0.6967 0.6391 0.5658 0.2929 0.6459 
AR(2) 0.3731 0.2982 0.9276 0.4321 0.3516 0.4451 0.7824 0.1808 
         Observations 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 
Province 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Source: Author’s calculation. Notes: t statistics in parentheses and * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 All right-hand-side variables are expressed in 
Logarithms term. Two-step System GMM estimator are employed in all regressions. Being aware of the potential problem of autocorrelation, 1 lag of 
dependent variable are used for the all eight regressions according to the AR(2) test. The dataset is 5-year averaged over 1980–2010 into 6 groups 
where the sixth group contains 6-year averaged data. 
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 Table 8.15 Alternative panel estimators for Finance and growth, 1980–2010 (Liberalization) 
Dependent variable: GG Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FRI 0.0280**   0.00798    (-2.39)   (-0.68)   LBR  0.00187   0.0182***    (-0.62)   (-5.66)  SRF   -0.0866***   -0.160*** 
   (-3.36)   (-3.55) Lagged real GDP per capita -0.000742 -0.000575 0.00192 -0.0301*** -0.0387*** -0.0125* 
 (-0.18) (-0.15) -0.51 (-4.34) (-5.86) (-1.71) 
Capital 0.0450*** 0.0437*** 0.0512*** 0.0545*** 0.0542*** 0.0520*** 
 (-8.91) (-9.45) (-9.88) (-7.98) (-8.78) (-8.22) 
Education -0.00778** -0.00879** -0.00720** 0.00983* 0.0145*** 0.00896* 
 (-2.15) (-2.57) (-2.07) (-1.89) (-2.86) (-1.8) 
Infrastructure 0.00751*** 0.00757*** 0.00783*** 0.00844 0.0138** 0.0135** 
 (-4.43) (-4.53) (-4.84) (-1.42) (-2.44) (-2.31) 
FDI 0.00488*** 0.00394*** 0.00452*** 0.00540*** -0.000439 0.00519*** 
 (-3.98) (-2.93) (-3.93) (-4.43) (-0.30) (-4.56) 
CONSTANT 0.200*** 0.179*** 0.142*** 0.438*** 0.460*** 0.245*** 
  (-5.73) (-5.24) (-4.26) (-7.53) (-8.41) (-3.54) 
R-squared 0.1782 0.1937 0.2066 0.2142 0.2614 0.2423 
       Observations 752 778 778 752 778 778 
Province 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Source: Author’s calculation. Note: t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. All right-hand-side variables are expressed in 
Logarithms term. For Column 4 through 6, fixed effects estimator were chosen according to Hausman test.
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 8.5.6 Summary 
 
To summarize the empirical findings from the system-GMM panel estimator, it was first 
found that the three traditional financial variables, credit, deposits, and household 
deposits, negatively correlated to the growth of the economy. This means that expansion 
of the financial system might negatively affect overall economic development. However, 
such negative effects decreased over the reform periods, as seen in the relatively smaller 
coefficients captured in the second half of the reform from sub-sample estimations. This 
highlights the effects of financial reform during the post-1995 period, which promoted 
efficiency in allocating resources.  
 
Second, positive DLR and SIR suggest that the positive effects of financial development 
on economic growth are largely through coordinating deposits and loans, and savings 
and investment. From this perspective, China’s financial system has done a good job in 
recourses integration.  
 
Finally, the third set of financial development variables, under Liberalization, shows 
that the effect of overall financial repression, reflected by FRI, is unclear. Furthermore, 
the substitution of loans from budget expenditures in fixed assets investment generated 
positive effects on economic growth. The negative correlation between the share of 
self-raising funds in investment and economic growth suggests that investment funds 
channeled by financial intermediations are relatively still more efficient. 
 
8.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, empirical tests were applied to verify the connection between financial 
 356 
 development and economic development in China. First, the relationship between 
investment efficiency and the scale of investment was tested to capture the possible 
technological progress embodied in the expansion of investment. A significantly 
negative correlation between the TFP growth rate and ICOR, as well as a weak 
connection between the ICOR and the rate of investment, suggests that embodied 
technological progress and induced productivity enhancement during the process of 
capital accumulation has been limited. Next, the correlation between financial 
development and the quantity and quality of investment was tested. It was found that 
the size of the expansion of the financial sector generates negative effects to overall 
investment efficiency, but positive effects for capital formation. 
 
Finally, by using the System GMM method, a provincial-level panel estimator was 
adopted to capture the direct correlation between financial development and economic 
development. It was found that all the Size variables reported negative correlations with 
economic growth in China. This was linked with the findings earlier in this chapter: 
there is a negative correlation between the efficiency of investment and the scale 
expansion of the financial sector. That is to say, through the distortion of investment 
efficiency (allocative inefficiency), scale expansion of the financial sector had negative 
effects on economic growth. On the other hand, it was also found that the major positive 
effects financial development had on economic growth was through coordination of 
deposits and loans, and savings and investment. This implies there were positive effects 
of credit expansion on growth through effectively integrating aggregate supply and 
effective demand. The effects of overall financial repression on growth determination, 
however, remain unclear. By substituting bank loans for state budget expenditures in all 
sources of investment funds, a positive connection between less state intervention in the 
financial sector and greater economic growth can be observed.  
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 Chapter 9  
Conclusion 
 
9.1 Contributions of this thesis 
 
In finance–growth studies, China, the second-largest economy in the world, still 
receives very little attention. Additionally, the literature that does include China largely 
takes the “simple application” approach in investigating the potential relationship 
between financial development and economic development, as happened with the 
theoretical and empirical models developed from mainstream tradition. One crucial 
problem ignored in these studies is whether any preconditions or presumptions based on 
market-based economies are met in China’s mixed economy. Without considering the 
historical features, economic conditions, or other specific facts related to China’s 
economy, outcomes of such studies cannot be complete. For example, as compared with 
purely market-based economies, there remains a high degree of state sector involvement 
in China’s economy. 
 
This thesis argues that without carefully assessing the features embodied in China’s 
economy and financial sector, a “simple application” approach will inevitably have bias 
in any understanding of the evolution of China’s financial reforms and the impact on 
that state’s real sector development.  
 
To overcome these limitations and to capture a comprehensive picture of the features, 
characteristics, and interactions related to economic development and financial reform 
in China since 1978, this thesis goes one step beyond: synthesizing competing 
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 theoretical traditions on the finance–growth nexus. By introducing alternative theories, 
a comparative, analytical framework is constructed that defines China’s financial 
development via different theoretical perspectives, including the 
Keynesian-Schumpeterian view of endogenous credit creation. The linkage mechanisms 
between development of China’s financial sector and the impact on real sector 
development is analyzed by examining and verifying the validity and feasibility of the 
preconditions, assumptions, and channels of how finance affects growth.  
 
The main contribution of this thesis is that it constructs a synthesized framework to 
assess the historical progress, degree of reform, and impact on economic growth and 
financial development in post-1978 China. It examines the applicability of several 
competing theoretical perspectives on the topic of interactive relationships between 
financial development and economic development.  
 
9.2 Summary of the thesis and major findings 
 
“How can an ‘inefficient’ financial system, according to purely commercial criteria, 
successfully support China’s economic development?” This was one question raised in 
Chapter 1. This question, and the others, has been answered throughout this thesis. To 
now deliver a comprehensive conclusion, the preceding chapters are summarized in 
order and the major findings are highlighted.  
 
Chapter 2 contains a detailed survey of the theoretical and empirical literature, and lays 
the foundation and theoretical basis for constructing this thesis’s analytical framework. 
The Keynesian-Schumpeterian view of endogenous credit creation is introduced as an 
alternative to the mainstream finance-growth theory. A review and summary of the 
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 various theoretical models of financial liberalization and financial development includes 
endogenous financial intermediations from the endogenous growth models, from the 
functional view of financial development. Allocative efficiency, according to 
neoclassical doctrine, and productive efficiency, from the Keynesian-Schumpeterian 
tradition of endogenous finance, are explained.  
 
Throughout the analysis, it was found that misconnections between theoretical models 
and empirical studies on the topic of finance-growth nexus has without doubt led to the 
concept and definition of the term “financial development” to become blurred. In early 
theoretical models, under neoliberalism, financial development was usually understood 
to be the same as financial liberalization. The endogenous growth models in the 
neoclassical tradition emphasize the existence of market frictions, that is informational 
asymmetry and transaction costs, and recent mainstream theoretical models indicate an 
improvement in resource allocation efficiency is due to financial development. In 
addition, in the Keynesian-Schumpeterian tradition, financial development is usually 
understood as efficiency in generating loanable financial resources, hence improved 
productive efficiency. However, in the empirical studies, given that efficiency cannot be 
directly observed, measuring financial development largely takes place through 
measuring the level of financial deepening. Some efficiency indicators, however, are 
built on restrictive presumptions that are largely not held in economies that are not 
purely market-based, like China’s. In empirical studies, financial development is treated 
the same as financial deepening.  
 
In most of the literature, no matter whether the concentration is on financial deepening, 
financial liberalization, or improvements in allocative or productive efficiencies, the 
term “financial development” is universally used. This thesis argues that each of the 
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 competing theoretical perspectives accounts for only one dimension of the story of 
financial development. Different theoretical perspectives on financial development do 
share some common settings, but their preconditions and assumptions are far from the 
same. In order to study the real development of China’s financial sector, all dimensions 
must be considered and examined under a unified framework. 
 
In Chapter 3, the focus is on the evolution of China’s financial reforms, which started in 
1978. Given the dominance of banks in China’s financial sector, the analysis focused 
only on banking sector reforms. Emphasizing the importance of the principle of 
gradualism in China’s overall economic transition, the reform process is broken into 
four periods. These periods were created according to the different focus in the reforms. 
It is found that the financial system transformed from a mono-banking system, and that 
the overarching goals of the reforms were marketization, commercialization, and 
internationalization. However, it is also found that through the four periods, the focus of 
the reforms changed over time. In the first two periods, from 1978 to 1994, although a 
multi-tiered banking system was constructed, building the capacity of the financial 
system in facilitating investment was the priority. In the second half of the reform, 1995 
to 2010, the focus shifted to resource allocation efficiency through a process of real 
commercialization. Other features of China’s financial reforms are summarized here. 
First, following the principle of gradualism, each period of concentrated reform was 
followed by a period of adjustment. Second, the pace of the financial reforms largely 
depended upon the pace of reforms in the corporate sector, which means that China’s 
financial reforms followed, rather than led, the real sector. Third, it was only in 1994, 
when corporate sector, especially state-owned enterprises (SOEs), reform speeded up 
that the process of real commercialization and marketization took place in the financial 
sector. While SOE reforms largely released state-owned banks (SOBs) to pursue 
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 profit-oriented targets, adopting market-based criteria in lending standards created 
externalities that induced SOEs to pursue improvements in efficiency and productivity 
of the financial system.  
 
Structural reforms, institutional arrangement—with state input and on-going changes in 
the financial system—took more than 30 years to achieve. In the current phase of 
reform, especially after the IPO of all four SOBs in 2010, focus has shifted to more 
prudential regulations through the adoption of international rules and standards of the 
Basel Banking Supervision Accords.  
 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 revealed not only the theoretical foundation, but also the 
necessity to deliver this thesis’s analysis under a synthesized framework, remaining 
aware of the market-supplanting attributes in both China’s economy and its financial 
sector. 
 
In Chapter 4, financial development is assessed via China’s monetization and financial 
liberalization. In the first part of the chapter, two dimensions of monetization are 
discussed: financial deepening and financial broadening. In the analysis, both the depth 
of the monetization and the structural expansion of the financial system are taken into 
consideration. It was found that, first, over the course of the 30 years of reform, banks 
have always dominated China’s financial sector and the financial markets’ influence has 
remained relatively weak. This implies a high degree of financial broadening of the 
banking sector but a low level for capital markets. Second, although dominance by the 
four SOBs in the market decreased from almost 100% to nearly 50%, there is still a 
high level of state dominance in the banking system. Third, financial deepening in 
China occurred at a high degree and rapid pace, even by international comparison. 
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 Furthermore, this monetary expansion was achieved mainly through the expansion of 
banking credit. In respect to monetization, China’s financial development tended to be 
high. 
 
In the second half of Chapter 4, the financial system is defined via financial 
liberalization. First, financial repression is estimated through real interest rates, 
financial intermediation control, and state influence in bank lending. It is illustrated that 
financial repression was mixed. The influence of state attributes in lending practices 
declined gradually, when measured by the share of total credit extended by SOBs to 
SOEs, while interest rate control and financial intermediation control remained strict. 
Second, for this thesis, a single financial repression index (FRI), created by using the 
principle component analysis (PCA), was developed to illustrate the overarching 
changes of financial repression in post-1978 China. The results show that although 
rapid and significant financial liberalization occurred, the degree of financial repression 
remained relatively high, which means that financial liberalization in China is not 
complete.  
 
To estimate the allocative efficiency of the system, in the first two sections of Chapter 5, 
the validity of using indicators as proxies to assess efficiency is questioned, such as the 
proportion of SOBs’ lending in total bank lending and the proportion of SOEs’ in total 
credit allocations. In doing this, financial performance and productivity between SOEs 
and non-SOEs, and several key performance indicators between SOBs and non-SOBs, 
are examined. The findings include, first, that SOEs’ institutions, productivity, and 
contributions to long-term economic growth exceeded that of non-SOEs, especially after 
the Zhua Da Fang Xiao reform in 1998. At the same time, the financial performance of 
the SOEs became comparable to the non-SOEs. Second, capital adequacy ratio (CAR), 
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 non-performing loans (NPLs), and profitability analyses all suggest the SOBs moved 
into a better financial position starting in 2003, with the introduction of public listing 
reforms. Third, based on the previous two findings, it is argued that it is clearly 
inadequate to estimate allocative efficiency of China’s financial system by emphasizing 
a more efficient non-state sector. Fourth, SOBs’ current lending to SOEs cannot be 
considered inefficient, given that more market-conforming attributes became embodied 
in both SOEs and SOBs.  
 
In the rest of Chapter 5, two alternative methods are used to measure and observe 
allocative efficiency. The first method found a smoother credit growth trend through 
high allocative efficiency, which assumes that the deviation of credit expansion from 
market-clear level is a reflection of allocative inefficiency. The second method 
measured the efficiency of investment via the proxy of incremental capital-out ratio 
(ICOR). Both measurements indicate a process of allocative efficiency over the course 
of the financial reforms.  
 
In Chapters 6 and 7, financial development via interactive relationships between savings 
and investment and then between banking deposits and banking loans are reviewed at 
the macro-level. In Chapter 6, a comprehensive picture of the structure, composition, 
and state attributes lays the foundation for the analysis in Chapter 7. It is found that 
there is an observable decrease in the influence of state attributes from both the supply 
and demand sides of financial resources.  
 
Chapter 7 discusses the synthesis of the allocative efficiency view of financial 
development and the productive efficiency view of finance. This allows for a single 
unified and consistent framework. By approaching the assessment via the 
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 aggregate-level savings–investment balance and deposit–loans balance, two periods, 
pre- and post-1995, were found to represent different interactions of the above two 
efficiencies. Productive efficiency in the pre-1995 period emphasized the function of 
credit creation in the financial system, at a cost of efficiency loss in investment and 
instability in delivering economic growth. Conversely, allocative efficiency received 
greater attention post-1995. Emphasizing the interactions between these two efficiency 
attributes, it is argued that although the financial system generated both efficiencies at 
the same time, policy-makers could emphasize one over the other across time, largely 
determined by the condition of the real economy. 
 
This analysis is further tested via provincial-level panel regressions and the panel error 
correction model (ECM) to draw on cross-regional capital mobility and the inverse 
causal relationship between savings and investment, emphasized by the two efficiencies. 
Two conclusions are drawn from these econometric tests. First, it is found that pre-1995, 
when productive efficiency dominated, can be characterized as a period with more 
effective aggregate supply and effective demand coordination, but less efficient 
resource allocation. For the post-1995 period, when reforms focused on improved 
allocative efficiency, reverse attributes are found. Second, according to the results from 
the panel ECM estimation, a bilateral causal relationship between savings and 
investment, in both short-term dynamics and long-term equilibrium, was found. On the 
one hand these findings verify the feasibility and applicability of both theoretical 
perspectives under the Chinese context; on the other hand, the results suggest a 
complementary, not a strictly substitutive, relationship between allocative and 
productive efficiencies. This shows the existence of potential trade-offs between either 
efficiency. 
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 Additional empirical tests are conducted in Chapter 8, where the roles of capital 
accumulation in China’s economic development, investment efficiency in capital 
accumulation, financial development in investment and investment efficiency, and 
financial development in overall economic growth are tested to verify the analyses in 
this thesis. In the time-series models, it is found, first, that capital accumulation was the 
driving force behind China’s growth performance. However, the embodied 
technological progress and induced productivity enhancements during the process of 
capital accumulation—the expansion of investment—tended to be limited. Second, the 
results suggest a negative correlation between financial development and investment 
efficiency, where financial deepening and financial liberalization measure financial 
development. It is further found that monetary expansion, measured by money supply 
and banking credit provision, generated strong positive effects on capital accumulation. 
However, the effects from financial liberalization, measured by the constructed FRI, 
remained insignificant and limited.  
 
Based on the panel GMM (generalized method of moments) technique, the empirical 
relationship between financial development and economic growth in China is analyzed. 
Three indicators, Size, Intermediation, Liberalization, are used to capture the effects of 
the regressions. It is found that, first, all traditional indicators of the size of financial 
development report negative correlations with economic growth. It is through the 
distortion of investment efficiency, that is allocative inefficiency, that the expansion of 
the scale of the financial sector negatively affects economic growth. Second, the major 
positive effects that financial development had on economic growth is through 
coordination of deposits and loans and of savings and investment. This implies the 
positive effects of credit expansion on growth was through successfully integrating 
aggregate supply and effective demand. Third, the effect of overall financial repression 
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 on growth determination remains unclear. However, the indicator that measures the 
substitution of loans to budgetary expenditure in fixed investment found a positive 
connection between less state intervention in the financial sector and increased 
economic growth.  
 
This thesis assesses the evolving interactions between China’s financial reforms and 
economic development over the past 30 years by examining the applicability and 
feasibility of competing theoretical perspectives under the context of China. Drawing on 
the aspects of monetization, financial liberalization, allocative efficiency in the 
neoclassical doctrine, and productive efficiency in the Keynesian-Schumpeterian view 
of endogenous credit creation, it is argued that, as a transitional economy where strong 
market-supplanting attributes remain, comparing China’s financial development and its 
interactive role with real sector development with pure market criteria leads to certain 
biases. Using the synthesized analytical framework, financial deepening, financial 
liberalization, and the allocative efficiency of finance can only explain some parts of 
China’s financial governance and financial arrangements. Particular functions of the 
financial system—credit creation and related efficiency attributes (productive 
efficiency)—are not accounted for in the three above dimensions. Throughout this 
analysis, substantial evidence is found to illustrate the positive effects on economic 
growth that originated with productive efficiency over financial reform. It is argued that 
it is the complementarity of the productive efficiency with allocative efficiency that 
explains the seemingly confusing phenomenon that an inefficient financial system, 
according to purely commercial criteria, can successfully support China’s economic 
development.  
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 9.3 Limitation of the thesis and prospects for future research 
 
While many of this research’s limitations have been overcome, the results of this study 
can be improved. First, in this study several alternative methodologies are used to study 
the efficiency attributes of China’s financial system. However, by taking a 
financial-only perspective, the outcome of these estimators may be affected and 
explained by factors other than financial development. Therefore, the first suggestion 
for future research is to consider the micro-foundations of these competing theoretical 
perspectives and place them under a unified analytical framework; for example, linking 
microeconomic models in neoclassical endogenous growth doctrine with models from 
the monetary or financial circuit theories in the post-Keynesian school of thought.  
 
In this study, SOBs comprised three policy banks and the four, fully state-controlled 
banks. However, in looking at owners’ equity of joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) 
and city commercial banks (CCBs), it is found that the majority shareholders in these 
banks are still local governments and large SOEs. Being aware of the conflict of 
interests between the central and local governments, as well the conflict of interests 
between the state sector and market criteria, it is argued that the marginal effects of state 
ownership on performances could be important when studying China’s financial 
institutions in different forms. Furthermore, the share of state ownership in financial 
institutions is not the same as the share of state influence. Therefore, a second 
suggestion for future research is to consider a more detailed classification of state 
influence when analyzing China’s financial institutions, so as to distinguish the 
differences among state influences, for example, how to quantify the insurance effects 
from the state government or how to quantify the actual equity share of the state in total 
owners’ equity in financial institutions.  
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Also in this study, only the conflict of interests between the central and local 
governments is considered. It can be argued that conflicts of interests among different 
bodies of the central government exist throughout the financial reforms. That is to say, 
the interests of the fiscal department (the Ministry of Finance), the monetary authority 
(the People’s Banks of China), and the regulatory bodies (China Banking Regulatory 
Commission, China Securities Regulatory Commission, and China Insurance 
Regulatory Commission) could be largely different. To a certain degree, the actual 
reform path of China’s financial sector could be the result of a compromise among these 
organizations (see Shih, 2008; Bell & Feng, 2013). Given this possibility, the third and 
the final suggestion for future research is to construct a more comprehensive analytical 
framework, with the consideration of the conflicting interests among different state and 
non-state bodies that involved in China’s economic and financial reform.  
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